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## Beyond the National Interest

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despotic power on the ruins of republican freedom. Studying this checkered past with care, both Niccolò Machiavelli (whom some see as the founder of realism) and Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu (who could be considered a founder of liberal internationalism), sought ways to combine the security advantages of large empires with the freedom (from military rule especially) of healthy republics.

What practical use might this mixed success of republican security theory be today? Clearly, it lies at the origins of the two grandest experiments in international cooperation of the twentieth century—the League of Nations and the United Nations. Rather than view the less-than-complete success, and sometimes patent failure, of either as proof that republican security theory has reached a point of diminishing returns, Deudney concludes with an analysis of how early experiments in nuclear arms control might suggest ways to apply republican security theory to avoid the danger of nuclear violence while preserving individual freedom. In this respect, Deudney appears to have more in common with contemporary liberal internationalists than with today's realists, but he has no patience with charges that his project is utopian. It has worked in the past, and it continues to work in the American union. With enough intelligence and determination, he argues, it might be the only practicable solution to the global problems of this century, which no single state can address on its own. In making this claim, Deudney has gone, like the starship *Enterprise* (which served a federation of republics!) where few today have gone before, to help found a new discipline, one that might be called

“world political theory.” At a time when U.S. maritime strategy has become ever more concerned with the security of the global system, this is a book that thoughtful strategists will need to read again and again.

KARL WALLING  
*Naval War College*



Coicaud, Jean-Marc. *Beyond the National Interest*. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007. 297pp. \$19.95

It should come as little surprise that Jean-Marc Coicaud, a noted French scholar with extensive experience at the United Nations, sees the need for a fundamental change in the way the international system addresses its most pressing security problems. He bemoans the fact that “narrow national interests” have made prompt, effective multilateral peacekeeping interventions on behalf of humanitarian needs very difficult. In his *Beyond the National Interest* he offers prescriptions to alleviate this situation.

This short book covers in some detail the history of international humanitarian interventions since the 1990s, in search of trends and lessons learned. The author conveys a sense of optimism that the end of the Cold War presented a perfect opportunity for universal human values to displace traditional values according to which sovereignty was sacrosanct and nation-states responded only to direct external threat. He optimistically proclaims that NATO was moving forward progressively in this direction.

Unfortunately, his detailed historical examples consistently belie this

optimism, as some protagonist (normally the United States) always allows its conduct to be driven by the atavistic notions of sovereignty and physical security. In fact, the United States (particularly the last Bush administration) comes out as the book's principal villain, although the Clinton administration also takes its hits. Owing to its superpower status, the United States is directly involved in every incident in which humanitarian intervention is a possible course of action, and its responses never meet the author's high standards.

While Coicaud's facts and historical analysis are correct and fundamentally sound, a reader might get the impression that it is only a matter of time before the entire world is persuaded to see the *responsibility to protect*—the international community sending in forces to protect the citizens of an offending country—much as an enlightened European does now. I am certain that Coicaud is buoyed by the advent of the Obama administration in hopes that the United States will eventually join in this enlightenment. Unfortunately, his optimism is probably misplaced, for two reasons. First, none of today's emergent powers (China, Russia, India, or Brazil) have been proponents of what the author calls "conditional" sovereignty. If anything, they hold dearly their sovereignty and support this right for other nation-states. The second point forces us to focus on the title of the book.

That is, national interest is the real culprit. As long as nations constitute the world's central cast, there is little likelihood that it will achieve Coicaud's idealistic standards. Even his recommendations to strengthen the United

Nation's peace-enforcement and humanitarian roles are largely bureaucratic and peripheral, suggesting that the author is also aware of the fundamental resistance. As long as the UN remains nationally based, the likelihood that its members will be driven by "supranational" interests will be slim. Indeed, simply getting *beyond* the national interest is not enough. The international community must adopt *supranational* interests or it will forever be hampered by the primacy of "security issues" and "self-centered nationalism," which, unfortunately for Coicaud, is likely to be a long time coming.

Although a welcome addition to those advocating for the rights of individuals over those of nation-states, the book unfortunately fails to deal meaningfully with the real obstacles to the ideal. Further, since much of this book is a diatribe against the Bush administration, its salience is increasingly historical.

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Cohen, William A. *A Class with Drucker: The Lost Lessons of the World's Greatest Management Teacher*. New York: AMACOM, 2008. 248pp. \$24.95

Krames, Jeffrey A. *Inside Drucker's Brain*. New York: Penguin, 2008. 257pp. \$24.95

Peter Drucker, considered the father of modern management, died in 2005 at the age of ninety-five. For six decades he consulted with industry and government leaders and taught at New York University and the Claremont Graduate School of Management, publishing thirty-nine books, including one on