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Great Strategic Rivalries: From the Classical World to the Cold War

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Edited by James Lacey of the Marine Corps War College, this collection’s sixteen essays explore prolonged strategic rivalries, beginning with Athens, Sparta, and the Peloponnesian War, and ending with the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. Each essay explores a rivalry’s nature and causes, the reasons it endured, how it ended, and its legacy. While some revisit well-trodden ground, such as Paul A. Rahe’s discussion of the Peloponnesian War, others offer interesting new insights. Sally Paine’s analysis of the three-sided struggle among China, Japan, and Russia for regional dominance highlights the importance of developing civic and economic institutions to support military power, conducting long-term planning, securing allies, and focusing on the right enemies. Nineteenth-century China failed to do any of these, and reaped the consequences in a succession of military defeats and “unequal treaties.” Chinese leaders went to war with Britain and France—distant powers that posed little threat to China—instead of focusing on nearby and more dangerous Russia.

Kathleen M. Burk’s impressive essay on Great Britain and the United States illuminates a multifaceted rivalry that involved both cooperation and competition and was often more commercial than military. Its slow, peaceful end in the twentieth century made it particularly unusual, as British leaders urged the United States to assume primary responsibility for regions critical to British security.

In contrast, Christine Shaw’s analysis of Genoa and Venice demonstrates that commercial rivalries can be quite bloody, involving not only conventional military operations but raids on trade quarters in foreign ports and piracy. Despite their bitter rivalry, Genoa and Venice too sometimes fought the same enemies, as when both joined the Holy League to fight the Ottomans.

Kenneth W. Harl’s analysis of the long rivalry between Rome and the Parthians and Persians underlines geography’s enduring influence. Defeat of one enemy can pave the way for a new, more powerful one, such as Sassanid Persia. The Ottoman Turks, in turn, inherited Byzantium and Rome’s rivalry with Persia, and faced the same strategic problem of securing borders and waging war in an arid region.

Kelly R. DeVries explores the role of secondary powers in these rivalries by examining Anglo-French rivalry during the Middle Ages. Maintaining the wool trade required English rulers to support rebellions and wars by the Low Countries against France, the Holy Roman Empire, and Spain. Similarly, English campaigning focused on securing and defending the port of Calais so England could control both ends of the wool trade. Hoping to weaken England, Scotland and Wales aided France.

Matt Schumann and Michael V. Leggiere cover the later stages of the Anglo-French rivalry, in which Britain prevailed owing to superior economic and maritime power, though not without committing substantial troops to fight on the European continent. Like DeVries, both authors adroitly blend discussions of military and economic factors. Leggiere’s cost-benefit analysis of Napoleon’s Continental System
and its effect on global trade is particularly thorough and well argued.

Troubled by distance, information overload, and numerous local rivals to their scattered holdings, the Hapsburgs, Geoffrey Parker notes, were almost always at war, often in different places against different enemies. Their empire’s status as the leading Catholic power further complicated the strategic situation and influenced important strategic decisions. Despite the logistical and operational problems the Spanish Armada faced, Philip II believed that divine favor would bring it victory against England. Religion often proved less an obstacle to the Hapsburgs’ rivals, as demonstrated by France’s alliance with the Ottoman Empire, which Andrew Wheatcroft’s essay details.

Geoffrey Wawro, Williamson Murray, William M. Morgan, Robert M. Citino, and James H. Anderson, respectively, explore more-recent rivalries: France versus Germany, Britain versus Germany, the United States versus Japan, Germany versus Russia, and the United States versus the Soviet Union. Citino places the Nazi-Soviet pact in the historical context of earlier partitions of Poland and argues that “German-Russian strategic rivalry was the real and proximate cause of World War I” (p. 465).

Lacey’s introduction ties the essays together and highlights their commonalities, such as the economic and financial systems needed to support protracted rivalries. Rivalries often begin and end with shocks to the international system, such as the rise of new powers or the collapse of old ones; examples include the Athenian-Spartan rivalry that arose after the Persian threat to Greece receded and the long-standing Anglo-French rivalry that ended when Germany arose as a new threat to both nations. Fear, honor, and interest—categories introduced by Thucydides in his history of the Peloponnesian War—cause rivalries to endure.

Strategic rivalry is a topic worthy of more research, particularly since, as Lacey notes, disputes between enduring rivals are twice as likely to lead to war as disputes between nations without a history of rivalry. The breadth and depth of this book’s essays make it an excellent choice for a course text.

STEPHEN K. STEIN


George Orwell and Winston S. Churchill do not strike us as two men whose surnames would share a dust jacket. One only has to look at David Levine’s clever caricatures in the New York Review of Books for two entirely different men to appear: Orwell the rustic, in tweeds, chewing on a piece of hay; and Churchill, clad in coronation robes, the king of his own dominion. Yet Thomas Ricks, a journalist formerly at the Washington Post, has written an interesting book, a dual biography of sorts that claims that the men had much in common as they fought fascism and Communism, two of the greatest evils of the twentieth century.

Ricks focuses on the “fulcrum” years of Orwell’s and Churchill’s lives—the 1930s and 1940s. And this is just as well, because if they had died before 1940 they would be remembered little today, if at all. A sniper’s bullet almost