

SOME PERSPECTIVES ON REVOLUTION

Thomas B. Grassey

For many years people in the United States argued that the outcome of the Vietnam conflict would have critical implications for the future of freedom everywhere. The familiar argument ran: If the Communists were victorious, Western security would be weakened; but if the Communists were defeated in Vietnam, we would have met "The Third Challenge," "Wars of Liberation," and convinced the enemy that he could not succeed in world conquest by proxy.

The insurgency in Vietnam finally has reached its conclusion. Perhaps now, more than a decade after American combat units were introduced to help a friendly government deal with an externally supported insurgency and 3 years after those forces were withdrawn

under "peace with honor," it is possible to see why our counterinsurgency effort failed.

The paragraph has an odd ring to it. There is something strange—and in that strangeness we may find at least part of the answer to the question, "Why did our counterinsurgency efforts fail?" Try reading the paragraph again, substituting *revolution* for *insurgency* and *counter-revolutionary* for *counterinsurgency*.

What I wish to examine, therefore, is not Vietnam but the fundamental conceptual errors of which Vietnam was merely a symptom. For if we misconceived the situation, our loss might not be as ominous as we had feared; if, however, our misconceptions contributed to or even caused our failure, we must correct them before they are repeated.

How we define situations, what labels we attach to realities, which words we use in thinking about the

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problems we face greatly influence our judgments and behavior. If we are bewitched by false labels, we will make bad decisions. And one of the most disastrous false labels currently in our national vocabulary is "counterinsurgency." Of course, it is not an *accidental* false label; Americans are deeply opposed to being "counterrevolutionaries." So we almost invented this odd word and deliberately applied it even to places where it was wildly inappropriate (the "meat and potatoes" cases of our counterinsurgency courses have been Vietnam, China, Cuba, Algeria and Malaya). Unwilling to think about "counterrevolution," we labeled all our activities "counterinsurgency" and became literally unable to discriminate between an insurgency and a revolution. It is time to recall that distinction.

"Insurgency," a word used mostly in international law, is defined as "a revolt against a government, not reaching the proportion of an organized revolution, and not recognized as belligerency." Since "insurgency" is defined relative to revolution, what is a revolution?

A revolution may be distinguished from a coup d'état, foreign invasion, military seizure of power, rebellion, and insurgency by several indicators. The most obvious is that a revolution has sizable (though not always majority) organized popular support. It aims at a redistribution of political power, although social, economic and cultural changes may accompany this shift. It usually involves violence; some writers (including Frantz Fanon, Régis Debray and Karl Marx) consider violence *essential* to a revolution, but they confuse a usually necessary tactic with a definition of the goal. "Nonviolent revolution" is not a contradiction in terms: Gandhi led one such revolution in India, and Lenin surprised himself by coming close to a nonviolent Bolshevik revolution in Russia. However, revolutionary activities must be illegal or the changes in society, no matter how radical, will

be the results of a constitutional process (Hitler's 1933 accession to power) or a successful reform movement (U.S. women's suffrage). The truly essential element in revolution is the rejection of governmental legitimacy: the deliberate and explicit denial of the government's right to enforce its rules and laws. So a revolution is an organized, popularly based attempt to alter radically the existing political structure, usually by violent and always by illegal means.

Of all the myths about revolutions, the most prominent American misconception is that their cause is material deprivation—poverty, hunger, bad health and overcrowding. History does not support such a thesis, but instead offers notable exceptions. In 1958 Cuba had a large middle class and one of the highest per capita incomes in Latin America. It should have been one of the least likely candidates for revolution in the Western Hemisphere if the "deprivation" thesis were true. Although grinding poverty is endemic to India, that country has not experienced a revolution since achieving independence. The Poles and Hungarians had incipient revolutions in 1956 although they enjoyed higher standards of living than their quiescent bloc neighbors. Historians agree that the American Revolution did not result from material want. It is true that poverty is a prominent feature of most societies facing revolution; but the difference between correlation and causation is one which we Americans persistently ignore in justifying foreign aid, planning military civic action programs, sponsoring the Peace Corps, and studying revolution.

Curiously, the notion that material deprivation causes revolution is purely Marxian. Marx thought his great "discovery" was that economics determines the structure and processes of every society.

The general conclusion at which I arrived . . . may be briefly summed up as follows: In the

social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations constitutes the economic structure of society—the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness. At a certain stage . . . the material forces of production in society come into conflict with the . . . property relations within which they had been at work before . . . Then comes the period of social revolution.¹

Marx believed that, by its very nature, capitalism must lead to greater and greater disparity between the rich few and the impoverished masses, with worse and worse material exploitation of the laboring class. Finally, and inevitably, the oppressed will rise in revolution against the world's rich to abolish private property and establish the classless, Communist society. Although Americans often accept and promulgate this strictly Marxist idea that poverty, hunger and bad living conditions cause revolutions, the fact is they do not. Conversely, despite our national preoccupation with material wealth, revolutions cannot be prevented merely with better food, housing, clothing and health care. Marx was wrong, and so is this American myth of what causes (or prevents) revolution.

Some social scientists (e.g.,

Durkheim, Lasswell), after considerable research, have concluded that the cause of revolution is *frustration*. We encounter graphs and tabular charts, "curves of rising expectations," measures of individual discontent and social anomie, and useful or obscure theories of cohesion and social breakdown. Brian Crozier begins his book:

Frustration is the one element common to all rebels, whatever their aims, political ideals or social backgrounds . . . What, then, is frustration? For my purpose, it is simply the inability to do something one badly wants to do, through circumstances beyond one's control.²

One may readily agree that a revolutionary is frustrated, but this is not a markedly useful distinction since almost all human beings are in various ways frustrated. Moreover, many of these theories are simplistic blanket notions that barely cover the heroic dedication one finds among revolutionaries. John Paul Jones' crew, Washington's Valley Forge army, and Nathan Hale were "frustrated." Algerians who were brutally tortured by French paratroopers resisted because of "the disparity between goal visualization and goal achievement." Ho Chi Minh was a revolutionary for 60 years because he experienced severe social anomie, and so forth. Since social scientists are reluctant to make implicit value judgments by using words like "good," "bad," "right," and "wrong" (a scientist "observes facts," he does not "make moral judgments"), and due to our own preoccupation with material wealth, we have all but forgotten the classical political theory upon which America was built.

"The masses of men make revolution," Aristotle wrote, "under the idea that they are unjustly treated."³ Justice, for Aristotle, consisted of treating equals alike and unequals differently, but in proportion to their relevant

differences. This supports the idea that all men are equal in a fundamental sense (the right to be treated justly), yet it allows for dissimilar treatment based on inequalities among men. We are not obliged to hold that justice requires treating everyone alike, so that all of us must receive identical amounts of food, clothing, housing, education, entertainment and honors. But we are required to show that some relevant difference between persons justifies the privileges, benefits and burdens each is assigned. Thus a ship's captain is entitled to treatment different than a deckhand's because of the difference in responsibilities. Even so, this is always proportional, and there are limits beyond which the captain-deckhand differentiation cannot be presumed to justify extreme disparities in treatment.

If "the masses of men make revolution under the idea that they are unjustly treated," the key question is: What do men think is unjust? For injustice is not a natural phenomenon like rainfall or difference in height; it is a human concept, dependent for its existence on value judgments made by individuals. Feudal serfs who believed that God made some men to be poor, cold, hungry serfs and other men to be rich, warm, well-fed lords saw no injustice in their situation. Despite being miserable themselves, and aware of their baron's luxuries, they did not revolt. Our modern world has parallels: with a long Brahmin-Parish caste heritage, Indian society has tended to accept as just great inequalities in the treatment of people. Mao Tse-tung wrote that his biggest problem in 1928 was getting the peasants to realize that something was *wrong* with Chinese society, that something better was feasible. Fidel Castro's main support came not from the peasants but the educated and middle class—those who were materially comfortable but who felt unjustly excluded from a genuine political process.

A revolutionary situation exists when

people feel unjustly treated to a severe degree, and not because of poverty, frustration or even glaring social inequalities. John Adams understood this point. He knew that the American struggle was not really over taxes or the king's policies or various acts of Parliament. The issue was sovereignty, the right in justice of a people to govern themselves, and Adams wrote:

The Revolution was effected before the war commenced. The Revolution was in the hearts and minds of the people . . . *This radical change in the principles, opinions, sentiments and affections of the people, was the real American Revolution.*⁴ [His emphasis.]

Another myth which we Americans have incorporated in our current view of revolution is that of the outside agitator. It is true that a revolution requires leadership and organization. Someone must think "this is unjust"; someone must propagandize to convince others that there is an attractive and attainable alternative to the present-felt injustice; and someone must be willing to break laws, engage in violence, and risk his own safety and security to oppose the "oppressor." These roles of thinker, propagandist, and activist define revolutionary leadership; they may be filled by one man (Lenin) or several (Jefferson, Paine, Washington). But because leadership is necessary for a revolution, many people mistakenly believe that it is sufficient to cause a revolution. This is tantamount to arguing that because oxygen is necessary for a fire, the presence of oxygen will cause a fire. Common views found in much of our counterinsurgency literature and attitudes are that Lenin, Ho, Fidel, or Mao and a small band of conspirators succeeded in their efforts without genuine popular support; that ignorant people were duped; that a small faction compelled reluctant support through mass terror; or that a skilled propagandist

whipped a minor gripe into an unwarranted revolutionary issue.

The commonly ignored point is that no revolution can succeed without at least the passive support of a sizable segment of the population, support which the revolutionaries can gain only through governmental indifference, stupidity or callousness. Considering the resource imbalance between an established government and a nascent revolutionary movement, the vulnerability of conspirators, the isolation of urban and rural guerrillas, and the inherent tendencies of people to obey the law and oppose radical change ("All Experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while Evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the Forms to which they are accustomed"⁵), it is surprising that revolutions occur at all. Yet throughout history we have heard the weary refrain of privileged groups denying the reality and legitimacy of anger among the less fortunate. Plato and Cicero reported it, and it may be found prominently in the English Civil War debates and British colonial empire discussions, as well as in the literature defending American slavery. More recently we have heard the denial of any genuine problem, the same automatic response—"outside agitators"—to civil rights protests, student campus violence, urban ghetto riots, and military race relations conflicts.

The myth of the outside agitator is an understandable and very human response, because those who are privileged cannot easily appreciate that many people really are terribly angry about the way the world is. It is difficult to see a situation as unjust unless one is the victim. Consequently, those who are privileged tend to deny that there is injustice and blame the turmoil on "outside agitators." Thus, in 1857, George Fitzhugh wrote:

We warn the North that every one of the leading abolitionists is agitating the negro slavery

question merely as a means to attain their ulterior ends . . . a surrender to Socialism and Communism—to no private property, no church, no law; to free love, free lands, free women and free children.⁶

That sad blindness of the South's leading apologist for slavery existed, ironically, six years after Friedrich Engels had naively claimed (in the *New York Daily Tribune*):

The times of that superstition which attributed revolutions to the ill will of a few agitators have long passed away. Everyone knows nowadays that wherever there is a revolutionary convulsion, there must be some social want in the background which is prevented by outworn institutions from satisfying itself.⁷

If "outside agitators" are not blamed for causing revolutions, "ignorance" is. But as Ted Gurr has noted about this explanation:

Man's resort to political violence is in part unreasoning, but does not occur without reason. Ignorance is almost always among its causes: sometimes ignorance of its consequences by those who resort to it, *more often* ignorance by those who create and maintain the social conditions that inspire it.⁸

So what we see in the myth of the outside agitator is an attempt by the fortunate to explain away the anger of those crying "injustice!" by attributing it to external provocateurs and ignorance. Woodrow Wilson recognized and eloquently criticized such self-delusion:

Men do not start revolutions in a sudden passion . . . Revolutions do not spring up overnight. Revolutions come from the long suppression of the human spirit. Revolutions come because men know that they have rights and that they are disregarded.⁹

Support of the people is the central theme of every revolutionary leader and theoretician. It is obvious from even the most casual perusal of revolutionary literature or history that the majority of the people must at least passively accept the revolutionaries' activities. Trotsky learned this in abortive Bolshevik attempts to "inspire" revolutions in Berlin, Munich, Hungary, Hamburg, Bulgaria and Estonia; "Permanent Revolution" was abandoned. Lin Piao renounced Chinese initiation of revolution in other nations, saying:

The liberation of the masses is accomplished by the masses themselves—this is a basic principle of Marxism-Leninism. Revolution or people's war in any country is the business of the masses in that country and should be carried out primarily by their own efforts; there is no other way . . . Foreign aid can play only a supplementary role.¹⁰

Che Guevara, Cuba's Trotsky who thought that with 50 men he could wage a successful revolution anywhere in Latin America, brilliantly diagnosed his own failure:

Where a government has come into power through some popular vote, fraudulent or not, and maintains at least an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted since the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted . . . This is clearly seen by considering the case of bandit gangs. They have all the characteristics of a guerrilla army . . . The only thing missing is *support of the people*; and, inevitably, those gangs are captured and exterminated.¹¹

A third myth in our American approach to revolution is the myth of the military victory. Because governments tend to deny the strength, legitimacy and even the existence of revolutionary

movements, they postpone reaction until the situation has grown quite serious. Then military forces are assigned to "solve the problem." Admiral Zumwalt told a 1974 Tufts University audience that as a rear admiral in 1963 he had written that "our national interest would not be served by becoming militarily involved" in Vietnam; his report, he said, was overruled by a Pentagon civilian, Dr. Daniel Ellsberg.¹² If there is any hope at all for the military commander to accomplish his mission, he must remember the two preceding myths and seek a governmental response to the *causes* (the perceived injustices) even more than to the *symptoms* (violence, political terrorism) of the revolution. Military professional training inculcates an aggressive, "can do," result-oriented attitude, with "results" almost inevitably thought of as quantifiable. Performance tends to be judged on things we can count: patrols, arrests, raids, "pacified hamlets," and casualties. Meaningless rules-of-thumb, like "10:1 (or 15:1) is the magic troops: guerrillas ratio for victory," acquire holy auras. It is imperative that the commander and his subordinates appreciate how little these numbers may correlate with mission accomplishment. No matter how good the numbers look, the revolution may be succeeding. "My feeling," said Marine Corps Commandant Wallace M. Greene in 1966, "is that you could kill every Vietcong and North Vietnamese in South Vietnam and still lose the war."¹³ Strictly speaking, armed force is only a temporary shoring device which may briefly reestablish social order in a time of tumult; it offers the government one last chance to alleviate the grievances fueling the revolution. It is not, *per se*, a solution.

The heart of the revolutionaries' claim is that they are *right*, not that they are *stronger*; a successful military occupation proves nothing against that conviction. If men feel unjustly treated, military patrols, curfews, and searches

(no matter how polite) will not change their opinion. In fact, such measures themselves lend plausibility to revolutionary propaganda that the government is hostile to and oppressive of the people's rights and welfare. Indeed, a prime ambition of many revolutionaries is to provoke a harsh military crackdown; it bolsters their claims that the unjust government will resist by force of arms any peaceful reform attempt, so a violent revolution is necessary. The paradigm of a military success/political catastrophe was General Massu's ruthless and complete annihilation of every known member of the Algerian FLN leadership by use of martial law, torture and counter-terrorism. Many Algerians consider Massu's military "success" in the Casbah the point when their revolution for independence became irreversible because an amicable political settlement had been made impossible. Short of genocide, there is no military solution to a revolutionary situation because a revolution is a contest of ideas rather than arms, of justice and allegiance rather than firepower and body counts. We forget these points again at our own peril.

The world's population is today approximately 4 billion people. Overall, the growth rate is about 2 percent *per annum*. Each day, therefore, there are nearly 200,000 more human beings alive than there were the day before; every passing *second* adds two and a quarter persons. This is not births, but births minus deaths, or net growth. In the time it would take a nuclear task force to sail from the United States to the Persian Gulf—2 weeks or so at a 30-knot speed of advance—the world's population would have increased by 3 million people. That is roughly equivalent to the population of Honduras, Ireland, Israel, Laos, Lebanon, New Zealand, Somalia or Uruguay added to the world during transit. If present population trends continue, there will

be twice as many people on the planet in 2006 as there were in 1973.

A second consideration: The wealth of the world is unevenly distributed. Fewer than a quarter of the world's inhabitants possess three-quarters of the riches. Two-thirds of the people live in "underdeveloped countries"; their children under the age of 15 equal in number the entire populations of the world's developed nations. And the gap between rich and poor is opening, not closing. A decade ago our per capita income was nearly \$3,000 while the World Bank classified 38 countries "very poor" with per capita incomes below \$100. Discounting inflation "growth," our real per capita income is projected to reach \$4,500 by the end of the century; the very poor nations will reach \$160.

Third in importance to population and the distribution of wealth is the continuing worldwide tendency to urbanize, Westernize, and communicate. By living in or near a large city, by viewing a movie or the village television, more and more people of the world are seeing glimpses of how others live and of what they themselves do not have. This is much too meager to be called "education" about other lands—even "awareness" may overstate the case—but it is a glimpse, an image, an impression.

If these trends of population growth, economics, and increased communication of images continue, there will be greater and greater known disparity between the world's rich and poor. "The wretched of the earth" (as Fanon called them), increasing in number three times as fast as the world's comfortable people, more and more will be seeing glimpses of what they do not have. Inevitably, they will recognize the difference between what life is like for the fortunate and what it is like for them and their children. And *they will call it unjust.*

So, if Aristotle was right that the

masses of men make revolution under the idea that they are unjustly treated, the world must seem to be on the verge of a profound revolution. The remainder of this century promises great political instability in the world, numerous periods of tension among nations about questions of justice, and frequent temptations to use naval or military force to achieve national objectives. Standing behind our nation's actions will be an implicit proclamation of what we, as a people, value. Particularly important, how the United States perceives and reacts to revolution will be largely shaped by, and will directly affect, those in uniform today.

I think we should reexamine the prevalent belief that the world struggle is between communism and capitalism, with the Communists engaged in an international effort against capitalist societies. Not since Trotsky's failures has the Communist Party been truly international. Lenin abandoned Turkish and Persian Communists in courting both Ataturk and the Shah for border adjustments. The Korean and Indonesian parties were expelled from the Comintern in 1927 for unauthorized revolutionary efforts. Stalin directed the Chinese Communists to work with Chiang in 1925, which led to Chiang's liquidation of most of the CCP leadership. (Mao and Chou barely escaped "the great headhunt"—Mao's first wife did not.) In 1936 Stalin told the Spanish Communists to forget revolution and to side with the Republicans. The German and Polish Communist parties were sacrificed for the 1939 Ribbentrop Pact. After the war, Stalin directed the French Communists to support de Gaulle, the Italians to accept Badoglio (despite a strong partisan base for revolution), Tito to agree to a restoration of the Yugoslav monarchy, and Mao to form a coalition with Chiang. The French Communists enraged Ho Chi Minh by opposing independence for

Indochina during the 1946 elections.

In fact, the Soviets did very little for the Chinese, Algerian, or Cuban revolutionaries during their wars. Greek Communists had to rely, uneasily, on Yugoslav aid because Stalin gave them virtually no help. The Cuban Communist Party had a comfortable *modus vivendi* with Batista, and when Castro called a 1958 general strike, the Communist-controlled unions ignored it. Indeed, the Cuban Communist Party had no formal contact with Castro's army until a few months before Batista fled.

Among non-Communist countries, the Soviet Union has given the greatest amounts of aid to Egypt, Syria, Iraq, India and Indonesia. In every one of these nations, the Communist Party was at one time or is now illegal and party members have been jailed or executed. Such prohibitions and prosecutions have not necessarily affected the flow of aid. Also, on the whole, Chinese and other Communist regimes have given relatively little aid to fellow Communist revolutionaries. Finally, Sino-Soviet border battles, support of opposing factions in Angola, and counteracting policies in the Indo-Pakistani conflict, are glaring contradictions to the idea of a "United Communist Movement."

The upshot of all this is that "an international solidarity of Communists" simply does not exist. That concept fails to explain Soviet or Chinese foreign policy with any rational consistency. *National self-interest*, however, does adequately and coherently account for Soviet and Chinese decisions; greater attention should be paid to national priorities than to ideological purity. It was neither Dean Acheson nor Dean Rusk who warned, "The policy of Russia is changeless . . . Its methods, its tactics, its maneuvers may change, but the polar star of its policy—world domination—is a fixed star." Karl Marx made that observation more than a century ago;¹⁴ he was, obviously, not always wrong.

The Russians have noticed that of the seven nations which have become Communist without Red Army "help," three—China, Albania and Yugoslavia—have proved very unreliable "allies." (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are uncertain; only Cuba seems steady.) They are further annoyed by the fickleness of aid recipients such as Egypt, Ghana, Syria and Indonesia. The obvious conclusion is that *military conquest* is the fail-proof method of gaining reliable control of a strategically important area. While land-bound border expansion in several directions still may be attractive to Soviet planners, the new vistas opened by a powerful Soviet Navy appear at least as dangerous to the West. If a Communist revolution were to develop in an area of great value to the Russians, they might attempt to land and sustain a support force—a contingency the U.S. Navy might be tasked with preventing.¹⁵ Our particular concern, then, is not with Communist revolutions *per se*, but rather with Soviet military intervention and usurpation of a revolution for her own national interest.

It also is important to note that our "counterinsurgency" attitude stems from a colossal feat of political legerdemain. At the 1961 World Communist Congress, Nikita Khrushchev unilaterally declared that all "Third World people's wars" were in the interests of, and would be supported by, communism. Two weeks later when John F. Kennedy became President, Khrushchev's premise was swallowed whole: Roger Hilsman, Walt Rostow and Maxwell Taylor launched us into the Green Beret Counterinsurgency era. (Years later, David Halberstam would write, very high Soviet officials told their American counterparts that it was all a misunderstanding, that the talk was aimed at the Chinese for propaganda and rhetoric purposes.¹⁶) Misunderstanding or not, our reaction was a mistake, for it simply is not true that all

Third World revolutionary activity is beneficial to the Russians or Chinese. Much of it reflects legitimate aspirations of people to achieve domestic justice by overthrowing colonial, racist or oligarchical tyrannies.

Our "counterinsurgency" attitude often has caused, tragically, what it was intended to prevent—the growth of anti-Americanism. "Neocolonialism," for instance, essentially is the accusation that American foreign policy is predominantly guided by economic self-interest, that we support repressive regimes to protect our overseas investments. The use of bribes and kickbacks by American corporations; diplomatic and military backing of dictatorships in return for base rights; CIA interference in other nations' political processes; the "destabilization" of democratically chosen governments which threaten American investments; attempted "prejudicial terminations" of various foreign leaders; police, army and intelligence "advisors" to help tyrannical but pro-Western governments frustrate popular uprisings; and covert or overt (as in Santo Domingo) American military interventions have been argued to be the rule rather than the exception in our foreign relations. While a free enterprise economic system may prove the best way to try to meet the world's burgeoning population needs, it would be foolish to deny that there has been economic exploitation of the lesser developed nations and that the central injustice in most Third World countries today is a grossly inequitable distribution of wealth, for whatever reason. Revolutionary movements quite naturally will be directed against that injustice; and, not uncommonly, U.S. overseas presence and investments will be labeled "colonialist." Further, the fact that they are living in misery while we experience unprecedented luxury strikes many of the world's poor as unjust. To them, free enterprise seems a license to exploit. But for us to call all

these revolutions "Communist insurgencies" is to make them what they need not be.

Western political theory holds that the purpose of business is profit, the purpose of government is justice, and *the two are not the same*. Marxists deny this; they contend that government is merely an instrument of exploitative class oppression. Thus, Marx's grand challenge was his claim that the rich of the world can only try to become even richer. Capitalists may talk about peace, freedom and justice, he said—they may even throw the oppressed some meager sops to ease their own consciences—but the truth of their actions belies their protestations: they are economically enslaved to place property ahead of justice, gain ahead of rights, material goods ahead of human dignity. According to Marx, all political decisions, democratic notions, lofty declarations of brotherhood, even religious and moral principles are subordinate to fundamental greed. The rich never will voluntarily give up their privileges, never peacefully consent to the reallocation of wealth which justice requires—this can be achieved only by violent revolution. Hence, the *Manifesto* concludes that Communist ends "can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Workers of the world, unite!"¹⁷

The world's poor, growing in number and feeling unjustly treated, will surely hear Marx's claim. We, the world's rich growing richer, must answer it. What do we stand for? How will we use our power? What do Americans value—liberty, or our standard of living? What goals do our armed forces serve—justice, or profit and privilege?

Because the Defense Department plays so significant a role in shaping our foreign policy, considerable astuteness is

required of military leaders. Short-term expedience must be carefully weighed with attention to our long-term national values. Policies that imply Marx's economic determinism will have to be balanced against our heritage from Jefferson and Lincoln. While there always have been evil men who would impose their Auschwitzes and Gulags worldwide unless deterred by brave men in arms, there also are other, more subtle, crimes against humanity—surfeit in a sea of want, ethnic and religious domination, various political exclusions—which now are awakening revolutions. Those who feel such injustices will judge the United States by how our armed forces are used; so it will not be enough to oppose the Gulags and proclaim "freedom and liberty" if we support oligarchies, dictatorial juntas, and "pro-Western" tyrannies against revolution. But all too often, "counterinsurgency" has meant just that.

Military leaders must be more attentive, then, to the causes of revolution, the limited relevance of military power to deal with an essentially political struggle, and the implications of American support to governments facing revolution. They also should be aware that 90 percent of mankind is non-White. Africans, Asians and Latin Americans—the whole Third World—form opinions about America by seeing how their distant relatives—Black, Oriental and Hispanic Americans—are treated, especially in military units deployed overseas. If our armed forces deter international aggression, if our foreign policy recognizes the legitimate grounds of many revolutions, and if our national experience demonstrates that the United States stands for justice and human respect as well as material prosperity, then we may look hopefully at Karl Marx's prediction: "Russia has only one opponent: the explosive power of democratic ideas, that inborn urge of the human race in the direction of freedom."¹⁸

NOTES

1. Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*; reprinted in *Social and Political Philosophy*, edited by J. Somerville and R.E. Santoni (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1963), p. 379.
2. Brian Crozier, *The Rebels* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), pp. 15, 16.
3. *Politics* 1303b5; in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, edited by Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 1237.
4. John Adams, letter to Hezekiah Niles, 13 February 1818; in *The Works of John Adams* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1856), vol. X, pp. 282, 283.
5. *The Declaration of Independence*.
6. George Fitzhugh; quoted in Charles A. Madison, *Critics and Crusaders: a Century of American Protest* (New York: Ungar, 1959), p. 5.
7. Friedrich Engels, *The New York Daily Tribune*, 25 October 1851; reprinted in Friedrich Engels, *Germany: Revolution and Counter-Revolution* (New York: International Publishers, 1933), p. 9.
8. Ted R. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 359.
9. Woodrow Wilson; quoted in C.L. Sulzberger, *Unfinished Revolution: America and The Third World* (New York: Atheneum, 1965), p. 5.
10. Lin Piao, *Long Live the Victory of the People's War* (1965); reprinted in full, Samuel B. Griffith, Brigadier General, USMC (Ret.), *Peking and People's War* (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 85, 88.
11. Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), pp. 2, 4.
12. Elmo Zumwalt, Admiral, USN; quoted in *The New York Times*, 19 April 1974, p. 42:2.
13. Wallace M. Greene, General, USMC; quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Bitter Heritage—Vietnam and American Democracy 1941-1966* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), p. 48.
14. Karl Marx, "Poland's European Mission (1867)"; reprinted in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Russian Menace to Europe*, edited by P. Blackstock and B. Hoselitz (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952), p. 106.
15. This was originally written before the Havana-Angola airlift occurred. The logistic limitations of that tactic (e.g., no bulk cargoes such as POL, and requirements of secure airspace and good airfields) are familiar to military planners and would have been obvious had a functioning Angolan government existed or had Western response been more vigorous. The movement of Soviet naval amphibious units along Africa's west coast suggested an appreciation of airlift vulnerability.
16. David Halberstam, *The Best and The Brightest* (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, 1973), p. 152.
17. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, final paragraph of *The Communist Manifesto*.
18. Karl Marx; quoted in *The Reader's Digest*, June 1964, p. 231.