Marching toward Hell: America and Islam after Iraq

Robert Harris
Michael Scheuer

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well as Lieber’s refutation of it. This work is the latest in the debate within political science circles on the causes of war. I highly recommend this book to historians, political scientists, military officers, and analysts, who should all be familiar with offense-defense theory and objections to it.

S. MIKE PAVELEC
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Former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer offers an assessment of the war on terror, providing in varying proportions the history, an estimate of the global situation, recommended tactics, and a polemic against what he believes has both provoked al-Qa’ida and impaired Washington’s ability to fight it successfully. Scheuer was chief and then special adviser to the chief of the CIA’s Bin Laden unit from 1996 to 2004.

Scheuer’s core argument is twofold. First, he argues that al-Qa’ida’s attacks America because of U.S. foreign policies in the Islamic world, and not because of any objection to the nature of American society. In Scheuer’s estimate, while jihadists do have contempt for American values, it is only Washington’s interference in Muslim lands that motivates them to target Americans and their allies. Second, he argues that this misunderstanding has led Washington to underestimate them and thus remain superficial in its responses.

Scheuer is fairly convincing in his first argument, primarily using statements by al-Qa’ida leaders to illustrate how they focus attention on U.S. policies and how they use sophisticated strategies to attack (or spare from attack) other Western nationals in proportion to their support for those policies.

However, he also shows how ineffective the U.S. response has been toward these attacks, arguing that the central premise of American strategy in the Muslim world is flawed. That is, whether or not America is a prosperous, free, tolerant, and generous country is beside the point; many Muslims may agree and yet still believe that America deserves punishment for its policies. He then delivers stinging critiques of other U.S. policies since 9/11—for example, deploying too few troops to Afghanistan and deposing a natural ally against al-Qa’ida, Saddam Hussein.

Some of his critiques are less convincing than others. It is frustrating that the author does not critically evaluate the veracity of al-Qa’ida’s accusations against the United States or logically explain how U.S. policy failures flow directly from its failure to comprehend al-Qa’ida’s true motives. The book is also riddled with run-on sentences and strings of four-or-more-words-connected-by-hyphens, which better editing could have reduced.

The value of the book for the national security community is its identification of eight future hot spots in the global war on terrorism. Scheuer identifies one of these regions, the northern Caucasus, as particularly dangerous and well positioned to provide al-Qa’ida with nuclear weapons.

Because the book’s virtues, insights, and provocative ideas are mixed with logical gaps and woeful underdevelopment, this reviewer cannot give it his
unqualified endorsement. If you read only one book on the global war on terrorism, do not make it this one. If, however, you read several books on the subject or your job involves long-term planning for the war on terror, this work is certainly worth a look, as it will make you aware of many of the mind sets and biases that shape government rhetoric and conventional commentary on terrorism and national security.

ROBERT HARRIS
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Public diplomacy today is a topic of global conversation. Books on the “new public diplomacy” of state and nonstate actors appear with increasing frequency. Memoirs by practitioners and monographs on cultural diplomacy and international broadcasting abound. Until now, however, there has been no in-depth scholarly treatment of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), the government organization primarily responsible for America’s international information, broadcasting, and educational and cultural exchange activities during the Cold War.

Nicholas Cull, a historian who teaches public diplomacy at the University of Southern California’s Annenberg School for Communication, provides this much-needed scholarship, with a well written account grounded in twelve years of archival research and more than a hundred interviews with practitioners. Beginning with the development of information and cultural programs during World War II, Cull’s narrative, organized in chapters on presidential administrations and USIA directors, deals principally with the decades between USIA’s creation in 1953 and the end of the Cold War in 1989. He concludes with a brief epilogue on USIA’s final decade, years that saw consolidation of U.S. international broadcasting services under the independent Broadcasting Board of Governors and the transfer of USIA’s information, exchange, and foreign-opinion-research programs to the Department of State in 1999.

Cull assesses with remarkable evenhandedness the priorities, decisions, and organizational struggles of political leaders and USIA’s practitioners. There is no ideological tilt in his examination of sharply contested approaches to winning the Cold War struggle for “hearts and minds.” The book is not a lament for USIA’s demise or a call for its restoration. Cull brings a scholar’s discipline, a wealth of empirical evidence, and arm’s-length perspective to his analysis. Nevertheless, Cull does have strong opinions. He renders critical judgments on USIA’s successes and failures. In so doing, he frequently prefers to show rather than tell.

On foreign-policy issues and USIA’s domestic political context, Cull’s account is strong on the McCarthy era, the Soviet launch of Sputnik, the civil rights movement, and the Vietnam War. He provides insights into USIA’s marginal role as an adviser to the president, State Department, and National Security Council on implications of foreign public opinion in policy formulation and communication. He deals at length with tensions between USIA and