

INTERVENTION AND DETENTE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

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In the century after the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, the European state system was established on the basis of the political principle of territoriality and of the legal principle of sovereign equality. The former notion entailed the effective control by the major princes within established territorial limits and the second concept established the norm of complete political jurisdiction by the prince and his government within these territorial boundaries unencumbered by any earthly, external authority. Although states were unequal in material capabilities and political influence, they confronted each other in the international arena under the obligation to recognize each other as masters within their territorial domains. And, in the intercourse of nations, agreements were to be based on the norm of contracts, explicit or implicit, among equal partners, whatever the actual power political

realities underlying their calculus. States organized according to exclusive internal authority and interstate relations organized not by a supranational power but by the sovereign agreement of these states—this was to be the pattern of modern international relations. Linked with this pattern were the notions of nonintervention and domestic jurisdiction—princes may meet each other in battle and adjust the political map of Europe but they must resist the urge to influence too blatantly the character of each other's type of regime and ideological commitment by direct or covert intervention. That this conception of international affairs was only imperfectly realized is obvious but that it provided an influential normative frame of action is also clear.

The evolution of the principles of the modern state system is attributable in the first instance to the experiences of

the emergent states from the 14th to the 16th centuries. The attempt by the various princes to separate their domains from an empire and a church with supranational pretensions and the division of Christendom in the reformation, suffused the politics of the period with a harsh ideological cast and rendered problematical political regimes and territorial boundaries, all of which culminated in the Thirty Years' War. The partial stalemate among states and the jeopardy in which intervention placed every regime persuaded Europe's political leadership to evolve a system which would better guarantee the stability of the states. The key was to separate international relations from internal politics. The separation was never complete and the smaller states were never as certainly covered by the new norms as the great states, but international relations in rough-and-ready fashion did conform to the new pattern until the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon.

With the French Revolution, the nature and character of regimes became again a stake in the international conflict and ideological concerns once again interacted with power political motives. The defeat of Napoleon largely restored the prerevolutionary notions which, despite the strains of nationalism, class ideologies, and racial doctrines, persisted until World War I. Since that great war, however, the world has been buffeted by supranational ideologies and ambitions cloaked in universal principles whose very intensity erodes political boundaries and casts in doubt the distinction between domestic and international politics. Moreover, with the rise of a multitude of weak and divided states unable to establish domestic order and resist foreign incursions, the problem of distinguishing levels of political activity and limiting political ambitions has been exacerbated. Some have further cited the interdependence of the international economy as another

element in the erosion of the classical principles of the modern state system. In such a "revolutionary" situation, then, what is the role of the doctrine of nonintervention?

Henry Kissinger and Nonintervention: From Cold War To Détente. In a real sense, the cold war is a result of the convergence of ideology and ambition such as characterized the period prior to the Peace of Westphalia and the French Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were thus elements in an increasingly global revolutionary struggle the objective of whose combatants was not only extended direct territorial control but modification of political regimes and socioeconomic structures. In such a context, American support, covert and open, to liberal political forces in Western Europe was seen by the concerned public as both necessary and proper. Even the extension of assistance to regimes more authoritarian in nature was widely seen as a justifiable attempt to limit Soviet influence.

The experiences of Vietnam and the political as well as economic costs of intervention in areas of high political instability led many opinion leaders, however, to reassess America's international role. There simultaneously occurred a parallel reevaluation by some Western commentators of Soviet ambitions. The convergence of these trends is most visibly seen in the détente policy of the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

If American foreign policy since World War II has been largely inspired by polar confrontation and doctrines of political and economic reconstruction and nation-building among the non-Communist states, recent détente policy is aimed in the words of its primary expositor, Henry Kissinger, at the encouragement of "an environment in which competitors can regulate and restrain their differences and ultimately

move from competition to cooperation."¹ The primary focus of American policy thus becomes less the containment—and, in effect, isolation—of the Soviet Union than the development of a nexus of relations which are designed to "create a vested interest in cooperation and restraint."² And whereas the earlier containment doctrine largely represented a negative policy vis-à-vis the East and placed dominant emphasis on the development and maintenance of alliance ties with Western Europe, Japan, and other states of important strategic interest, the practical result of recent policy is to reverse the emphasis and increasingly assess our alliance relations in terms of their contribution to Soviet-American détente.

This approach is ultimately founded on three assumptions: First, that in the words of the Secretary of State "the Soviet Union has begun to practice foreign policy—at least partially—as a relationship between states rather than as international civil war"³ and that, in any case, common interests in survival and some degree of predictability are more important factors in U.S.-Soviet relations than basic changes in their regimes or ideological motivations; second, that a strong Western military posture and a continuing intimacy within the Western alliance will be maintained; and, third, that a separation between domestic and international politics and a clearer acceptance of spheres of influence in the policies of the Soviet Union and the United States can be established.

In a recent reply to those critics who assert that political and economic concessions by the United States to the Soviet Union should be linked to a modification of Soviet domestic policies of emigration and, perhaps, dissent, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger argues: "Where the age-old antagonism between freedom and tyranny is concerned, we are not neutral. But other imperatives impose limits on our ability

to produce internal changes in foreign countries. Consciousness of our limits is recognition of the necessity of peace—not moral callousness."⁴ In effect, Dr. Kissinger contends that a stable international system thus depends in this view on an agreement about international rules of behavior—not a common notion of justice which could well place in doubt the authority of the several regimes comprising the system. To attempt to devise agreements which establish both rules of international conduct and norms of domestic rectitude is seen as likely to increase frustration and exacerbate conflict, especially in an international environment characterized by fundamentally different regimes. At the same time, however, it is clear that Dr. Kissinger has not elevated the doctrine of nonintervention to a categorical imperative but limits it to great power, i.e., Soviet-American, relations and couples the notion with an implicit understanding on spheres of influence. The distinction between domestic and international politics and the concomitant rule of nonintervention are thus prudential and limited rather than principles and universal. It is not that an absolute doctrine of nonintervention is simply rejected in the abstract but that conditions of state security, as well as state aspirations, are viewed as ruling out complete submission to such a precept. Indeed, the classical notion of power politics has always maintained a distinction between great and small powers and included concepts of spheres of influence. Inhibitions on ideological preferences and restrictions on direct interference in domestic politics arise in this view not from abstract notions of justice but from calculations of prudence—which do include, it must be noted, the elaboration of prudential rules of international behavior and guides for alliance maintenance. In this conception then, Secretary Kissinger is not alone but in a long and dominant foreign policy tradition.

Although the imperative of nonintervention is traditionally linked with the notions of legal sovereignty and equality, all three conceptions are ultimately founded on a situation of international anarchy and on the principle of self-help. Both Naturalists and Positivists historically expressed this relationship by reference to the doctrine of state "rights" which are not normative commands in any meaningful sense at all but simply prudential imperatives arising from the problem of self-preservation in the midst of anarchy. Such prudential imperatives need not, however, be calculations of short-term self-interest but in fact may demand attention to some modicum of predictability and order in the international sphere and thus concern for the long-term implications of state actions. While anarchy may imply self-help, scholars and statesmen alike have been concerned with informing the notion of self-help with such restraints and limitations that it does not also entail chaos. Nonintervention is thus recommended less by reference to legal commitment than to prudential calculations.⁵

The Soviet Polity, Peaceful Coexistence, and the Doctrine of Nonintervention. The concept of nonintervention espoused by Secretary Kissinger appears therefore to be motivated by calculations of prudence and qualified by an implicit doctrine of spheres of influence. An important question is whether or not the Soviet Union is animated by similar considerations. On the face of it, the statement by Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Soviet Communist party, before The Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe appears to accept a more unqualified and principled commitment to nonintervention. Speaking of the conference and its final act, Mr. Brezhnev declared:

The experience of the work of the conference provides important

conclusions for the future too. The major one that is reflected in the final document is this: No one should try to dictate to other peoples, on the basis of foreign policy considerations of one kind or another, the manner in which they ought to manage their internal affairs. It is only the people of each given state, and no one else, that has the sovereign right to resolve its internal affairs and establish its internal laws. A different approach is a flimsy and perilous ground for the course of international cooperation.⁶

By reiterating a principal provision of the conference declaration, some delegates were led to wonder whether Moscow was signaling its intention to forego its prerogative to intervene militarily in East Europe in order to maintain Communist governments friendly to the Soviet Union. Although Prime Minister Harold Wilson of Great Britain felt that such a declaration by the General Secretary would make invocation of the so-called Brezhnev doctrine more difficult in the future, most observers apparently believed that the real intent of the statement was to inform the West that the human rights section of the conference declaration could not be used to press for the liberalization of the East European regimes. If this latter interpretation is accepted, it might still be argued that Brezhnev was, however, prepared to accept a generalized nonintervention doctrine also qualified by a sphere of influence notion. If so, this convergence of views, along with the fear of nuclear war, might provide a basis for a long-term Soviet-American détente. One can be excused for some degree of skepticism on this point as well.

The Soviets have consistently insisted that "the sphere of class and national-liberation struggle" cannot be brought within "peaceful coexistence" and that, indeed, détente has given "a powerful

impulse to the national-liberation movement of colonial and oppressed peoples." Brezhnev has argued that détente is a result of "a new relationship of forces"—that is, the ascendancy of the Soviet-Socialist forces. Hence, as an *Izvestia* commentator recently contended, "the process of détente does not mean and never meant the freezing of the social-political status quo in the world" and in fact nothing could or should prevent the Soviet Union from giving "sympathy, compassion, and support" to these forces of "national-liberation." In this view, then, détente or peaceful coexistence involves direct state relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, particularly in the strategic area, but is not designed to prevent Soviet support for "favorable developments" in various third states.⁷

The American Polity, Contemporary International Politics, and the Doctrine of Nonintervention. If some commentators doubt the commitment of the Soviet regime to a doctrine of nonintervention, even one qualified by notions of spheres of influence, we can also justly raise questions whether such a doctrine is compatible with the character of the American polity. In a remarkable article entitled "Was Woodrow Wilson Right?" Daniel P. Moynihan argued:

Wilson conceived of patriotism not as an instrument of the state, but as an expression and extension of the moral capacities of the individual, specifically of men seeking freedom in its many manifestations. He saw that in the age then commencing such a patriotism would be meaningful only as it manifested itself in a world setting, engaging its energies in a world struggle. Democracy in one country was not enough simply because it would not last. In 20th-century America Wil-

sonianism has been disparaged for enthusiasm, much as high Anglicans disapproved of the Methodists of 18th-century England. And yet the Methodists, had they been ordained, almost surely would have kept the English people in the church, and possibly also their bishops. Instead the people wandered away into nothingness. Does not the American faith in democracy face something of this dilemma, and are we not adopting much the same course at the silent behest of men who know too much to believe anything in particular and opt instead for accommodations of reasonableness and urbanity that drain our world position of moral purpose?⁸

Wilsonianism expressed a belief common from the early days of the Republic—that the American experiment in government was not for the United States alone but provided a standard and harbinger for the nations of the world. Thomas Jefferson, reflecting on the meaning of the Declaration of Independence, wrote in 1826:

May it be to the world what I believe it will be: to some parts sooner, to others later, but finally to all—the signal of arousing men to burst the chains . . . The mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs for a favored few, booted and spurred, ready to ride them by the grace of God but to govern themselves by the grace of God, and they will by the grace of God.⁹

Abraham Lincoln speaking of the Declaration in 1861 expressed a similar belief: "Something in that Declaration [gave] liberty, not alone to the people of this country, but hope to the world for all future time. It was that which gave promise that in due time the weight should be lifted from the shoulders of all men, and that all should

have an equal chance."¹⁰ Lincoln then expressed the belief that, while the Declaration offered a vision, it did not in itself provide guidance for the construction of free government. That task was only accomplished in the text of the Constitution of the United States. In similar vein, Americans have traditionally viewed not only the Declaration of Independence as potentially universal in scope but also the principles and structures of constitutional government. The American experiment in constitutional democracy has thus been viewed not only in domestic but in global terms.

In a real sense, the American approach to government and international affairs has represented in almost quintessential form the modern liberal perspective in politics—animated by notions fundamentally different from those which undergird Soviet and much of non-Western society but confident that those liberal notions represent the basis for just societies everywhere. The belief in the universality of rationalism and individualism which characterized the 18th century Enlightenment received its best expression in the American political experiment and its finest rhetorical statement in the words of the Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident . . ." The 19th century elaboration of these Enlightenment principles in the notions of the free flow of peoples, goods, and ideas became standards by which we not only judged the performance of our government but other regimes as well.

To a substantial degree, however, confidence in the liberal notion of politics and law has been eroded within Western society itself and the applicability of such notions to much of the rest of the world cast in doubt. It is a fact, nonetheless, that the malaise concerning liberal thought affected the rest of the Occident earlier and much more profoundly than the United States. Indeed, a renewed sense of confidence

was kindled after the Second World War, very much under the leadership of the United States. It is true that in the late 1960's, America began to suffer the same crisis of confidence which had gripped European society earlier. It is, however, the contention of such observers as Daniel Moynihan that the abandonment of important liberal beliefs is not in fact fatalistically required by the world situation and that such a surrender would be harmful to the foundations of the American polity itself. If the vision of Wilson can no longer be accepted in unqualified fashion, neither can it be completely jettisoned without damage to the American soul and indeed to the quest for a legitimate world order. A foreign policy whose appeal is primarily to *realpolitik*, power balances, spheres of influence, and avoidance of war may in this view be not so much irrelevant as inadequate.

Even assuming, however, that American and Western foreign policy should be animated by the very principles of their own political founding, it is still a matter of debate as to what degree of external activism and indeed intervention this requires. The United States, for instance, as many liberal societies, has fluctuated in its policies between relative noninvolvement in international politics, on the one hand, and messianic engagement on the other. In the first case, one heard the argument that external political entanglement would damage material interests and risk moral contamination and that exemplary behavior at home would act as a beacon and redeeming model for the rest of the world. In the case of more extensive external engagement, this was recommended on the basis of direct threats to the core values of American society and the necessity of reestablishing an international environment in which the natural spiritual and material links among peoples would no longer be subordinated to authoritarian control.

Indeed, many Enlightenment and 19th century liberal commentators addressed themselves to the question as to what conditions, if any, would justify not only extensive foreign policy activism in general but direct intervention within other societies. Archetypical examples of the various approaches might be found in the writings of Richard Cobden, John Stuart Mill, Immanuel Kant, and Joseph Mazzini.

Basically, Cobden stated the most uncompromising theory of nonintervention—one founded on the partiality of states in defining universal notions of right and on the relative efficiency of nonintervention in serving over the long-run the material interest of peoples. It must be noted that a basic assumption undergirding Cobden's view was that, transcending interstate relations, there is a plethora of relations between peoples. Goods, people, and ideas are to cross frontiers freely, thus ameliorating state conflicts and binding nations together: "as little intercourse as possible betwixt the *governments*, as much connection as possible between the *nations* of the world." Hence, coupled with his doctrine of nonintervention was a liberal world vision which provided for the interpenetration of peoples.¹¹ Mill, Kant, and Mazzini, while accepting much of Cobden's vision, provided in varying degrees for a policy of state intervention.

Mill enunciated the doctrines of limited humanitarian intervention to protect lives and property from barbarous acts of violence and to end deadlocked civil wars and of counterintervention to uphold the rule of nonintervention.¹² Kant perhaps eroded the limitation on intervention even further by his notion that stable rules of international behavior depend on a radical revision of international society into republican regimes. Moreover, the league of states in Kant's schemes might also possess a right of intervention in behalf of the republican order.¹³

Mazzini completes this evolution by arguing that the rule of nonintervention had become an instrument of the status quo employed by the great powers to protect "legitimate" governments while restricting transnational liberal ties and assistance.¹⁴ In effect, the erosion of the Cobdenite principle stemmed from the dynamics of anarchical competition itself and the conflicting political visions of the state actors.

Although there is little question that the counsel of Richard Cobden is most appealing to Americans today, it must also be noted that the conditions underlying Cobden's advice are missing throughout much of the world—the free flow of peoples, ideas, and goods. The transnational society about which so much has been written in recent years is not really universal in its scope. Indeed, much of Henry Kissinger's diplomacy might be construed as an attempt to establish various links—economic, technical, political, cultural—between the West and the East in such a way as to bring gradually the states of Eastern Europe into a more transnational society, in the preservation of which they would then have a stake. The fact of the matter, however, is that these states are still only marginally connected with that transnational world and that much of the character of their regimes militates against the same type of interlinkages allowed by liberal politics. At the same time, the homogeneity of political principle and aspiration which might allow the acceptance of a sphere of influence doctrine and limited noninterventionism, does appear still to be lacking. Indeed, under such conditions, Mazzini's observation that the rule of nonintervention may be used to protect and legitimize authoritarian control is apt and much akin to commentaries on Brezhnev's public espousal of nonintervention.

In effect, to the degree that the United States and the West are still motivated by classical liberal notions of

politics, the counsels of John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant are likely to be attractive—that is, the notion of counterintervention to uphold the principle of intervention and the Kantian vision of the spread of republicanism as a precondition of international stability. If in fact Soviet foreign policy is still inspired by Leninist political principles and the United States is similarly influenced by liberal perspectives, then any *détente* must be conceived as limited in nature and much more closely akin to what the Russians call peaceful coexistence. The notion of peaceful coexistence does not rule out areas of cooperation where material interests converge or where the fear of destabilizing and potentially suicidal warfare becomes dominant. But one must be skeptical as to whether anything more intimate sustains current American-Soviet relations. The belief held by both sides in varying degree that “what is mine is mine and what is yours is subject to historical transformation—with some fraternal assistance,” is likely to continue in force. Indeed, the examples of Portugal, and especially Angola, may very well be cases in point. Despite announcements on the unlamented end of the cold war, we are probably still living in a revolutionary international system. As Henry Kissinger wrote many years ago: “The characteristic of a stable order is its spontaneity; the essence of a revolutionary situation is its self-consciousness. Principles of obligation in a period of legitimacy are taken so much for granted that they are never talked about, and such periods therefore appear to posterity as shallow and self-righteous. Principles in a revolutionary situation are so central that they are constantly talked about.”¹⁵

If the future is to see the continuance of revolutionary clashes among different notions of public order, are we then subject to the conclusion which Kissinger reached in that same earlier

study?—“And because in revolutionary situations the contending systems are less concerned with the adjustment of differences than with the subversion of loyalties, diplomacy is replaced either by war or by an armaments race.”¹⁶ The character of nuclear armaments, the desire of the superpowers for a modicum of stability in their relations, the challenge of other international pressures, and the press of internal demands—all these forces may indeed sustain a limited *détente* which impedes war and stabilizes arms races. Indeed, it is these forces which provide the foundation for Kissinger’s *détente* strategy—but it must be emphasized that the predominantly Hobbesian nature of these inducements fails to preclude a rather intense political contest which makes talk of non-intervention and even accepted spheres of influence premature.

Henry Kissinger has, in effect, been arguing that the involvement of the United States in the complications of power politics and equilibrium policy is permanent and can only be reversed at the peril of our national security. Should we either withdraw from the game of nations with all of its moral contradictions or should we act on assumptions of natural harmony, universal justice, or too blatant a notion of American uniqueness, we may jeopardize the survival both of our political influence and of our national values. The reduced margin of our power has meant that both a completely negative policy of containment toward our adversaries or a perception of total consensus with our allies will destroy our flexibility and endanger our national interests. In the past, he has argued,

... we had margin for error

... we acted as if the world’s security and economic development could be conclusively insured by the commitment of American resources, know-how, and effort. We were encouraged—

even impelled—to act as we did by our unprecedented predominance in a world shattered by war and the collapse of the great colonial empires. At the same time the central character of moral values in American life always made us acutely sensitive to purity of means—and when we disposed of overwhelming power we had a great luxury of choice. Our moral certainty made compromise difficult; our preponderance often made it seem unnecessary.¹⁷

It is the passing of this preponderance coupled with the permanent necessity to engage in the complex maneuvers of diplomatic-strategic relations which defines our current problems—and which, in Kissinger's view, compels not only a modification of policy but a transformation of our traditional views of world politics. In such a world, we would better see ourselves in the European tradition of equilibrist statesmen who sought not only concert with allies but collaboration with enemies—a world of controlled conflict and limited cooperation rather than a community of justice or a world of unambiguous enemies and unshakable friends. In Kissinger's view, increasing interdependence, declining resources, and the rising demands and, in some cases, power potential of the "Third World" states make power politics and the equilibrist perspective more rather than less compelling.

To an extraordinary degree, Kissinger's perspective has defined the problem not only for the Republican Administration but the Democratic Party opponents. Although Jimmy Carter speaks of a "democratic concert of nations" and international human rights as a primary focus of American policy—themes to which the Administration has responded in this Presidential election as well as bicentennial year—both Carter and Zbigniew Brzezinski, a Carter foreign policy advisor, have

appealed to equilibrist notions not dissimilar to those of Henry Kissinger. However, there still persists a tension between Kissinger and his bipartisan foreign policy critics which goes beyond details of policy. There is what appears to be an almost instinctive reaction against the implications of Kissinger's doctrine for the definition of the nation itself. From the beginning of the nation, the American polity has been defined not only as a nation among nations but as a great experiment in government with relevance not only to this people but to peoples everywhere. Our sense of ultimate political harmony arising from consent, of the application of rational techniques, and of special political destiny, are all intimately tied to that great revolutionary experiment of 1776 and its completion in constitution-making in 1787. In this view, it is not to the European past that we should turn but to our own.

James Madison defined the constitution-making task thusly:

To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of [a passionate majority] and at the same time to preserve the Spirit and form of popular government is the great object to which our inquiries are directed.

In similar vein, the foreign policy task is to reconcile the soul of American democracy with the exigences of involvement in a world which shares few of our assumptions. Hostility to Kissinger may in part stem from a belief that he is too little concerned with that soul—despite his latter-day sermons on American destiny and moral purpose—and too willing, in order to meet the demands of international politics, to adopt alien political models. In fact, however, both the claims of American democratic-republicanism and the exigences of an increasingly insecure globe must be met. As we enter the third century of our national existence, the task we face is no less complex—or

exhilarating—than the one faced by James Madison and his cohorts.

It is thus probably unrealistic to view détente as foreclosing struggles over the character of regimes both within and without presumed spheres of influence. Debate within Western societies would be better directed less toward the desirability of intervention than toward the modalities of such involvement. It appears inevitable that under current conditions this must involve attention to tactics of intervention and counter-intervention. In a world where transnational flows are important and growing, the Cobdenite eschewal of state intervention in favor of the interpenetration of peoples has much to commend it. Where such communication is impeded and assistance is rendered to various national groups who would further restrict the transnational flow of goods, people, and ideas, then the problem for Western governments becomes the development of effective instruments to influence the domestic evolution of various critical countries. In the current debate within the United States over how to restrict American involvement abroad, including the intelligence apparatus of the United States, one may lose sight of the fact that the United States has an interest in developments within certain countries, as indeed does the Soviet Union. It is a legitimate concern that the modalities of American influence be compatible with the very principles they are intended to uphold. Moreover, an American policy too exclusively dominated by *realpolitik* may have fewer constraints and lead to more extensive commitments than one animated by attention to the first principles of the American regime. On the other hand, if such attention is given, then one cannot totally ignore the warning of Alexander Solzhenitsyn:

We are also threatened by the catastrophe that the physically squeezed, constrained world is not allowed to become one spiritually;

molecules of knowledge and compassion are not allowed to move across from one half of the world to the other. This is a grave danger: THE STOPPAGE OF INFORMATION between the parts of the planet. Contemporary science knows that such stoppage is the way of entropy, of universal destruction. Stoppage of information makes international signatures and treaties unreal: within the zone of STUNNED SILENCE any treaty can easily be reinterpreted at will or, more simply, covered up, as if it had never existed (Orwell understood this beautifully). Within the zone of stunned silence lives—seemingly not Earth's inhabitants at all—a Martian expeditionary force, knowing nothing whatever about the rest of the Earth and ready to trample it flat in the holy conviction that they are "liberating" it.¹⁸

At the same time, if the character of the international system impels concern for interventionary *policies* and their prudential and principled limitations, it would be a mistake to elevate intervention itself to a matter of first principle and general *norm* of international conduct. If the international society makes it unlikely that Cobden's advice will be widely accepted, so one must recognize the dangers of too enthusiastically embracing notions of revolutionary intervention and counterintervention. Perhaps the only position is to maintain ambiguity rather than sanction nasty conduct or impose impossible rules of behavior. In any case, nothing in the character of the Soviet and American regimes or in the political and economic structures of the emerging states indicates that the requisite stalemates, tolerance, or internal stability have been achieved so that international regimes of nonintervention after the fashion of Westphalia may yet be established. Pre-

mature movement in that direction will not reaffirm the doctrine of noninter-vention but will consecrate the victory of one form of intervention.

NOTES

1. "Secretary Kissinger's statement on U.S.-Soviet Relations," News Release of the Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Office of Media Services, Washington, D.C., Special Report, 19 September 1974, No. 6, pp. 3-4.
2. "Secretary Kissinger at *Pacem in Terris*," News Release of the Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Office of Media Services, Washington, D.C., 10 October 1973, pp. 4-5.
3. *Ibid.*, at 4.
4. "Secretary Kissinger's Statement of U.S.-Soviet Relations," *op. cit.* at footnote 1, p. 3.
5. For an excellent discussion of the classical arguments for and against intervention, as well as historical and contemporary practice, see R.J. Vincent, *Nonintervention and International Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).
6. *The New York Times*, August 1, 1975, p. 2:4.
7. V. Matveyev, *Izvestia*, 2 December 1975, p. 4.
8. Daniel P. Moynihan, "Was Woodrow Wilson Right?" *Commentary*, May 1974, p. 29.
9. As cited by Archibald MacLeish, *The Great American Fourth of July Parade* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975), pp. 46-50.
10. Roy P. Basler, ed., *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953), vol. 4, p. 240.
11. See *The Political Writings of Richard Cobden*, ed., F.W. Chesson (London: Cassell, 1886), esp. his essays on "England, Ireland and America" and "Russia."
12. See J.S. Mill, "A Few Words on Non-intervention," in *Dissertations and Discussions: Political, Philosophical, and Historical* (London: Longmans, 1875), vol. III, pp. 153-178.
13. See Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace* (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill, 1957). Also C.J. Friedrich, *Inevitable Peace* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948).
14. See J. Mazzini, *Life and Writings of Joseph Mazzini*, 6 vols. (London: Smith & Elder, 1890), esp. vol. 6, appendix on "Non-intervention."
15. Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, nd), p. 3.
16. *Ibid.*
17. "The Future and U.S. Foreign Policy," Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Bicentennial Hearings on Foreign Policy Choices for the 70's and 80's, Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services, Washington, D.C., 16 March 1976, p. 2.
18. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *Nobel Lecture* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1972), p. 25.