As 1968 drew to a close, it seemed likely that the year ahead would see both the United States and the Soviet Union committed to defense budgets which would rival the largest peacetime military spending of either nation. For the United States, whose defense spending for the past several years had been centered on the Vietnam war, the year ahead would most probably be devoted to further development of its “new generation” of strategic missiles: Poseidon, Minuteman III, Spartan ABM, and further refinement of the multiple warhead technique. For the Soviet Union, whose increased defense budgets for each of the previous 3 years had concentrated on missile power, past observed patterns would most likely persist: development of a multiple reentry vehicle, further modification of the ABM Golash and Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS), and a step-up in development of the mighty 25 megaton SS-9 missiles.

On the horizon, however, was a possible alternative to the continuing arms spiral. In signing the Nonproliferation Treaty on 1 July 1968, President Johnson announced that the Soviets had agreed to enter into discussion on ways to limit and reduce both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons systems. Yet, as bright as that horizon appeared, it was soon clouded—at least momentarily—by two separate events: a cooler U.S. assessment of the U.S.S.R. following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August and the election of Richard Nixon, who had throughout his campaign charged the incumbent administration with creating a “security gap for America.” So as 1968 closed, there seemed no relief to the mad momentum.
of the arms buildup which had been in progress since 1945.

Certainly the arms race is not unique to the post-World War II era. In 1919 there was little doubt that a major cause of the First World War had been a race to arm. Consequently, the Covenant of the newly created League of Nations pledged a "reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations." But the massive firepower unleashed by the Axis in the first years of World War II testified to the League's failure in realizing the dream of its founders.

Two and a half decades later, the men who gathered to organize the United Nations sought to insure that the hours of futile League debate over disarmament would not be repeated by its successor. Instead, the objective of the new organization was to disarm the enemy states, to create a joint security force to prevent future aggression, and to pledge members against the threat or use of force. The term "disarmament" appears only twice in the charter. Article II grants the General Assembly the power to "consider the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments," and article 47 authorizes the Military Staff Committee to advise the Security Council on the "regulations of armaments and possible disarmament."

The explosion of atomic weapons in August 1945 suddenly added an unexpected element to the arms equation, forcing the United Nations to take significant steps beyond the vague and general charter provisions on arms control and disarmament. In its first resolution, the General Assembly, on 24 January 1946, unanimously created the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) to eliminate all weapons capable of mass destruction and to control the peaceful use of atomic energy. Buoyed by Great Power support, the U.N. seemed to be embarking on an active program to regulate atomic arms and to seek atomic disarmament.

Yet, over the years which have followed, progress in arms negotiations, both within and without the United Nations, has been painfully slow and unproductive. Since 1945 the arms issue has been a matter of almost continuous debate, with some 60 formal disarmament conferences between the United States and the Soviet Union. Both sides realize that a race for nuclear weapons is potentially a race for mass extinction, as well as an excessively costly undertaking. Yet, mankind is in the fourth decade of the nuclear age without any real progress toward arms control or disarmament.

In the meantime, the Soviets have achieved both an atomic and a nuclear capability. Both sides have graduated from reliance on bombers to reliance on missile delivery vehicles. Each nation has developed sea-based missile systems, multiple warheads, and antiballistic missile defense. The peak of hope which the world experienced in July 1968 and the valley of disappointment a few months later have typified the fluctuating arms scene since 1945.

World War II came to a close with the United States in possession of an atomic monopoly in the face of overwhelming Russian conventional military superiority. In the space of a few brief years, Allied wartime cooperation dissolved and was replaced by increasingly cold peacetime competition between East and West. On the arms front the Soviet goal was, quite naturally, to overcome drastic strategic inferiority. The United States, for its part, sought to shift the control of atomic power to international authority provided, however, that its own vulnerability in conventional forces could not be exploited by the Soviets. The explosion of the first Soviet atomic weapon in August 1949 symbolized the unbridgeable gap in arms goals and positions.
characterizing the first 7 years following the war.

In 1953 the Americans got a new President, and the Russians buried Stalin. That same year the Soviet Union exploded its first thermonuclear device, only 9 months after the United States had accomplished the same feat. Both nations soon realized they were like two scorpions in a bottle, each capable of killing the other but only at the risk of its own life. During these years cautious probing began, the absolute hostility of the preceding era was modified, and partial measures of arms control were sought. "Peaceful coexistence" was born, as each nation sought to surpass the other economically, hoping somehow that the awful destructive might of nuclear war might be avoided. The gap appeared to be narrowing.

The sixties began with the quest for general and complete disarmament. However, it became increasingly obvious that this broad goal was impossible because of the deep suspicions still harbored by each side. Yet, these years saw considerable progress in achieving more limited measures, among which were the banning of nuclear tests everywhere except underground, the establishing of a "hot line" between Washington and Moscow, the renouncing of the orbiting of nuclear weapons, and the signing of the Nonproliferation Treaty. It appeared as if the gap had become, to a certain degree at least, bridgeable.

Before turning to a more detailed analysis of successes and failures of arms negotiating in the 1960's, however, there are certain matters which should be touched upon first in order to clarify the discussion which follows.

First, a definition of terms. Although the terms have often been indiscriminately interchanged, there is a vast difference between "disarmament" and "arms control." The former is the elimination of all weapons systems and production. It is, of course, a utopian goal which history has shown to be virtually impossible. "Arms control" encompasses any one of a broad range of possible arms agreements seeking to reduce or limit arms, thereby decreasing the likelihood of armed conflict or limiting the distinctiveness of war. The only area in which agreement has occurred to date is in the arms control area. The far broader realm of disarmament remains the ideal, emerging most often in U.N. speeches and in other forms where the principal end in sight is propaganda gain.

It is here that we come to the second area deserving comment; i.e., that the postwar arms picture has been muddied and muddled by debate directed at the public rather than at the opposition. Agreement has not always been the primary goal of arms talks. Too often states have sought to project images of themselves as peace-loving. This has been especially true in the years since the emergence of the Third World and the concomitant East-West struggle to win the allegiance of that massive conglomerate. Too often a state's arms proposals are so biased to its own advantage that rejection is all but inevitable, and with rejection comes the inevitable decline in the rejector's international prestige.

President Eisenhower's "open skies" proposal of 1955, while attractive to the world, was bound to encounter the Russians' resistance because of their invariable opposition to revealing their exposed society and secret military installations to the anxious eye of the American camera. No such fear permeates American thinking because our society and its military installations are a matter of public record. While the Soviet rejection was inescapable, so were the international propaganda gains for the United States.

The West is not alone in tuning its proposals to the ear of the world, as the Soviet effort in the late 1960's to ban the flight of nuclear armed aircraft over international borders illustrates. Coming
in the wake of the loss of a U.S. plane with nuclear weapons in Spanish waters, this proposal had great international appeal but was patently impossible from the vantage point of the United States.

In this same vein, the Soviets use the term "disarmament" to describe all arms talks. This despite the fact that, for the most part, their proposals have not been disarmament per se but rather only partial measures at arms control. The Americans, on the other hand, have used the terms "limitation, regulation, and control of arms" and, since the late 1950's, "arms control," thereby subjecting themselves to Soviet assertions that the West is not really interested in disarmament or arms reduction but only control... meaning a reduction in Soviet national sovereignty.

A third point is the specious argument that the possession of arms leads to arms races which, in turn, cause wars. Bertrand Russell used to argue eloquently in favor of unilateral disarmament, believing as he did that the possession of nuclear weapons would perforce cause war. Unfortunately, he overlooked the important fact that it is not arms in and of themselves which lead to war, but rather the men who use them. Even if the world were to disarm completely, nuclear and otherwise, it would not have eliminated the political problems, ideological conflicts, and national mistrusts which sow the seeds of war.

Fourth, we turn to the differences in Soviet and American negotiating practices. Since 1945 the Soviets have had only seven chief arms negotiators; all these men have been well versed, professional arms negotiators. In contrast, the U.S. example has been less than meritorious, with the expertise of our numerous negotiators variously waxing and waning. Bernard Baruch headed a highly respected and competent team of negotiators, but his resignation in early 1947 was followed by 8 years of haphazard coordination and direction in U.S. arms negotiating practice. Not until Harold Stassen was given Cabinet status as President Eisenhower's Special Assistant on Disarmament did a U.S. negotiator have easy and assured access to the ear of the President. Prior Soviet doubts as to American sincerity in talking arms reductions were inevitable. Stassen's abrupt removal 2 years later and the lack of any replacement only confirmed Soviet suspicions about U.S. arms policy.

The fifth and final point is that for both the United States and the Soviet Union the pursuit of arms control and disarmament has been a function of foreign policy. It has never been for either nation a goal within a vacuum; it has always been intimately tied to national security, as well as international political issues. The web is tight and closely twined. Throughout the years the arms positions of both sides have fluctuated, often drastically, depending on the propaganda perspective, depending on the relative strategic standing, and depending on the particular foreign policy goals at any particular time. Like each nation's foreign policy, the arms policy of each has been an ad hoc affair, ever adaptable to the exigencies of the situation. As one side has acted, the other has reacted; this action-reaction phenomenon has occurred repeatedly throughout the arms scene—both politically and technologically.

Perhaps the one consistency throughout has been this: the Soviets have approached arms talks from the position of inferior power seeking to reduce the American superiority; the Americans, on the other hand, have had the advantage of superiority and have generally sought to persuade the Soviets to opt out of the arms race and accept the status quo. For instance, in 1964 when the U.S. strategic delivery force surpassed that of the Soviet Union by a ratio of some 4 to 1, the United States proposed a freeze on further production of nuclear delivery vehicles. The
thought was that the deterrent value of each side's force was adequate to prevent a first strike by the other. Yet the Soviets reasoned otherwise, unwilling to settle for a second-best position. Like Avis, there has been a great deal of pride in the Soviet drive to catch and overtake the number one power.

The pages which follow deal with this pursuit and try to assess the important similarities and differences between each nation as they have sought to integrate their national interests with the ideal of arms control and disarmament over the last decade.

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On Inauguration Day, 1961, Premier Khrushchev, who had refused to have anything to do with President Eisenhower after the U-2 incident, cabled the new American President expressing his hopes that there would be a "radical improvement" in Soviet-American relations. Clearly, renewed efforts at achieving a mutually satisfactory agreement on arms limitations would have to rank high on the list of priorities in any genuine attempt to radically improve relations between Washington and Moscow. In the initial statement of his first press conference 4 days after becoming President, John F. Kennedy gave great evidence of his concern over arms control by announcing the appointment of John McCloy to coordinate the disjointed American arms bureaucracy. By September, Congress had created the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and for the first time since the departure of Harold Stassen from the scene, the United States had a full-time staff of arms experts. President Kennedy's thoughts behind the creation of the new agency were eloquently expressed in his Inaugural Address when he said:

Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.
Let both sides, for the first time, formulate serious and precise proposals for the inspection and control of arms—and bring the absolute power to destroy other nations under the absolute control of all nations.

Having criticized Eisenhower's administration for failing to bridge the gap with the Soviets, Kennedy was determined to build such a bridge himself.

Despite these flickers of hope, the beginning of the new era in postwar arms negotiations was far from bright. The international political climate remained tense even though the U-2 incident had been all but forgotten. The turmoil in Laos was reaching its peak. The Congo was ablaze. Even the most casual observer of international events knew where the Bay of Pigs was. The Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in Vienna in July 1961 showed that neither leader would back down over the mounting problem of Berlin. The next month the Soviets broke the test moratorium and began flexing their muscles with explosions of over 50 megatons. Meanwhile, the Berlin Wall had gone up—a symbolic blockade to agreement on more than the divided city.

Developments at the arms level only heightened the tensions. Elected on a platform attacking the Republicans for having permitted a "missile gap" to develop, the Democratic administration quickly set about to reverse the tide and regain the undisputed American strategic lead. Defense spending went up, the Minuteman program was accelerated, the production of Polaris submarines was intensified, and, following the Soviet example, testing was resumed. On the conventional front, the "flexible response" strategy for NATO was supported by larger American standing forces in Europe.

The action-reaction phenomenon which had prompted this concentrated American response to the Soviet ICBM and sputnik achievements led the Russians, in turn, to renewed efforts to
regain the strategic momentum. Besides resuming nuclear testing, they increased their defense budget, halted the demobilization steps taken in 1960, and conducted large-scale conventional operations in 1961. For both sides the age of satellite reconnaissance had begun, with the United States launching its first Samos satellite in early 1961 and the U.S.S.R. its first Cosmos series a year later.

In the midst of these developments, the two sides continued to reaffirm their support for the concept of General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) that Khrushchev had advocated 2 years earlier. For example, on 25 September 1961, the President addressed the U.N. General Assembly, warning that:

"Today, every inhabitant of the planet must contemplate the day when this planet may no longer be habitable. Every man, woman and child lives under the sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident, or miscalculation or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us." 3

While GCD was impossible to realize in light of the prevailing political and military tensions, public commitment to the concept was necessary in the campaign for political support in the Third World. Consequently, 5 days before Kennedy’s U.N. speech, the Americans and the Russians had issued a joint statement outlining a set of Agreed Principles, pledging both nations to the achievement of GCD at the earliest possible date. 4 The eight-point program called for the elimination of all nuclear and nonnuclear weapons, forces, production, and delivery vehicles, plus the end of military spending. The various stages to be agreed upon would be balanced to insure that neither side ever gained the upper hand before both had completely disarmed; furthermore, each stage would be supervised by an international control authority within the U.N. framework.

By March the next year, the campaign for GCD carried to the creation of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), composed of five Western, five Communist, and eight nonaligned countries. Over the following months of 1962, both major powers presented at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee elaborate and complex three-stage plans for GCD. 5 Despite the joint statement of the previous fall, however, major differences were to prevent any confluence of views leading to an agreement on GCD.

The essence of the Soviet approach was that all nuclear delivery vehicles and all foreign bases be eliminated in the first stage. This would, naturally, erase the West’s superior strategic delivery capability and insure the U.S.S.R. extremely favorable odds in case of a conventional war in Europe over Berlin. Their second stage provided for the destruction of all remaining nuclear weapons. This provision came to be modified later in the talks, however, as the Soviets accepted the U.S. logic of continued mutual strategic deterrence in the disarmament process; accordingly, the Soviets conceded the American argument that a limited number of strategic weapons ought to be retained as a nuclear “umbrella” until the end of the third and final stage in any disarmament accord.

The American GCD platform centered on freezing—rather than immediately eliminating—existing strategic weapons. The first stage called for a reduction by 30 percent in all such weapons, with 50 percent of the remainder to be destroyed in the second stage, and the rest eliminated as the final step. This method of disarmament would, quite obviously, insure the perpetuation of U.S. strategic might throughout the process. One is reminded of the Soviets’ earlier advocacy of an across-the-board, one-third cut in
armed forces to insure their own continued conventional superiority.

The differences between the two sides in 1962 over disarmament were basically the same as they had been for 15 years. As always, the Soviets' main interest was to get the United States to relinquish as soon as possible those weapons in which it was strongest and the U.S.S.R. relatively weak; to wit, strategic weapons. In contrast, the Americans still preferred to stretch the process out over a longer period of time, during which a viable system of international control inspection might be established and put into operation. Here an old problem was raised. The United States wanted such a system set up early in the game; further, it wanted inspection of not only those weapons being destroyed ("verification of disarmament") but also of all those remaining ("verification of remainders"). Only this way, it was argued, could it be certain that weapons were, in fact, being destroyed and, most importantly, not being replaced. But the only inspection the Soviets would even agree to discuss was of those weapons actually being destroyed; anything more, such as a search for concealed weapons, would be tantamount to a breach of national sovereignty.

In addition to the usual disagreements, there was another. The joint Russo-American statement of Agreed Principles of 20 September had called for the assigning of national forces to a U.N. military force which would, as the charter had originally intended, insure world peace. However, the Russians objected to such a provision in the American GCD proposals at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in the spring of 1962. Despite the influx of new U.N. members which had begun early in the 1960's, the U.S.S.R. was still a minority on the world body. It had no intention of risking its own security by abolishing its defense establishment and relying on an international one which would be dominated by the United States and its allies.

In short, despite the efforts made, no agreement on GCD was possible. Political differences and strategic disparities would have prevented agreement even without the fundamental differences in both sides’ proposals. Those differences only underscored the fact that there was no real convergence of mutual interest by either the United States or U.S.S.R. except on the broad and utopian principle of General and Complete Disarmament.

GCD had always been more a Russian than an American project. The United States had responded to the initial Soviet proposal with one of its own because of the overriding political necessity. To have remained silent on this popular—if impractical—topic would have been to leave itself open to Soviet charges that the United States was not, after all, interested in peace and disarmament. By late 1962, however, GCD was no longer the major Soviet arms priority. After a brief interlude, the emphasis shifted once again back to the more practical search for partial measures en route to “eventual” General and Complete Disarmament.

That brief interlude was Moscow’s attempt to redress the arms imbalance by placing Soviet missiles and heavy bombers in Cuba where they would be aimed at the underbelly of the United States. By mid-1962 the Americans had demonstrated their ability to outspend and outproduce the Russians; any possible “missile gap” had been overcome, and our strategic arsenal surpassed that of the Soviet Union by a ratio of about 4 to 1.6 There was only one way the Kremlin could regain the momentum, and that was by an all-out effort to increase its nuclear delivery production; but that meant problems. Soviet agricultural output was below its projected levels; consumer production was falling. Khrushchev had promised the capitalists he would bury them through peaceful
coexistence, specifically, through economic competition. Could the economy respond in meeting that goal at the same time that a total effort was being mounted to produce more ICBM's? Even if it could, would not the United States do the same, keeping the existing ratio the same?

Yet something had to be done. In the Soviet system an important measure of success in foreign policy is victory—military, diplomatic, or psychological. As one author has noted, "Without a continuing series of foreign policy successes...the dynamic drive of the Communist movement might threaten to stall." The Russian leaders were no doubt asking themselves if the Congo, Laos, and persistent strategic inferiority were not evidences of such stalling.

They had hoped to regain some of the lost impetus through the series of nuclear tests conducted in late 1961. The pressure on Berlin was another way. Nevertheless, the West continued to outproduce them strategically, and the new President had made his commitment to the German city unequivocal. To make matters worse, Communist China and Cuba were becoming more and more vocal in their criticism of Moscow's leadership of the Communist world. The only alternative to the shoddy performance of the past few years seemed to be the emplacement of long-range ballistic missiles and heavy bombers on the doorstep of the Americans.

The events taking place in October 1962 fall outside the range of this paper. What is important for us are the effects of these events on subsequent arms negotiations.

As Khrushchev said of the crisis shortly after it was over, "There had been a smell of burning in the air." This odor convinced both sides that it was time to take steps to bridge the gap which had separated them since 1945. GCD was put aside, and a sincere effort was made to come up with measures of partial disarmament. The most important area of progress was in the banning of tests in the atmosphere, under the water, and in outer space.

The testing of nuclear weapons became a matter of acute international concern by the midfifties. The intense political maneuvering of both sides over the latter half of the decade was not much more than window dressing designed to cover up their halfhearted attempts to achieve an actual agreement to end tests. An initial problem had been the American refusal to consider testing separately from a comprehensive "package" deal including conventional and strategic arms level safeguards against surprise attack, and control of objects entering space. But world pressure for a ban proved too much, and Washington's stance was modified the next year.

However, once again, inspection blocked agreement. A multitude of questions further complicated matters. How were inspection posts to be manned, by national or international teams of scientists? Was the number of inspection stations to be proportional to the number of unexplained seismic signals detected yearly, or should there be a fixed number based on the nation's geographic size? How many on-site inspections per year were appropriate? Or, in the event manned inspection stations were rejected, what about setting up black boxes in each nation? In that case, what kind of device should be used; how many were necessary; who would decide where each was to be installed; and how often throughout the course of a year would they be activated? Finally, regardless of whatever system was adopted, what method of punishment ought to be accorded the violators? Rising above these many questions was the loud Russian voice claiming that any inspection amounted to an excessive degree of interference with the national sovereignty of Russia.

The particular detail which finally
kept the discussions from bearing fruit was the debate over the number of on-site inspections. As long as the international climate opposed any testing, there was no chance for a partial treaty permitting only underground tests. Hence, some type of inspection seemed inevitable. By March 1961 the Soviets had indicated their willingness to accept three on-site inspections per year; the United States, pressing for 20, then reduced its requirements to 12. But a détente was not in the making, as the Russians then withdrew their offer of three and said they would tolerate no on-site inspections. Further, they added a new demand which had been made famous in the U.N. dispute over the future of the Secretary General's office: that a troika commission be established to administer any test ban treaty. When they also shifted ground by saying that a test ban could only be discussed as part of a total GCD package, it was obvious that stalemate had overtaken the issue. The talks were indefinitely suspended.

Agreement might have been reached throughout these frustrating years, however, on an uninspected partial test ban treaty in which underground testing would be permitted. But such an accord was not forthcoming. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission had already decided that it preferred open air to underground tests. Further, there was still the matter of principle. The United States was trying to force the Soviet Union into acquiescing to some sort of inspection measure.

Both sides resumed testing in the fall of 1961. The international pressure for a ban, however, persisted, and once each side had satisfied itself of its latest strategic advances, the talks resumed that winter of 1961.

To circumscribe the thorny inspection issue, the Soviets suggested a ban on all except underground tests. But the West balked, still determined that it would have its way: a complete ban with inspection. But by the late summer of 1962, frustration had persuaded the United States to accept the earlier Soviet proposal for a limited test ban treaty. It was then the Soviets' turn to resist, arguing that they wanted a total ban. Perhaps they were unconvinced that their level of technology would insure that they could detect all American tests. More likely they simply did not want a treaty and were maneuvering to prevent agreement. When the issue of inspection was then raised, as it inevitably had to be in discussing a total ban, the differences centered on the old question of the number of on-site inspections. The Russians revived their previous figure of three. The West, now more confident of its detection capability, dropped its requirement to seven, plus 10 unmanned posts.

At this point the Cuban missile crisis intervened. The long-feared nuclear war almost became a reality, and both nations saw the immediate need to stabilize the helter-skelter arms spiral which had come so perilously close to pushing the world to the brink of disaster. Each side resumed its unilateral test moratorium early in 1963. The possibility of some kind of formal limit on testing looked better than it had in a long time. Besides the near war the previous October, there were other reasons for this turn of events.

First, no technological breakthrough appeared imminent for either side. Their respective tests in late 1961 had brought each to its strategic peak, and any limitation on further tests would not be damaging.

Second, an end to testing was propitious for both nations, although for different reasons. For the United States, a test ban would mean that her undisputed lead in the arms race could not be risked by future Soviet developments. The Soviets, resigned momentarily at least to their absolute strategic inferiority, could still draw satisfaction from the fact that theirs was an
adequate deterrent capability. If the United States could be kept from testing, perhaps Russia might somehow be able to achieve a breakthrough in the meantime.

Third, economics made a test ban a welcome prospect for both nations; it was time to turn to butter, especially in the U.S.S.R., and leave guns for a later day.

And fourth was the proliferation issue. Too many states were on the verge of realizing a strategic capability. An end to testing might keep the nuclear club small. Of particular concern were China, yet to detonate her first atomic device and whose likely refusal to agree to a test ban would at least be a propaganda gain for the Soviet Union and Europe, in the midst of negotiating with the United States for a Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF). Here the Soviets must have hoped that the appearance of détente might reduce pressures within NATO for a nuclear capability. This could even aggravate the already strained NATO alliance. The British had just been vetoed by the French from joining the Common Market, and France was at odds with her allies, especially the United States, over her role within NATO and her aspirations for a United Europe.

By July all of these factors had become reason enough for both superpowers to reach a limited agreement. Both sides met in Moscow and within 10 days had drafted and signed the Moscow Treaty prohibiting all nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space. The question of inspection prevented any prohibition of underground testing; to this day, it continues as the one stumbling block to any further enlargement of the Moscow Treaty. Otherwise, the treaty represented the greatest convergence of interests between the two nations yet achieved in postwar arms negotiations. Both had relented on their previous demands that any test ban be comprehensive. While the treaty provided for no reduction in arms per se, it was unique in providing at least a partial freeze on arms levels. Above all, it was the first formal agreement since 1945 requiring nuclear nations to reduce some on-going military activity.

The treaty had many critics, including the American nuclear scientist Edward Teller. Among the arguments used against the treaty were first, that it would keep the United States from ever overcoming the higher Russian level of megatonnage. This argument, however, failed to take into account the fact that we already had a greater variety and larger number of smaller and more accurate weapons than did the Soviets. If they were ever to catch us, it would only be by enduring the higher costs of underground testing.

Second, it was argued that while the United States would be scrupulous in adhering to the treaty, the U.S.S.R. would probably end up testing a fraction of a foot beneath the ground, thereby fulfilling the letter of the law but, in effect, violating the treaty. But this objection overlooked the international pressure which would keep both sides from violating the conditions of the ban.

Third, it was claimed that the treaty was weak in failing to cut stockpiles and in failing to deal adequately with proliferation. But stockpiles were too sensitive a subject to be dealt with at this point, and the possibility of proliferation was reduced every time another nation agreed to the terms of the treaty.

Well over 100 nations have signed the treaty. As was initially feared, China and France have refused to do so. For France, the refusal goes back to De Gaulle’s search for “grandeur.” As part of his internal policy, he sought unity after years of turmoil; by expressing his independence from the United States both by refusing to sign and by developing the force de frappe—he hoped to
persuade his countrymen of that independence. As part of his continental policy, he hoped to sway Germany from its loyalty to the United States and to fall in with his plans for European unity. The French-German treaty of cooperation of early 1963 had been part of that design. Finally, on the international level, De Gaulle's refusal to sign was part of his policy of giving France an independent talking point.

Khrushchev had hoped, however futilely, that China could be convinced to sign the treaty. But Peking balked, arguing that Khrushchev was selling out to the West and, not incorrectly, that Russia was trying to put China under its own strategic dominance. In rejecting the treaty, China continued its search for nuclear parity and political leverage against the U.S.S.R. and the United States. Its behavior was reminiscent of that of the Soviet Union 15 years earlier in its refusal to agree to American attempts to keep it from acquiring a strategic capability.

Another area of partial agreement which came in the wake of Cuba was the decision in June 1963 to join Moscow and Washington by a "hot line." It was hoped that this would provide rapid communications to reduce the risk of a preemptive attack in a future crisis situation. The idea had been suggested in the spring of 1962 by the United States, but it was not until the near disaster over Cuba that agreement was possible.

The "hot line" was an outgrowth of the observer concept which had been bantered around for years by both sides in connection with the inspection issue. Observers had been proposed to help verify that neither side was preparing a surprise attack against the other. Herebefore there had been no progress, largely because of the national sovereignty problem. The 1962 missile crisis, however, provided the necessary impetus. A simple communications problem could have thrown the world into nuclear war. As the Greek Xenophon told his Persian counterpart back in the 4th century B.C.,

"I know of cases... when people, sometimes as a result of slanderous information and sometimes merely on the strength of suspicion, have become frightened of each other and then, in their anxiety to strike first before anything is done to them, have done irreparable harm to those who neither intended nor even wanted to do them any harm at all. I have come to the conviction that misunderstandings of this sort can best be ended by personal contact..." 11

Technology and the arms race made imperative in 1963 the "personal contact" which had so concerned this general 2,500 years ago.

The remainder of the 1961-68 period continued to see a great flurry of activity on the edge of the disarmament question. GCD continued on occasion to raise its head, but military and political relations between the two superpowers precluded any rapprochement on this broad topic. In addition, certain factors were working against the Soviets' pushing GCD as they once had. For one, the Sino-Soviet dispute was worsening, and the U.S.S.R. did not want to add fuel to the Chinese argument that the Soviets were colluding with the Americans. For another, the anti-Khrushchev faction which assumed power in 1964 was not about to adopt the fallen leader's shibboleth. Nevertheless, while GCD was taking the back seat, considerable attention was devoted to achieving some partial measure of arms reductions. Each side was very much aware that the threat of nuclear war still had to be contained.

Guiding Soviet military thinking at this time was the paramount concern that the American strategic lead be overtaken. The Cuban crisis had dramatically demonstrated the bargaining
power provided by a superior nuclear arsenal. Consequently, the U.S.S.R. turned its attention to developing its own strategic forces by improving its ICBM's, by developing an ABM system, and by planning a fleet of ballistic missile nuclear-powered submarines. While these steps were going on, the U.S.S.R. was advocating, among other things, the withdrawal of foreign troops from foreign territory, a NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression treaty, the creation of a nuclear free zone in central Europe, the elimination of heavy bombers, and the expansion of the test ban treaty to cover underground explosions. Most of these proposals were old hat. The realization of any of them would help reduce Soviet vulnerability. They might also halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons to NATO allies, particularly West Germany.

The United States, in contrast, felt no such military insecurity. Despite the brink to which Cuba had brought us, we were clearly the number one nuclear power. Once the Minuteman expansion plans were completed by the mid-sixties, there would be no need to enhance our already impressive ICBM might. No Soviet missile expansion appeared imminent. Besides, our attention was focused on a nonnuclear engagement in Southeast Asia.

As the search for partial measures went on, hopes for agreement in certain areas such as a limit of delivery vehicles, a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, and a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact were evasive. In others, however, some accord was possible: a cutback on the production of certain fissionable materials, the prohibition of nuclear weapons in orbit, and agreement on curtailing proliferation. A discussion of each of these six items follows.

The chances of reducing nuclear weapons per se were so slight that the limitation of delivery vehicles was turned to as perhaps a more attractive alternative. In January 1964 at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, the United States urged a production freeze on all such vehicles, specifically bombers and missiles, as well as on ABM's. A freeze at current levels would be clearly advantageous to the United States, considering our sizable lead in bombers and missiles. Likewise, an agreement limiting ABM's would also be in the interest of the United States, in view of the Soviets' developing capability in this regard and the American lag in producing any counterpart. Not unsurprisingly, therefore, the U.S.S.R. rejected this American proposal. For the rest of the period, the two sides never even came close to any agreement on the limiting of delivery vehicles.

The Soviet effort to ban the use of nuclear weapons at this time was another version of the earlier campaign to "ban the bomb." By the 1960's, as the GCD talks were showing, any effort to eliminate nuclear weapons was futile. But banning their use might yield better results; at least world opinion thought so. A 1961 General Assembly resolution declared that the use of nuclear weapons would violate the spirit of the U.N. and its charter. Five years later another General Assembly resolution called for a world disarmament conference to ban the use of these weapons. In the fall of 1967, a Soviet draft convention was passed by the Assembly prohibiting the use of weapons of mass destruction. Despite these three attempts, however, no convention was ever agreed to by the United States and the U.S.S.R. The primary obstacle was U.S. opposition to such a ban. We were not about to erase a basic pillar of the NATO alliance—the use of tactical nuclear weapons against a Warsaw Pact army.

Soviet hopes of a nonaggression treaty fared no better. Such a NATO-Warsaw Pact treaty would have been more a symbolic victory for the Soviets than a military gain. For it would have
meant American negotiations with East Germany, thereby entailing a possible modification to the adamant U.S. refusal to recognize Walter Ulbricht's government.

In July 1966 Brezhnev and Kosygin went one step further and suggested that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact be abandoned. The independent actions of France vis-a-vis the Western alliance had probably encouraged the Russians to believe that the crack in the NATO superstructure was widening. NATO is far more of a thorn in the Soviets' side than the Warsaw Pact is in the West's. The former brings American troops precariously close to Russia, while the latter does not reciprocate in kind for the Soviet Union. The end of NATO would be a military coup for the U.S.S.R., to say nothing of the psychological gains it would also bring. Obviously, the United States would not acquiesce to any such abandonment of its allies. Yet, the Soviet Union persisted in its host of demands designed to weaken or destroy NATO, demands ranging from the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Europe to the abolition of the pact.

All efforts aimed at a partial agreement on arms control were not entirely futile during this period, however. In January 1964 at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference, the United States proposed the halt of production of fissionable materials for weapons use; short of this measure, the U.S. proposal also suggested an interim step by which such a reduction could be realized "through both sides closing comparable production facilities on a plant-by-plant basis, with mutual inspection." Soviet objection was inevitable. Such a freeze would put them at a disadvantage in light of their own smaller stockpiles of fissionable material. As if that were not enough, there was the old inspection quagmire again. But 3 months later a dramatic change occurred, with both sides announcing simultaneously respective unilateral reductions in the production of certain of these materials, specifically plutonium. Besides the propaganda value of such declarations, there was the added fact that each nation had already produced more than sufficient quantities of plutonium for its own usage.

Any additional and more substantive agreement between Washington and Moscow appeared dim as the Russians continually cited Vietnam as a roadblock to meaningful accord. Nonetheless, the end of the 1961-68 period saw two of the most meaningful arms agreements yet achieved by the two countries. Together, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the Nonproliferation Treaty signed the next year combined with the earlier Antarctic (1959) and Moscow (1963) Treaties to form the crux of the postwar arms accords.

The question of outer space went back to the middle of the previous era. In early 1957, with the Soviet earth satellite breakthrough just around the corner, the United States urged the peaceful use of outer space by all nations. The U.N. General Assembly in 1961 adopted this same tack, declaring that space ought to be restricted to only peaceful purposes. Two years later, on 17 October 1963, a joint Soviet-American statement was adopted by the Assembly, calling on all states to "refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction." This joint resolution was possible once the Americans had dropped their insistence that space launchers be inspected and once the Soviets had abandoned their demand that all military activity in outer space be prohibited.

The 1967 space treaty between the United States, U.S.S.R., and Britain, like the 1963 resolution on which it was based, did not outlaw reconnaissance or communications satellites nor did it
prohibit potential use of outer space for other military purposes. Like the resolution preceding it, it concentrated on banning weapons from outer space. But, in addition, it went one step further, prohibiting military installations of any kind on planetary bodies. Both sides had recognized the potentially disastrous results of a frenzied race to orbit nuclear weapons, and they sought to cut it off before it began. Furthermore, they sought to guarantee that outer space be free for exploration and use by all states.

Along with the Antarctic Treaty, banning all nuclear and nonnuclear military activity in that continent, the Outer Space Treaty is the only Soviet-American arms accord yet achieved covering both nuclear and nonnuclear weapons.

The third substantive arms agreement between 1961 and 1968 was the Nonproliferation Treaty. Although some sort of nonproliferation agreement had been mentioned as early as the mid-fifties, it remained secondary to a test ban arrangement. Still, the one area in which the two superpowers had been in almost unbroken agreement since the 1940's was their respective unwillingness to share nuclear secrets with their allies. This despite the massive quantities of military assistance—funds, advisers, and equipment—which both had lavished on their friends. The only U.S. exception was its 1958 agreement with Britain to share nuclear knowledge; the only Russian exception was its early atomic assistance to China in the 1950's, believed to have been withdrawn in 1960. These deviations aside, the basic consensus has been that the smaller the nuclear club the better. Otherwise, there would be no guarantee against a catalytic war with small powers setting off a conflict between the superpowers; likewise, there would be no way of keeping nuclear weapons from being used in local wars among third nations.

A central issue of the meetings of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in the midsixties was how to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. Many similar drafts were presented by both sides, yet there was no agreement until 1968. The problems were several. For one, the Soviets insisted that plans for the MLF be dropped before any nonproliferation agreement would be possible. Although the MLF was intended to keep nuclear weapons from Germany, the Russians’ fear was a possible German hegemony over this type of international nuclear force. Another area of difference was the nature of protection to be given those nonnuclear nations who signed the treaty. Third was the matter of inspection. Both the United States and U.S.S.R. favored International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) inspection of plants to insure their output was for only peaceful use. But while the superpowers were agreeing on the principle of inspection (because Soviet territory was not involved!), the members of Euratom were protesting against IAEA inspection, arguing that the chances for espionage within such a large international body were too great. Fourth, as the Soviets were striving with the Americans for a nonproliferation accord, their enthusiasm was at times diluted by the chilling Chinese attacks against their alleged conspiracy with the West.

Despite these obstacles, the events of June 1967 inspired progress. The 6-day war raised the specter of nuclear war in the Middle East. The Chinese nuclear test that same month underscored the possibility of Japan and India turning to independent nuclear self-defense capabilities.

The inspection issue was quickly resolved, as it was agreed that the IAEA would conduct inspection, contingent on each nation’s negotiating separately with that organ. An attempt to meet the security fears of the nonnuclear powers was made in a U.N. resolution proposed
jointly by the United States, the U.S.S.R., and Britain calling for prompt action against any nuclear aggression. This was the first real postwar example of Great Power cooperation designed to implement the Security Council's theoretical unity of purpose in the face of aggression.

The simultaneous signing in Washington and Moscow of 1 July 1968 of the Nonproliferation Treaty was possible only because that rare phenomenon in postwar politics had occurred: the prime antagonists had become the prime collaborators. The final success was a product of the conjuncture of interests between both nations. Despite their outstanding political differences, most notably Vietnam and the Middle East, there was enough room for agreement on the need to halt proliferation. The MLF was dead. There was no threat posed to Soviet national sovereignty. The Sino-Soviet dispute was at its most bitter level, and, no doubt, the Soviets needed the semblance of friendship from somebody. And the possibility of other nations soon feeling the need to develop their own nuclear capabilities had become all too real.

Despite these hopeful signs of partial agreement along the road to disarmament, the strategic race had far from leveled off. For the Soviets, the years after Cuba were years of substantial development in ABM, Fractional Orbit Bombardment Systems, and ICBM capability. For the United States, despite the quicksand of Vietnam, these years were not without strategic significance, particularly in the development of a multiple warhead, the Minuteman III, and the initial conversion to Poseidon.

In January 1968 the American Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara said that, "In terms of numbers of separately targetable, survivable, accurate, reliable warheads, our strategic forces are superior to those of the Soviet Union." Meanwhile, the Soviets were striving valiantly to surpass the United States. "From Soviet writers and from Soviet behavior... it seems clear that superiority in all realms... is a value cherished by the Soviet political and military leadership and a value worth great investment and effort." As this arms spiral went on, the Institute for Strategic Studies observed for 1967 what could well be said of the last several years of the 1961-68 period: "Undoubtedly, the great missed opportunity... was... a Soviet-American understanding on mutual restraint in new strategic technological developments...."

Still, as the period closed, there were some signs that perhaps the bridge of agreement which had been spanned during the 1960's in limited areas might be further enlarged to include other more significant areas. A nine-point Soviet statement at the signing of the Nonproliferation Treaty suggested in general terms a wide range of subjects for further discussion, including a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a ban on chemical and biological warfare, and the demilitarization of the seabed. What was most significant in this potpourri of themes was the expression for the first time of a willingness to discuss measures to limit nuclear weapons and strategic delivery vehicles.

The years 1961-68 covered the spectrum from the campaign for General and Complete Disarmament to the near outbreak of nuclear war. In between were sandwiched several areas of partial agreement. These included the "hot line," the agreement to limit production of certain fissionable materials, the Outer Space Treaty, and the Nonproliferation Treaty. While not as sweeping or encompassing as the more optimistic would have hoped, these accords still represented a considerable degree of progress toward arms control from the experience of earlier years.

These several areas of agreement were possible for various reasons. One, their limited nature; all left the United
States and the Soviet Union free to pursue their respective programs of military expansion. Two, the fact that none involved actual arms reductions or affected the military capability of either nation; none reduced U.S. superiority, and none limited Soviet efforts to redress the imbalance. Three, while each dealt with a matter of not inconsequential importance, they still dealt with matters peripheral to the arms race. Space was still of moot military value in 1967, and neither the test ban nor nonproliferation arrangements affected the production or deployment of nuclear weapons. Four, no international inspection organization was created by any of the agreements.

The willingness of the Soviets in July 1968 to discuss limits on strategic weapons systems presaged a new chapter in the struggle to reach a mutually satisfactory arms limitation agreement. The invasion of Czechoslovakia the next month and the 1968 American Presidential campaign delayed but could not postpone that chapter popularly known as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

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Despite the fact that this essay has focused on Soviet-American arms negotiations of the 1960’s, some observations on progress of the SALT talks to date seem appropriate, especially in view of the fact that SALT represents the first real effort to tackle the vital matter of strategic weapons.

Parity had made the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks possible. Our Polaris-Poseidon submarine fleet and greater progress on multiple warheads were balanced by both the more sophisticated Russian ABM system and massive 25 megaton SS-9 missile capability. While the United States surpassed the Soviet Union in 1969 in sheer numbers of missiles, it appeared likely that the Russian defense system could limit considerably the number of American missiles ultimately reaching target; in addition, the SS-9 could probably wipe out even our hardened Minuteman III silos.

In agreeing to the SALT talks, both sides decided not to let political questions interfere with progress. Further, it was initially agreed that limits on both offensive and defensive weapons were to be sought.

Despite these encouraging signs, progress in the five conferences to date has been negligible.

The basic U.S. proposal has called for a numerical ceiling on nuclear delivery systems—land-based ICBM’s, submarine carried missiles, and airborne bombs—that either side would be allowed to maintain. Changes would be permitted in the offensive forces within that ceiling; for example, substituting sea-based for land-based missiles. In addition, concerned with the rapid rate at which the SS-9 is being produced, we have urged a sublimit on deployment of that particular weapon. As a further part of the U.S. package, Washington’s chief negotiator, Gerald Smith, has stressed that the United States wants either a ban or limit on both nations’ ABM systems, including a control on missile defense radars.

The Soviets have, from the American point of view, been somewhat less than cooperative. In the fall of 1970 in Helsinki and the spring of 1971 in Vienna, they countered the entire U.S. package by proposing an ABM-only agreement. In making this suggestion the Soviets sought to confine the respective ABM systems to Moscow and Washington, restricting each network to about 100 missiles. But as President Nixon said in his state of the world message in February of this year, the U.S. position was still that any agreement at the SALT talks ought to cover not only defensive, but also offensive weapons.

The White House insistence on a
simultaneous treatment of both weapons stems from at least two factors. One is the concern that Soviet upgrading of the SA-5 surface-to-air missiles surrounding western Russian cities could make them integral components of any ABM network. Another is the argument that an ABM-only agreement would remove the main American bargaining chip. The hope has been that the nascent U.S. Safeguard system might be used in getting the Russians to limit their own SS-9 production. The fear is that if an ABM-only accord were achieved, the Soviets might balk further SALT negotiations and go back home to concentrate on increasing their ICBM capability which already outnumbers ours by some 1,500 to 1,054.

There has been another major area of disagreement as well that centers on the definitions of “strategic” and “tactical.” On the one hand, before shifting to its ABM-only stand, the U.S.S.R. had insisted that all nuclear weapons systems capable of reaching Soviet soil be included in any agreement on offensive weapons. To the United States this meant only bombers and land- and sea-based missiles; but to the Soviets it meant that the 500-odd U.S. aircraft on NATO bases and on 6th Fleet carriers in the Mediterranean he included. According to the U.S. argument, these are only tactical weapons and fall outside any strategic limitations agreement. On the other hand, the Soviets had refused to concede that their 700 intermediate-range missiles aimed at the heartland of Western Europe ought to be limited. They argued that these, too, are only tactical weapons for use in the event of a NATO invasion of Russia.

Yet, the road has not been all rocky despite these problems. For one, Soviet and American experts agreed in Vienna this past spring to improve the “hot line” joining Moscow and Washington by using two communications satellites, one American and one Russian. For another, agreement was also reached for joint planning to avoid World War III by an accidental missile launch by either superpower or by a third nation. As a result, data on the more sophisticated American fail-safe and electronic locks are being passed to the Soviets so that they might improve their own command and control safeguards on nuclear systems.

By far the most hopeful sign was the 20 May 1971 joint statement issued a week before the end of the fourth SALT round. That statement continued to be reflected in the fifth round. In essence, both countries said they would concentrate on limiting ABM’s and agree to “certain measures” with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons. Perhaps the Soviets have recognized that the cost and marginal effectiveness of such systems make them less vital than was once believed. From the U.S. point of view, the political pressure of an upcoming election year may well force the President’s hand. With his trip to China hopefully soon to become a reality, he would certainly like to have in his back pocket an agreement with the Soviets by the fall of 1972.

In any event, optimism rings the air. As one correspondent wrote from Helsinki last July:

Conference sources confidently speak of the possibility of a partial SALT agreement being reached before the end of the year. They note that both delegations arrived in Helsinki with instructions to work for “concrete” results and that the fifth round has made a good running start with ad hoc technical groups already working on the complete details involved in a specific treaty.23

Assuming that some ABM agreement is forthcoming, that still leaves the most prickly issues for a second stage SALT agreement, one which would presumably seek those “certain measures”
with respect to offensive weapons; specifically, this would be some kind of limit on bombers, missile submarines, ICBM's, and, above all, MIRV systems. The handling of these questions awaits the writing of a concluding and, hopefully, final chapter in these intricate postwar arms negotiations.

FOOTNOTES

6. One hundred fifty-six ICBM's and 144 Polaris missiles to 75 Soviet ICBM's. See Roberts, p. 59.
15. Officially known as the “Treaty Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Space.”
20. Ibid., p. 149.
22. Helsinki in late 1969; Vienna that next summer; Helsinki again in December 1970; Vienna in March of 1971; and then Helsinki.