Defending the Homeland: Historical Perspectives on Radicalism, Terrorism, and State Responses

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Beijing, and in Taipei and Washington as well.

For China, that means not allowing the island to become an independent state widely recognized by the international community of nations, but forcing or drawing Taiwan into reunification with the mainland. Beijing has frequently stated its willingness to use military force to prevent Taiwan’s independence, but Taipei seems to ignore it, while Washington continues to tread a tenuous line between the two. While Wachman focuses on policy-making motivation and attitudes in Beijing, he makes a significant contribution to our understanding of this complex and dangerous situation.

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Hicks, Melinda M., and C. Belmont Keeney, eds. Defending the Homeland: Historical Perspectives on Radicalism, Terrorism, and State Responses. Morgantown: West Virginia Univ. Press, 2007. 233pp. $27.50

Defending the Homeland is not about homeland defense as defined by the Defense Department—the military defense of U.S. territory from external attack. Rather, what the editors provide is a wide-ranging examination of, first, how the United States has responded to a variety of internal and external threats over its history and, second, how societal reactions to terrorism may unintentionally encourage the terrorist mind-set. The volume comprises nine academic essays from among those submitted to the 2005 Senator Rush D. Holt History Conference at West Virginia University.

As Jeffrey H. Norwitz notes in his introduction, “The greatest battle is to remain a nation of law in the face of a ruthless enemy who would consider this our weakness.” Illustrating the point, Ellen Schrecker surveys our history from the Alien and Sedition Acts to the first “red scare” of World War I, while coeditor Keeney tells the story of strikes and labor violence in West Virginia coalfields in the first three decades of the twentieth century. The writers conclude that we are too easily willing to suspend constitutional rights in the face of sometimes-specious threats to the nation. Even such a luminary as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes accepted limitations to freedom of speech in wartime, saying, “When a nation is at war, many things that might be said in time of peace . . . will not be endured so long as men fight . . . and no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.”

The book’s second section examines the factors that push activists toward radicalism and from radicalism ultimately to killing in the name of social justice or religious purity. For instance, according to Jean Burger’s essay on the role of women in revolutionary Russia, tsarist Russia contributed to its own demise by systematically eliminating any peaceful means of bringing education, health, and opportunity to the state’s peasants, industrial workers, or women. Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon points out that not only is there a wide variety of terrorisms but that the distinctions between terrorists and “people who use violence and are not called terrorists” grow ever thinner over time. We therefore need to take care that in the effort to perfect homeland security we do not
lose the body of tradition and law that defines our homeland.

The editors cover an ambitious amount of ground for such a slim volume, and the space available does not permit a variety of perspectives on each topic. An examination into the U.S. government’s reactions to racial and political unrest at home after the McCarthy era, for instance, would have been welcome. However, the book’s essays seem selected to provoke the reader to explore their subjects more deeply, and the contributions are uniformly well supported. The citations provide ample direction for readers wishing to explore on their own the issues presented.

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Counterinsurgency warfare is what used to be called “colonial warfare.” Although the association might make some people uncomfortable—Americans perhaps more than most, given their aversion to colonialism—much of the strategic intent and many of the tactics, techniques, and procedures of modern counterinsurgency derive directly from the colonial wars and police actions of the past.

In some respects riverine warfare suffers from the taint of colonialism more than do other aspects of counterinsurgency, a prejudice that is currently reinforced by the apparent trend for insurgents who worry the West to center their operations in urban rather than rural environments and to seek sanctuary in the anonymity of cities rather than remote countrysides. In many parts of the world, however, rivers remain the principal transport routes, and their control remains of fundamental importance to the success or failure of insurgent movements.

The last great colonial empire in Africa was Portuguese, and a history of the riverine campaigns fought in its defense between 1961 and 1974 is long overdue. John P. Cann, a retired Marine Corps University professor with a doctorate in African counterinsurgency from King’s College London, shows that the Portuguese took what they could from British and, particularly, French experiences and adapted it to suit their particular circumstances and the often limited resources at their disposal.

After placing the total effort in the strategic context of the Cold War, the historical context of twentieth-century Portuguese history, and the contemporaneous political context of the regime of António de Oliveira Salazar, Cann demonstrates how the Portuguese navy and naval infantry, the fuzileiros, fought an effective campaign in three diverse theaters: on the rivers of Angola; on the Rovuma River and Lake Niassa in Mozambique; and among the estuaries, deltas, and swamp forests of the West African enclave of Bissau.

Cann recounts with balance and clarity the lessons the Portuguese drew from the experience. Insurgency is political war where the center of gravity is the population. Consequently, the naval role differs very little from that of the army. The essence is to develop and maintain contact with the civilian population so close and regular that it often amounts to “armed social work.”