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The Tao of Spycraft: Intelligence Theory and Practice in Traditional China

John R. Arpin

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“justice as equal regard”—the equal right of besieged victims to have force used on their behalf.

Those of us who serve or have served in the military often draw our battle lines starkly: black and white, good and evil, us and them. This crucial book offers a chastening reminder not only of the many shades of gray needed to nuance a view of religion as it relates to global security in a confusing new age but also of the richly colorful tapestry woven by religious ideas and approaches to political problems. If that doesn't persuade, then simply recall the book's thesis: nations that respect religion's role in the world are far more secure than those that do not.

JOHN D. CARLSON
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy
Arizona State University



Sawyer, Ralph D. *The Tao of Spycraft: Intelligence Theory and Practice in Traditional China*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2004. 617pp.

Ralph Sawyer continues his work on Chinese political and military writings with *The Tao of Spycraft*. The title, however, may be somewhat misleading. Rather than compartmentalizing intelligence separate from other endeavors, Sawyer demonstrates how intelligence is an integral aspect of war, diplomacy, and politics.

A sampling of current war college articles shows a strong interest in “integrating all elements of national power,” for which the Defense Department uses the acronym DIME (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). Sawyer demonstrates that this was a common concept thousands of years ago in China.

Diplomatic maneuvers, economic inducements, propaganda, and whispering campaigns were all an essential element of statecraft. Most important, unlike our contemporary U.S. attitudes, intelligence was not isolated as some kind of supporting activity or a commodity accessed when needed but an integral part of all state activities.

The book is divided into six parts: Early History, Spycraft, Covert Activities, Theories of Evaluating and Intelligence, Military Intelligence, and Prognostication, Divination, and Nonhuman Factors. Each part contains several topical chapters, each rich with examples from Chinese history. For example, part 4 (Theories of Evaluating and Intelligence), chapter 10 (“Basic Theory and Issues”) provides a primer on critical thinking and evaluation as good as any contemporary U.S. intelligence text. It addresses analytic biases and prejudices, how to judge the reliability and credibility of sources, how to make assessments on limited information, and confidence levels of assessments—all issues the intelligence community must continually address.

Several common concepts run the length of the book. The first is the integration of intelligence into statecraft. Another is the view that intelligence is essentially a human endeavor. The statesman, the general, and the spy-master must understand both human nature in general and the personalities of their colleagues, allies, and enemies in particular.

This work is not without flaws. It cries out for maps, especially political maps of the “Spring and Autumn” and “Warring States” periods. The book assumes that the reader has a basic understanding of traditional Chinese history and

culture; some sections may be hard going for the casual reader. Parts of the book are rather dry; this reflects the extensive translations more than the author's style. But for serious students of China, intelligence tradecraft, or information operations, this book provides essential understanding of contemporary Chinese statecraft.

JOHN R. ARPIN
Major, U.S. Army Reserve (Ret.)
Centreville, Va.



Graham, Euan. *Japan's Sea Lane Security, 1940–2004: A Matter of Life and Death?* New York: Routledge, 2006. 320pp. \$115

As the first English-language analysis of its kind, Graham's comprehensive case study fills a critical gap in the literature concerning the maritime dimension of Japanese national security. This is an exciting issue at a dynamic time: in October 2004, Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and coast guard led Northeast Asia's first Proliferation Security Initiative exercise. In the Indian Ocean, the MSDF is currently fueling allied vessels to support operations in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Japan is struggling to assert control over its exclusive economic zones, the boundaries of which are increasingly contested by China and South Korea.

Graham (currently a British government researcher at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's North Asia and Pacific Research Group) draws on fresh, original sources, including Japanese-language documents and interviews with Japanese officials, to demonstrate that while Japan's defense and foreign policy have changed dramatically since

its opening up to the world in 1853, sea-lane security has been an enduring national security concern. Graham offers insight into Japanese leaders' and analysts' perceptions of their nation's own security context, thereby avoiding the tendency of much related scholarship to view matters exclusively through the prism of relations with the United States.

Graham situates resource-poor Japan in its geographic context: "Although at nearly 30,000 km, Japan's coastline is one-third longer than that of the United States, no inland point is more than 150 km from the sea." He explains Japan's historical concern with the security of its sea lines of communication (SLOC), citing official Diet testimony that "the greatest cause of [Japan's World War II] defeat was the loss of shipping" to the Allied blockade. Graham records a recent manifestation of Japanese SLOC concerns: Prime Minister (1996–98) Ryutaro Hashimoto's worry that "many commercial flights and aircraft [were] forced to divert around those areas affected" by China's March 1996 missile tests, during which "some of the missiles landed in waters only 60 km from [Japan's] Yonaguni island." Graham's analysis is well written, organized, and documented; based on numerous, very current data; and highly accessible to the reader. It is thus an essential reference for analysts of East Asian security.

Given this significant achievement, one hopes that Graham and other scholars will conduct follow-up research concerning such areas relevant to Japan's future SLOC security as China's maritime legal and naval development. Some assessments may need to be revisited as additional data becomes available. For