America’s Viceroys: The Military and U.S. Foreign Policy

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Matheson documents most of the recurring concerns in sanctions (problems with enforcement, collateral consequences, and possible legal limits on sanctions), peacekeeping operations (tensions produced by the principles of consent and impartiality applicable to Chapter VI peacekeeping operations), and the use of force. Also provided is a most welcome description of the various UN technical commissions and of the criminal tribunals established by the Security Council to address crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. His descriptions are concise, accurate, and well documented.

This book admirably serves its descriptive role and supports the author’s thesis regarding the council’s post–Cold War renaissance. In the end, however, one comes away feeling that the UN has been largely spared critical scrutiny in this book, that the writer, though eminently well qualified to take us through a more focused and prescriptive treatment of this vital international institution, stopped short. Now that Matheson has piqued our interest, perhaps he will provide us with those additional insights in a sequel—one that draws out the lessons to be learned from the “re-nascent” Security Council’s response to the acknowledged threats to international peace and security posed by Iran’s nuclear programs and the genocide in Darfur.

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In 2000, Washington Post reporter Dana Priest wrote a series of articles on the rising importance of the regional combatant commanders, comparing them to modern-day “proconsuls” whose Roman forebears served as regional governors and commanders in chief of their military forces. Reveron’s America’s Viceroys examines this comparison, providing a historical and contemporary analysis of contemporary regional combatant commanders and their rising influence in the foreign policy-making arena. (While the implications of this rising trend are left to the reader, nowhere does the book imply that our combatant commanders are present-day Caesars, about to cross the Rubicon and seize Rome.) The last chapter of Reveron’s book expertly examines their rising power and influence on traditional civil-military relations. In short, he finds, administrations use the military in non-warfighting ways, because of its size, capabilities, and “can-do” culture.

It is somewhat ironic that it was the military services and the Pentagon that fought hardest to prevent the ascendency of the regional combatant commanders. Four decades of legislative changes to the Department of Defense and military mistakes from World War II to DESERT ONE finally culminated in passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This act finally gave unity of command to the combatant commanders and reduced the service chiefs to the secondary role of training and equipping their forces. In hindsight, however, it was the Department of State, not the service chiefs, who suffered the greatest loss of influence with this change.

The regional combatant commanders today are considered by many within the U.S. government to be policy entrepreneurs. Each commands a large staff, oversees a huge budget, and travels frequently within his region to promote U.S. interests. In fact, our national security strategy now directs regional combatant commanders to engage with regional allies and promote theater security cooperation. A regional viewpoint and focus, instead of the country-specific view represented by U.S. ambassadors, makes combatant commanders ideally suited to promote and implement security agreements with heads of state. Their enormous resources and regional access dwarf the capabilities of the State Department, whose process of policy formulation still resides in Washington, D.C. In contrast, regional commanders are out on the ramparts daily, just like the proconsuls or British viceroys in the days of empire.

In this aspect, readers will find much of value in the book. As Reveron points out, there is a paucity of scholarly research on the subject of foreign policy making by regional combatant commanders and their subsequent encroachment into traditional fields of international relations. Anthony Zinni, a retired Marine Corps general and former commander of U.S. Central Command, describes the book in these terms: “Derek Reveron has put together an excellent work describing the controversial role of our nation’s combatant commanders. It is an insightful, accurate, and provocative presentation of the issues and history done by first-rate contributors who clearly know the subject.” The book is well suited for midcareer officers and students of international relations who are about to enter the field of national security policy making. While the cost of the hardcover edition will certainly deter all but the most avid readers of foreign policy, the paperback is now available for $26.95.

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At least since medieval expert Lynn White’s controversial argument that the stirrup was responsible for the demise of feudalism, historians have highlighted the seminal role of technology in social change. Paul Gillespie’s compelling, compact history of precision guided munitions (PGMs) is unlikely to raise such an acrimonious debate, but he has provided a valuable contribution to the study of technology and society and, more specifically, to the rapidly growing body of literature concerning the “revolution in military affairs.”

The great advantage of Gillespie’s book is its focus on a single, obviously significant military technology and on that technology’s effect on national security policy. The book traces the history of PGMs from World War I; the grainy picture of a destroyed bridge on the dust cover turns out to be, somewhat surprisingly, not the “Vietnam poster child” for PGMs (the notorious Tranh Hoa Bridge) but a bridge destroyed by an early guided bomb in Burma during World War II. Some readers may find a few of Gillespie’s claims a bit too “Air Force laudatory,” but one should expect...