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## Dark Victory: America's Second War against Iraq,

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Dallaire is especially hard on France, Britain, and the United States for their refusal to provide assistance or authorize the UN to take timely measures to block the massacre. He attributes their inaction in part to France's other interests in the region (the president's son is said to have had business interests in Rwanda) and to fear in the Clinton administration of another Somalia debacle. (Although Dallaire does not mention it, the Clinton administration's lack of response was to have severe consequences for the United States when Osama Bin Laden interpreted its unwillingness to act as American weakness.) Dallaire is not easy on Canada either. He refuses in his book to place blame on anyone within the UN leadership; however, in a later interview with a San Francisco radio talk-show host, Dallaire thoroughly castigated Boutros-Ghali as having been more responsible than anyone else for the genocide.

Command of UNAMIR had profound effects on the Canadian general, among them post-traumatic stress disorder. When he was relieved and returned to Canada, he was offered, and he accepted, the number-two post in the Canadian army. Haunted by his experience in Rwanda, he retired before his term ended. This is an excellent example of a good and highly competent man deeply disturbed by international failures and the Machiavellian tactics of world powers. His experience with the United Nations raises the question of how far a military commander should go in honoring orders from civilian authority. The precedent of the Nuremberg trials provides military officers with sanction to refuse orders that would produce sins of commission. But what about the "sins of omission"? There are no precedents,

which arguably prevented Dallaire from taking measures to block the genocide.

In the book's preface, Dallaire recounts how a retired army chaplain asked him if he still believed in God after his African experience. His reply was "yes, because he had shaken hands with the Devil." The work has had wide success in Canada but not as yet in the United States. (The American reader should note that morning or evening "prayers" refers to staff consultations, not religious observances.) *Shake Hands with the Devil* is an important book and should be read by every military officer and senior noncommissioned officer.

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Record, Jeffrey. *Dark Victory: America's Second War against Iraq*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2005. 205pp. \$49.90

Jeffrey Record is one of the nation's most experienced and respected defense analysts. His latest critique of the 2003 Iraq war, *Dark Victory*, provides many important insights into the reasons for the war and for its successes and failures. More generally, this work is a case study of the challenges of transforming military victory into a victory with meaningful and lasting strategic impact. In many ways this book focuses on the critical difference between "war fighter" and "war winner," and on the fact that conflict termination and its aftermath are at least as critical as any phase of battle proper.

Record, however, writes as a critic of a war he does not believe in, and of a nation-building process he sees as a

nearly disastrous failure. His book is a policy argument, not a dispassionate analysis, and needs to be read as such. There are also times when his focus on the argument gets in the way of his analysis.

Chapter 1, for example, contrasts the invasion of Iraq in 2003 with the 1990–91 Gulf war. It raises a number of valid arguments about the difference between the consensus building in the first war and the somewhat unilateral nature of the second, but it also implies that the United States could have toppled Saddam’s regime by extending the war long enough to destroy the Republican Guards or by some undefined actions to support the Kurdish and Shi’ite uprisings. It does not really address the fact that the U.S. and coalition forces were even less prepared for stability operations and nation building in 1991 than was the Bush administration for the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

More importantly, chapter 1 raises problems that as yet no analyst of war and its aftermath has convincingly addressed for either Iraq wars or other modern conflicts. Like the chapters that follow, it does not discuss the practical challenges in moving from limited war to total war or the problems inherent in the unpredictable nature of stability operations and nation building.

Record’s analysis of the failures of both Bush administrations to deal with the aftermath of military victory is remarkably insightful, but it is far from clear that the postwar situation in Iraq was in fact controllable or that a successful process of conflict termination and nation building could have been put in place. As Record points out in many other areas of his discussion, the fact that the United States is a superpower does not mean that

severe limits do not exist on what it can and cannot do; the broader question that surrounds the current nation-building effort in Iraq is whether any such effort on this scale can work.

This same issue pervades Record’s criticism of neoconservative ideology, theory, and practice in chapter 2 and thereafter. It simply is not clear that “realists,” pragmatists, or “neoliberals” would ultimately be able to achieve lasting strategic success. Certainly, remembering the arrogance and failures of the Rostow brothers (Walt and Eugene), McGeorge Bundy, and Robert McNamara, this reviewer had a horrible feeling of *déjà vu* when reading through Record’s discussion of the failures of the policy makers of the George W. Bush administration. The impact was strikingly similar to that of the conclusion of George Orwell’s *Animal Farm* (originally published in 1945): The leaders of the Bush administration’s war on Iraq became difficult to distinguish from the leaders of the Kennedy-Johnson administrations’ war in Vietnam. It also became painfully clear that the aptness of the phrase “lions led by donkeys” has long outlived World War I.

Record’s analysis of the practical problems in how the administration has handled conflict termination, stability operations, and nation building is extremely useful. To know what needs to be done right you have to know what has been done wrong, and Record does an excellent job of addressing the weaknesses in the “Bush doctrine,” the differences between Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden, the problems with U.S. war aims, the rationale for the war, and the failure to size or shape the invasion force for nation building. Record’s critique may not be balanced or objective,

but it is all the more useful for this. Record presents a clearly defined thesis that is to be rejected or accepted, and that makes the reader focus on the major strategic issues of the war.

The last two chapters deal with the "peace" that followed Saddam's fall and its broader implications for the future exercise of American power. Anyone interested in the transformation of the U.S. military, future grand strategy, and dealings with conflict termination should read these chapters. One way or another, the United States is going to have to deal with such issues again and again, as long as it is the world's preeminent military power. Even if the United States can eventually meet some definition of "success" in Iraq, it will still have to deal with the lingering impact of political and strategic mistakes that Record describes so well at the end of *Dark Victory*.

In short, this is a remarkably insightful book, one that raises precisely the issues that need to be resolved when assessing the Iraq war and shaping an American strategic posture for the future.

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Ganor, Boaz. *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 2005. 334pp. \$39.95

Among a cacophony of authors on terrorism writing since September 2001 is a small but refreshing group who offer specific, pragmatic, and tested solutions. Boaz Ganor joins this select few with a book aptly subtitled *A Guide for Decision Makers*. Ganor splendidly

captures inescapable fundamental truths. First, defining terrorism is fraught with politics, emotion, and legal quandaries; however, the world must reach a consensus in order to move toward solutions. Second, democracies are uniquely vulnerable to terrorism, and they are struggling with the question of whether to treat terrorism as a crime or as a method of war. Third, efforts to counter terrorism must be multigenerational. Finally, decision makers can and must take steps to inoculate society against the effects of terrorism, through a comprehensive education campaign.

This book is based on Ganor's doctoral dissertation, *Israel's Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, written for the Hebrew University. Israel is the only liberal democracy in the Middle East. Using the Israeli model, Ganor observes that democracies are uniquely vulnerable to terrorism where government must defend itself yet maintain principles of transparency, rule of law, and representative governance while remaining mindful of world opinion. Ganor explores ten explicit dilemmas that face democratic nations: defining the threat; defining counterterrorism; employing intelligence; deterrence policy; choosing offensive and defensive actions; public opinion and ethics; legislative and punitive policies; media coverage; damage to societal morale; and finally, dilemmas concerning international cooperation.

Ganor warns that if terrorism remains a subjective concept influenced by one's point of view, solutions will be similarly amorphous. Without consensus on the definition of what constitutes terrorism, global efforts to defeat it will fail. Ganor begins with a well considered definition of terrorism, including a rigorous analysis of why