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Forging the Shield: Eisenhower and National Security for the 21st Century,

Douglas Kinnard

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Dwight D. Eisenhower's greatest achievement as president came in the area of foreign policy and related defense matters. In the making and managing of strategic policy he was a strong, active, and effective leader. This book is an uneven collection of essays devoted to Eisenhower’s presidential influence on foreign policy and national security, essays that were presented at a symposium held in January 2005 at the National Defense University.

The lead paper, “Reflections on Eisenhower, the Cold War, and My Father,” by Sergei N. Khrushchev, provides an interesting recollection of Nikita Khrushchev’s attitude toward Eisenhower and the United States. According to Sergei Khrushchev, a Brown University professor and himself a veteran of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, his father, like many veterans of the “Great Patriotic War,” viewed Eisenhower as a former comrade in arms and thus welcomed his election as president. The elder Khrushchev was highly respectful of the danger posed by potential nuclear war and sought only equality in relations with the United States and the Eisenhower administration. Questions emerge as to how much new information Sergei Khrushchev’s memoir-analysis reveals, and how much is a son’s defense of a father. However, to a large segment of students, Professor Khrushchev’s reflections provide an interesting look at the key foreign power’s opposing viewpoint during the Eisenhower presidency.

The collection’s strongest work is Alan Millet’s “Eisenhower and the Korean War.” It was a conflict that Eisenhower inherited when elected and one that he knew he had to end. Millet traces Ike’s indirect involvement from the period when he was chief of staff after World War II until his pledge in the 1952 campaign that if elected “I shall go to Korea,” a pledge that Eisenhower understood needed rapid redemption.

With considerable insight Millet traces Eisenhower’s efforts to end the war and provide a defense policy for the long haul, based on concepts that Ike later set forth in his memoir. These concepts relied on deterrence, stressed the role of nuclear technology, placed heavy reliance on allied land forces around the Soviet periphery, and emphasized economic strength through reduced defense budgets. The outcome was the New Look strategy of the 1950s.

R. Cargill Hall’s essay, “Clandestine Victory,” is a competent account of the development of increasingly sophisticated aircraft and early satellites tasked with aerial surveillance and of the intelligence they provided, as well as of their influence on decision making. However, the paper deteriorates into an argument for further eye-in-the-sky commitments to counter twenty-first-century terrorism. Hall’s argument seems more public relations for an institutional constituency than a reasoned scholarly analysis and conclusion. Terrorism, at its most effective and frightening, depends on surreptitious individual initiatives that in general defy large-scale overhead surveillance.

One area that perhaps could have been developed more explicitly is Eisenhower’s role and technique in controlling the defense budgetary process and strategic dialogue within his administration. His principal secretaries of
defense were functionalists, and Eisenhower viewed their primary role as one of keeping the Pentagon programs within the budget, which was important for carrying out his conservative fiscal goals. On strategic matters, Eisenhower dealt directly with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and thus usurped an important portion of the secretary of defense’s role. He respected his secretaries as businessmen but in effect insisted on being his own secretary of defense.

Thematic throughout this collection is a focus on Asia and Europe. By stressing Eisenhower’s response to grand strategy, relations with Moscow, the interrelationship of politico-military-industrial and techno-scientific affairs, and trouble spots in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, the book ignores the twenty-first-century challenges posed for contemporary U.S. defense and foreign policy in the Southern Hemisphere—Africa and Latin America.

For the sophisticated and knowledgeable scholar, Forging the Shield likely contains little new information, but it will prove valuable to defense policy and military history students needing exposure to the Eisenhower era.

DOUGLAS KINNARD
author of President Eisenhower and Strategy Management


Charles Schencking, in charting Japan’s creation of the world’s third-largest navy by 1922, illuminates the workings of the Japanese political system and the evolution of both interservice rivalries and civil-military relations in the decades preceding World War II. He bases his history on an impressive reading of Japanese and English-language primary and secondary sources to produce a story with political implications far beyond the history of one service.

When the Meiji reformers took power in 1868, their minimal naval forces were part of their land forces. In 1871, over the objections of the army, the Military Ministry was subdivided into two ministries, army and navy. In order to secure funding to create a modern fleet, the navy soon allied with the Satsuma clans, while clans from Chōshū were already allied with the army. Together these clans brought the Meiji reformers to power. The opening of the Diet in 1890 brought fears among the clans that democracy would erode their power. Therefore, they solidified their ties with the army and navy. Thus highly politicized interservice rivalries were inherent in the Japanese political system.

Initial Diets were hostile to military funding. War with China in 1894–95, however, transformed the public perception of the navy from a financial burden into a service vital to Japan’s national security and domestic prosperity. This, combined with the large war indemnity from China, produced massive naval budgetary increases. The naval mission expanded from defense of the home islands to command of the sea and defense of the empire. The navy continued to press for a combat mission independent of the army, which retained responsibility for national defense and command over naval forces in wartime. Interservice