Making Waves: Politics, Propaganda, and the Emergence of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1868–1922,

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defense were functionalists, and Eisenhower viewed their primary role as one of keeping the Pentagon programs within the budget, which was important for carrying out his conservative fiscal goals. On strategic matters, Eisenhower dealt directly with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and thus usurped an important portion of the secretary of defense’s role. He respected his secretaries as businessmen but in effect insisted on being his own secretary of defense.

Thematic throughout this collection is a focus on Asia and Europe. By stressing Eisenhower’s response to grand strategy, relations with Moscow, the interrelationship of politico-military-industrial and techno-scientific affairs, and trouble spots in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, the book ignores the twenty-first-century challenges posed for contemporary U.S. defense and foreign policy in the Southern Hemisphere—Africa and Latin America.

For the sophisticated and knowledgeable scholar, Forging the Shield likely contains little new information, but it will prove valuable to defense policy and military history students needing exposure to the Eisenhower era.

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Charles Schencking, in charting Japan’s creation of the world’s third-largest navy by 1922, illuminates the workings of the Japanese political system and the evolution of both interservice rivalries and civil-military relations in the decades preceding World War II. He bases his history on an impressive reading of Japanese and English-language primary and secondary sources to produce a story with political implications far beyond the history of one service.

When the Meiji reformers took power in 1868, their minimal naval forces were part of their land forces. In 1871, over the objections of the army, the Military Ministry was subdivided into two ministries, army and navy. In order to secure funding to create a modern fleet, the navy soon allied with the Satsuma clans, while clans from Chōshū were already allied with the army. Together these clans brought the Meiji reformers to power. The opening of the Diet in 1890 brought fears among the clans that democracy would erode their power. Therefore, they solidified their ties with the army and navy. Thus highly politicized interservice rivalries were inherent in the Japanese political system.

Initial Diets were hostile to military funding. War with China in 1894–95, however, transformed the public perception of the navy from a financial burden into a service vital to Japan’s national security and domestic prosperity. This, combined with the large war indemnity from China, produced massive naval budgetary increases. The naval mission expanded from defense of the home islands to command of the sea and defense of the empire. The navy continued to press for a combat mission independent of the army, which retained responsibility for national defense and command over naval forces in wartime. Interservice
rivalries intensified. The navy assiduously cultivated popular support among politicians, journalists, disenfranchised former samurai, and entrepreneurs who dreamed of an empire in the South Seas.

The navy used World War I to seize German colonies and implement its “southward advance” strategy for expanding the empire in the Pacific region. The war also transformed Japan from a debtor into a creditor nation. These changed circumstances finally allowed a Seiyūkai-navy alliance to deliver greatly increased postwar naval budgets. Previously, the naval budget had occasionally exceeded the army budget, but from 1917 to 1922 it did so consistently and massively.

In response to those who believe that Japan’s military muzzled its civil leaders in World War II and that this accounts for Japan’s rampage through the Pacific, Schencking’s book shows that the political parties had always worked closely with the military and that, conversely, the military had always been deeply involved in politics. This meant ever-deepening interservice rivalries, and also incomplete and incompatible war plans that would spell disaster for Japan and much of Asia and the Pacific in World War II.

For nonspecialists, additional allusions to political and budgetary issues beyond naval appropriations would have put the subject of the book into a broader context. Nevertheless, Schencking provides one of the best descriptions of the inner workings of the Japanese political system and for future Japanese military strategy.

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Jeremy Black deliberately titled his book to link it with two classics, works that every maritime historian knows: C. R. Boxer’s *The Dutch Seaborne Empire* (1965) and J. H. Parry’s *The Spanish Seaborne Empire* (1966). The planned volume in that series that would have provided an overview of the British Empire was never completed, although nearly twenty years later D. B. Quinn and A. N. Ryan filled the gap for the early phase with their *England’s Sea Empire, 1550–1642* (1983). Black’s contribution shows a significantly different approach as well as a much broader and more nuanced view of the general theme.

Jeremy Black is a prolific writer who has become widely known for his broad, sweeping histories of British foreign policy in the eighteenth century and of the history of European and world warfare, as well as for his insightful studies of maps and cartography. He is fully experienced and eminently well qualified to attempt a broad-based study such as this.

Although Black’s title suggests a general history of the British Empire, his detailed focus is not on the earliest period but on the three hundred years from the Union of Scotland and England in 1707 to the present. To provide linkages,