2005

NATO and the Former Yugoslavia:

Tom Fedyszyn

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review

Recommended Citation
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss1/12

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.
states. We might infer from Simon’s books that he is skeptical of NATO’s transformative capacity and truly does view the evolution of civil-military relations as primarily a domestically generated phenomenon. This would be a difficult conclusion to defend, however, given that Simon himself points out that NATO made the Czech-Slovak relationship much easier to manage after the split than it otherwise would have been. Beyond that single, very important insight, the reader is left wondering whether the logic of NATO’s stabilizing capacity could be extended elsewhere.

In all likelihood, NATO’s inclusiveness has not only stabilized relations between states in Central Europe and between Russia and former Soviet satellites, but it also improved the quality of a range of domestic institutions throughout the region. Speculating about postcommunist Europe without NATO’s engagement, one imagines a historically vulnerable set of states with all the domestic dysfunctions that accompany acute military insecurity. All of the democratic adaptations that NATO requires to improve the interface with its members and consolidate a particular set of values would have been the subject of protracted debate. Moreover, without NATO’s support, those values, even in the most Western-oriented societies, might never have prevailed. There is indeed evidence of the contingent nature of democratic civil-military relations, it is worth asking where these countries would be if NATO had never introduced the norm as a desirable and functional feature of democratic governance.

For those concerned with NATO’s impact on the region, Simon’s series is, of course, an invaluable resource in understanding exactly what happened. Yet one has to look further than Simon to see the subtle, as well as the not-so-subtle, ways in which NATO has transformed the politics of postcommunist Europe. Now would be a particularly apt time for Simon to contribute to the debate about whether NATO has salutary political effects, because as the strategic environment has worsened, the United States in particular is manifesting less interest in the quality of democratic institutions in new member states than in foreign policy support for wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although cultivating policy loyalty might be politically expedient, NATO could be missing an opportunity afforded by the transition’s political and institutional fluidity to facilitate reforms that would not only improve the quality of domestic governance but also help consolidate a widening democratic community.

RACHEL EPSTEIN
Graduate School of International Studies
University of Denver

As the world steps farther away from the Cold War, the evolving structure of the international system continues to fascinate informed citizens as well as professional scholars. In this work, Joyce Kaufman, professor of political science at Whittier College, contributes to the debate on the evolution and future of the Atlantic Alliance, particularly as the situation in the Balkans confronted a post–Cold War (and expanding) NATO. In detailing the events between the collapse of Soviet communism (1990) and the attack on the twin towers (2001), the author makes a forceful case for the need for a unified NATO alliance that is willing to use force if necessary to quell international instabilities.

Kaufman’s effort is particularly helpful in plotting the movement of theory into practice in international relations. While no one at NATO headquarters in 1990 suggested that the world had not materially changed with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the alliance’s premier strategists could only make reasonable guesses about this “new world,” as they drew up the alliance’s Strategic Concept of 1991. It took the decade-long dissolution of the former Yugoslavia to force alliance planners to appreciate the detailed complexities of this world.

In one sense, this book is merely a confirmation of much of the conventional wisdom on diplomatic theory and the operations of alliances. On numerous occasions the author explicitly makes the point that diplomatic threats without military power are in vain; collective decision making is tortured, difficult, and slow; domestic politics intrude on the capacity to be statesmanlike; and the absence of a clear enemy provides an inducement for an alliance to lose focus. However, as Kaufman develops the story with names, personalities, and events, the reader can watch these theories come to life.

No one expects that alliance strategy would be made in a vacuum, and this work clearly and persuasively shows how constraints of domestic politics must be factored into NATO politics. Of particular interest to makers of American foreign policy is Kaufman’s documentation of how the United States evolved from an attitude that the Balkans was a “European problem” to being the alliance’s most forceful advocate for military intervention.

This work’s principal flaw is that its sources are almost exclusively official NATO documents and interviews with the people directly associated with those documents. The story is told from NATO’s viewpoint by someone who spoke to insiders but was not herself a member. Unfortunately, this provides the reader with a conventional, albeit well supported, interpretation of events.

However, this work’s positive attributes overwhelm this shortcoming. This easy-to-read historical account provides significant value for the student of international affairs, because it documents a perfect contemporary test case of how alliances evolve in the face of a changing security environment. While most pundits saw the Balkans as the most likely spot for crisis and conflict in Europe a decade ago, few would have guessed that the NATO alliance would have ultimately achieved such a preeminent role in its resolution. Indeed, just prior to the signing of the London Declaration in 1990, numerous editorials were suggesting that while NATO had done an admirable job during the Cold
War, we should make preparations to "turn out the lights" in Brussels. Today, as we find ourselves involved in a global war on terrorism, the United States is faced with a similar quandary. Does NATO have the capacity, flexibility, and will to engage the international terrorist movement? Do our European allies view the threat of terrorism as we do, allowing for unity of action and willingness to use force? Do adversaries such as al-Qa’ida allow the alliance to consider the entire globe its ultimate area of responsibility? Can NATO, as Madeleine Albright asked, move to a more expansive concept of collective security? These questions may also require a decade to resolve, but Kaufman previews the kind of difficulties the alliance is likely to encounter en route and sheds some light on the ultimate answers.

TOM FEDYSZYN
Naval War College


The late Washington Post publisher Philip Graham once said that journalism is the first draft of history. Todd S. Purdum’s A Time of Our Choosing: America’s War in Iraq, is the first draft of the history of the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Months before the Department of Defense made the controversial decision to embed reporters within U.S. units, Purdum was in Iraq reporting the war.

The military’s major criticism of the practice is that those assigned to the same unit throughout the campaign would only have a “soda straw” view of the war and would thus miss the big picture. Others (primarily the media) were concerned that reporters would lose their objectivity once the shooting started. However, Purdum’s professional work puts that argument to bed. Early on, Purdum states that his task was to “draw the work of my colleagues into a single narrative.” In other words his job was to bring those “soda straws” together into a comprehensive and concise chronicle of the war. He certainly has the necessary credentials for the task—he has worked for the New York Times for over twenty-five years and is a former White House and diplomatic correspondent.

Although Purdum’s narrative style is appealing, it is his ability to bring together all the different material that makes this book hard to put down. One reads of the Bush administration’s intensive efforts to convince a skeptical world of its case for invasion and of the debate over UN Security Council Resolution 1441. Divisions deepened as Secretary of State Colin Powell and France’s charismatic foreign minister Dominique de Villepin both courted the United Nations and public opinion. Meanwhile, military planning proceeded at the Pentagon and U.S. Central Command. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, expecting the Iraq army to implode, deployed a force much smaller than that of the nearly 550,000 troops in Operation DESERT STORM. Their plan was a test of a new American style of warfare that engaged large numbers of special operations forces and used highly accurate precision weapons and new technology in the form of unmanned aerial vehicles.