At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations since 1942,

Bruce Elleman
The book’s primary focus is the relentless twenty-one-day fight to Baghdad by the Marines on the right flank and the Army on the left flank. Purdum excels in tying together all the resulting reporting. What emerges is a factual and very human account of the intense ground campaign. Included are events of 23 March, which saw the ambush of the 507th Maintenance Company and the devastating losses suffered by the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment. The brief campaign also saw some excellent soldiering, such as the feint and race for the Karbala Gap and the “Thunder Run” armored thrusts into central Baghdad. Ever the concise chronicler, Purdum also discusses the northern front that was opened by the airdrop of a thousand paratroopers, and the operations conducted by the British in and around Basra. Purdum weaves all this together in such a way as to make this work an excellent read for military professionals and armchair strategists alike. It is a bit thin on the air and naval aspects of the war, due to the lack of threat posed by the Iraqi air force and navy and because the bulk of the embedded reporters accompanied ground units.

One of the successes of the program, however, was how the reporting brought out the human side of the war. Purdum discusses numerous examples of how the war directly affected such individuals as the U.S. Army officer who, after witnessing the results of an air strike, commented, “It’s a helluva thing watching people die,” or how an Iraqi man, his hands swollen from recent beatings by Iraqi security forces, emotionally thanked the Americans for saving him.

The book’s main strength—its immediacy in telling the whole story of the conflict—is also a major drawback. Toward his conclusion, Purdum recounts the events of July 2003 surrounding the deaths of Saddam Hussein’s infamous sons, Uday and Qusay. One of the vexing questions remaining was the whereabouts of Saddam Hussein. The coalition would wonder about the fate of the former Iraqi leader for another five months. The book concludes before Saddam’s capture in December.

Future historians and scholars will no doubt revisit this war and debate endlessly on the merits of preemptive self-defense, the effectiveness of the coalition of the willing, and whether the outcome achieved was the one desired. For now, however, Todd Purdum’s *A Time of Our Choosing* will more than suffice as the first draft of history.

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For years, “one China” has meant two completely different Chinas masquerading as one country—the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan (a.k.a. the Republic of China [ROC]). The PRC is huge, with a population of 1.3 billion, while Taiwan has only twenty-two million people in comparison. There are other differences as well: Taiwan is rich, with a per capita income in 2003 of over $23,000, versus the PRC’s per capita $5,000; Taiwan’s 5 percent unemployment rate is half, its 1 percent poverty rate is a tenth, and its seventy-seven-year life expectancy is
five years more than those of the PRC. More importantly, during the past decade Taiwan adopted a multiparty democracy, while the PRC has only one legal political party that is holding tightly onto its autocratic powers—the Chinese Communist Party.

How can two such divergent Chinas possibly reunite? What role has the United States played in their sixty-year standoff? These are the questions that Richard C. Bush, former chairman and managing director (September 1997 to June 2002) of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT—the pseudo–American embassy in Taipei), asks in *At Cross Purposes*.

Bush starts with an extremely useful historical summary of the origins of the PRC-Taiwan problem. He asks, for example, what would have happened if Chiang Kai-shek had not requested in 1942–43 that Japan cede Taiwan to China. Would there even be a PRC-Taiwan problem today? After all, China at one point considered, then rejected, demanding Okinawa as well. If circumstances had been different, could Taiwan have remained a part of Japan or a UN protectorate, or even been given its independence?

Bush argues that the great powers’ (the United States, the United Kingdom, and China) decision at Cairo to return Taiwan to China was the real origin of the “one China” problem, even though cross-strait tensions did not erupt until after the Nationalist retreat from the mainland in 1949. To this day, the PRC Decision, by lobbing “test” missiles off Taiwan’s shores.

After World War II, the U.S. government quickly found itself in a dilemma, since it appeared obliged to support the repressive Kuomintang. February 28, 1947, was the beginning of the massacre by the Nationalists, who arrested and killed hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Taiwanese; it was followed by an era known as the “White Terror.” Nationalist repression on Taiwan continued for more than three decades, until 10 December 1979 and the Kaohsiung Incident, which was the turning point in Taiwan’s transition to democracy.

Following Washington’s decision to recognize the People’s Republic of China in 1978 (part of America’s Cold War strategy aimed at the Soviet Union), Taipei’s increasing dependence on Washington for security actually gave the United States greater leverage to sponsor democratic reforms. Thus, quixotically, democratic reforms in Taiwan appear to have been spurred rather than halted by U.S. recognition of the PRC.

It is understandable that Bush, as former head of the American Institute of Taiwan, would want to credit U.S. diplomats and government officials with sponsoring Taiwan’s democratic development (one chapter even investigates the impact of the U.S. Congress and Taiwanese-Americans on this process). Granted, this is a subject he knows well; however, lest Taiwanese democracy be mistaken as simply an American knock-off, even Bush is forced to admit that these non-Taiwanese factors “made but a tertiary contribution to the democratization of Taiwan” when compared to the impact of Taiwanese reformers both inside and outside of the Nationalist
party. For better or worse, Taiwan’s democracy is completely homegrown.

To evaluate how Taiwan’s democracy and the Sino-U.S. Cold War diplomacy impacts relations today, Bush discusses the four diplomatic communiqués and congressional acts that have regulated U.S.-PRC-Taiwanese relations, including the Shanghai communiqué (1972), the U.S.-PRC normalization communiqué (1978), the Taiwan Relations Act (1979), and the U.S.-PRC communiqué on arms sales to Taiwan (1982). The commitments included in these four “sacred texts” were not trivial and have created fixed constraints on Washington’s and Beijing’s behavior. Although necessary to defeat the Soviets, these diplomatic agreements have often worked to the PRC’s advantage in putting diplomatic pressure on Taiwan to accept its “one country, two systems” formula.

As for what will happen in the future to this “one China” conundrum, Bush cautions that Taiwan’s recent democratic reforms have not given twelve million voting Taiwanese their own seat at the table in any future cross-strait talks leading to Chinese reunification. Democracy will make any satisfactory political solution of the PRC-Taiwan divide even more difficult to negotiate. He cautions, therefore, that the “Taiwan and China positions are sufficiently at odds that they cannot be papered over. If the stalemate is to be broken peacefully, either Beijing will have to abandon one country, two systems, or Taipei will have to accept it.” Since neither of these options appears likely, one is forced to conclude that PRC-Taiwan reunification can only be accomplished as a result of war.

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This book offers a rich collection of research papers on very important topics: the much discussed revolution in military affairs (RMA), and the less discussed diffusions of new military technology and the accompanying changes in military doctrine to other countries. The authors were carefully chosen experts in history, political science, and sociology, who address the very important factors of national culture as they affect the application of new military technologies.

The product of a series of workshops, this work owes a considerable debt to the prodding of Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, who has been encouraging scholarly analysis of the full implications of the RMA. Although recognizing the ambiguities relating to the exact definition of such a “revolution,” the book does not get bogged down in the debate, but rather directs its analysis to the sociological, cultural, bureaucratic, intellectual, and other processes by which such revolutions are, or are not, replicated. Military weapons may spread through arms sales, the commercial development of “dual-use” technologies, or by simple imitation, but the military doctrines appropriate to such new kinds of weaponry sometimes do not spread so rapidly.

There are some very stimulating and provocative historical case studies, including the foreign penetrations of the past five centuries into South Asia, the development of “blitzkrieg” armored