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The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas,

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party. For better or worse, Taiwan's democracy is completely homegrown.

To evaluate how Taiwan's democracy and the Sino-U.S. Cold War diplomacy impacts relations today, Bush discusses the four diplomatic communiqués and congressional acts that have regulated U.S.-PRC-Taiwanese relations, including the Shanghai communiqué (1972), the U.S.-PRC normalization communiqué (1978), the Taiwan Relations Act (1979), and the U.S.-PRC communiqué on arms sales to Taiwan (1982). The commitments included in these four "sacred texts" were not trivial and have created fixed constraints on Washington's and Beijing's behavior. Although necessary to defeat the Soviets, these diplomatic agreements have often worked to the PRC's advantage in putting diplomatic pressure on Taiwan to accept its "one country, two systems" formula.

As for what will happen in the future to this "one China" conundrum, Bush cautions that Taiwan's recent democratic reforms have not given twelve million voting Taiwanese their own seat at the table in any future cross-strait talks leading to Chinese reunification. Democracy will make any satisfactory political solution of the PRC-Taiwan divide even more difficult to negotiate. He cautions, therefore, that the "Taiwan and China positions are sufficiently at odds that they cannot be papered over. If the stalemate is to be broken peacefully, either Beijing will have to abandon one country, two systems, or Taipei will have to accept it." Since neither of these options appears likely, one is forced to conclude that PRC-Taiwan reunification can only be accomplished as a result of war.

BRUCE ELLEMAN
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Goldman, Emily O., and Leslie C. Eliason, eds. *The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2003. 415pp. \$75

This book offers a rich collection of research papers on very important topics: the much discussed revolution in military affairs (RMA), and the less discussed diffusions of new military technology and the accompanying changes in military doctrine to other countries. The authors were carefully chosen experts in history, political science, and sociology, who address the very important factors of national culture as they affect the application of new military technologies.

The product of a series of workshops, this work owes a considerable debt to the prodding of Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, who has been encouraging scholarly analysis of the full implications of the RMA.

Although recognizing the ambiguities relating to the exact definition of such a "revolution," the book does not get bogged down in the debate, but rather directs its analysis to the sociological, cultural, bureaucratic, intellectual, and other processes by which such revolutions are, or are not, replicated. Military weapons may spread through arms sales, the commercial development of "dual-use" technologies, or by simple imitation, but the military doctrines appropriate to such new kinds of weaponry sometimes do not spread so rapidly.

There are some very stimulating and provocative historical case studies, including the foreign penetrations of the past five centuries into South Asia, the development of "blitzkrieg" armored

warfare in World War II, aircraft carriers, and the Soviet impact on Arab armies (Soviet tanks were delivered, but Soviet doctrine was not adopted). More recent examples include the Soviet approach to managing the Warsaw Pact, the “special relationship” that has existed since 1945 among English-speaking democracies, and the patterns of nuclear proliferation and the spread of information technology.

This work is directed to both the social scientist and the policy practitioner. The chapters are well written and rich in detail, with excellent footnotes, thus making this a handy volume for anyone doing research in these areas.

There are times when the unifying theme of the diffusion of “technology and ideas” becomes so broad that it seems to include everything militarily that has happened or that is going to happen, for what else is there to a strategic confrontation but the weapons owned and how they will be used? Yet this work brings the subject into sharper focus, revealing how ideas about the appropriate use of weapons do not always travel as well as the weapons themselves. The introductory outline thus helps to maintain that focus, and the concluding chapter by Emily Goldman and Andrew Ross is extremely valuable for sifting out the recurring patterns that emerge from the evidence presented.

Among the important conclusions mentioned are that transformation leaders do not long monopolize their transformations; leaders are frequently surpassed by followers; leadership effecting a military transformation is no guarantee of victory; and wholesale replications of the innovations of a transformation may not be necessary. Most

central to this work is the finding that “software” (ideas and doctrine) does not travel as well as “hardware” (physical weapons). The explanation for this last limitation is the basic theme of the entire book.

Collections of conference papers often do not hang together well, or when they do, they typically do not wander far enough away from a simple theme. This book suffers from neither drawback, being rich and eclectic in the materials it offers, yet at the same time remaining focused on an important set of questions. It offers a great deal for anyone concerned with the military-technology revolution.

GEORGE H. QUESTER
University of Maryland



Record, Jeffrey. *Making War, Thinking History*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2002. 216pp. \$28.95

Jeffrey Record is professor of strategy and international security at the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base. He is the author of four books and numerous monographs on U.S. military strategy and has extensive Capitol Hill experience, including service as a professional staffer for the Senate Armed Services Committee.

This work assesses how the experiences of Munich and Vietnam influenced presidential decisions on the use of force in every administration from Harry Truman to Bill Clinton. Both Munich and Vietnam are regularly invoked in current political debate in an attempt to justify a viewpoint, especially since the Cold War foreign policy consensus has broken down in recent