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Negotiating with North Korea,

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that may be changing from minute to minute. The decision will be based on instinct born of training, individual disposition and character, and the perception of immediate danger. These perceptions were often as limited as those of soldiers in any war. For all our new technology, the fog of war descended as quickly and completely as a desert sandstorm, and even on sunny days and clear nights it could blank out an individual's surroundings beyond a narrow range.

These are points worth having driven home, and Wright's descriptions of the events he witnessed are vivid and often moving. Some of the best writing is in the quotations of the Marines of 2d Platoon. When the Marines accidentally shoot and kill an Iraqi child in her father's car at a roadblock, a corporal later states, "War is either glamorized—like we kick their ass—or the opposite—look how horrible, we kill all these civilians. None of these people know what it's like to be there holding that weapon."

Wright's book represents American war writing in its maturity. He avoids the pitfalls of glamorizing or moralizing. Many of the Marines he writes about are complex men. The staff sergeant nicknamed "Iceman" is an efficient and a somewhat emotionally remote professional fighting man who is also a sympathetic figure. It would be easy for Wright to dislike General James N. Mattis as a man of a different generation and completely different outlook, especially once Wright learns that he and the rest of Recon Battalion have been functioning as a diversion, a virtual decoy, during the attack north. The portrait of Mattis that emerges, however, is understanding and even admiring. Wright has the common sense to

realize that sometimes leaders must risk their own in war, and that he himself must have the courage to accept his role as a tactical pawn when his profession as journalist requires it.

Recon units are different. They probably contain a higher percentage of the "natural warrior" type than do other Marine Corps units. These fine-tuned combat thoroughbreds often come across as sensitive and complex. Despite the implications of the title, it is often these young men, rather than the elders, who display the greatest humanity and restraint. The Marines of 2d Platoon were sometimes surprised to find that they preferred saving or preserving life to taking it.

Make no mistake, these are the Marine breed—"Generation M." No apologies are needed for the wars they fought. We should be humbled and instructed by their example. After the rush of combat comes reflection, and after the battle is the effort to restore and rebuild. Courage will always be required of soldiers in war, but it is also required of us to be wise, if we can.

REED BONADONNA
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Saccone, Richard. *Negotiating with North Korea*. Hollym International Corp., 2003. 215pp. \$22.95

Perhaps the potentially most volatile part of the world is North Korea. Talks between the United States and North Korea seem to be a series of impasses, confrontations, brinkmanship, threats, and blusters. The usual explanation for this state of perpetual frustration for U.S. negotiators is that they are dealing with an enigmatic regime that has no

regard for peaceful resolution of the confrontations between it and the rest of the world. This work provides an alternate path for understanding and working toward more successful negotiations than has been the historical case for over half a century.

Richard Saccone, retired U.S. Air Force, alumnus of the Naval Postgraduate School, has spent over fourteen years in the Koreas. He has written six books on Korea covering history, culture, tourism, and business, and he is well qualified to discuss the topic of negotiations. He is a former representative for KEDO, the Korean Peninsula Development Organization, building nuclear power plants as required under the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Saccone currently teaches international relations and national government at St. Vincent's College in Latrobe, Pennsylvania.

Saccone explains such concepts as *Juche* (self-reliance), *Kibun* (spirit), and *Cheymyon* (saving face) in a manner that goes deeper than the caricature-like definitions found in the common press. Examination allows the reader to appreciate that the concept of communication requires both sending and receipt of information and ideas by at least two parties. When I was a college student, I read an essay by the noted semanticist S. I. Hayakawa about *denotation* and *connotation*. *Negotiating with North Korea* reveals that American negotiators may have been concentrating on the denotative aspects of communication and neglecting the connotations. It gives me hope that negotiations can progress beyond the cultural misunderstanding and confrontational nature of U.S.–North Korea relations.

Fully half the book concerns itself with the tactics used by North Korean negotiators. Saccone enumerates them in forty specific categories, which include threats, loaded questions, requests for compensation, red herrings, and appeals for fairness. This by itself is useful, but the author offers specific examples and provides countertactics that will help negotiations go forward to a mutually acceptable conclusion. The forty specifics are grouped into eight general headings: coercion, offensiveness, manipulation, assertiveness, confounding, obstruction, persuasion, and cooperation. Understanding and appreciating the analysis and advice provided by Saccone should allow U.S. negotiators greater success.

For example, one category, labeled “Lessons of History,” points out that North Korean negotiators are generally much better versed in past meetings and negotiations than American negotiators, who tend to be constantly rotated. Saccone provides the following advice, “The best counter to lessons from history is another lesson of history. This requires considerable preparation. U.S. negotiators are notoriously ignorant of history. If one is ignorant of the record you cannot even be sure that what the opponent is quoting is correct. Do your homework and counter history with lessons of your own choosing.” Saccone’s advice appears obvious, but the United States too often neglects to heed the obvious.

This work should be required reading for all who must deal with North Korea. Saccone understands its negotiating behavior. He distinguishes between myths and reality, and offers alternatives to improve U.S.–Korea relations. However, this work should not be confined

only to those involved with North Korea. Anyone involved in negotiations will benefit from this book.

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Betts, Richard K., and Thomas G. Mahnken, eds. *Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael J. Handel*. London: Frank Cass, 2003. 210pp. \$114.95

The essays in this collection were written for an international conference held in honor of the late Michael J. Handel at the U.S. Naval War College. Handel wrote several seminal pieces in the relatively new field of intelligence studies, and his colleagues are to be complimented for producing this impressive Festschrift. Betts and Mahnken put together an impressive group of practitioners and academics to write on various aspects of the work of intelligence agencies. It begins with four articles of a theoretical nature, followed by three articles that focus on historic case studies.

This volume appropriately opens with a classic by Handel on strategic surprises, published almost thirty years ago, which serves as an excellent introduction to a book devoted to intelligence. It is typical of Handel's general thinking on strategic affairs, pointing out several paradoxes inherent to the potential for strategic surprise that have become the common wisdom of the intelligence field. Handel claims that due to the great difficulties in differentiating between "noise" and "signals" (relevant information), all data amounts to noise, making the collection of additional information designed to clarify the

situation additional noise. Handel also stresses the paradox of estimating risk. The riskier a military course of action, the less a rival anticipates and prepares for it, paradoxically making its eventual adoption less risky. Handel also suggests that successive intelligence successes increase not only the agency's credibility but also the risk of strategic surprise, because its conclusions will be less subject to critical questioning. There is also the self-negating prophecy. A warning of an impending attack triggers military preparations that in turn prompt the enemy to delay or cancel his plans. Such a scenario makes it almost impossible even in retrospect to know if the military preparations were warranted. Another scenario that may lead to a strategic surprise is a quiet international environment that may be used to conceal the preparations for an attack. Following a fascinating analysis of the problems of perception, the politics of intelligence, and the organizational and bureaucratic features, Handel reaches the realistic conclusion that surprise is almost always unavoidable.

The second article, by editor Richard K. Betts, starts with the unconventional premise that politicization of intelligence services is not necessarily bad, and sometimes it is even advisable. Betts presents two opposing models of intelligence work. The first portrays the intelligence agency striving to achieve professional credibility by presenting thorough analysis, while the second depicts the intelligence organization stressing the supply of data that is useful and relevant to decision makers. In the second case, the managers of intelligence organizations make compromises and tailor the information