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From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 1940s

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personalities. Through these descriptions, Tyerman creates after all a snapshot of how the *crucesignati* and *jihadi* thought, and in particular how they were influenced by the concept of holy war.

Tyerman avoids the controversy of the influence of the Crusades on events in the Middle East today. He outlines the Christian concept of just war and holy war without assessing whether the Crusades were just. He describes the Muslim concept of jihad, yet does not pass judgment on the initial conquest or reconquest of the Hold Land by the Arabs. Additionally, he does not address Western guilt over the Crusades or the Islamic feeling of having been wronged. Only in passing does he mention a certain pope's apology and a certain politician's ill-timed use of the word "crusade." In a word, he neither condemns nor apologizes for the actions and violence of Christians or Muslims but clearly lays out the social, religious, political, and economic causes and results of the Crusades.

For readers searching for a single-volume survey of the crusading movement, Christopher Tyerman's *God's War* is invaluable.

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Reynolds, David. *From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 1940s.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006. 363pp. $45

In this insightful and elegantly written set of essays in international history, David Reynolds ruminates on the causes, evolution, and consequences of what came to be called the "special relationship" between the United States and Great Britain during the Second World War and thereafter through the Cold War. Geostrategically, this relationship originated with the fall of France in May 1940, which Reynolds treats quite rightly as the "fulcrum of the Twentieth Century." Until then, British leaders had counted on France to contain Germany, with England making only a limited commitment of ground forces to the continent and relying on a powerful deterrent based on strategic bombing. In 1940, with the French knocked out of the war and England's small army in ruins, whether the British could fight on against Germany's Wehrmacht depended above all on support from the United States. Winston Churchill's decision to continue fighting turned out to be the right policy chosen for the wrong reasons, because Franklin D. Roosevelt was initially unwilling to supply more than material aid and was later unable to bring Americans into the war until both Japan and Germany declared war on the United States. Shared hatred of a vicious enemy, a more or less common language, generally similar liberal political principles, shared intelligence, combined military staffs, summitry, and the industrial prowess of the United States was to make the Anglo-American alliance perhaps more effective than any other in history.

Year by year, however, British influence within the Grand Alliance waned as American power waxed. In the spirit of Woodrow Wilson, Roosevelt sought an alternative to traditional alliances in his vision of postwar international peace and security cooperation by means of

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the "Four Policemen"—the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and the Soviet Union—each of which would earn a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council. Despite Roosevelt's hopes of extending wartime cooperation with the Soviet Union into the peace, the ever more closed systems of government established within Soviet-occupied East-Central Europe increasingly induced both British and American leaders to begin to fear the USSR as the Second Coming of the Third Reich. This shared perception, fueled (somewhat unintentionally, Reynolds claims) by Churchill's "iron curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri, in 1946, brought the two wartime allies ever closer together again. Fears that appeasement would merely whet the aggressor's appetite for more then sustained the growing transatlantic consensus that the Soviet Union needed to be contained.

As the Cold War heated up, the British and the rest of Western Europe needed American power; Americans needed British bases around the world, as well as the legitimacy and self-assurance that the support of this ally, especially, might supply both at home and abroad. Although the *Pax Britannica* collapsed in the eastern Mediterranean in 1947, it was replaced rapidly and smoothly by the *Pax Americana*, as exemplified in the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with the especially close relationship between Britain and the United States serving as the foundation of transatlantic unity and cooperation. Henceforward, England would play Robin to America's Batman, gambling that loyalty to the United States would enable it to punch above its weight. Loyalty would purchase Britain a disproportionate influence in American foreign policy, though some in England might occasionally wonder whether the price in national honor was too high, especially when prime ministers appeared to be mere "poodles" serving American masters.

Reynolds does not romanticize the special relationship. The Suez crisis of 1956 made it clear that Americans would not prop up declining empires; indeed, it was American policy to hurry them into their graves. Nonetheless, Americans were there when the British needed them, with satellite intelligence and other support, in the Falklands War. However, the Iraq war of 2003 suggests that sometimes Robin might be too loyal to the caped crusader, who needs to look before he leaps and benefit from wiser counsel from his most loyal ally. For all these difficulties, Reynolds shows that the current international order rests on common Anglo-American liberal principles and overlapping political cultures that shaped how both the British and the Americans defined their interests from World War II to the end of the Cold War and beyond. Though the relationship may always have been more special to the British than the Americans, Reynolds shows why it needs to continue to be especially close. Arguably far more than Roosevelt's United Nations, Churchill's union of English-speaking peoples saved civilization from barbarism again and again in the twentieth century. Our prospects in the current century require us to keep that union especially in mind.

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