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State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century,

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policy can no longer afford to focus solely on defending the supply of oil. As time goes by, less oil will remain outside OPEC countries; proportionally more will be in areas where its extraction is more difficult and costly. Over time, this trend will make access problematic and uncertain. Lastly, energy is political. Because energy is centrally connected to everything else of importance, overhauling the current system is going to be one of the most politically difficult challenges facing the world in the twenty-first century. This process will entail considerable political and economic risk.

Overall, Roberts's coverage is balanced, providing significant insights into all aspects of the energy economy. One of the strengths of *The End of Oil* is that it offers the big picture without bogging down the reader in endless technical details or facts. Another of its strengths is that although the author is somewhat pessimistic about the world's ability to transition effectively and peacefully to the next energy economy, he is able to be optimistic as well.

In summary, *The End of Oil* is an effective argument for the need to take a proactive role in building America's energy future. We can either construct the kind of energy future we desire or wait and hope that the transition to the next energy economy will work out on its own. Hope, as any good strategist will tell you, is not a strategy. *The End of Oil* is therefore a must read for strategists, political and business leaders, and anyone interested in America's future.

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Fukuyama, Francis. *State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 2004. 132pp. \$21

This is an important policy analysis. Francis Fukuyama, an expert on political and economic development, has served on the State Department's policy planning staff and is now professor of international political economy at Johns Hopkins University.

In his book *State Building*, Fukuyama argues here that the international community must do a better job of "state-building . . . because weak or failed states are the sources of many of the world's most serious problems." We know a lot about public administration, he says, but much less about how to "transfer strong institutions to developing countries."

Fukuyama coins the term "stateness," referring to a regime's ability to perform. He distinguishes two dimensions of stateness: state *strength*, which denotes that a government can "enforce laws cleanly and transparently," and state *scope*, which embraces the range of the functions that a government tries to accomplish.

To understand what Fukuyama means by scope, imagine a government that seeks only to maintain public order, enforce contracts, provide national defense, and manage its money supply. Fukuyama would describe that state as having modest scope. Next, imagine a government that, in addition to what was just mentioned, owns and runs steel mills and hospitals, tries to provide free education through the university level, and promises its people pensions. Such a government would

have considerable scope. However, whether it could carry out any or all of these functions well is an entirely separate matter of state strength.

What do poor countries need to develop economically? According to Fukuyama, “conventional wisdom’s” answer to this question has changed in recent years. During the Ronald Reagan and the Margaret Thatcher years, development experts focused on state scope, arguing that less-developed countries (LDCs) needed smaller governments; accordingly, they urged states to discontinue activities that other parties could handle better. Unfortunately, they did not recognize the importance of institutions like courts that work and legal regimes that defend property rights. As a result, international bodies like the World Bank demanded that states get smaller without distinguishing between scope (which should have been reduced) and strength (which should have been enhanced).

Fukuyama lists the causes for LDC state weakness. Sometimes local elites benefit from the status quo, which in many instances is, for them, a life-or-death issue. In other cases, society may not understand how much better off it would be given better institutions—foreign donors’ efforts to develop stronger state institutions via “conditionality” often fail. (Donors find it hard to show “tough love” by cutting off states that fail to meet their conditions. Even if one does so, moreover, often another steps in.) In addition, donors often give higher priority to first-rate service delivery than to building the capacity of the LDC’s fledgling state bureaucracy. So they hire away the best locals, often leaving the LDC even weaker.

The book examines the “international dimension of state weakness,” stating that instability is in fact driven by state weakness. Since the Berlin Wall came down, the author notes, most international crises have had to do with weak or failing states. Sovereignty has been eroded because of this weakness. No one, says Fukuyama, in the international community believes in a “pure” sovereignty any more. The humanitarian interventions of the 1990s eroded what force that idea may once have had.

What should national security professionals learn from Fukuyama’s argument? Here are three lessons. First, do not assume that postwar stabilization operations always involve state building. For example, some people have expressed optimism about U.S. chances for making Iraq and Afghanistan into democracies, on grounds that the United States defeated tyrannical regimes in Germany and Japan and successfully made democracies of them. Fukuyama points out that those latter occupations did *not* involve state building. Germany and Japan were hard to beat because they were already strong states. U.S. victory and occupation changed those states’ bases of legitimacy; doing so was easier than creating a strong state from a weak one. Second, the United States should have modest expectations for building democratic states and growing economies in countries with weak states. The United States has “intervened and/or acted as an occupation authority . . . [and] . . . pursued . . . nation-building activities in . . . Cuba, the Philippines, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Panama, Nicaragua, South Korea, and South Vietnam.” Despite U.S. efforts, “South Korea was the only country to achieve long-term economic growth.” Third, given America’s poor track record

at creating strong states via occupation, it should be thinking about fall-back positions if it fails at creating democracy overseas.

The United States needs to get better at state building. The U.S. military cannot avoid bearing much of the implied burden, like it or not. Read *State Building* for a thoughtful introduction to the challenges involved.

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Coll, Steve. *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*. New York: Penguin, 2004. 695pp. \$29.95

The events of 9/11 led many in the United States to wonder what had actually led up to that fateful day. Who was to blame? How could the United States, with its multibillion-dollar intelligence and defense budgets, have allowed such a thing to happen? In *Ghost Wars*, Steve Coll provides a useful, if overly long, chronology and analysis of pivotal events, missteps, indecision, apathy, and ultimately tragedy up to the day before the attacks.

Coll, who served as the managing editor for the *Washington Post* until 2004, was the paper's South Asia bureau chief from 1989 to 1992. He won a Pulitzer Prize in 1990 for his reporting on South Asia, and he has been a keen observer of events in the region. He begins his story with the burning of the U.S. embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, in November 1979 and traces the long road of events to 11 September. It was shortly after the riots in Islamabad that the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, in December 1979.

As he weaves his narrative, Coll meticulously documents every player and agenda in this drama. Coll divides the book into three parts. In the first he discusses the Soviet occupation from December 1979 to February 1989. It is here that we are introduced to mujahedeen leaders Ahmed Shah Massoud, Hamid Karzai, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and Osama Bin Laden. One also becomes acquainted with key players in the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI-D) and in the Saudi monarchy who played key roles in bankrolling the resistance. The author also provides valuable insights into the U.S. policy-making process. During this period, the United States was consumed with battling the Soviet occupation, and most policy makers did not give serious thought to the repercussions of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate's growing control over aid distribution or the increasing anti-American attitudes of such rebel commanders as Hekmatyar.

Coll continues to trace events in Afghanistan after the Soviet pullout in 1989. Once the Soviets were gone, interest in a stable Afghanistan rapidly waned as other crises in the immediate post-Cold War era monopolized U.S. attention. As a result, Afghanistan fell into chaos as warlords fought each other for control of Kabul. The lack of American involvement after the Soviets withdrew left Pakistan as the primary force to manage the post-Soviet environment. The author captures the rivalries within Afghanistan, the manipulation of events by the Pakistani government, and the apathy of U.S. policy makers throughout this period.

One of the major strengths of *Ghost Wars* is how it skillfully captures the interagency debates within the U.S.