To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the World,

Paul William Garber

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The subtitle of Arthur Herman’s grand maritime history *To Rule the Waves* gives it all away: *How the British Navy Shaped the World.* Through a series of well-described episodes, Herman convincingly discusses how the Royal Navy came to dominate the seas and sustained Britain’s ability to expand and maintain its empire.

From John Hawkins and Francis Drake to the amazingly named Cloudsley Shovell, as well as Horatio Nelson, John Fisher, David Beatty, and the like, Herman traces the development of men, ships, and strategies, and the technologies that forced change.

The initial impulse for trade was matched by a desire for plunder, so that the relationship that later developed between the navy and the merchant trade required maturation. John Dee, writing a memorial to Queen Elizabeth in 1577, proposed a permanent navy as the “master key wherewith to open all locks that keep out or hinder this incomparable British empire.” Although the queen lacked the means, the idea never really died. John Holland, not quoted by Herman, wrote in his 1638 “Discourse of the Navy”: “If either the honour of a nation, commerce, or trade with all nations, peace at home, grounded upon our enemies’ fear or love of us abroad, and attended with plenty of all things necessary either for the preservation for the public need, or thy private welfare, be things worthy thy esteem . . . then next to God and the King, give thy thanks for the same to the navy, as the principal instrument whereby God works these good things to thee.”

And nothing has changed.

This is a good book that describes all the twists and turns necessary for a nation to become a great commercial power and to protect itself from substantial competition and extraordinary technological challenges. What Herman establishes clearly is that ultimately it was the will to develop a navy and the willingness to use it in the most courageous manner, whether as a matter of policy or as a commander’s individual initiative, that effectively supported the realm.

Unfortunately, Herman is not as well supported by his publisher. There are numerous editorial lapses in grammar and proofreading, and although substantive factual errors are few, there are enough to be annoying. For example, the assertion that the average Britisher consumed four pounds of sugar a day in 1700 and twelve pounds a day in 1720 should actually read “per year.” Saint Michel should read Saint Mihiel. It is Saint Nazaire, not Nizaire, and Veinticinco, not Veinticino. There is also the omission of Port Stanley as a principal town in the Falklands, and the incorrect statement that “from [Prince] Alfred on, every generation of the royal family would make sure someone carried on the navy tradition, King George V and Louis Mountbatten being the most famous and Prince Philip the most recent” would leave Prince Charles and Prince Andrew wondering where they fit in. In citing the Falklands campaign, Herman also mentions what we in Naval Control of Shipping refer to as “ships taken up from trade.” It is worth mentioning that without adequate auxiliaries a navy may be at risk and that
without a controllable merchant marine, a nation may be at risk.

Herman rightly celebrates the daring and enterprise of British naval officers and their willingness to use the means at hand to achieve their goals. A fleet in being is useless if not backed up by the commitment to use it. The problem was, as always, how to pay for the navy, which Herman cites as the major cause of Britain’s civil war in 1642. The same issue faces us in 2005.

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Australia is quintessentially a maritime nation. From the arrival of Lieutenant James Cook, RN, in Botany Bay in 1770, navies have featured heavily in the historical experience of Australia, and for this naval officer, the navy is rightfully regarded as “the senior service.” Given this background, it seems surprising that there is not more written about this naval tradition and especially about the triumphs and tragedies of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) in wartime. The recent publication of a second edition of David Stevens’s Royal Australian Navy in World War II fills a very important gap. First published in 1996, the book has been augmented significantly in this new edition.

David Stevens is a former naval officer, a graduate of the University of New South Wales and Australian National University, and currently director of Strategic and Historical Studies within the Sea Power Centre–Australia. He brings a critical and experienced eye to his editorship, and this is reflected in the many changes made in this edition. This book has a new cover, new photographs, six new chapters, and substantial updates to all preexisting chapters, with an increase of over a hundred pages. This work eschews any single theme but rather seeks to encapsulate an eclectic array of approaches to the general topic. While initially disconcerting, this methodology is skillfully used and provides a holistic account of the RAN wartime experience.

The chapters deal with, inter alia, matters of grand policy concerning Australian naval strategizing in the lead-up to the war, interesting accounts of battles experienced by former crew members, an outline of regional confrontation with Vichy French representatives, social assessments of the officer corps and female participation in the naval service, and a description of industrial reorganization within Australia, as well as accounts of naval operational thinking and planning during the course of the war. By any measure, the achievements of the RAN during the conflict were astonishing. At the war’s close, the RAN comprised 337 ships and over forty thousand mobilized personnel. The navy served in almost every theater of that global war and earned its fair share of battle glory. As James Goldrick notes in chapter 1, the RAN had been involved in the sinking of numerous enemy capital ships and submarines, the destruction of over a hundred enemy aircraft and over 150,000 tons of axis merchant shipping. Perhaps the RAN’s most significant achievement was its ability to keep open sea lines of communication to Australia at a