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BOOK REVIEWS

A PARADIGM SHIFT

Barnett, Roger W. *Asymmetrical Warfare: Today's Challenge to U.S. Military Power*. Brassey's, 2003. 176pp. \$39.95

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, a cacophony of voices arose (mostly from the conservative wing of the Republican Party) asserting that the United States was in danger of being eclipsed by the Soviet Union. In short, the argument was “the sky is falling.” President Reagan used the issue to great advantage during the 1980 presidential campaign, setting the stage for a massive increase in defense expenditures and the launching of the ambitious “Star Wars” program, the forerunner of the Clinton and Bush administrations’ attempt to build a national missile defense system. It turned out that Soviet power had been exaggerated and that our own political, intellectual, and ideological predispositions had blinded us to signs of the impending implosion of the Soviet system. Interestingly, it could be argued that however misguided the Reagan defense buildup might have been vis-à-vis its principal objective, programs launched during that era set us on the path that today has resulted in an unprecedented global conventional military superiority that we see manifested today in battlefields around the world.

Today, there are new arguments that the sky is falling, that the global security environment has undergone profound and even revolutionary change, and that the United States remains woefully unprepared to deal with the threats posed by a new caste of diabolical adversaries boasting new and dangerous capabilities. Roger Barnett’s *Asymmetrical Warfare* could be regarded as a bible for those interested in exploring the implications of such a thesis. Like proponents of arguments advanced in the early 1980s, Barnett, professor emeritus at the Naval War College, believes that the United States has never been more vulnerable and must take drastic steps to avert an impending catastrophe. Today’s security environment, aptly and eloquently described in the Bush administration’s *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, is characterized by undeterred rogue states and transnational terrorist organizations with access to new weapons that can inflict mass casualties on an unprecedented scale. Barnett argues that the new environment represents a fundamental departure, or paradigm shift, in that there are no longer any

behavioral constraints on those seeking to attack the United States. In short, the international order stands at the precipice, if it has not already descended into the Hobbesian state of nature.

Barnett argues that a series of mutually supporting, and damaging, constraints—moral, political, organizational, legal, and operational—developed over the second half of the twentieth century and are now conspiring to subvert the ability of the United States to use force as a tool to manage the new security environment. He argues that the United States is fundamentally in a strategically defensive posture, thereby ceding the initiative to its adversaries and making it vulnerable to the kinds of surprise attacks that happened on 9/11. This means that “the United States has, without malice and forethought, backed unwittingly into the situation where it resembles the mighty Gulliver, cinched down by Lilliputian strings.”

Barnett believes that these limitations on using force have effectively created a “breeding ground” for asymmetrical actions by adversaries under no moral or political limits, who in fact perceive these constraints as signs of weakness. Throughout the history of warfare, participants have always sought to exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, but Barnett posits that asymmetric warfare today constitutes something new and different—war and conflict without limits. In other words, we are not talking about adversaries advancing creative ideas on asymmetric warfare like those developed during the 1930s by the Billy Mitchells and Heinz Guderians of the world, which eventually revolutionized conventional military warfare. Today’s adversaries are bent on mass destruction using any means at their

disposal—nuclear, chemical, biological, and cyberspace.

Barnett’s description of the international environment seems apt enough, if a bit dire, and his discussion of the various constraints is interesting and contains some good and useful points. He is right to point out that moral and legal constraints have assumed great importance in the conduct of military operations. Such issues as collateral damage, the idea of proportionality in using force, and the perpetration of the myth that the American people have an aversion to taking casualties have all affected the decision-making process on when and if the country should use force. As for the country’s decision making on using force, Barnett rightly criticizes the haphazard series of interactions between various governmental bureaucracies and the executive and legislative branches as a discombobulated process that can be manipulated and exploited by sophisticated adversaries. He is also right to point out that the United Nations has proven to be only marginally successful in managing new threats to security in the international environment and that the successive surrendering of authority to the international body under various treaties has constrained some capabilities that could conceivably be useful for deterrence and operational use. Barnett’s prescription to address the problem is useful, suggesting that the United States undertake a systematic review of circumstances under which the nation will use force and be prepared to declare war, and make these circumstances widely known to its adversaries.

However, like those who declared that the sky was falling in the 1980s, one cannot help feeling that Barnett has

overdramatized the situation. While the 9/11 attacks created a cottage industry of sorts describing a supposedly new and dangerous security environment, the toppling of the World Trade Center towers needs to be seen in the context of a pattern of increasingly bold attacks on the United States that arguably stretch back to the 1980s, when the first hostages were taken in Lebanon. One of the surprising things about the attacks was that they were a surprise at all. After all, Ramzi Youssef came closer than is generally appreciated to bringing down the towers in 1995; the Khobar Towers attack in 1996 resulted in a dramatic change in U.S. security posture in the Persian Gulf; and the United States had already returned fire with al-Qa'ida following the August 1988 embassy attacks. Over this twenty-odd-year period, America adjusted and took a variety of steps, mostly at the operational and organizational levels, that helped create the special operations capabilities that are now being deployed around the world in the so-called global war on terrorism. Homeland defense is now a priority, seeing the creation of a new cabinet secretary and department to coordinate efforts at the federal, state, and local levels.

While Barnett decries the irrelevance of the United Nations in the new environment, the global war on terror is in fact taking place within an internationally sanctioned legal framework that requires all states to take necessary steps to combat terrorism, including the use of force. While the United Nations has proven less successful in addressing threats posed by rogue states, UN Security Council Resolution 1368 (passed after 9/11) provides a useful and interesting template that requires global

cooperation against the very threat Barnett argues is a principal source of evil in the international system. It is hard to see that it is anything other than a useful tool for marshaling a global cooperative effort against terrorism.

Moreover, while it is true that the United States operates under a number of constraints when using force, today's global military deployments around the world simply belie Barnett's contention that the United States remains hamstrung in using force as a tool to manage the international environment. If anything, it would appear that efforts over the last twenty years have positioned America quite well to go after its adversaries in all four corners of the globe, and that the attacks of 9/11 created the political environment for decision makers to use force aggressively to address perceived threats. While Barnett asserts the necessity of a more systematic and commonsensical process for deciding when to use force, events indicate that we are not doing too badly on that front. As for a new declaratory policy spelling out when the country will use force, any adversary could read the Bush administration's national security strategy report and get a good idea of the nation's intolerance for directly threatening the United States.

On a stylistic note, *Asymmetrical Warfare* at times reads like a legal brief, and it gives the impression that the author simply searched for arguments supporting his thesis and consciously ignored any contradictory evidence or points of view. Some parts of the text simply consist of a series of long, strung-together quotes by other authors, making for heavy going. The extent to which the author

repeats his arguments in successive chapters is also somewhat irritating.

These criticisms notwithstanding, the book provides an extremely interesting and thought-provoking argument that is cogently expressed in a well organized work. Barnett has produced a useful and positive contribution to the ongoing revitalization of the field of strategy and to the associated debate surrounding the use of force in the international environment. Students and professors interested in security strategy in the new century should add this work to their libraries.

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Stanik, Joseph T. *El Dorado Canyon: Reagan's Undeclared War with Qaddafi*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2002. 360pp. \$34.95

This well researched and clearly written study of U.S. combat with Libya in the 1980s has important echoes for today's policy makers. It begins with a quick look at America's first war with a Muslim state—in the nineteenth century, when the U.S. Navy fought viciously with the Barbary pirates off the coast of North Africa. It then traces the rise of one of the Barbary pirates' direct descendants—the well known late-twentieth-century practitioner of state terrorism Muammar Qaddafi of Libya. Throughout the book Joseph Stanik, professor of history and retired naval officer, provides detailed accounts of the 1980 key attacks and a well reasoned analysis of their political impact. There is, of course, particularly well documented material covering the key air strike of 15 April 1986, which

was a devastating blow against Qaddafi's regime and changed his approach profoundly.

For those of us on active service in the 1980s, the battles with Libya seemed a bit of a sideshow when compared to the main dance of the Cold War. Yet this relatively short, bitter conflict was actually a harbinger of things to come. Much as today's terrorists seek to influence global events through individual attacks, Qaddafi sought to drive the course of world activity through bombings and state-sponsored terrorism. The Reagan administration at first responded with rhetoric, but it eventually became clear that more forceful action would be needed.

It is interesting, in this time of "global war on terrorism," to look back to the 1980s and realize that this is a war that began long before 9/11. President Reagan was elected in no small measure in response to the state-condoned terrorism of Iran, where radical students had held American diplomats hostage for 444 days before Reagan's election, releasing them just after his inauguration. Over the next five years, a series of dramatic terrorist incidents followed—bombings and killings in Lebanon, including the horrific truck-bomb attack on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, killing over two hundred Marines in a single moment; the murder of Marine embassy guards in El Salvador; the hijacking of major airliners and the killing of hostages, including a U.S. Navy SEAL, Robert Stethem; airport killings in Rome and Vienna; and the dramatic disco bombing in Berlin. Clearly, the United States had to respond, so in the spring of 1986, Operation EL DORADO CANYON sent a clear and dramatic message to Muammar Qaddafi, with telling results.

Beginning in the 1970s with territorial claims that the Gulf of Sidra was actually within Libyan internal waters, Qaddafi had plotted a collision course with the United States. For over two decades he attempted to use Libya's oil wealth to undermine moderate governments in the Middle East and Africa, sought weapons of mass destruction, and developed a national foreign policy that incorporated the use of terrorism to achieve his objectives.

This is a story painted on a global canvas, from the 1986 La Belle Disco bombing in West Berlin, which killed U.S. servicemen, to the ghastly destruction of a global war on terrorism.

El Dorado Canyon is a fine case study in combating terrorism and deserves a place on the shelf of anyone interested in America's current conflict, as well as the history of U.S. Navy involvement in combat.

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Friedman, Norman. *Seapower and Space: From the Dawn of the Missile Age to Net-centric Warfare*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000. 384pp. \$36.95

This work examines the development of space systems and its implications for naval warfare in the twenty-first century by focusing on the argument that "access to space systems makes possible a new style of warfare." It addresses the "linked revolution of long-range missiles and their space-based supporting systems." Furthermore, Friedman seeks to understand how the development of space-based systems (notably rockets and satellites) has radically influenced how

naval forces conduct navigation, communication, reconnaissance, and targeting. The reality is that modern military forces depend almost entirely on platforms in space to know where they are and to communicate with friendly forces, as well as to know the location of enemy forces and use that information to destroy them. This "revolution in military affairs" is now having an effect on a global scale.

None of these observations, however, is particularly new, and in fact all have been widely discussed within the defense establishment since the Persian Gulf War, when it became evident that U.S. military forces depend to a unique and unparalleled degree on constellations of satellites. Such technologies as the Global Positioning System (GPS) became familiar in the public debate about national security in the early 1990s with reports that U.S. soldiers used commercially purchased GPS receivers to navigate across Iraq's featureless desert. In addition, the images broadcast globally of Scud missiles landing in Saudi Arabia and Israel reinforced the reliance on space-based systems to warn of impending attacks. Nor have we forgotten the failure of coalition forces during the Persian Gulf War to find Iraqi Scud missiles in what were called "Scud hunts."

What is interesting and noteworthy about Friedman's work is its focus on the fact that the development of these space systems has profound implications for the nature and conduct of maritime operations. In 2004, naval forces can know exactly where they are in the middle of vast oceans; communicate with their counterparts anywhere on the globe; scan entire oceans or land masses for targets in relatively short order;

and use precision-guided munitions, such as Tomahawk cruise missiles, to destroy them. Not surprisingly, the combination of space-based systems has significantly improved U.S. maritime as well as military capabilities.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of Friedman's work is the sheer volume of data that it contains. The reader is led through discussions of the development of space launchers, including detailed reviews of the U.S. and Soviet programs. Friedman is quite comfortable discussing the development of these technologies and thus easily examines how the United States has integrated space technologies into everyday military operations. This descriptive material is quite useful for those not familiar with many of the technologies and capabilities that exist under the rubric of space systems. The central value of *Seapower and Space* is to help the reader understand the technological and operational forces that have changed how the U.S. defense establishment, most notably its naval component, goes about its business.

All told, Friedman's work is useful because of its breadth and depth. Yet in many chapters the analytic foundations of the work are obscured by the exceptionally detailed discussions of the evolution of, for example, rocket programs, communications systems, satellite programs, and cruise missile programs, to name a few. For readers who are more interested in how space systems support maritime operations, these details prove somewhat distracting.

How, then, should we judge the value of Friedman's work? The overall quality of the research and writing speaks for itself. The chapters are tightly organized and lucid, which reaffirms that the

author is knowledgeable about naval matters. This is a useful work that by contributing to the literature on the relationship between space and naval operations exposes the reader to a wide range of systems and technologies that are fundamental to the capabilities possessed by modern navies and military forces. As a history of space and maritime systems, it contributes new and useful particulars, background, and insights into how space systems help the naval commanders. My only wish is that he could have focused less on programmatic details. That being said, Friedman's work represents an important step toward analyzing how space represents the next set of technologies that will revolutionize naval operations in the future.

WILLIAM C. MARTEL
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Lim, Robyn. *The Geopolitics of East Asia: The Search for Equilibrium*. New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003. 208pp. \$90

Kane, Thomas M. *Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power*. Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 2002. 158pp. \$55

One of the most intriguing questions about the People's Republic of China (PRC) today is whether its communist government does or does not have the "ambition" to acquire a *blue-water* navy. If building an oceangoing fleet is among Beijing's long-term goals, then China may one day become a dangerous peer competitor of the United States. If so, a future Sino-U.S. maritime conflict is possible; if not, Washington's primarily maritime power and Beijing's primarily continental power need never meet in battle.

The two books discussed here focus on different aspects of China and so answer this question in radically different ways. Robyn Lim examines Far Eastern geopolitics and history to address the issue of Sino-U.S. conflict. Focusing on the numerous twentieth-century wars fought among the East Asian quadrilateral—the United States, China, Japan, and Russia—Lim concludes that a new “great-power war” is “thinkable” and that such a conflict would probably be maritime in nature: “If China, a rising continental power, is indeed seeking domination over East Asia and its contiguous waters, this pattern of conflict is set to continue—because the United States, with its own maritime security at stake, is bound to stand in China’s way.”

The underlying reason for a possible future Sino-U.S. conflict, says Lim, is Japan’s defeat in World War II, coupled with the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991. Not only has Russia’s precipitous decline given China “strategic latitude unprecedented in modern times,” but the waning security threat along the Sino-Russian border has allowed Beijing to point “east and south strategically, pressing on the vital straits that connect the Indian and Pacific Oceans.” In light of Russia’s decision to sell massive amounts of military equipment—dominated by ships, planes, and naval weaponry—to China, possible Sino-U.S. flashpoints include a PRC invasion or blockade of Taiwan, international conflict on the Korean Peninsula, maritime tensions with Japan over the Senkaku (in Chinese, Diaoyutai) Islands, and Southeast Asian resistance to China’s self-proclaimed sovereignty over the South China Sea.

To offset such a conflict, Washington must ally itself even more closely with

Tokyo, be prepared to stop a PRC attack on Taiwan, dampen the rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and redirect future Chinese maritime expansion into more peaceful directions. Lim cautions that too strident a policy might push China into a corner, leading to irrational decisions on Beijing’s part—much as Washington’s 1941 failure to deter Tokyo resulted in the miscalculated decision to attack Pearl Harbor. However, Lim concludes that in the coming years a certain degree of great-power conflict will probably be unavoidable, since “when China started to demonstrate blue water ambition, it was certain to collide with America’s interest as the global ‘off-shore balancer.’”

Thomas Kane examines the future of China’s navy in *Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power*. Studying the history of Chinese grand strategy, which has most recently included calls for the creation of a “new order” among the world’s great states, Kane concludes that “if China wishes to claim a leading role in international politics, it must become a seapower,” which means, in turn, that “maritime development is one of the most prominent and most challenging goals of the PRC’s [grand] strategy.”

To support his point, Kane argues that for thousands of years the Chinese were among the world’s great practitioners of seapower. From the sixteenth to the mid-twentieth century, however, China’s navy stagnated, only to be born anew during the 1950s, when Mao Zedong proclaimed that China should develop a strong fleet. In 1979, Deng Xiaoping helped to make Mao’s dream a reality, redirecting an ever larger share of the defense budget to the People’s

Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Not only was a strong navy necessary to exploit maritime resources in the surrounding seas, including enormous reserves of fish, oil, and natural gas, but “until the Chinese have an oceangoing navy, their freedom to trade will depend upon the goodwill of others. China’s leaders understand this fact, and are determined to remedy it.”

During the twenty-first century, the Chinese navy is bound to grow. It is no match for the U.S. Navy, but Kane cautions that just because “China’s navy remains materially weak does not mean that it is strategically useless.” In fact, the PLAN is clearly “designed to serve a purpose in war,” and if “one reflects upon how China’s navy measures up to the tasks Beijing is putting it to, and combines those reflections with a consideration of how the Chinese fleet may develop over time, the PLAN begins to seem more adequate.”

China’s primary strategic goals include coastal defense, intimidation of Taiwan, and the gradual expansion of Chinese power southward into the South China Sea. In recent years, the PLAN has begun to acquire the naval equipment necessary to achieve these limited goals. In particular, Kane notes the rapid increase in China’s mine warfare capability: “As of the year 2000, almost 90 percent of the major ships in China’s fleet could carry mines as part of their standard armament.” In addition, all newly purchased naval equipment from Russia, including the Kilo-class submarines and the *Sovremenny*-class destroyers, “have integral minelaying capabilities.” Such capabilities may soon grow beyond the point where the U.S. Navy and its Asian allies can easily counter them.

Although the Chinese navy still exhibits serious vulnerabilities, especially in air defenses, air forces, and electronic systems, concerted efforts are under way to correct these problems. In addition, should Beijing ever focus its land and sea forces either on mainland Asia or any of the thousand offshore islands, the “PLA’s assault forces could also prove overwhelming in battles for islands in the South China Sea, and perhaps for attacks on more distant islands as well. China, in other words, is well equipped to use land forces as part of a joint maritime strategy.”

Lim and Kane have approached this question from different angles—one from the field of geopolitics and the other from strategy—but they agree that the PRC’s future ambitions most likely include the construction of a blue-water navy. Until that navy is complete, China cannot hope to fight and win a war at sea, especially against a force as large and sophisticated as the U.S. Navy. However, as Kane aptly suggests, a naval victory may not be part of China’s grand strategy, since Beijing “has reason to hope that it has found limits to Washington’s willingness to intervene.” So long as China keeps its strategic goals small, it may succeed in making incremental gains unopposed. It is perhaps because of this threat of incremental gains that Lim warns, “The need to establish a stable power equilibrium in East Asia is an imperative of international security that the United States cannot afford to ignore.”

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Rashid, Ahmed. *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 2002. 281pp. \$24

After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, U.S. policy makers focused heavily on Central Asian states as venues for basing troops and equipment for the war on terrorism. Although that war initially focused on Afghanistan, the effects of militant Islam have also affected various states in the Central Asian region to the north. In this book, Rashid provides the reader with a journalist's account of what has led to the rise of militant Islam in Central Asia. This book had just gone into editing when the attacks on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon occurred, and it underwent revision shortly before publication.

Rashid served as the chief correspondent for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia at the *Far Eastern Economic Review* and the *Daily Telegraph* for several years. His books and articles have made him one of the most respected observers of events in the region. His previous book, *Taliban*, won him worldwide acclaim and became a best-seller after 9/11 for its explanation of the rise of the Taliban.

Rashid begins by providing historical background. He points out that due to its geographic location, Central Asia has historically been the setting of numerous conquests, great-power struggles, significant economic activity, literary and artistic developments, and discussions about Islamic philosophy. Some of these themes still resonate today.

The struggle between Russia and Great Britain in the late nineteenth century

saw major Central Asian khanates (territories), such as Bukhara, Samarkand, and Tashkent, fall under Russian influence. This influence continued into the Soviet era despite attempts by Central Asian territories to forge autonomy. By appealing to Islam in various combinations with nationalism, ethnic identity, and ideology, Muslim intellectuals and clerics in Central Asia initially tried to find common ground with the Bolshevik government. Unfortunately, all overt symbols of Islam were ultimately suppressed, and the religion went underground during Soviet times.

After the Soviet Union's collapse, Islam underwent a rebirth in Central Asia, according to Rashid. However, most of the region's new leaders were former Communist Party officials turned nationalists who were mainly concerned about maintaining order and preventing the infiltration of militant Islamists. The civil war in Afghanistan, the rise of the Taliban, and the presence of al-Qa'ida fed these objectives. Furthermore, the new Central Asian rulers have been unable to improve the economic condition of the people. Rashid observes that among other factors, a combination of abject poverty, authoritarian rule, and the skepticism of Central Asian leaders about even peaceful manifestations of Islam have led to the rise of militant groups throughout the region.

The author uses three examples to illustrate his points: the Islamic Renaissance Party in Tajikistan, the Hizb-ut-Tahrir in several Central Asian states, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Each of these, although in itself unique, owes its prominence to the reasons outlined above. Rashid also discusses the situation of great-power rivalry among the

United States, China, and Russia as it relates to oil pipelines and regional stability. He also goes into detail regarding neighboring states, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, and their respective agendas toward the region. These chapters round out a complete picture of all the factors affecting Central Asia's stability.

The author ends with a chapter that highlights the issues contributing to Central Asia's woeful situation and offers some thoughts about forging stability there. This latter portion is disappointingly short; Rashid devotes only nine pages to discussing possible solutions to alleviating Central Asia's plight. A more developed discussion would have been beneficial.

Aside from this flaw, *Jihad* provides an excellent overview of the reasons for the rise of militant elements in Central Asia. The book gives an understanding of the stakes involved in Central Asia's security and how the region applies to U.S. interests. Central Asia has become significant for U.S. interests not only because of the prospects for oil but also for its potential as a haven for terrorist bases.

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Klare, Michael T. *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict*. New York: Henry Holt, 2002. 304pp. \$15

Michael Klare argues that most wars of the future, like many of those of the past and present, will be caused by conflicts over natural resources, especially oil and water. As a consequence, he suggests that American national

security policy focus “on oil field protection, the defense of maritime trade routes, and other aspects of resource security.” This position represents a reaffirmation of the industrial and economic dimensions of U.S. national security. In effect, if Klare is right, we are witnessing a resurgence of a materialist strand of American strategic thought that has been prominent at least since Alfred Thayer Mahan. For strategists, neither the clash of civilizations, the tragedies of identity politics, nor the long-buried animosities of religion or ethnicity are sufficient motivations for the major sources of conflict in the modern world. Rather, conflicts and national security policies are about the struggle for natural resources.

Lest anyone think that this is a purely American phenomenon, Klare suggests that the “economization” of international security affairs holds not just for the United States but also for most countries, including China, Japan, and Russia. Insatiable consumption coupled with finite, poorly distributed resources, as well as with a propensity to use armed force, leads to a conflict-ridden future.

Much of Klare's argument reads as if it were inspired by the tumultuous events of the 1970s, specifically after the first global oil shock helped to alert the world to upcoming neo-Malthusian dilemmas. The 1973–74 oil crisis, among other events, forced the United States and the world to face the reality that petroleum supplies are finite, poorly distributed across the globe, and vulnerable to rogue states. Academics and policy entrepreneurs then spent much of the decade cataloguing the vast number of critically important natural resources that were in short supply or projected to be, given consumption trends and

demographic growth. Klare continues to assume that resource shortages lie in wait for humanity as a whole and for specific societies in particular.

Unfortunately, Klare barely pauses to consider the possibility that diplomatic, economic, and political developments might ease potential resource conflicts before they escalate into armed conflicts. After all, countries fighting over access to water or oil could simply negotiate arrangements or allow market forces to dictate outcomes; the author himself notes examples and cases where diplomatic solutions have succeeded in the past. In fact, the absence of economic reasoning in this book is startling. After all, economists from cranks to countless mainstream professionals have demonstrated how market forces can help manage the worst aspects of resource shortages. Thus energy shortages that lead to price increases in turn encourage consumers to conserve; consumption is reduced, as well as overall dependence. Hence, despite tremendous economic growth, Western Europe, Japan, and even the United States have become much more energy efficient since the oil shock of the 1970s. Substitution effects are also possible, although perhaps not for a resource as fundamental and elemental as water.

This book is less than persuasive on the topic of politics. In its final section, which describes alternatives to war, Klare sets up a straw man, arguing that “it seems reasonable to ask whether a resource-acquisition strategy based on global cooperation rather than recurring conflict might not prove more effective than guaranteeing access to critical supply over the long run.” He then answers his own question by claiming that “such a strategy would

call for the equitable distribution of the world’s existing resource stockpiles in times of acute scarcity.” In short, Klare suggests a utopian solution to a deeply practical set of problems. It is more likely that many, if not most, of the various potential resource “wars” outlined here will be settled short of war (or at least of a major war) by various methods of muddling through. Grand bargains over potentially equitable distributions of various resources seem unlikely given the present state of international politics.

Even if one accepts Klare’s dire assumptions about the possibility of shortages and conflicts, his list is very traditional. Oil and water conflicts are old news. He does not mention the possibility of new competitions, for resources like satellite “parking spaces” or access to ocean fisheries, that might lead to clashes among great powers. Nor does he explore in great detail demographic realities that underlie competition for water and energy. For many of the water conflicts, for example, the key variable is tremendous population growth, which makes old agreements obsolete and intensifies bargaining over future resources.

Criticisms aside, *Resource Wars* offers readers a great deal. Klare provides thumbnail summaries of numerous conflicts great and small, from the South China Sea to the headwaters of the Nile. He represents each case with grace and economy. He reminds us of the oft-forgotten histories and details of geography that matter greatly in resource wars. More importantly, Klare provides a useful corrective to the ideational, historical, and political explanations of international behavior so popular today. Even the Arab-Israeli conflict is linked to competition for

land and water in ways that some who focus on the religious conflicts, the shadow of the past, and the various weaknesses of the Israeli-Palestinian and other Arab authority structures forget. In short, academics, policy makers, and military officers should pay close attention to those regions that have the greatest potential for armed conflict based on the relative scarce supplies of critical resources.

PETER DOMBROWSKI
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Benjamin, Daniel, and Steven Simon. *The Age of Sacred Terror*. New York: Random House, 2002. 490pp. \$25.95

Were you to begin with the last chapter of this book, “A World of Terror,” you would note that radical Islamists do not have an exclusive hold on terror as a strategic weapon. In fact, you might be well advised to consider reading this chapter first, to understand that extremist adherents of Christianity as well as other faiths also have employed sacred terror as a tool in the pursuit of their aims. If, on the other hand, you choose to begin with chapter 1, you will receive a good overview of the terrorist events of the past ten to twelve years, with a focus on those of Islamic origin.

Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, senior staff members of the Clinton administration’s National Security Council, paint a coherent picture of the genesis of sacred terror, the response to it, and prospects for the future. The time frame also includes the end and the beginning of the two Bush administrations. Benjamin and Simon’s conclusion points out the long-term nature of

the issue and recommends that the West engage it with a view to the postconflict possibilities. The book’s purpose may include an attempt to influence history’s interpretation of the data, particularly with regard to the years of the authors’ involvement, but that hardly negates its significance.

Benjamin and Simon offer three particularly valuable discussions. First, they carefully tease three threads from the history of radical Islamism. Second, they give an airing to the workings of government—probably always less than transparent. In this, they do not hesitate to parcel out responsibility for good and for ill. Finally, they offer a strategic reflection that goes beyond radical Islamism.

That Islam was, and can be, a religion of the sword should come as no surprise. After Muhammad (d. 632), Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyya, born in 1269, an accomplished Islamic jurist at age twenty, established the intellectual underpinning of today’s radical Islamism. Ibn Taymiyya did more than anyone to erect *jihād*—actual warfare—as a pillar of Islam. From him descended in the subsequent centuries serious intellectuals, hard men ready to commit violence, messianic figures whose zeal seems most foreign to twenty-first-century realities. Together, “they feed into the eruption of jihadist Islamism that has confronted the West, America in particular, over the last decade.” Now, the warrior prince Usama bin Laden carries jihadism into the new millennium.

“Exactly when the name Usama bin Laden began appearing in American intelligence reports and FBI investigative materials is something we are unlikely to ever learn.” This observation,

coupled with the truism that we judge the unknown to be unlikely, points out how it was that we only gradually gave shape and definition to the terrorist threat. When one considers that the United States was riding the laurels of the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War and that its economy was steaming comfortably, it seems almost understandable that no one put all the pieces together earlier. Nevertheless, Benjamin and Simon take turns putting agencies and leaders in the pillory. Interagency collaboration is mostly a game of “I’ve got a secret.” Alley politics overshadow intelligent analysis and policy making as the White House and Capitol Hill threw punches at each other; a president lacked personal credibility; and the news media, aware of the public’s low interest for international news, failed to pursue stories aggressively.

Before 9/11, “America was the prisoner of an old paradigm for thinking about terrorism, and it could be released only through a revolutionary act of violence.” Herein lies a tragic blessing. As its long-range response, the administration created a new cabinet-level department for homeland security. Other measures were also taken, and others need to be taken once the technology measures up. Additionally, citizens and governments alike must become much more attuned to the various currents that have been shaped by the past and that will shape the future. Developing a sustainable strategy depends on it, lest the tragedy become pathos.

The book concludes with a riveting chapter on terrorism under the cloak of other religions. Jewish messianism, the quasi-Buddhist cult Aum Shinrikyo, and Christian apocalyptic literature and movements all point to more terrorism.

The Age of Sacred Terror will enlighten leaders and citizens alike, and it should be a must-read for midlevel officers, especially those aspiring to senior leadership. It challenges the way we plan and train, and it certainly provides grist for the mill of doctrine development—while pointing out, yet again, that this is not the foe our parents and grandparents faced. If we learn no other lesson, this book will have served us well.

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Kurspahic, Kemal. *Prime Time Crime: Balkan Media in War and Peace*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003. 261pp. \$19.95

Solving the puzzle of the destruction of Yugoslavia is one of the dominant historical and political questions of our time. Prominent scholars, high-ranking military officers, and noted politicians all seem to be asking how an advanced confederation could fail so quickly and with such disastrous consequences. Kemal Kurspahic, the award-winning editor of the Sarajevo wartime daily newspaper *Oslobodjenje*, provides some important answers to this question with his firsthand account of media in the former Yugoslavia.

This book provides chilling, first-person insight into the decline of the Yugoslavian media into nationalism and into its contribution to the destruction of the Yugoslav federation. Kurspahic, a Bosnian Muslim, paints a picture of the disintegration of the former republic that, like many horror stories, is at once riveting, revolting, and compelling. This is a work that is riveting in its

honesty, revolting in its facts, and ultimately compelling in its insight. The author's journalistic style easily dissolves the complexity of politics and personality, offering the reader a valuable glimpse into a political arena rarely seen, much less understood, by Westerners unfamiliar with the Balkans.

The first chapter's treatise on the author's thoughts and beliefs concerning journalism during Josip Broz Tito's socialist revolution evokes an optimism shared by many Yugoslavs during the days of the "Balkan miracle." This optimism offers a starting point for the reader's compassion for the people of the former Yugoslavia and their lost dream. Many readers will find here an illuminating perspective on the lost opportunities during Tito's regime—a time of great hope for unity but ultimate belief in nationalism, ethnicity, and culture.

The importance of ethnicity became excruciatingly clear during the early 1990s, when, as the author describes, the nationalist parties and leaders in Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia managed to capture the press. Playing on themes and seams between cultures that had been glossed over by Tito's press, journalists began an easy decline into uncontested nationalist rhetoric. According to Kurspahic, "the Yugoslav public . . . still had only one ruling party and its ideology. What was once a Communist controlled media became a nationalist-controlled media. Milosevic simply renamed his party—from Communist to Socialist—and switched . . . from 'brotherhood and unity' to 'hatred toward neighbors.'" These divisions provided stronger focal points for the parties and easier writing for the media,

and they reinforced the nationalist bias of the people.

Not limiting his comments to Serbia, Kurspahic thoroughly examines the slide of Croatian and Bosnian media into nationalist propaganda as well. He paints a consistent theme of one-party rule and its ability to control and focus the press. The press, responding to the call of nationalism, simply followed the path it always had—support of the party in power.

This point leads to an exceptionally compelling aspect of the narrative, the rise and suppression of the opposition media. Kurspahic exhaustively categorizes attempts in each republic to combat the rampant nationalism. Most of the attempts by a critical press to establish itself, regardless of location, met disastrous ends. The work's firsthand accounts of resistance to nationalism and its effects offer remarkable insights into journalistic ethics and the strength they offer editors and reporters, even at the threat of their own lives. The decisions made to crush the opposition press provide more chilling evidence of the strength of nationalism as a political tool of control.

However, the work's concern is not the pathos of the opposition and its attempt at critique but its inability to alter the ethnic momentum of the warring republics. Kurspahic's contribution to an understanding of the war is his argument regarding the willingness of the people to accept the crimes of its leaders as a natural part of the progression to statehood. This was the true media disaster in the former Yugoslavia. In the eyes of the author, the media's crime was its unchallenged, biased, and willing complicity with nationalist rhetoric.

The author's attempt to weave a straight course through the warfare of three ethnicities suffers from a few shortcomings. As the author seeks to produce history, there is a great deal of personal recollection. If the author is attempting an autobiography, there is a great deal of history. Some might say his own ethnic identity prevents a balanced account of Serb or Croatian media. Kurspahic understands this; his damning indictment of his own country's media and how Bosnian nationalism translated into violence speaks for itself. Nevertheless, the author also accepts the necessity to play the ethnic card and laments that *Oslobodjenje's* "selected editing" in Sarajevo was necessary for its survival.

Concluding with the current changes in the Balkan media and a list of future policy options to prevent media nationalism, Kurspahic returns to the optimistic tone of the beginning of the work. Reviewing the policy recommendations of the last chapter, Kurspahic yearns for a free and independent press, one worthy of, and desiring, outside critique. The author would also welcome a press that challenges the government. This optimism, though warranted, may be premature. It remains to be seen if international media-watchdog groups can bring about any of these changes.

Prime Time Crime commands an important place on the bookshelf of anyone studying the former Yugoslavia. Kemal Kurspahic trains an unblinking eye on the nationalist Balkan press and its contribution to the war. In particular, the first chapter and the appendices should be required reading for any officer posted to duty in this troubled region. Although addressing just one small piece of the puzzle that was the

fall of Yugoslavia, Kurspahic's narrative of the rise of a nationalist press answers many questions about the society of former Yugoslavia, its destruction, and its ability to prosecute such a horrendous conflict. In a much broader sense, *Prime Time Crime* reveals what may happen when any government, political leader, or nationalist ideal captures or co-opts the media.

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Kennedy, Gregory C., and Keith Neilson, eds.
Military Education: Past, Present, and Future.
Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002. 256pp. \$64.99

This collection of ten essays is largely historical. Only three deal with current military education, and none focuses substantially on the future. Six examine European institutions, while three address military education in the United States and one recent change in Canada. The editors and authors are seasoned historians; some teach at civilian institutions, some at military schools.

The essays report the continuing tension between academic officer-preparation and hands-on experience, and the contrast of both approaches with the military's more usual method of preparation—training. All agree that technology and its continued development mean education is required. History is agreed to be crucial to military education, but there are critiques here of how it is used and of its tendency to direct attention to the past rather than to consider the past's meaning for the future.

T. G. Otte discusses the influence of the French Revolution and German

philosophy on von Clausewitz's discussion of the development and value of leaders with "genius." Dennis E. Showalter describes the evolution of Prussian military education in the direction of merit criteria for officer selection and the resulting increase in the number of officers who were commoners. Lori Bogle of the U.S. Naval Academy then addresses how Prussian lessons were applied at the Military Academy at West Point by Sylvanus Thayer, superintendent from 1817 to 1833. She describes his emphasis on moral education, which included religious revivals and rigorous mental and physical discipline. Equality, honor, competition, and formal training in ethics were all part of Thayer's efforts to tame what Bogle calls "boy culture" and its individualistic definition of personal honor—characteristic of the antebellum American South—in terms that entailed military obedience.

Several essays consider British military education. Andrew Lambert notes that militaries believe experience is crucial, but in fact many officers do not actually have experience, so academics are important. Academics, he says, should stimulate real thinking, but too often that comes only after military defeat. Further, the "edge" provided by critical thinking is too often of short duration. Lambert argues that selection for intellectual prowess and assignments to posts that use prowess is all-important and that poor leadership leads to setbacks. One example of poor leadership, he says, was that of First Lord Winston Churchill, "who would not listen to advice." David French discusses officer training in the regular British army between the two world wars. A not entirely successful effort was made to

broaden the social class of officers, broaden their education, expand their view beyond that of the regiment, recruit officers with university degrees, and promote by examination as opposed to primarily by seniority. A weakness of officer education that appeared in the early years of World War II was its lack of training in "all-arms cooperation."

Mark R. Grandstaff gets to tell the story of the founding of the U.S. Air War College in the heady days of the newly created service after World War II. Its motto? "Unhampered by Tradition"; its education was to be "prewar not postwar." One goal was to develop military strategists, but from the beginning there were also some who argued that the purpose was to develop "air statesmen" who could "stand up to the politicians" and gain a "full share in the formulation of national policies." Grandstaff credits the Air War College with excellent methodology but finds the value of its educational content variable. He does not consider how method, in fact, affects content.

The one important change in U.S. military education since Vietnam has been the emphasis given to joint education. This shift was imposed by Congress. Thomas A. Keany details the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act's requirements, noting an assumption that education on jointness can occur only in a joint environment and arguing that emphasis on campaigns diminishes the attention given to the many other ways in which the services should be cooperating. Ronald G. Haycock explores another example of civilian intervention, recounting Canadian changes since its military's "Last Traumatic Experience." (Canadian troops murdered a Somalian

teen in 1993.) The National Defense College was closed, officers were required to get college degrees, the content of their education was greatly expanded, and the publication of a new college journal was ordered. Haycock's essay on the changes and their potential should be required reading as Canada endeavors to find its way out of the "colonial cringe" through emphasized tactics and technology.

In his overview of current European military education, Peter Foot describes three types that exist today: "Jena" schools, which look to professional, in-house education; "Falkland" schools, which "bolt on" new material; and "Kosovo" schools, which address complexity and ambiguity and seek external, civilian accreditation. Foot notes a trend toward commonality, including more joint and combined training and advanced distance learning. He gives particular attention to military training in Eastern Europe, noting in particular developments in Bulgaria and in the Baltic republics' tristate institution.

In all, this is a collection worth reading, especially to remind us of the impediments to change and the perpetual tension between training and education (within its critical thinking), between tradition and innovation, and between technology and strategy. The debate over military education began as early as Plato, and it will not end with Kennedy or Neilson.

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Hackworth, David H., and Eilys England. *Steel My Soldiers' Hearts*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002. 444pp. \$27.95

There are so many books about the Vietnam War and the Vietnam experience that the message of one more risks being lost amidst a vast ocean of tragic tales told with great pain. However, Hackworth and England have provided something more than a reminiscence of an Army combat unit in the post-Tet Offensive world of Vietnam; they have presented readers with a tactical reform primer for infantry. All the information is there in stark GI English, beginning with the first sentence of chapter 1 (not repeated here out of delicacy), and finishing up with the last sentences of the last chapter: "We now need to fight smart as much as we need to get even. There is no other choice. We do it right or we lose. We win—or we die." Hackworth and England are referring to the new war against terrorism in the post-9/11 world. The quotation applies to the current day, and it applied to Hackworth's nightmare battalion in the Mekong Delta in 1969.

His unit was the 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. The troops making up the battalion were, as the authors state, citizen draftee soldiers, not the volunteers that had filled the first combat units that went into Vietnam back in 1965. These soldiers did not want to be in Vietnam. They had come from a country where protests against the war had become large-scale performance art, widely publicized by news media and, most importantly, were supported by a large portion of the population. These reluctant warriors were doubly cursed, for they were part of an army the leadership of which had started to unravel in the face of the stubborn refusal of an enemy to admit defeat, an enemy who still could attack U.S. soldiers with skill,

speed, and lethality. Hackworth and England are unsparing in their depictions of the martinets and incompetents who made up a fair portion of the officer and noncommissioned officers' corps that led soldiers into the Delta swamps and rice paddies—beginning with the battalion commander who places his unit's main base in the middle of a Viet Cong minefield, through a commanding general more focused on maximizing body counts for his own career than on effectively fighting an elusive enemy.

Despite determined opposition both from the enemy and higher headquarters, Hackworth achieved an organizational transformation of his hard-luck battalion. The 4/39th became a skilled, deadly foe of the Viet Cong in the Delta, a unit that took the fight to the enemy, taking away his initiative. Hackworth did this through reimposition of a strict but fair discipline, introduction of and training in proven and successful fieldcraft, and leadership from the front. There are no magic bullets or technological fixes for this kind of transformation, just simple success on the battlefield—the enemy dies or goes away. In the beginning of his command, Hackworth's disciplinarian approach earned him a contract on his head from his own soldiers. By the time he left, one of these same soldiers would write, "The most terrible thing happened today. Colonel Hackworth left. You remember the one everyone hated, and wanted shot? Now there's another bounty out for him—to anyone who can get him back."

Steel My Soldiers' Hearts contains the collected practical wisdom of this successful battalion commander. Curiously, however, the wisdom that keeps

soldiers alive on the battlefield does not necessarily contribute to the end of battles or wars. Hackworth and England acknowledge as much in an account of a conversation between Hackworth and John Paul Vann. Hackworth and Vann were compatriots and friends; Vann had been Hackworth's company commander in Korea. Vann, now a civilian advisor to the South Vietnamese regime, told Hackworth that while his battalion was improving the security of the area, they were killing too many civilians. Vann added, "Once the 9th's out of here, I reckon that eighty to ninety percent of the Delta's population will come to our side. You guys have been the VC's biggest recruiter. You kill a boy's mama, which side do you reckon he'll join?"

Therein lies the major lesson of this frank, valuable book. A nation's armed forces can be exceptionally well trained, exceptionally lethal, and full of esprit de corps. They can win all the battles. They can maximize the body count. But if the end of the battle or war is flawed—or worse, uncertain—no amount of courage, steel, or personal battlefield leadership will have obtained victory.

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Taubman, Philip. *Secret Empire: Eisenhower, the CIA and the Hidden Story of America's Space Espionage*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003. 441pp. \$27

That the United States has conducted a program of high-altitude and spaceborne photographic reconnaissance since the mid-1950s is hardly a secret.

With the public release of many previously classified source documents and project histories, the time is right for Philip Taubman's history of the strategic issues, politics, personalities, and technologies that drove the development of America's extraordinary space reconnaissance capability.

Taubman has reported on national security and intelligence matters for the *New York Times* for more than twenty years. He is clearly a thorough researcher; his list of consulted sources, documents, and technical reports runs to eighteen pages of small print. Much of it is material new to the public domain.

Strange as it may seem today, when the United States is rich in strategic intelligence, in the early 1950s it had no reliable estimate of the numbers of strategic bombers, missiles, or nuclear warheads in the Soviet Union. As Winston Churchill said, the USSR was "a riddle wrapped in an enigma." Bison bombers flew circles around Moscow to inflate the estimates of Western air attachés of their numbers; Nikita Khrushchev rattled rockets to add to the noise.

In this murky but threatening environment, the Eisenhower administration was struggling to develop a balanced defense policy, one that would offer effective defense against an opponent whose capabilities and intentions were imperfectly known, but one that would not break the nation's economy. Hard strategic intelligence—reconnaissance-based counts of strategic things—was key. However, the Soviet Union was then what was picturesquely called "a denied area." RB-47s and similar aircraft probed the borders but could not see deeply into the Soviet Union, and their reconnaissance flights often ended

in political embarrassment for the government and tragedy for the crews.

At this point, a collection of remarkable men entered the game: Edwin Land of Polaroid, a politically well connected systems engineer; Kelly Johnson, head of Lockheed's fabled "Skunk Works" and builder of extraordinary aircraft; James Baker of Harvard, a most creative camera-system designer; and Arthur Lundhal of the CIA, a gifted photographic interpreter. Richard Bissell, the CIA's legendary manager of high-risk projects, assumed the leadership of this gang and with it brought the fabled U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft and later the first photographic reconnaissance satellites, Corona, to operational fulfillment.

Taubman paints these men unreservedly as patriots, putting their considerable technical skills and imagination at their country's service. That they were. More importantly, they grasped the need for hard strategic intelligence and had the perspective to see the promise of new technologies and their application to the problem of strategic reconnaissance.

The author does a splendid job of interpreting the significance of the technical problems encountered and the brilliant ingenuity of the solutions. Aircraft had never operated at the combination of altitude (over seventy thousand feet) and range (beyond three thousand miles) that strategic overflight of the Soviet Union would require. The solution from Johnson's Skunk Works was the U-2, a sort of jet-powered glider with the climb characteristics of a homesick angel. Baker designed cameras with long focal lengths that folded into tight fuselage and satellite spaces; Kodak developed films that could

survive the temperature extremes encountered at reconnaissance altitudes; Lundhal organized a photographic interpretation activity to receive and analyze the pictures.

When satellite-borne cameras replaced the U-2, new and even more demanding technical problems arose. Just getting a satellite launched and into orbit was no mean trick. Choosing between relaying television pictures from space or returning exposed film was a subtle and demanding technical choice. Recovery of the exposed film was selected and became the coolest trick of all: film capsules, ejected from the satellite, reentered the atmosphere and parachuted down to where a specially equipped C-130 snagged them out of the air.

All this seems quite ordinary today, but in the 1950s these were innovative technical accomplishments. Too often strategic histories treat critical technical accomplishments lightly and gloss over their significance to strategic and policy choices. To Taubman's credit, he is attuned to the importance of the enabling technologies and brings their role and impact to the reader's understanding.

After getting the cameras aloft, Taubman turns his attention to the consequences of the pictures they returned. The first flights captured staggering numbers of detailed pictures covering vast sweeps of the hidden interior of the Soviet Union. The pictures revealed that Soviet Bison bombers were as rare as the animal is today in Montana and that Soviet intercontinental missiles, while large and ugly, were few and in a low state of readiness.

This did not end the Cold War or put America completely at ease, but it did bring some balance and scope to

defense planning for the late 1950s. In 1960 a presidential candidate who should be remembered for better things rode to victory partly on claims that the Eisenhower administration had allowed a dangerous missile gap to grow. The pictures from these satellites and aircraft put paid to that.

Taubman's book is twice valuable—first, for its historical development of the value and impact of strategic intelligence, and second, for its insight into the role of technology and technologists in shaping strategic policy.

In his final pages, Taubman raises important questions about America's current reliance on technical intelligence collection methods. He notes that little about al-Qa'ida's activities or capabilities is being revealed or forecast by satellite reconnaissance and that human intelligence sources and the collection of intelligence must play a central role in the twenty-first-century war against terrorism.

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Bonds, John Bledsoe. *Bipartisan Strategy: Selling the Marshall Plan*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002. 256pp. \$64.95

When we look back on great historical events, we often ascribe an inevitability to things that were, in fact, anything but. In this lucid and comprehensive study of the formulation and enactment of the Marshall Plan, John Bonds recounts how this great pillar of American post-World War II policy was anything but inevitable. Bonds, a retired captain of the U.S. Navy and professor of history at the Citadel in Charlestown, South Carolina,

concludes his penultimate chapter on the final legislative approval of what was to be Public Law 793 with the words: "So it was finally done. The country had made a significant commitment to Europe and to internationalism in general, consciously and with conviction, despite some difficult holdouts like Mr. John Taber, Chairman, House Appropriations Committee. *But to the last the issue had been in doubt.*" On that last sentence (emphasis added) hangs the tale of this study.

The Republicans controlled Congress, the president was seen as weak and was opposed by prominent members of his own party, and the Republicans smelled a White House victory in 1948, for the first time since 1928. On partisan grounds alone, then, 1947–48 did not seem a propitious time for a major bipartisan initiative. Beyond considerations of party, however, there were large substantive policy issues that divided the nation: how best to deal with the erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union; fear of inflation and the ultimate cost of European recovery; concern for balancing the budget; and how to meet the public desire for "normalcy" after years of depression and war.

Bonds gives an impressive account of the extraordinary skill of the Truman administration and the rightly celebrated Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in mobilizing business, labor, intellectuals, and public opinion in support of what many correctly perceived as a decisive break with traditional American foreign policy. In this mobilization of external opinion and lobbying of congressional support (at a time when such lobbying was seen as improper), there

were mutually countervailing pressures tending to minimize President Truman's public engagement, which was seen as raising partisan hackles, but also to maximize the president's public role, the better to position him for the 1948 election. Bonds correctly concludes, however, that such considerations and skills were insufficient to account for the final enactment.

A fundamental change of perspective was required, and skillful alliance building and sales strategies were inadequate. Indeed, the administration understood this and sought to justify the shift in American peacetime engagement by the need to restore the European balance of power and the international trading system, ravaged by depression and war. At the same time, there was a desire to establish for the first time in American history a program of universal military training. In the mind of the president, Secretary of State George C. Marshall, and Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal, the European Recovery Program and a new foundation for national defense were inextricably linked.

In the event, none of these arguments, or the general campaign to weld an alliance of business, labor, academia, and the public in support of America's new role, generated sufficient votes in Congress to pass the Marshall Plan. Soviet actions in Finland, Czechoslovakia, and Berlin did.

All of this is particularly remarkable in view of the fact that the administration had consciously sought to downplay the Soviet menace as the motive for its initiative. More abstract discussions of the balance of power and international commerce were consistently favored. This stemmed from the desire neither to slam the door on some renewed

understanding with the Soviet Union (a position favored by some influential opinions in the United States) nor to create trouble for the French government, seemingly both dependent on and threatened by the French Communist Party.

The Soviet-menace card was played on several occasions in the unfolding debate, but in general it was subordinated to more abstract arguments of enlightened self-interest. Moreover, it was clear to many in the administration that too great an emphasis on the imminence of war with Russia would scuttle both the recovery program and universal military training in favor of a general wartime mobilization. In effect, although Soviet pressures certainly provided the needed ingredient for legislative success, they also had the potential to divert the country from the recovery program itself. Later events would ultimately modify the balance between economic assistance and military mobilization—but that is another story, beyond the scope of this fine book.

Finally, it should be noted that Bonds has the ability to tell a story clearly, at times even breezily, and analyze without cumbersome jargon. For clarity and sophistication, this is likely to be a standard reference for some time to come.

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Hore, Peter, ed. *Patrick Blackett: Sailor, Scientist, Socialist*. Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 2003. 330pp. \$59.50

Patrick Maynard Stuart Blackett was a key member of the international circle of scientists who led the Allied defense research efforts of World War II, and

he was the heart and soul of the Cold War military-academic-industrial complex. In this book, sixteen authors attempt to shed light on Blackett's role in that story. The collection includes papers presented at a 1998 conference commemorating Blackett at Cambridge University, as well as other recent writings about him.

Not surprisingly, the compendium offers a range of perspectives on events and issues with which Blackett was associated, rather than a comprehensive examination of his life and work. The articles are arranged in roughly chronological order, but there is otherwise little integration among them—a characteristic only exacerbated by Blackett's wide-ranging interests and expertise. However, it is clear that an integrated whole was not the editor's goal. Instead, Hore's intent was to augment the inadequate body of literature on Blackett by encouraging new research on him and publishing the results.

After an opening overview of Blackett's youth, compiled from Blackett's own autobiographical notes, the book covers his education in the Royal Navy's preparatory school system, his service as a naval officer during World War I, and his post-secondary and graduate education in physics at Cambridge University under the tutelage of Sir Ernest Rutherford. After a summary of Blackett's contribution to Britain's war preparation efforts during the 1930s, several chapters are devoted to his wartime work on defense science, technology, and policy. This material addresses his widely acknowledged leadership in the field of operational research and the ways in which that research contributed to high-level disputes over convoying strategy and strategic-bombing policy.

The final chapters examine the postwar public controversy sparked by Blackett's vocal opposition to nuclear weapons, his long association with Indian political leaders and scientists, a summary of his Nobel-winning career as a physicist, and his role in the first administration of England's prime minister Harold Wilson during the late 1960s.

Hore accomplishes his goal of facilitating and gathering new research on Blackett. Rather than introduce brazen, new concepts, the book's primary contribution to academic research will be as a resource for those endeavoring to examine elements of Blackett's life in the larger context. This is for the most part a function of the biographical nature of this work, the very practical personality of the subject, and the large number of contributors, each with a particular perspective. Several of the authors, however, have focused too intently on specific, detailed narratives, passing up the larger questions. In some cases the focus is so narrow that the book's main subject—Blackett—is conspicuous by his absence. In fact, arguably, this is the general weakness of the book; there is so much emphasis on Blackett's work that little attention is paid to Blackett himself.

The two chapters on operational research are useful examples. Jock Gardner's brief contribution, "Blackett and the Black Arts," analyzes wartime reports from the British signals intelligence and operational research departments to determine the extent that the two groups issued reports based on one another's data. The chapter by Richard Ormerod is an institutional history of operational research as a field of study, focusing on the vagaries of the field's attempts to define itself. Blackett himself is rarely

mentioned in these chapters. Given Blackett's central role in the history of operational research, this would have been the perfect opportunity to learn more about his contributions and to understand the influence of operational research during and after World War II.

Fortunately, several of the contributors chose broader topics. For example, Peter Hore's own chapter offers a thoughtful look at Blackett's experiences as a sailor during World War I, using a variety of sources to place that story within the wider circumstances of the war and to consider how Blackett weathered the ordeal. Mary Jo Nye's contribution, "A Physicist in the Corridors of Power," must also be singled out for praise. Following Blackett throughout his entire career, Nye describes the ebb and flow of Blackett's influence on both national policy and science, demonstrating how Blackett's career expressed his character and political beliefs. It is contributions like these that make this work a valuable and enjoyable book.

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Sondhaus, Lawrence. *Navies of Europe*. London: Longman, 2002. 256pp. \$26.95

O'Brien, Phillips Payson. *Technology and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century and Beyond*. Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 2001. 360pp. \$63

Since the onset of the industrial revolution, navies have continuously struggled with the challenges posed by technological change. In *Navies of Europe*, Lawrence Sondhaus examines this problem from a European perspective. Sondhaus chronicles the fortunes of

both great and minor powers beginning in 1815, at a time when the navies of Europe still dominated the globe, up to the present day.

Compressing nearly two hundred years of naval history into a single volume is a difficult task, but this work is a solid introduction to the subject for the general reader. The book provides a clear overview of the major technological developments of the modern era, including such important events as the transition from sail to steam, the advent of the armored warship, the dreadnought revolution, and the rise of naval aviation. It also offers a lucid account of naval operations during these two centuries. As might be expected, the two world wars receive the most detailed treatment, but the author is equally adept at recounting, and explaining the importance of, numerous lesser-known naval operations.

One of the book's greatest strengths is its attention to the navies of minor European powers, which are usually overlooked entirely in surveys of this period. These small states were seldom on the cutting edge of naval innovation, but their fleets were still significant from a national or regional perspective. Minor powers could and did possess navies for purposes that were often unrelated to those of their larger or more powerful neighbors. Sondhaus never lets these lesser navies dominate the narrative—their inclusion sometimes reads like an afterthought—but he consistently strikes a fair balance between Europe's different states.

Europe may no longer be able to dominate the world's sea-lanes as it once did, but this book provides a useful reminder that European naval forces, though overshadowed by the United

States in both resources and capabilities, remain at the forefront of technology and innovation, and continue to be capable of performing a wide variety of missions on relatively short notice.

Technology and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century and Beyond examines some of these same navies in greater depth but also includes chapters on two non-European powers, the United States and Japan. The title, however, is somewhat misleading. The fifteen articles in this collection actually pay very little attention to naval combat during the twentieth century—nearly all the chapters focus on peacetime naval policy, warship construction, and technology.

It is also worth noting that not all the states examined receive equal treatment. Italy and France drop out of the volume after their entry into the First World War, while Germany and Japan disappear with the outbreak of World War II. The United States, however, does not appear until 1919, and the Soviet Union is included only in the section on the Cold War. Britain's navy is the only one to appear in all sections of the book, and the period before World War I is only partially covered with a previously published article by Nicholas Lambert on Admiral Sir John Fisher and the concept of flotilla defense in 1904–1909.

None of this is meant as criticism, however, as the volume was clearly not intended to serve as a comprehensive naval history of the twentieth century. Both the general reader and the specialist will find much of interest here. Leading scholars in the field have written the individual chapters, and the overall quality of the contributions is

high. The book's highlights include insightful overviews of the U.S. and British navies during the Cold War era by George W. Baer and Eric Grove, and a piece on the current and future direction of the Royal Navy by Geoffrey Till. Because the authors are able to examine specific navies and periods in some detail, this volume illustrates more effectively than *Navies of Europe* the full range of political, economic, and technological factors that typically shape a state's naval policy.

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Zimmermann, Warren. *First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made Their Country a World Power*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2002. 562pp. \$30

The path of America's rise to global dominance has always attracted the attention of distinguished historians and political scientists, ranging from Henry Adams to Walter LaFeber to Stephen E. Ambrose. Warren Zimmermann, a thirty-three-year veteran of the Foreign Service, joins the fray with *First Great Triumph*, a provocative analysis of the "fathers of American imperialism" at the onset of the twentieth century. Zimmermann examines how President Theodore Roosevelt, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan, Secretary of State John Hay, and Secretary of War Elihu Root engineered American imperial expansion in the decade from 1898 to 1908.

Why these five men? Zimmermann claims not only that they were influential in establishing the United States as a global power but that their characters

and beliefs helped determine how that power would be used. In essence, this book is about imperialism by "Roosevelt and his friends." Zimmermann also gives due credit for constructing the first overseas empire to Admiral George Dewey, Leonard Wood, Philippine colonial governor William H. Taft, and President William McKinley. Regrettably, he downplays the contributions of Admiral Stephen B. Luce and Secretary of the Navy Benjamin F. Tracy, both of whom influenced Mahan in the development of his naval theories.

Graduates of the Naval War College will find Zimmermann's analysis of Mahan's career particularly interesting. Zimmermann's Mahan is the preeminent American strategist of his generation, a "pen and ink sailor" who in midcareer found himself "out of sorts with the navy which accurately considered him a misfit and a complainer." At home in Newport, Rhode Island, Mahan articulated a doctrine of seapower as the controlling factor to national greatness. Like George Kennan, who authored the containment doctrine a half-century later, Mahan inspired American foreign policy with his insightful analysis of America's position among nations.

The centerpiece of this work, however, is undoubtedly Roosevelt. Roosevelt constructed the first true imperial presidency and ushered in the "American Century." Fresh from his heroics during the Spanish-American War, Roosevelt was catapulted to the White House upon the assassination of William McKinley. By the time he departed eight years later, the United States was the dominant force in the Caribbean and a major presence in Asia. On the strength of his marshaling of public

opinion and judicious use of America's economic and military power, Roosevelt, not Woodrow Wilson, emerges as the true "father of American diplomacy." During the Roosevelt administration, American foreign policy combined national power with what Zimmermann terms "high purpose."

Zimmermann offers equally compelling character sketches of the other members of Roosevelt's team. Lodge emerges as a political manipulator who guides imperialist policies through Congress. Hay contributes to American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere by developing closer ties with Great Britain, while Root creates the first American colonial administration, in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War. Their combined efforts made their country a power to be reckoned with on the international scene.

However, Zimmermann's crystal ball looks far bleaker as the United States enters the twenty-first century. Here Zimmermann's interpretation is based on too much conjecture and too little fact. Despite the massing of American military might in the Middle East in the aftermath of 11 September, Zimmermann

opines, this country faces an erosion of its power due to a weakening of the U.S. presidency and the reemergence of congressional dominance in foreign policy. Additionally, he sees a current trend toward nonmilitary involvement and an unwillingness to commit military forces in support of foreign policy. Lastly, Zimmermann posits that international terrorism has produced a backlash against U.S. policies as well as the cultural, ideological, and economic principles that guide the United States.

In summary, Zimmermann offers a provocative interpretation about American imperialism during the last century and a chilling prognostication for the current one. The reader is more likely to concur with his thesis that the expansion of the United States to an international power was not an aberration but a culmination of forces that had dominated the political and economic scene since its birth, than with the decline in the power of the presidency, which is more a function of personality than of the reemergence of legislative authority.

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