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El Dorado Canyon: Reagan's Undeclared War with Qaddafi,

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repeats his arguments in successive chapters is also somewhat irritating.

These criticisms notwithstanding, the book provides an extremely interesting and thought-provoking argument that is cogently expressed in a well organized work. Barnett has produced a useful and positive contribution to the ongoing revitalization of the field of strategy and to the associated debate surrounding the use of force in the international environment. Students and professors interested in security strategy in the new century should add this work to their libraries.

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Stanik, Joseph T. *El Dorado Canyon: Reagan's Undeclared War with Qaddafi*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2002. 360pp. \$34.95

This well researched and clearly written study of U.S. combat with Libya in the 1980s has important echoes for today's policy makers. It begins with a quick look at America's first war with a Muslim state—in the nineteenth century, when the U.S. Navy fought viciously with the Barbary pirates off the coast of North Africa. It then traces the rise of one of the Barbary pirates' direct descendants—the well known late-twentieth-century practitioner of state terrorism Muammar Qaddafi of Libya. Throughout the book Joseph Stanik, professor of history and retired naval officer, provides detailed accounts of the 1980 key attacks and a well reasoned analysis of their political impact. There is, of course, particularly well documented material covering the key air strike of 15 April 1986, which

was a devastating blow against Qaddafi's regime and changed his approach profoundly.

For those of us on active service in the 1980s, the battles with Libya seemed a bit of a sideshow when compared to the main dance of the Cold War. Yet this relatively short, bitter conflict was actually a harbinger of things to come. Much as today's terrorists seek to influence global events through individual attacks, Qaddafi sought to drive the course of world activity through bombings and state-sponsored terrorism. The Reagan administration at first responded with rhetoric, but it eventually became clear that more forceful action would be needed.

It is interesting, in this time of "global war on terrorism," to look back to the 1980s and realize that this is a war that began long before 9/11. President Reagan was elected in no small measure in response to the state-condoned terrorism of Iran, where radical students had held American diplomats hostage for 444 days before Reagan's election, releasing them just after his inauguration. Over the next five years, a series of dramatic terrorist incidents followed—bombings and killings in Lebanon, including the horrific truck-bomb attack on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, killing over two hundred Marines in a single moment; the murder of Marine embassy guards in El Salvador; the hijacking of major airliners and the killing of hostages, including a U.S. Navy SEAL, Robert Stethem; airport killings in Rome and Vienna; and the dramatic disco bombing in Berlin. Clearly, the United States had to respond, so in the spring of 1986, Operation EL DORADO CANYON sent a clear and dramatic message to Muammar Qaddafi, with telling results.

Beginning in the 1970s with territorial claims that the Gulf of Sidra was actually within Libyan internal waters, Qaddafi had plotted a collision course with the United States. For over two decades he attempted to use Libya's oil wealth to undermine moderate governments in the Middle East and Africa, sought weapons of mass destruction, and developed a national foreign policy that incorporated the use of terrorism to achieve his objectives.

This is a story painted on a global canvas, from the 1986 La Belle Disco bombing in West Berlin, which killed U.S. servicemen, to the ghastly destruction of a global war on terrorism.

El Dorado Canyon is a fine case study in combating terrorism and deserves a place on the shelf of anyone interested in America's current conflict, as well as the history of U.S. Navy involvement in combat.

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Friedman, Norman. *Seapower and Space: From the Dawn of the Missile Age to Net-centric Warfare*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000. 384pp. \$36.95

This work examines the development of space systems and its implications for naval warfare in the twenty-first century by focusing on the argument that "access to space systems makes possible a new style of warfare." It addresses the "linked revolution of long-range missiles and their space-based supporting systems." Furthermore, Friedman seeks to understand how the development of space-based systems (notably rockets and satellites) has radically influenced how

naval forces conduct navigation, communication, reconnaissance, and targeting. The reality is that modern military forces depend almost entirely on platforms in space to know where they are and to communicate with friendly forces, as well as to know the location of enemy forces and use that information to destroy them. This "revolution in military affairs" is now having an effect on a global scale.

None of these observations, however, is particularly new, and in fact all have been widely discussed within the defense establishment since the Persian Gulf War, when it became evident that U.S. military forces depend to a unique and unparalleled degree on constellations of satellites. Such technologies as the Global Positioning System (GPS) became familiar in the public debate about national security in the early 1990s with reports that U.S. soldiers used commercially purchased GPS receivers to navigate across Iraq's featureless desert. In addition, the images broadcast globally of Scud missiles landing in Saudi Arabia and Israel reinforced the reliance on space-based systems to warn of impending attacks. Nor have we forgotten the failure of coalition forces during the Persian Gulf War to find Iraqi Scud missiles in what were called "Scud hunts."

What is interesting and noteworthy about Friedman's work is its focus on the fact that the development of these space systems has profound implications for the nature and conduct of maritime operations. In 2004, naval forces can know exactly where they are in the middle of vast oceans; communicate with their counterparts anywhere on the globe; scan entire oceans or land masses for targets in relatively short order;