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Bipartisan Strategy: Selling the Marshall Plan,

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survive the temperature extremes encountered at reconnaissance altitudes; Lundhal organized a photographic interpretation activity to receive and analyze the pictures.

When satellite-borne cameras replaced the U-2, new and even more demanding technical problems arose. Just getting a satellite launched and into orbit was no mean trick. Choosing between relaying television pictures from space or returning exposed film was a subtle and demanding technical choice. Recovery of the exposed film was selected and became the coolest trick of all: film capsules, ejected from the satellite, reentered the atmosphere and parachuted down to where a specially equipped C-130 snagged them out of the air.

All this seems quite ordinary today, but in the 1950s these were innovative technical accomplishments. Too often strategic histories treat critical technical accomplishments lightly and gloss over their significance to strategic and policy choices. To Taubman's credit, he is attuned to the importance of the enabling technologies and brings their role and impact to the reader's understanding.

After getting the cameras aloft, Taubman turns his attention to the consequences of the pictures they returned. The first flights captured staggering numbers of detailed pictures covering vast sweeps of the hidden interior of the Soviet Union. The pictures revealed that Soviet Bison bombers were as rare as the animal is today in Montana and that Soviet intercontinental missiles, while large and ugly, were few and in a low state of readiness.

This did not end the Cold War or put America completely at ease, but it did bring some balance and scope to

defense planning for the late 1950s. In 1960 a presidential candidate who should be remembered for better things rode to victory partly on claims that the Eisenhower administration had allowed a dangerous missile gap to grow. The pictures from these satellites and aircraft put paid to that.

Taubman's book is twice valuable—first, for its historical development of the value and impact of strategic intelligence, and second, for its insight into the role of technology and technologists in shaping strategic policy.

In his final pages, Taubman raises important questions about America's current reliance on technical intelligence collection methods. He notes that little about al-Qa'ida's activities or capabilities is being revealed or forecast by satellite reconnaissance and that human intelligence sources and the collection of intelligence must play a central role in the twenty-first-century war against terrorism.

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Bonds, John Bledsoe. *Bipartisan Strategy: Selling the Marshall Plan*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002. 256pp. \$64.95

When we look back on great historical events, we often ascribe an inevitability to things that were, in fact, anything but. In this lucid and comprehensive study of the formulation and enactment of the Marshall Plan, John Bonds recounts how this great pillar of American post-World War II policy was anything but inevitable. Bonds, a retired captain of the U.S. Navy and professor of history at the Citadel in Charlestown, South Carolina,

concludes his penultimate chapter on the final legislative approval of what was to be Public Law 793 with the words: "So it was finally done. The country had made a significant commitment to Europe and to internationalism in general, consciously and with conviction, despite some difficult holdouts like Mr. John Taber, Chairman, House Appropriations Committee. *But to the last the issue had been in doubt.*" On that last sentence (emphasis added) hangs the tale of this study.

The Republicans controlled Congress, the president was seen as weak and was opposed by prominent members of his own party, and the Republicans smelled a White House victory in 1948, for the first time since 1928. On partisan grounds alone, then, 1947–48 did not seem a propitious time for a major bipartisan initiative. Beyond considerations of party, however, there were large substantive policy issues that divided the nation: how best to deal with the erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union; fear of inflation and the ultimate cost of European recovery; concern for balancing the budget; and how to meet the public desire for "normalcy" after years of depression and war.

Bonds gives an impressive account of the extraordinary skill of the Truman administration and the rightly celebrated Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in mobilizing business, labor, intellectuals, and public opinion in support of what many correctly perceived as a decisive break with traditional American foreign policy. In this mobilization of external opinion and lobbying of congressional support (at a time when such lobbying was seen as improper), there

were mutually countervailing pressures tending to minimize President Truman's public engagement, which was seen as raising partisan hackles, but also to maximize the president's public role, the better to position him for the 1948 election. Bonds correctly concludes, however, that such considerations and skills were insufficient to account for the final enactment.

A fundamental change of perspective was required, and skillful alliance building and sales strategies were inadequate. Indeed, the administration understood this and sought to justify the shift in American peacetime engagement by the need to restore the European balance of power and the international trading system, ravaged by depression and war. At the same time, there was a desire to establish for the first time in American history a program of universal military training. In the mind of the president, Secretary of State George C. Marshall, and Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal, the European Recovery Program and a new foundation for national defense were inextricably linked.

In the event, none of these arguments, or the general campaign to weld an alliance of business, labor, academia, and the public in support of America's new role, generated sufficient votes in Congress to pass the Marshall Plan. Soviet actions in Finland, Czechoslovakia, and Berlin did.

All of this is particularly remarkable in view of the fact that the administration had consciously sought to downplay the Soviet menace as the motive for its initiative. More abstract discussions of the balance of power and international commerce were consistently favored. This stemmed from the desire neither to slam the door on some renewed

understanding with the Soviet Union (a position favored by some influential opinions in the United States) nor to create trouble for the French government, seemingly both dependent on and threatened by the French Communist Party.

The Soviet-menace card was played on several occasions in the unfolding debate, but in general it was subordinated to more abstract arguments of enlightened self-interest. Moreover, it was clear to many in the administration that too great an emphasis on the imminence of war with Russia would scuttle both the recovery program and universal military training in favor of a general wartime mobilization. In effect, although Soviet pressures certainly provided the needed ingredient for legislative success, they also had the potential to divert the country from the recovery program itself. Later events would ultimately modify the balance between economic assistance and military mobilization—but that is another story, beyond the scope of this fine book.

Finally, it should be noted that Bonds has the ability to tell a story clearly, at times even breezily, and analyze without cumbersome jargon. For clarity and sophistication, this is likely to be a standard reference for some time to come.

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Hore, Peter, ed. *Patrick Blackett: Sailor, Scientist, Socialist*. Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 2003. 330pp. \$59.50

Patrick Maynard Stuart Blackett was a key member of the international circle of scientists who led the Allied defense research efforts of World War II, and

he was the heart and soul of the Cold War military-academic-industrial complex. In this book, sixteen authors attempt to shed light on Blackett's role in that story. The collection includes papers presented at a 1998 conference commemorating Blackett at Cambridge University, as well as other recent writings about him.

Not surprisingly, the compendium offers a range of perspectives on events and issues with which Blackett was associated, rather than a comprehensive examination of his life and work. The articles are arranged in roughly chronological order, but there is otherwise little integration among them—a characteristic only exacerbated by Blackett's wide-ranging interests and expertise. However, it is clear that an integrated whole was not the editor's goal. Instead, Hore's intent was to augment the inadequate body of literature on Blackett by encouraging new research on him and publishing the results.

After an opening overview of Blackett's youth, compiled from Blackett's own autobiographical notes, the book covers his education in the Royal Navy's preparatory school system, his service as a naval officer during World War I, and his post-secondary and graduate education in physics at Cambridge University under the tutelage of Sir Ernest Rutherford. After a summary of Blackett's contribution to Britain's war preparation efforts during the 1930s, several chapters are devoted to his wartime work on defense science, technology, and policy. This material addresses his widely acknowledged leadership in the field of operational research and the ways in which that research contributed to high-level disputes over convoying strategy and strategic-bombing policy.