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Navies of Europe,

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The final chapters examine the postwar public controversy sparked by Blackett's vocal opposition to nuclear weapons, his long association with Indian political leaders and scientists, a summary of his Nobel-winning career as a physicist, and his role in the first administration of England's prime minister Harold Wilson during the late 1960s.

Hore accomplishes his goal of facilitating and gathering new research on Blackett. Rather than introduce brazen, new concepts, the book's primary contribution to academic research will be as a resource for those endeavoring to examine elements of Blackett's life in the larger context. This is for the most part a function of the biographical nature of this work, the very practical personality of the subject, and the large number of contributors, each with a particular perspective. Several of the authors, however, have focused too intently on specific, detailed narratives, passing up the larger questions. In some cases the focus is so narrow that the book's main subject—Blackett—is conspicuous by his absence. In fact, arguably, this is the general weakness of the book; there is so much emphasis on Blackett's work that little attention is paid to Blackett himself.

The two chapters on operational research are useful examples. Jock Gardner's brief contribution, "Blackett and the Black Arts," analyzes wartime reports from the British signals intelligence and operational research departments to determine the extent that the two groups issued reports based on one another's data. The chapter by Richard Ormerod is an institutional history of operational research as a field of study, focusing on the vagaries of the field's attempts to define itself. Blackett himself is rarely

mentioned in these chapters. Given Blackett's central role in the history of operational research, this would have been the perfect opportunity to learn more about his contributions and to understand the influence of operational research during and after World War II. Fortunately, several of the contributors chose broader topics. For example, Peter Hore's own chapter offers a thoughtful look at Blackett's experiences as a sailor during World War I, using a variety of sources to place that story within the wider circumstances of the war and to consider how Blackett weathered the ordeal. Mary Jo Nye's contribution, "A Physicist in the Corridors of Power," must also be singled out for praise. Following Blackett throughout his entire career, Nye describes the ebb and flow of Blackett's influence on both national policy and science, demonstrating how Blackett's career expressed his character and political beliefs. It is contributions like these that make this work a valuable and enjoyable book.

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Sondhaus, Lawrence. *Navies of Europe*. London: Longman, 2002. 256pp. \$26.95
O'Brien, Phillips Payson. *Technology and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century and Beyond*. Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 2001. 360pp. \$63

Since the onset of the industrial revolution, navies have continuously struggled with the challenges posed by technological change. In *Navies of Europe*, Lawrence Sondhaus examines this problem from a European perspective. Sondhaus chronicles the fortunes of

both great and minor powers beginning in 1815, at a time when the navies of Europe still dominated the globe, up to the present day.

Compressing nearly two hundred years of naval history into a single volume is a difficult task, but this work is a solid introduction to the subject for the general reader. The book provides a clear overview of the major technological developments of the modern era, including such important events as the transition from sail to steam, the advent of the armored warship, the dreadnought revolution, and the rise of naval aviation. It also offers a lucid account of naval operations during these two centuries. As might be expected, the two world wars receive the most detailed treatment, but the author is equally adept at recounting, and explaining the importance of, numerous lesser-known naval operations.

One of the book's greatest strengths is its attention to the navies of minor European powers, which are usually overlooked entirely in surveys of this period. These small states were seldom on the cutting edge of naval innovation, but their fleets were still significant from a national or regional perspective. Minor powers could and did possess navies for purposes that were often unrelated to those of their larger or more powerful neighbors. Sondhaus never lets these lesser navies dominate the narrative—their inclusion sometimes reads like an afterthought—but he consistently strikes a fair balance between Europe's different states.

Europe may no longer be able to dominate the world's sea-lanes as it once did, but this book provides a useful reminder that European naval forces, though overshadowed by the United

States in both resources and capabilities, remain at the forefront of technology and innovation, and continue to be capable of performing a wide variety of missions on relatively short notice.

Technology and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century and Beyond examines some of these same navies in greater depth but also includes chapters on two non-European powers, the United States and Japan. The title, however, is somewhat misleading. The fifteen articles in this collection actually pay very little attention to naval combat during the twentieth century—nearly all the chapters focus on peacetime naval policy, warship construction, and technology.

It is also worth noting that not all the states examined receive equal treatment. Italy and France drop out of the volume after their entry into the First World War, while Germany and Japan disappear with the outbreak of World War II. The United States, however, does not appear until 1919, and the Soviet Union is included only in the section on the Cold War. Britain's navy is the only one to appear in all sections of the book, and the period before World War I is only partially covered with a previously published article by Nicholas Lambert on Admiral Sir John Fisher and the concept of flotilla defense in 1904–1909.

None of this is meant as criticism, however, as the volume was clearly not intended to serve as a comprehensive naval history of the twentieth century. Both the general reader and the specialist will find much of interest here. Leading scholars in the field have written the individual chapters, and the overall quality of the contributions is

high. The book's highlights include insightful overviews of the U.S. and British navies during the Cold War era by George W. Baer and Eric Grove, and a piece on the current and future direction of the Royal Navy by Geoffrey Till. Because the authors are able to examine specific navies and periods in some detail, this volume illustrates more effectively than *Navies of Europe* the full range of political, economic, and technological factors that typically shape a state's naval policy.

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Zimmermann, Warren. *First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made Their Country a World Power*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2002. 562pp. \$30

The path of America's rise to global dominance has always attracted the attention of distinguished historians and political scientists, ranging from Henry Adams to Walter LaFeber to Stephen E. Ambrose. Warren Zimmermann, a thirty-three-year veteran of the Foreign Service, joins the fray with *First Great Triumph*, a provocative analysis of the "fathers of American imperialism" at the onset of the twentieth century. Zimmermann examines how President Theodore Roosevelt, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan, Secretary of State John Hay, and Secretary of War Elihu Root engineered American imperial expansion in the decade from 1898 to 1908.

Why these five men? Zimmermann claims not only that they were influential in establishing the United States as a global power but that their characters

and beliefs helped determine how that power would be used. In essence, this book is about imperialism by "Roosevelt and his friends." Zimmermann also gives due credit for constructing the first overseas empire to Admiral George Dewey, Leonard Wood, Philippine colonial governor William H. Taft, and President William McKinley. Regrettably, he downplays the contributions of Admiral Stephen B. Luce and Secretary of the Navy Benjamin F. Tracy, both of whom influenced Mahan in the development of his naval theories.

Graduates of the Naval War College will find Zimmermann's analysis of Mahan's career particularly interesting. Zimmermann's Mahan is the preeminent American strategist of his generation, a "pen and ink sailor" who in midcareer found himself "out of sorts with the navy which accurately considered him a misfit and a complainer." At home in Newport, Rhode Island, Mahan articulated a doctrine of seapower as the controlling factor to national greatness. Like George Kennan, who authored the containment doctrine a half-century later, Mahan inspired American foreign policy with his insightful analysis of America's position among nations.

The centerpiece of this work, however, is undoubtedly Roosevelt. Roosevelt constructed the first true imperial presidency and ushered in the "American Century." Fresh from his heroics during the Spanish-American War, Roosevelt was catapulted to the White House upon the assassination of William McKinley. By the time he departed eight years later, the United States was the dominant force in the Caribbean and a major presence in Asia. On the strength of his marshaling of public