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On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom

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and against much different enemies—enemies who do not wear a uniform but move freely “amongst the people.” Smith uses this idea to examine past conflicts, touching on the guerrilla fighters operating on the Iberian Peninsula in the Napoleonic wars before moving on to analyze the British successes in Malaya, the French and American failures in Vietnam, and the two Gulf wars. Thereafter, he develops a series of questions for commanders to ask prior to the employment of force and devotes the penultimate chapter to applying these questions, albeit post hoc, to his experience in Bosnia.

The Utility of Force is not a scholarly work, nor does it claim to be; it has few footnotes and no bibliography, but neither does it need them. The book is not military history but rather a skillfully presented interpretation of certain trends in the history of warfare. Meanwhile, it raises a number of important questions that all future strategic leaders should be considering.

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Fontenot, Gregory, E. J. Degen, and David Tohn. *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2005. 539pp. \$34.95

On Point, as stated in its opening pages, is clearly intended for a professional military audience. General Eric K. Shinseki, former chief of staff of the Army, commissioned this work in 2003 as an after-action review. The overarching purposes were to educate soldiers and defense professionals with respect

to the conduct of combat in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and to suggest implications for continued U.S. Army transformation.

In telling the story of the Army in OIF, the authors appeal not only to the target audience but to the general public at large through objective and informative analysis. *On Point* provides a clear appreciation for the complexities involved in planning, preparation, and execution of military operations across the range of military operations. Further, *On Point* provides the lay reader insight into the after-action-review process, which remains critical to advancing institutional learning and improving the future application of the armed forces as an instrument of national power.

On Point tells the story from a decidedly Army perspective. The discussion encompasses topics essentially in three parts, from the strategic-operational level down to the tactical level of war. The first discusses the Army preparation for OIF. The second focuses on the ground war through the conclusion of major offensive combat operations. It is discussed in four phases: Phase I—preparation, Phase II—shaping the battlespace, Phase III—decisive offensive operations, and Phase IV—post-hostilities. Finally there is an analysis of the campaign’s implications regarding future conflict, Army organization, and transformation to a future force. Army successes and failures are clearly delineated, along with the authors’ recommendations for the future.

Like many military books written by military officers and professionals, *On Point* often suffers from an overemphasis on acronyms and abbreviations, making the writing sometimes dry and overly detailed. Nonetheless, the

authors have effectively blended official battle narratives, after-action reviews, and eyewitness accounts of the war to emphasize one or more of the central themes to be investigated by the OIF Study Group.

Shortly after its completion in 2004, *On Point* was available only online through links to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), and to a select group of officers fortunate enough to receive a limited edition produced by the Combat Studies Institute Press in 2004. This first edition from the Naval Institute Press makes the work available to the public in a single bound edition. Unlike the online version, the pictures, illustrations, graphics, and maps are difficult to read and interpret accurately due to poor printing and reproduction. Until this problem is corrected in a subsequent edition, the reader should refer to the color online version for any necessary clarification. Additional tools available to the reader include a complete glossary of military terms and acronyms, as well as a detailed U.S. order of battle for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Nonmilitary readers will no doubt need to consult both items early and often during their reading and study.

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Ellis, Jason D., and Geoffrey D. Kiefer. *Combating Proliferation: Strategic Intelligence & Security Policy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2004. 287pp. \$48

Jason Ellis, a former senior research professor at the National Defense University, and Geoffrey Kiefer, a researcher at NDU's Center for Counterproliferation

Research, seek to illuminate the intersection between intelligence and America's "quest to prevent and manage WMD proliferation."

The authors focus on six topics, discussing the issues involved in each, and illustrate each with a pair of case studies. Chapter 2, "Standards of Evidence," focuses on intelligence concerning the Pakistani nuclear program and Chinese missile assistance, while the remaining five chapters address, in succession, estimative uncertainties and policy trade-offs, intelligence surprise, intelligence sharing, military support, and war-fighting in a WMD context. The North Korean nuclear program and Soviet/Russian biological warfare activities serve as the case studies for the estimative uncertainties chapter. They are followed by studies on India's 1998 nuclear tests, North Korea's 1998 launch of a three-stage Taepo Dong-1, and U.S. intelligence sharing with Russia (concerning its nuclear and missile assistance to Iran) and the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), as well as the boarding of the *Yin He* along with the attack on the al-Shifa facility in Sudan. The final two case studies examine the Operation DESERT STORM air campaign and counterforce in DESERT FOX.

As indicated by the sixty-three-page notes section, the authors made an extensive effort to mine the open-source literature for relevant material. As a result, their case studies provide valuable accounts of some of the key examples of the intersection of intelligence and proliferation in recent years.

One shortcoming stems from Ellis's and Kiefer's desire to focus on current developments concerning the intersection of intelligence and proliferation. In