Combating Proliferation: Strategic Intelligence & Security Policy

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authors have effectively blended official battle narratives, after-action reviews, and eyewitness accounts of the war to emphasize one or more of the central themes to be investigated by the OIF Study Group.

Shortly after its completion in 2004, *On Point* was available only online through links to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), and to a select group of officers fortunate enough to receive a limited edition produced by the Combat Studies Institute Press in 2004. This first edition from the Naval Institute Press makes the work available to the public in a single bound edition. Unlike the online version, the pictures, illustrations, graphics, and maps are difficult to read and interpret accurately due to poor printing and reproduction. Until this problem is corrected in a subsequent edition, the reader should refer to the color online version for any necessary clarification. Additional tools available to the reader include a complete glossary of military terms and acronyms, as well as a detailed U.S. order of battle for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

Nonmilitary readers will no doubt need to consult both items early and often during their reading and study.

TERRY L. SELLERS
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army


Jason Ellis, a former senior research professor at the National Defense University, and Geoffrey Kiefer, a researcher at NDU’s Center for Counterproliferation Research, seek to illuminate the intersection between intelligence and America’s “quest to prevent and manage WMD proliferation.”

The authors focus on six topics, discussing the issues involved in each, and illustrate each with a pair of case studies. Chapter 2, “Standards of Evidence,” focuses on intelligence concerning the Pakistani nuclear program and Chinese missile assistance, while the remaining five chapters address, in succession, estimative uncertainties and policy trade-offs, intelligence surprise, intelligence sharing, military support, and war-fighting in a WMD context. The North Korean nuclear program and Soviet/Russian biological warfare activities serve as the case studies for the estimative uncertainties chapter. They are followed by studies on India’s 1998 nuclear tests, North Korea’s 1998 launch of a three-stage Taepo Dong-1, and U.S. intelligence sharing with Russia (concerning its nuclear and missile assistance to Iran) and the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), as well as the boarding of the *Yin He* along with the attack on the al-Shifa facility in Sudan. The final two case studies examine the Operation DESERT STORM air campaign and counterforce in DESERT FOX.

As indicated by the sixty-three-page notes section, the authors made an extensive effort to mine the open-source literature for relevant material. As a result, their case studies provide valuable accounts of some of the key examples of the intersection of intelligence and proliferation in recent years.

One shortcoming stems from Ellis’s and Kiefer’s desire to focus on current developments concerning the intersection of intelligence and proliferation. In
doing so, the authors have bypassed any discussion of older events that might have provided opportunities for some long-term perspective. They report the recommendations of Admiral David Jeremiah’s investigation of the intelligence community’s failure to provide advance warning of India’s 1998 tests. Yet those recommendations—including altering collection priorities, better human intelligence, and improved coordination—are eerily similar to those of the community’s post-mortem of its failure to warn of India’s 1974 test. The similarities raise a number of questions—possibly, that the intelligence community has simply proven it is unable or unwilling to correct its shortcomings.

Another problem for the reader (although not the authors’ fault) is that the book only briefly refers to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. There is only a brief mention of Colin Powell’s presentation of intelligence to the UN, and none at all of the postwar findings on U.S. intelligence performance. Had the book been completed a year or two later, these would have been prime topics. However, Combating Proliferation is not a book overtaken by events but rather a valuable guide to the issues concerning intelligence and proliferation.

JEFFREY T. RICHELSON
National Security Archive

Civil-military relations are the subject of considerable scrutiny and debate throughout the Clinton presidency. Unfortunately, the academicians, journalists, and occasional uniformed professionals who joined in that debate have been inexplicably mute since the Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld regime came to power. So this inquiry by Kansas State University political science professor Dale Herspring offers a welcome shot of intellectual adrenalin to an enduringly important, if temporarily moribund, topic. Herspring confronts two issues that are central to the canonical discourse of civil-military relations: civilian control of the military by elected and appointed political officials, and the political neutrality or nonneutrality of those in uniform. Herspring is well qualified to address the subject, having spent twenty years as a foreign service officer in relatively senior State Department and Defense Department assignments, as well as some thirty-two years of combined active and reserve duty in the Navy.

Focusing his attention primarily on the senior ranks of the military—the controlled—rather than on the civilian controllers, Herspring considers the intersection of presidential leadership and military culture an arena of inevitable conflict. Where the two are compatible, he argues, conflict is minimized; where they are not compatible, the frequency and intensity of conflict are magnified. He holds that since the Truman administration the military has become progressively more political, displaying common interest-group behavior by using Congress and the media to serve its own institutional self-interest at the expense of dutiful obedience to executive civilian authority.