The Shield and the Cloak: The Security of the Commons

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Gary Hart

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Gary Hart offers a bold grand strategy to deal with the complexities of security in the twenty-first century. He states that America will fail in defining its role in the world if it does not recognize a broader definition of security. Security narrowly defined as “prevention of physical harm by creating a protective shield” is insufficient. The “cloak” of economic, environmental, health, energy, educational, and government security provides “genuine security.”

Hart argues against the Bush administration’s “narrow” focus on the war on terrorism, the promotion of democracy, and its emphasis on unilateralism and preemptive use of military force.

Hart’s cooperative security strategy embraces liberalism expanded to deal with a multidimensional security environment. A major theme is securing the “commons.” “Central, is a sense that we are not alone, that our security, in an age of global integration, is reliant on a global community—a commons—with increased opportunity and responsibility.”

Three principles inform Hart’s grand strategy. First, “Our economic cloak is the basis of our strength, and our strength is the basis for our world leadership.” Hart calls for investment in knowledge through a new national security education act to increase scientists, engineers, and teachers. His energy policy would encourage moves toward independence (zero imports). A Persian Gulf treaty alliance comprising oil-producing and consuming nations would guarantee oil flow.

Hart’s economic agenda would reward savings, investment, and productivity and penalize borrowing, debt, and consumption.

Second, “America’s role in the world is to resist hegemony without seeking hegemony by the creation of a new global commonwealth focused on stability, growth, and security.” Hart proposes reforming international institutions, focusing global development assistance on individuals, and increasing control of weapons of mass destruction. He suggests an international “peace-making” force that would be “part constabulary and part special forces . . . inserted into zones of violence.”

Third, “to respond to this century’s new threats, the U.S. military shield must be comprised of these principles: flexibility, reform, and intelligence.” Hart recommends appreciation of fourth-generation warfare and establishment of a human intelligence corps within the CIA. He consolidates all special forces into a fifth service, and brings the National Guard home to reassume its traditional duties of guarding the homeland.

One minor weakness is repetition in successive chapters.

Hart has served as a U.S. senator for twelve years, serving on the Armed Services Committee—the first congressional committee to investigate the CIA. Most important is his work as co-chair of the U.S. Commission on National Security for the Twenty-first Century, which in 1999 predicted catastrophic terrorist attacks on the United States, and in January 2001 recommended a department of homeland security.

Readers will do well to consider his proposed grand strategy. It is rare to
find a single plan laid out in such complete detail.

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Presumably Stansfield Turner did not devise the nonsensical title of this history of the DCI’s (Director, Central Intelligence) relationship with the president of the United States.

In twelve chapters on chief executives from Franklin D. Roosevelt through George W. Bush, Turner discusses the nineteen men who headed America’s intelligence organization. “Within six months of Pearl Harbor, FDR’s enthusiasm for ‘Wild Bill’ [Donovan’s] ‘innovative thinking’ had evaporated,” Turner writes, noting that Donovan was never given access to the ULTRA/MAGIC code-breaking program, and he regularly lost struggles with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and J. Edgar Hoover.

In January 1946, Harry Truman created the Central Intelligence Group and appointed Sidney Souers as the first director of central intelligence, with simple expectations: “to keep him personally well-informed of all that was going on in the outside world.” By September 1949, however, the CIA had not been privy to Atomic Energy Commission information, so the day after Truman learned that the Soviet Union had exploded its first atomic bomb, he read Intelligence Memorandum 225: “The earliest possible date by which the USSR might be expected to produce an atomic bomb is mid-1950 and the most probable date is mid-1953.”

Turner recounts subsequent intelligence failures, but because the manuscript was submitted to the CIA for security review, few readers should be surprised by this history.

While most facts are familiar, Turner’s thesis is that the director of Central Intelligence serves the president in two capacities: leading the CIA in providing unbiased intelligence; and heading the intelligence community, “fifteen federal agencies, offices, and bureaus within the executive branch.” Turner evaluates the eighteen DCIs before Porter Goss on how each performed both tasks, including his own service under Jimmy Carter.

If Turner is frank about errors he made, he excoriates his successor, Bill Casey. “Overall, I found this transition group to be as unbalanced, opinionated, and unwilling to listen as any group I have ever encountered. They came to their task with their minds made up, and no facts were going to change their conclusions.” Fifteen blistering pages recount Casey’s politicization of the agency and obsession with covert actions, culminating in his leading Ollie North to undertake “two highly illegal operations—selling arms to Iran and funneling the money to the contras in Nicaragua.”

Turner devotes the final chapter to reflections on the 2005 Intelligence Reform Act. “The big question, then, is whether President Bush will line up with the presidents since FDR who have favored giving more authority to the DCI or whether he will give in to the Defense Department’s persistent efforts to keep the DCI’s authority limited.” Noting that “the CIA’s reputation in the country is at