The Face of Naval Battle: The Human Experience of Modern War at Sea,

Richard J. Norton
al-Qa’ida and that the war on terror will be as fully developed as his examination of Jackson’s Valley campaign or the battle of Midway. Those readers will be disappointed. The discussion of al-Qa’ida is only a small part of his penultimate chapter, “Military Intelligence since 1945,” which discusses the Falklands War in greater length than what the United States faces today. Nevertheless, Keegan speculates that old-fashioned human intelligence will be the best means of carrying the war to the new enemies of the United States, and through his historical exposition of intelligence, we are well reminded just how crucial this apparently mundane work really is.

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An author who uses the words “the face of battle” in the title of any book pertaining to military matters is throwing down a pretty hefty literary gauntlet. For “face of battle” guarantees that the work in question will be compared to Keegan’s 1976 landmark volume of the same name. Keegan asked the basic question, “What is it like to be in a battle?” He sought the answer in a comparative study of the battles of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme.

John Reeve and David Stevens were well aware their book would be compared to The Face of Battle. In fact, they encourage the comparison and offer their book as a sort of maritime bookend to Keegan’s earlier work. There is a patent need for such a work and while some, including Keegan himself, have tried to fill it, none have yet succeeded. Despite a most encouraging beginning, however, Reeve and Stevens also miss the mark, although this book is still worth reading. Rather than a coherent examination of the human experience of naval combat, this work is a collection of essays by seventeen separate authors, the majority of whom happen to be Australian. This is not surprising when the reader learns that most of the essays were originally presented at the 2001 King-Hall Naval History Conference in Canberra.

The book starts off strongly with a masterful essay by John Reeve, who discusses naval history in general, identifying certain challenges in “piercing the veil” of individuals’ experiences in naval battle and suggesting an organizational approach, analogous to that used by Keegan, that could be used to grow a general understanding of naval combat. Unfortunately, the use of preexisting essays may have precluded such an approach, and the promise of the first chapter is not met in the book’s subsequent pages.

The essays are arranged more or less in chronological order and cover such diverse topics as a look at the battle of the Yellow Sea, the treatment of German sailors taken prisoner in World War I, and the personal experiences of an officer in command of an Australian guided missile destroyer in Operation DESERT STORM.

Despite its failure to live up to the promise of its title, this work is worth reading for several reasons. First, much of it, especially the portion written by Russell Parkin, deals with the
development of Australian naval power and doctrine. Though it was one of the staunchest allies of United States, Australia’s development and contributions in this area are often overlooked or misunderstood. In addition, the naval challenges Australia has faced and continues to face are by and large shared by other maritime nations that do not have the industrial or economic capacity of a superpower. Thus the Australian experience may contain lessons for other mid-sized naval powers. Furthermore, as all U.S. sailors lucky enough to have worked with their counterparts “down under” know, Australian warships are superbly handled, well maintained, and boldly employed. Australian sailors’ maritime skills and contributions to both world wars, Korea, Vietnam, and DESERT STORM deserve wider recognition.

A second reason to read this book is that several of the writings illuminate obscure yet fascinating historical episodes. Bruce Elleman’s discussion of the 1894 battle in the Yellow Sea between modern Japanese and Chinese warships is excellent, although his attempt to draw parallels between the Chinese navy of 1894 and that of today is on less firm ground. Likewise, Michael Dowsett’s examination of the treatment of casualties resulting from the 9 November 1914 battle between the German SMS Emden and the Australian cruiser HMAS Sydney makes for compelling reading.

A significant portion of this work is devoted to personal recollections. The best of these are written by Rear Admiral Guy Griffiths, AO, DSO, DSC, RAN, Ret., and Commodore Lee Cordner, AM, RANR. Griffiths is a veteran of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, where he commanded HMAS Hobart. Commodore Cordner commanded HMAS Sydney during Operation DESERT STORM and is an alumnus of the Naval War College. A third essay, written by Michael Whitby, which discusses the wartime diaries of Commander A. F. C. Layard, DSO, DSC, RN, is also well done. Yet as good as these individual accounts of service and command are, so much more could have been done if the editors had mined these narratives for points of commonality. For if the face of naval battle is not so unique as to preclude any similarities between one battle and the next, it should be possible, as Keegan did with land combat, to identify the shared perspectives and experiences that affect sailors who make war upon the sea.

At least the editors did not fall into the trap of concentrating solely upon the memoirs of officers. Some room is also provided to the enlisted view of naval combat. These include a discussion by David Jones on the wartime experiences of U.S. submariner Thomas R. Parks, and Peter Stanley’s quick look at the naval life of J. S. Macdonnell, who rose to the rank of gunner in the Royal Australian Navy and then went on to a life of writing “potboiler” novels. While entertaining, and at times poignant, these recollections, like those of the senior officers, lack the analysis and study that could elevate them to more than just brief biographical sketches.

The book concludes, somewhat predictably, with a look at “The Face of the Future Naval Battle.” There is a discussion of such emerging technologies and concepts as network-centric warfare, and transformation and concept-led long-range planning. These complex issues
are barely touched upon, so readers who are familiar with them will not learn anything new, and readers who had not heard of them will know little more.

No doubt the day will come when someone will write the book that truly reveals the face of naval battle in all its dimensions, but this is not the day. Taken as a whole, Reeves and Stevens have created a work of interest and merit that is able to stand on its own. It is a significant contribution to an increased understanding of history and the contribution of the Royal Australian Navy. Readers who do not expect more will not be disappointed.

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According to the opening chapter, the Coast Guard manages to achieve a complex mission on an annual budget that is smaller than 2 percent of all the other services’ combined budgets. Phillips and Loy identify a twelve-part mission that includes responsibilities ranging from boating safety to homeland defense. Thus they argue that the Coast Guard provides a valuable case study for leading a complex organization because it achieves so much with limited funds.

Using a variety of approaches, including historical examples, anecdotes, and organizational philosophy, Phillips and Loy illustrate sixteen principles that they believe are foundations for a well run organization. For example, the first principle they posit is “define the culture and live the values.” By discussing exactly how the Coast Guard achieves this goal, they then set forth how this principle can also be successfully implemented by other organizations.

The authors are uniquely positioned to examine Coast Guard leadership. Donald Phillips has written ten books on leadership, including the best-selling Lincoln on Leadership (Simon and Schuster, 1992), and spent twenty-five years as a manager in major corporations. After graduating from the Coast Guard Academy in 1964, coauthor Admiral James Loy served in the Coast Guard for over thirty years, culminating in four years as commandant. Upon his retirement in 2003, he assumed the post of administrator of the Transportation Security Administration.

Overall, this book has many points to recommend it. Unlike many management books, this one is written in an easy-to-read fashion. The aforementioned sixteen principles are grouped into four parts: Set the Foundation, Focus on People, Instill a Bias for Action, and Ensure the Future. Readers can thus focus on groups of principles that are of specific importance or interest in their own organization. In addition, while leaders may be reluctant to read a management book that discusses “sea stories” over the latest theories, the authors do an excellent job of linking the Coast Guard experience to leadership and management principles. Every chapter closes with a summary of the important leadership points behind each principle.

The leadership principles presented here will resonate with federal civilian and military managers alike as many relate to issues they currently face. The