Uneasy Balance: Civil-Military Relations in Peacetime America since 1783,

Cynthia Perrotti

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needs have driven the process, while public opinion in the South has determined its course. South Korean nongovernment organizations have also contributed large sums of money. The whole process presents a major challenge to the North’s system “as it will be more and more difficult to build fences around South Korean economic investments and business practices.” Once again, democratization and normative development will be as important as economic and security imperatives to successful reconciliation. Considering the implications, it is sobering to consider that there is no obvious way that such identity change can occur peacefully in North Korea.

Internal reconciliation processes are no easier than external ones. Nayan Chanda explains how Cambodia has achieved only superficial reconciliation following the genocidal acts of the Khmer Rouge regime. The Buddhist tradition can justify much as resulting from actions of a prior life. The lack of political stability makes many Cambodians fearful of reopening old wounds, particularly when racist aspects of Cambodia’s political philosophy may bear some culpability. Phnom Penh earlier granted amnesties that would make it difficult to prosecute former leaders, and more recently argued that a full-blown tribunal would make reconciliation less likely. The legitimacy bestowed on the regime by other states makes prosecution somewhat awkward, and China opposes revealing fully the record of the former regime. The prospects are not good for major trials capable of healing this nation.

Other chapters present a mixed record on the prospects and benefits of reconciliation for Aborigines in Australia and East Timor, and for the loved ones who died in a popular uprising on Taiwan in 1947. In addition to the political and cultural repression involved, the dead in each case number in the tens of thousands. The Taiwan case makes what is probably the most convincing argument that democratization and political stability, combined with firm political leadership, are critical to successful reconciliation.

All who study Asian security or the role of justice in international relations should read this book. Reconciliation can bring restorative justice to war-torn peoples. However, this requires a rejection of purely retributive justice. In addition, the case studies in this volume reinforce that there is no universal formula and that a great deal of political creativity and political courage is required. As the editor also concludes, victims and victimizers must work together and maintain a forward-looking approach, preferably in a democratic environment. Most of all, there must be a commitment to the process. It is perhaps this factor that promotes the kind of identity change that is required for true reconciliation.

JOHN GAROFANO
Naval War College


Thomas S. Langston believes “it has never been easy for Americans to decide what to do with the military” at the end of a war. During peacetime, should the military solely focus on preparing for future wars, or should it usefully serve
the nation in other ways? Langston cites some examples of the military providing a service to the nation during peacetime. For instance, after the War of 1812, the military “took the lead in opening the West for settlement” by building roads, surveying canals, and farming. After World War I, the military “operated the main barge line on the Mississippi River . . . operated and extended cable and telegraph lines in Alaska, operated steamship and canal services in Panama, and responded to natural disasters.”

According to Langston, the “transition to peace and the postwar era” is important to civil-military relations. Langston, a professor of political science at Tulane, has written several books with political themes, including: With Reverence and Contempt: How Americans Think about Their President (1995), and Ideologues and Presidents: From the New Deal to the Reagan Revolution (1992).

Langston relies on historical analysis and judgment to determine how the military balanced war preparation and internal reform with service to the nation after the following conflicts: the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, the Vietnam War, and the Cold War. He wrote this book halfway through George W. Bush’s term and before Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Langston predicted that the war on terror would essentially be like a police operation, similar to the war on drugs. It turns out, however, that the post–Cold War peace was short-lived; America currently finds itself fully engaged in the war on terror.

Independent of whether the United States is currently fighting a war or enjoying peace, Langston’s thesis still applies, believing that the ideal postwar transition balances military reform with service to the nation. This balanced “happy state of affairs” occurs when there is cooperation between civilian and military leaders and when “political consensus [is] in support of the military and its varied uses.” For example, is there agreement for the use of military force? Should it be used to protect only vital interests or should it also support humanitarian objectives? Does the nation expect a “peace dividend”? According to the author, during the post–Cold War period of the late 1990s, there was an uneasy balance between the military’s desire to hold onto a Cold War force structure and the president’s use of military force that “stretched a shrinking force around the globe.”

In my opinion, it is understandable that the military would want to prepare for the next war during peacetime. Likewise, it makes sense for the nation to expect the military to provide different services to the nation when not at war. My only wish is that the author had specifically recommended a list of military service projects for the post–Cold War period.

Langston’s work is useful because of its depth of research on previous peacetime periods. Although all the details can be cumbersome, his idea that military and civilian leaders must cooperate and reach consensus on the purpose of a peacetime military force is clear and succinct.

CYNTHIA PERROTTI
Naval War College