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## In My View

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## IN MY VIEW

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### CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Sir:

I think Richard H. Kohn [“The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today,” Summer 2002, pp. 9–60] is largely correct, based on my twenty years of participation/observation. There are two areas, however, where I think he may be missing something. One is the so-called Republican affiliation of the military officers. You do find a preponderance of what used to be called conservative—we now call it paleoconservative—viewpoints in the military. But in party affiliation, due to the merger in ideologies of the two major parties in the last thirty years, a pretty fair representation of officers consider themselves independents, Democrats (hawkish, often southern Democrat in ideology, and libertarian-leaning), as well as registered Republicans.

For paleoconservatives (holding registration cards of several different political parties), an alarming trend in current politics in the Pentagon is the emergence of neoconservative political appointees, who in fact have ideological roots in the hawkish Democratic politics of Senator Scoop Jackson in the 1950s–1970s. As discussed in a 1990 Heritage Foundation interview with Senator Joe Lieberman, a Scoop Jackson Democrat (like himself) or neoconservative supports “both a strong international presence for the United States and a positive role for the federal government in creating a better economic life at home” (<http://www.policyreview.org/summer90/lieberman.html>). Richard Perle, of course, was a staffer for Scoop Jackson under Carter, and both he and Mr. Wolfowitz officially left the Democratic Party in the late Carter/early Reagan administrations. If you trace the political roots of many who make policy today in President Bush’s inner circle, you will find similar trends.

These trends have direct implications for defense, sometimes toward adventurism, and we are all watching closely. Strikingly, the new National Security Strategy is notable in that it is itself a military, or at least militaristic, strategy that in a very real sense supersedes the upcoming National Military Strategy. Yet,

appropriately and traditionally, the military in the Pentagon didn't participate in the development of the NSS but instead take it for guidance as we develop the NMS.

Thus, the political ideology or advocacy of the officer corps cannot be discussed accurately without a reflection of the political evolution of the Republican Party itself in the same time frame. Current Republicans making policy are neoconservatives, closer ideologically to traditional Democrats than any other modern U.S. political party. In fact, we have to go back to the Whigs of the mid-1800s, precursors of Lincoln's Republican Party, to find similarly nationalistic advocacy of major federal/congressional intervention in domestic as well as international affairs.

My second point is that there are two classes of flag officer, and these are not distinguished in Dr. Kohn's article. There are those who intend after retirement to work for the military industrial complex (either as CEOs, advisers on boards, or lobbyists for business interests), and there are those (apparently far fewer in number) who will retire their stars entirely and do something else. Generals and admirals know in which group they are while still on active duty, and what they want for themselves afterward drives them, perhaps, to stray (as Kohn suggests) from the sole defense of the Constitution into proposing and lobbying within the system for particular policies.

I am very happy with the oath I took twenty years ago, and I believe my understanding of the Constitution has been strengthened by my military experience. It is a good oath, and if followed, it would address many of the problems that Kohn describes. I am also happy to be retiring soon from a military business-place that I think has become at best a Spartacracy, at worst a self-licking ice cream cone.

KAREN KWIATKOWSKI

*Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force*

## JOHN BOYD, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE CAREERISTS

Sir:

As the author of seven novels and three nonfiction books, I know better than most the truth of the axiom, “A book is like a mirror. If an idiot looks in, you cannot expect an apostle to look out.” Nevertheless, I am bewildered at what Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Whiting saw when he looked at Grant Hammond’s biography of Colonel John Boyd [*The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security*, reviewed in Spring 2002, pp. 89–104].

If he sees Hammond’s book as focusing on Air Force persecution of Boyd, then either he sees visions in cloud formations or I need a remedial reading course. I read a book about a brilliant thinker who faced bureaucratic opposition to his work, not a book about a persecuted officer.

Whiting takes a gratuitous swipe at Hammond when he says Hammond “even senses persecution” in how the Air Force memorialized Boyd at the Weapons School. Here’s what happened. When Congressman George Nethercutt asked the Air Force to develop a fitting memorial to Boyd, he was told that Hammond’s book would be sufficient. Nethercutt insisted on something more concrete—thus Boyd Hall, at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. The highlight of the building dedication was to be a speech by a one-star general. The original draft was twenty minutes long. A retired four-star said Boyd was not worth twenty minutes, to cut the speech in half. That was not persecution. It was jealous, careerist minds at work.

Whiting also uses a sometimes-crutch of reviewers in that he criticizes Hammond for what the book is not, rather than what it is. This would be akin to Whiting’s mother criticizing him because he was not born a girl, or because he joined the Air Force rather than the Navy.

Finally, Whiting reveals the traditional mind at work when he says that in air combat technology is more important than maneuverability. This is nonsense. Technology has taken such great leaps in the last decade or so that we may be approaching that situation, but Whiting’s glib assertion misses a serious point. During the Vietnam War the F-4 and the F-111 were on the very cutting edge of technology. The missiles used in Vietnam were on the cutting edge of technology. Those aircraft and those missiles were, not to put too fine a point on it, failures. Technology failed, and there was little maneuverability.

Boyd is the reason the F-15 and F-16 have such maneuverability today (although “missionizing” the aircraft degraded their performance far below what it was originally). The Air Force was on the way to producing a ponderous aircraft with a variable-geometry wing—an updated F-111—that, in turn, Congress

would almost surely have refused to authorize. Had Boyd not given America the F-15, the Air Force would have been forced to buy the Navy F-14.

Grant Hammond wrote a good, solid book, and it deserves more serious treatment than that afforded by Whiting.

ROBERT CORAM

*Atlanta, Georgia*

*Author of Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War,  
Little, Brown, November 2002*

## **GREENHOUSE GASES AND GLOBAL WARMING**

Sir:

In his article “American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls” (*Naval War College Review*, Spring 2002), Stephen Walt strongly criticized the Bush administration for its “undiplomatic rejection of the Kyoto Protocol” because it was a unilateral decision to advance U.S. interests. However, nowhere does he address either the urgency (or lack of it) or the effect of ratification on the U.S. economy and national security. The purpose of this note is to examine briefly the science behind the protocol and show that the Bush administration’s decision was the correct one.

The fraction of carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) in the atmosphere has been slowly but steadily increasing since systematic observations began a century ago. Little concern was evident until the mid-1980s, when some researchers suggested that CO<sub>2</sub> would warm the atmosphere by absorbing infrared radiation emitted by the earth. Environmentalists soon joined on an international scale to clamor for stringent controls on the sources of CO<sub>2</sub>. The result was the Kyoto Protocol cited above.

The protocol, which is both lengthy and complex, requires large reductions in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. (The United States would have to reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions to a level 7 percent below that of 1990 by the years 2008 to 2012—this despite the steady growth of the U.S. population and the phase-out of nuclear power generation.) The “Third World,” including the giants China and India, is exempt. Despite this exemption, Third World countries would, under the terms of the Protocol,

accrue “credits” for emissions, which they could sell to the “First World.” In other words, the protocol would become an instrument for transfer of wealth from nations such as the United States to Third World elites, a sort of international welfare scheme under a misleading name.

Carbon dioxide molecules can warm the atmosphere through changes (“excitation”) in their vibrational and rotational properties. (For  $\text{CO}_2$ , such excitation occurs in the infrared part of the electromagnetic spectrum, in which the earth is an efficient emitter. Heating of the atmosphere occurs by transfer of energy from  $\text{CO}_2$  to air molecules via molecular collisions.) This compound is not the only atmospheric greenhouse gas, for several others, such as nitrous oxide ( $\text{N}_2\text{O}$ ) and methane ( $\text{CH}_4$ ), are also covered by the Kyoto Protocol. However, water vapor, which cycles through the atmosphere in about a week via evaporation from oceans, lakes, and rivers followed by condensation and precipitation, is far and away the most important greenhouse gas, because it is plentiful in the atmosphere and it strongly absorbs infrared radiation emitted by the earth. Absence from the atmosphere of water vapor would make the entire earth like the Sahara Desert—or, to state it more dramatically, like Mars. In contrast,  $\text{CO}_2$ , with a cycle duration of, according to recent analysis, thirty to fifty years, is much less plentiful and absorbs infrared radiation more weakly than does water vapor. The major removal mechanisms for  $\text{CO}_2$  are absorption by vegetation and the oceans.

Other phenomena also strongly influence the heating and cooling processes. For example, clouds formed during the condensation of water vapor reflect sunlight, causing solar radiation reaching the earth to be reduced. Thus, warming of the atmosphere causes increased evaporation of water vapor and more low cloud cover, yielding a “negative feedback” that acts as a thermostat. However, high-altitude (cirrus) clouds tend to trap the earth’s radiation, enhancing the greenhouse effect. To account for all of the phenomena that control atmospheric temperature, one must solve in some manner the various hydrodynamic, thermodynamic, and radiative transfer equations that describe the motion and thermal behavior of the atmosphere. Atmospheric scientists have constructed giant computer programs (“models”) to solve these equations, but they are necessarily limited in their simulation of the real atmosphere. For example, they cannot, perhaps never will, realistically simulate clouds; the oceanic models that must form an essential part of the simulation are quite primitive; and the geometry used in the models is much too coarse grained. (It is interesting to note that the models cannot even predict the present climate.) The early models predicted a temperature rise of  $4.5^\circ\text{C}$  ( $8^\circ\text{F}$ ) for a doubling of atmospheric  $\text{CO}_2$ . The most recent simulations, made with much-improved models, predict a rise of only

about 1.5° C (3° F) in the mean atmospheric temperature. In other words, as the models have improved, the predicted temperature rise has steadily decreased.

We know from geologic records, tree rings, and human records that the mean temperature of the atmosphere has varied markedly during the past million years. The most glaring aspect of the record is the series of glacial periods, at least partially associated with the earth's orbital characteristics, which last on average about ninety thousand years, with "interglacial" periods of about eleven thousand years. A more recent feature of the record is the "little Ice Age," which lasted from the end of the fourteenth century until about 1850, when began a gradual temperature rise that essentially ended in 1940. This period, which was characterized by low agricultural productivity and frequent famines, may have been due in part to reduced energy output by the sun; sunspot activity was abnormally low during much of the period of low temperature.

The rise in mean atmospheric temperature during this century is often cited as evidence of the warming effect of CO<sub>2</sub>. Those who cite this "evidence" fail, however, to mention that nearly all of the warming occurred before 1940, as the earth recovered from the "little Ice Age."

What of the most recent record? Atmospheric temperature measurements are routinely made at airports, in urban areas, at sea, etc. They are also made by balloon-borne radiosondes and (since 1978) by satellites. While the surface measurements do show a small temperature rise (about 0.6° F since 1980), they are contaminated by the so-called "urban heat island" effect. Urban areas and airports have been emitting greater and greater amounts of heat energy as a result of growing human activity that has nothing to do with the greenhouse effect. Corrections applied to the surface data are unreliable, because a large degree of estimation is involved.

Balloon-borne radiosonde and satellite measurements of the temperature of the "free atmosphere" (i.e., at heights that would capture any heating caused by CO<sub>2</sub>) are far more reliable. Although the records are characterized by a wild oscillation, one can compute a trend line using standard spreadsheet methods. The observed temperature change decreases slightly with time for the balloon data and is essentially zero for the satellite measurements. The National Academy of Sciences has recognized the conflict between satellite and surface temperature measurements as a major problem with no known explanation.

U.S. energy consumption in 2000 was more than 10 percent larger than in 1990. Thus a 7 percent decrease from 1990 consumption would really mean either a 15 to 20 percent drop below 2000 levels or a very substantial increase in tax rates to purchase "credits" from Third World countries. Despite claims by treaty proponents to the contrary, such a reduction in use would have severe economic consequences, because of the strong dependence of our economy on energy.

William Nordhaus of Yale University has calculated the cost to the world economy of “stabilizing” the climate to be \$12.5 trillion (1989 dollars). Since the United States consumes about 25 percent of the world’s fossil fuels, the cost to this nation would be in excess of three trillion dollars, an enormous stress to place on its economy. The national defense would also suffer, because of the enormous fuel requirements for training the armed forces, not to mention those for combat, as in Afghanistan. All this when there is *no credible evidence* for global warming due to carbon dioxide emissions.

ROBERT C. WHITTEN

*Commander, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)*

*Commander Whitten is a retired NASA research scientist who has performed extensive research in the atmospheres of the earth and other planets. He holds a Ph.D. in physics from Duke University.*

## **KRUPP CALIBERS**

Sir:

Professor Frank Uhlig’s review of Richard Worth’s *Fleets of World War II* [Summer 2002, pp. 167–8] stated that the German 280 mm gun was not the 11.1 inches (283 mm = 11.14 inches) given by Mr. Worth. This is incorrect. All Krupp guns of nominal 280 mm size were actually of 283 mm land-to-land bore diameter exactly (new gun), from the late nineteenth century to the end of World War II.

Krupp had two sorts of guns. In one group were internal designs with oddball diameters usually given (for some reason) in texts as the nearest five or ten millimeters or so; the nineteenth-century Krupp “17 cm” gun was actually 174 mm, for example. Even the Krupp “150 mm” guns had various actual diameters of 148–152 mm, depending on the date made and gun model. The other comprised foreign-design/specified guns (many from treaty requirements), which were made to exact sizes matching their book values. The World War II naval 20.3 cm (eight-inch) and 380 mm (very close to fifteen-inch, 381 mm) guns are examples. However, there is no doubt about the Krupp “28 cm” guns all being 283 mm, since there are blueprints of the guns and projectiles available for all

models, including guns of this size made by Krupp for other nations. They are all the same diameter, though varying considerably in projectile length, weight, and practically any other possible way.

NATHAN OKUN

*Port Hueneme, California*

*Professor Uhlig replies:*

My thanks to Mr. Okun for bringing to our attention this new information.