Defense Policy Choices for the Bush Administration

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States and Russia are confirmed by Alexei Arbatov, the veteran Russian analyst of American institutions and foreign policy. In his "Russian Security and the Western Connection," Arbatov describes the destabilizing effect the American abrogation of the ABM Treaty would have upon Russia’s conventional forces. They would be degraded to the point where they would be "hardly sufficient for even one local contingency and several peacekeeping operations." Like Newhouse, Arbatov is particularly critical of the present American foreign policy, arguing that the "quality and wisdom" of its design is no longer commensurate with the financial and military power of the United States.

Similarly, Ivan Safranchuk has presented an equally fascinating tour d’horizon in his analysis of "An Array of Threats to Russia." Safranchuk effectively entombs the Cold War with the argument that today Russia’s primary strategic posture is defensive. This point is demonstrated by his assertion of Russian action. Surrounded by pariah regimes such as exist in Iraq and Iran and possessing the potential for deploying weapons of mass destruction, Russia, Safranchuk argues, now accepts penetration of its Central Asian and Caucasus borderlands by the United States. This is a theme worth exploring.

Thérèse Delpech’s query with reference to “A Safe and Secure Europe?” echoes British foreign secretary Douglas Hurd’s contrapuntal prediction of a decade ago of “a new disorder,” against former President Bush’s proclamation of a “New World Order.” Delpech portrays the “9/11” attacks as events “which gave asymmetric warfare a horrific shape." In order to “tame” the current perceived U.S. penchant for a triumphalist unilateralism, Delpech would echo Aeschylus in Prometheus Bound and envelop or constrain Pax Americana with the bonds of multilateralism.

I was struck by the book’s lack of a comprehensive introduction or concluding chapter to sum up and assess the future in a meaningful way. Instead, the reader is left with several conclusions, which detracts from a sense of cohesion about the book’s contents. Nevertheless, each individual contribution has something of value to offer, and taken in that context, each is significant to our understanding of the power calculus at work today.

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O’Hanlon presents his blueprint for how U.S. resources should be spent based on thorough strategic and military assessments. He recommends that the Bush administration set priorities and make the difficult choices. However, the terrorist attacks of “9/11” and the completion of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) have changed fiscal conditions and defense strategy.

O’Hanlon is a senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution. He is the author of numerous books and articles on U.S. defense strategy, with special emphasis on defense budgets and military technology. His
comprehensive analysis and extensive footnotes not only demonstrate his deep knowledge of the subject but also reinforce the complexity of strategic and force planning decisions.

The book addresses “two major theaters for war,” defense strategy, military readiness and modernization, overseas troop commitments, homeland defense, national missile defense, offensive nuclear forces, and U.S. force planning implications if the United States assists Taiwan in defeating a hypothetical Chinese blockade. Each chapter describes and assesses the strategic environment, then offers comprehensive suggestions for modifying the 2001–2005 resource allocations.

A central theme throughout this work is that the defense budget is unlikely to make substantial gains and that the Bush administration must balance competing defense requirements. Even with the large plus-up in the fiscal year 2002 defense budget, the military is still fiscally constrained due to the demands of the “procurement holiday” (the period after the Reagan administration’s massive military buildup in which adequate funds were not provided to modernize existing weapons—without the constant increase of new modern weapons, the need to replace old equipment is exacerbated) and the war on terrorism. Overall, O’Hanlon believes in buying more existing weapons than developing expensive next-generation weapons. The author states that the 1997 QDR’s plan for modernization is excessive. Rather than rush to transform most weapons, O’Hanlon recommends taking a patient, balanced approach, such as buying less advanced hardware for the large, main weapon systems while “aggressively modernizing electronics, munitions, sensors, and communications systems,” giving a higher priority to research and development and joint experimentation. For example, he recommends that the Navy cancel its variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, purchase the 1997 QDR-proposed quantity of F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, and procure additional F/A-18C/Ds to meet fighter aircraft force structure requirements. O’Hanlon estimates this mixture of planes would “save more than $5 billion over the next decade.” Using the same philosophy, O’Hanlon suggests that the Air Force reduce the procurement quantity of Joint Strike Fighters from 1,700 to five hundred and purchase 1,200 more F-16 aircraft. The savings from these changes could fund new technologies to make the military more deployable and lighter, as well as “small numbers of next-generation major weaponry as ‘silver bullet’ forces.”

In another chapter, O’Hanlon recommends reducing the operational tempo by dropping overseas troop commitments, stating that a service member is “away from home at least 15–20% of the time,” due mostly to deployments and training. According to the author, 250,000 service members are either based or deployed overseas. O’Hanlon advocates maintaining a U.S. presence in regions with key strategic interests and scaling back in other regions. For example, the number of Marines on Okinawa should be reduced from eighteen thousand to approximately five thousand, because the deployment is “not militarily or strategically essential—and...is on balance harmful to the U.S.-Japanese alliance.” As a substitute
for personnel, he recommends positioning additional equipment on the island in case of a regional crisis. Secondly, O’Hanlon proposes that the Navy take another look at its full-time presence in the Mediterranean. He believes that “NATO’s southern flank and Israel’s western flank no longer constitute strategic vulnerabilities in the post–Cold War era.” If a threat no longer exists, eliminate carrier deployments that are carried out only to reassure allies and give “psychological comfort.” Reducing unnecessary deployments, shifting bases closer to contested regions, and rotating crews to the ship instead of returning the ship to port will decrease the operational tempo of the sailors, eliminate the need for two carriers, and generate savings.

The recommendations made in this work in early 2001 could have given the Bush administration some policy options and provided alternatives for the 2001 QDR. However, many of O’Hanlon’s arguments have been overtaken by world events. Nevertheless, O’Hanlon’s exhaustive research and insightful analysis make this an interesting book for readers of strategy and force-planning decision making.

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The United States and Asia presents a cogent analysis of U.S. strategic planning in Asia, sweeping from Japan to Pakistan. The study’s specific focus is development of policy options and recommendations, looking out at an approximate twenty-year horizon into the future, especially analyzing and noting implications for Air Force planning. A result of Project AIR FORCE’s work on future Asian security, this book was prepared by a team of RAND specialists, with the help of senior U.S. Air Force leadership, and with editorial comment by U.S. foreign policy officials. It benefits from the strengths of the team approach without the flaws of design by committee. It succinctly presents the thoughts and findings of the research group in clear, thought-provoking prose and figures.

The brief introduction stresses the need to prevent latent rivalries in Asia from upsetting the twenty years of relative peace between 1980 and 2000. The challenge for the United States is to develop policies that will continue to promote a stable Asia compatible with U.S. interests—in short, to succeed in a quest for “dynamic peace.”

The scene is set with a discussion of the range of international trends and problems in Asia, including possible Korean unification, the U.S.-Japan relationship, China’s emerging profile, India’s ambitions, Pakistan’s difficulties, Russia’s future, disputes in the South China Sea, stresses on Indonesia, and Vietnam’s significance. Although necessarily a whirlwind tour and not for country specialists, these are short, basically fair synopses. Additionally, the book includes four longer appendices by area specialists that add considerable detail to the earlier descriptions of changing political-military environments in Northeast Asia, China, Southeast Asia, and South Asia.