The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture

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for personnel, he recommends positioning additional equipment on the island in case of a regional crisis. Secondly, O’Hanlon proposes that the Navy take another look at its full-time presence in the Mediterranean. He believes that “NATO’s southern flank and Israel’s western flank no longer constitute strategic vulnerabilities in the post–Cold War era.” If a threat no longer exists, eliminate carrier deployments that are carried out only to reassure allies and give “psychological comfort.” Reducing unnecessary deployments, shifting bases closer to contested regions, and rotating crews to the ship instead of returning the ship to port will decrease the operational tempo of the sailors, eliminate the need for two carriers, and generate savings.

The recommendations made in this work in early 2001 could have given the Bush administration some policy options and provided alternatives for the 2001 QDR. However, many of O’Hanlon’s arguments have been overtaken by world events. Nevertheless, O’Hanlon’s exhaustive research and insightful analysis make this an interesting book for readers of strategy and force-planning decision making.

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The United States and Asia presents a cogent analysis of U.S. strategic planning in Asia, sweeping from Japan to Pakistan. The study’s specific focus is development of policy options and recommendations, looking out at an approximate twenty-year horizon into the future, especially analyzing and noting implications for Air Force planning. A result of Project AIR FORCE’s work on future Asian security, this book was prepared by a team of RAND specialists, with the help of senior U.S. Air Force leadership, and with editorial comment by U.S. foreign policy officials. It benefits from the strengths of the team approach without the flaws of design by committee. It succinctly presents the thoughts and findings of the research group in clear, thought-provoking prose and figures.

The brief introduction stresses the need to prevent latent rivalries in Asia from upsetting the twenty years of relative peace between 1980 and 2000. The challenge for the United States is to develop policies that will continue to promote a stable Asia compatible with U.S. interests—in short, to succeed in a quest for “dynamic peace.”

The scene is set with a discussion of the range of international trends and problems in Asia, including possible Korean unification, the U.S.-Japan relationship, China’s emerging profile, India’s ambitions, Pakistan’s difficulties, Russia’s future, disputes in the South China Sea, stresses on Indonesia, and Vietnam’s significance. Although necessarily a whirlwind tour and not for country specialists, these are short, basically fair synopses. Additionally, the book includes four longer appendices by area specialists that add considerable detail to the earlier descriptions of changing political-military environments in Northeast Asia, China, Southeast Asia, and South Asia.
Although the book discusses terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, the events of the past year argue for more analysis of these topics in any strategic discussion, especially as they relate to South, Central, and Southeast Asia.

In the strategy section, key U.S. objectives in Asia are defined as continued economic, political, and military access, and the prevention of the rise of a regional power or coalition that would prevent access to the region. Discussed strategic options for achieving these objectives include strengthening U.S. hegemony, forming a "condominium" with one of Asia’s major powers, acting as a “balance” in a multipolar regional power system, creating a comprehensive collective security system, and U.S. disengagement. Each approach discussed is discarded as either too expensive, too fraught with domestic problems, too subordinate, or too ineffectual historically. The study then recommends a strategic approach that is flexible and pragmatic, involving elements of most of these strategic options. Bilateral relationships should push toward multilateralization, creating a larger core partnership including the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and perhaps Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand. At the same time it advocates a balance-of-power strategy among the rising powers of China, India, and Russia that will prevent these states from either threatening each other or “bandwagoning” to undercut U.S. interests. It encourages promotion of a security dialog among all the states of Asia and encourages others to enter the U.S.-led multilateral framework. It suggests maintaining flexible relations with as many countries as possible to support the formation of ad hoc coalitions to deal with emerging regional problems. The study goes on to outline more than a dozen ways this strategy could be adapted to implement U.S. policies in Asia.

In the military section, observations are made about U.S. force structure in Asia, with some suggestions for reconfiguring military presence given anticipated changes in the Asian environment. The study predicts that North Korea may not require that all U.S. military forces leave South Korea if and when Korea unifies, so it suggests the option of maintaining one of the two main operating air bases in Korea. The study also recommends expanding base facilities on Guam. Beyond that, it recommends making arrangements to use existing bases in Asia, both U.S. and foreign, through diplomatic means. In this way, the United States would remain neither overcommitted nor undercommitted. This section is enhanced by the inclusion of a series of schematic maps and tables that identify and assess U.S. air bases in Asia. The maps are especially useful in assessing U.S. Air Force capabilities for crisis response in Korea, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and South Asia.

An important recommendation is made to improve the U.S. Unified Command Plan either by including Pakistan under the Pacific Command, as India is, or by establishing a coordinating committee for daily communication.

Concluding military recommendations are for buildup of Guam as a major hub for U.S. power projection in Asia, cooperation of the U.S. Air Force and the Navy to maximize joint leverage, and review of the Air Force future force structure, looking toward longer-range combat platforms, including heavy
bombers, arsenal planes, and long-range, high-speed strike craft.

Concluding strategic recommendations include maintaining open lines of communication with as many parties in Asia as possible, maintaining U.S. transparency so that U.S. objectives are clearly understood, and expanding the net of U.S. security partners.

This RAND outline of a comprehensive, realistic, flexible U.S. strategy in Asia, with appropriate military reconfiguration, is an important contribution to our search for continued stability in this part of the world.

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The United States and its allies once more stand on the brink of war with Iraq. What makes this war different, however, is that its primary goal is to replace the dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein with a democratic form of government. In the opinion of the Bush administration, removal of Saddam and his weapons of mass destruction will bring stability to the Middle East and the world. While there is consensus to remove Saddam and destroy his weapons, there is disagreement among the experts as to how to accomplish it. Kenneth Pollack is a specialist on Iraq whose experience as an analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council gives him a unique vantage point from which to comment on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. In

The Threatening Storm, Pollack posits that a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq is the only logical means to end Saddam’s regime. This argument results from a thorough discussion of the rise of the current regime and of Iraq’s relationships with its neighbors and the West, followed by a painstaking analysis of the several options available.

In the case of Iraq, says Pollack, our vital national interest, as well as that of the entire world, clearly lies in the economic stability of the region based on ability to export crude oil without interference. Following the Gulf War of 1990–91, the United Nations implemented a number of measures to contain Iraqi ambitions. A short time later, teams of weapons experts entered the country to locate and destroy chemical and biological weapons stockpiles and production facilities. In 1998 Iraq threw out the inspection teams, and for the past four years, notes Pollack, the Iraqis have allegedly been reacquiring chemical and biological weapons and have reenergized their research programs to develop nuclear weapons. Some world leaders and strategists have proposed five options for dealing with what they claim is a clear and present danger to their vital national interest in the Persian Gulf. These options are containment, deterrence, covert action, the “Afghan” approach, and invasion.

Containment has been the policy since the end of the Gulf War. Originally, it had two key components: weapons inspections and economic sanctions. With the eviction of the weapons inspectors, economic sanctions became the sole functioning component of the policy. The oil-for-food program and smuggling, as well as reluctance on the part of some allies, notably France and