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Victory on the Potomac

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strategists seeking to understand the war in some form less than book size. Arkin advises readers not to be deceived by appearances or Powerpoint briefings on just what decided victory for the Nato allies. The article certainly should replace the disingenuous official Kosovo report by the secretary of defense used in the curriculum of the Naval War College and other service schools.

However, the Arkin piece is only the appetizer. There is insufficient room to highlight all the fine articles in this review, but two struck this reviewer between the eyes. In the first, Anatol Lieven warns American “hawks” not to believe Kosovo is a model for future wars but that the conflict “will persuade . . . adversaries to confront the West indirectly, using nonstate actors.” This was written before 11 September 2002. Lieven points out that the chaotic, decentralized, and violent nature of likely future conflict environments, including Afghanistan, can negate the high-technology advantages of the West, forcing the fighting down to earth on conditions more to the liking of the enemy. Reading Lieven, and then watching General Tommy Franks tell U.S. troops in Afghanistan that the war will be a long one, made this reviewer’s hands cold and sweaty. In the second article, Andrew Bacevich conducts a revisionist tour de force describing the evolution of the Clausewitzian “remarkable trinity” as it applies to the United States, focusing especially on the latest changes effected by the Clinton administration and first demonstrated in Kosovo. At the risk of simplification, Bacevich would have the current trinity composed of a globally involved government able to use a professional, not conscript, armed force wherever it wants in face of an uninterested public—as long as the conflict is quick and bloodless. Whether or not one agrees with Bacevich’s premise and findings, the power and flow of the author’s conceptualization is truly impressive.

This is a necessary book for those who teach and practice national security. The writing and thinking are deep and compelling. One must congratulate the editors for their selections. One also must hope that defense decision makers, as well as students who will form the next generation of leadership, will read and pay serious attention to the works in this book.

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Locher, James R., III. *Victory on the Potomac.* College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2002. 507pp. $34.95

Jim Locher describes the history of the intense bureaucratic struggle to redesign relationships between the Joint Chiefs of Staff, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, secretary of defense, the president, and Congress. The prolonged struggle culminated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. This document is thought by many to be the most sweeping military reform of the last forty years. Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn believed the system was broken and consequently was providing low-quality military advice to the secretary of defense. Others, particularly the service chiefs and the secretary of defense, strongly disagreed with this assessment. *Victory on the Potomac*
represents a dramatic, detailed, and sometimes entertaining description of the prolonged hardball political maneuvering and bureaucratic infighting between those for and those against reform. Locher colorfully describes the tactics and personalities of the key figures involved in the debate. He begins with the long and difficult history of efforts made during the Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower era to reform the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to strengthen the role of its chairman. Locher then focuses on Senator Goldwater, Senator Nunn, Representative Ike Skelton, Representative Bill Nichols, and key staffs’ detailed strategy for reform. Their efforts led to bitter confrontations with senior military and civilian leaders who held the view that proposed legislation would cripple the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s influence. Of particular interest is Secretary of the Navy John Lehman’s total opposition to the legislative proposals and his tactics to outflank the legislators and, indeed, at times to outflank his own boss, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger. Locher also describes the particular difficulties for senior military officers favoring reform. Individuals like Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., exhibited the utmost delicacy in balancing personal beliefs with the Pentagon’s antireform stand.

Although the book emphasizes the Goldwater-Nichols struggle, it is a textbook on the complexities and strategies of bureaucratic politics fought for high stakes between the legislative and executive branches. Emotion, parochialism, and legitimate beliefs conflict and, at times, become highly personal. Students of government politics will find that the book adds generously to insights on the dynamics of gaining support for, or fighting against, significant legislative proposals. Readers with serious interest in national security policy formulation will benefit from the detailed examination of how arguments are developed, coalitions are constructed, and past history (such as Lebanon and Grenada) is marshaled to support either side of a debate. Those who favored reform will marvel at the persistence and political skill of the advocates. Those opposed will, no doubt, regard many of the described political tactics as unfair and perhaps unethical.

In an excellent epilogue, Locher reiterates the original purposes for the legislation and uses them to evaluate the present success of the Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions. His analysis has balance and notes that the behavioral changes sought have not been fully realized, but he does conclude that the legislation “made significant and positive contributions in improving the quality of military advice.” Locher observes that this judgment is shared by principal customers of the Joint Staff and by senior Joint Staff practitioners. Those who believe that significant improvement has resulted include former secretary of defense Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, and General John M. Shalikashvilli. In a separate book of his own, Admiral Crowe, the first chairman under Goldwater-Nichols, noted that the increased authority of the chairman was a significant benefit and not overly contested by the heads of service. Increasing the authority of the regional commanders was thought to add much to their capability for fulfilling war-fighting roles. General Powell added that the Joint Staff had “improved so dramatically [that] it had become the premier military staff in the world.”
The epilogue also examines disappointments, including the observation that “the Pentagon still lacks a vision of its needs for Joint officers and how to prepare and reward them.”

Locher is a graduate of West Point and the Harvard Business School. He was a leading Goldwater-Nichols strategist on the staff of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. He is the authority on the detailed political pulls and tugs that brought Goldwater-Nichols into existence. While Locher strives for a balanced analysis, his commitment to the Joint Chiefs of Staff reform and his own key role in that process result in a more detailed examination of the proponents’ view while giving less detail to the arguments of the opponents. Some of the opponents he classifies as excessively parochial, while others are characterized as ignoring obvious system flaws.

Goldwater-Nichols has had an unquestioned major effect on the Joint Staff process and on officer education. It is and will be for many years, the subject of intensive debate and analysis. Locher’s book will be an important reference in this debate (and in turn, his article “Has It Worked? The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act,” in the Autumn 2001 issue of this journal, is a good introduction to it). I strongly recommend that anyone interested or involved in the national security process read this book. It describes democracy at work and just how hard that process can be.

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Tom Schachtman’s brief history of the influence of science and technology on World War II needs less “gee whiz” and more John McPhee. As in the war itself, the author’s strategic decisions are critical to the book’s successes and failures.

The successes can be quickly acknowledged. The book is well written. Schachtman shows a good familiarity with the oral histories and memoirs of the most prominent scientists. He is interesting when identifying personalities and providing biographical material to enliven the narrative. He also correctly treats most of the significant scientific-technical developments of the war: the exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum for command and control, guidance systems for such ordnance as acoustic torpedoes and proximity-fused shells; nuclear weapons; signals intelligence; jet propulsion; and chemical and biological warfare.

Now I’ll drop the other cyclotron. *Terrors and Marvels* does too little with too much, and it suffers from Schachtman’s attempt to be international and chronological. Except for the fact that somehow the Allies “did better science” than the Axis (all those refugees from Nazism certainly helped), the author offers little explanation of how all these Allied wonder weapons, crypto dominance, and radar-sonar devices came about. If Schachtman had written separate chapters on his prize weapons, one would be far the wiser about the scientific and