degradation and shortage of water. Diamond points also to a growing disparity between the super-rich flocking in to enjoy the scenery and the economically distressed local population whose means of livelihood are being eroded, and the political tensions that inevitably result.

This same confluence of problems, many coming as a result of conscious decisions on the part of leaders or citizens, is being played out across the globe. One would expect Africa, the perennial loser in such comparisons, to hold the anchor position as the continent most likely to fail. Not so. Australia heads the list, due to the legacy of aggressive importation of harmful species; government policies that promote and reward deforestation and soil ruination; destruction of aquatic habitats needed for sustainable fisheries; and other problems. Diamond opines that these conditions are not irreversible but that the continent’s sustainable population is probably around eight million, somewhat less than half its current level. While one may question the exactitude of the eight-million figure, his case of overpopulation in relation to sustainability over time is well made, at least in terms of capacity for food production.

Turning to Africa, Diamond offers an instructive analysis of the Rwandan genocide. Taking a Malthusian view over the more common Hutu-versus-Tutsi source of disruption, he demonstrates how a complex mixture of poverty, fear, and opportunism, not tribal affiliation, drove the genocide. In the final analysis it all came down to land. As the population exceeded the land’s ability to sustain it, the traditional fabric of Rwandan society was ripped apart. This situation was exploited by government, tribal, and even religious leaders who turned the destitute against the merely poverty stricken. The result was the mass murder of people who had some land by those who had none.

For all the apparent doom and gloom, Diamond is cautiously optimistic about the future. Despite past failures, there are too many stories of societies successfully adapting to changing circumstances for us to despair. Technology can also contribute to success, though we are wise not to consider advances as a panacea. As to the importance of turning things around, he notes that today’s terrorists may be well educated and moneved but argues that “they still depend on a desperate society for support and toleration.” He further notes, “well nourished societies, offering good job prospects . . . don’t offer broad support to their fanatics.” Perhaps it is this angle, if not that of survival itself, that holds the greatest interest for today’s national security community.

THOMAS E. SEAL
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired


The current climate of reform and blame affecting the intelligence community can deflect attention from its substance and value as a contributor to policy and military operations. Lost in the shuffle of reorganization and finger-pointing are issues that will consistently remain important challenges—matters of defining and improving analysis,
educating intelligence consumers on the possibilities and constraints of intelligence, dealing with the embedded and new challenges of collection in a world dominated by previously unimagined threats, and balancing security with the need to share. It is against this backdrop that the editors, George and Kline, have collected essays by an impressive list of authors addressing many of the issues especially salient to intelligence practitioners and their consumers in this time of reflection and reform.

The anthology provides an excellent baseline for educating any analyst or consumer, new or experienced, on many of the issues consistently at play within the intelligence community. Providing content and context to the issues of requirements, collection, exploitation, analysis, and consumer use, the book provides an excellent foundation for understanding the challenges inherent in each part of the intelligence cycle. It is ideal for its intended use as a textbook for future analysts and policy makers, and is equally suited for anyone interested in how the intelligence community and its components operate.

The book is well organized, providing different perspectives on important issues. The organization allows the reader, as any great anthology does, to pick up the book and select an article or group of articles. An additional benefit of the thoughtfully considered collection is the diversity of perspectives. Essays by practitioners, theorists, and consumers each give glimpses into every role that might not otherwise be known. This range of views helps meet the stated intentions of the book—to stir thought on how the community does and should work and how it should best serve all of its diplomatic, policy, and military consumers.

Some sections are particularly thought provoking. The essays devoted to “Intelligence and the Military,” for example, make the reader consider what kinds of options are available and should be pursued in strengthening the relationship between military and civilian intelligence practitioners and agencies: Where should the lines for collection, analysis, and dissemination be drawn or redrawn in order to exploit most effectively each group’s relative strengths? Or more basically, what are the real strengths of each outfit? What should they be?

The parts devoted to the “Challenges of Analysis” and “The Perils of Policy Support” produce valuable insights into how the different organizations are configured for their roles in the intelligence process. The “Challenges of Analysis” section describes some of the ongoing challenges of analysis and how the CIA, primarily, has developed methods to address these challenges. “The Perils of Policy Support” describes how consumers view and use intelligence. However, and though both of the last-named sections provide interesting insights into how each side currently operates, they offer little in the way of suggestions for improving the status quo. Perhaps an additional article in each of these sections, proposing or otherwise articulating several options for the way ahead, based on current legislative language or the state of debate, would be warranted in a future edition.

Deception, while a critical issue, probably gets too much play. Its treatment is a bit too founded in historical examples. In the realms of open sources, cyberspace, and network-centric adversaries, deception...
issues and means of evaluation are different. While practitioners and consumers should necessarily be encouraged to learn the lessons and benefits of deception, perhaps this section should be coupled with the one devoted to open-source analysis to discuss the still unwieldy problems of the future of intelligence—reams of information from a variety of unknown sources that current "INT" equipment and methods are not ready to handle.

Overall, this book is remarkably valuable to any course dealing with the intelligence community. As it is used in classes, the outcomes of the debates it will inevitably create should themselves become anthologies for future readers.

JAMESON JO MEDBY
RAND Corporation


Most students of international affairs would agree that understanding the causes and results of military interventions is one of the more pressing security issues facing the United States in the early years of the twenty-first century. William Lahneman, program coordinator of the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, has assembled a gifted group of analysts to examine seven instances of military intervention and, through the use of a common set of pertinent questions, attempt to reach a deeper understanding of interventions, while identifying ways to increase the chances of success in an intervention.

The eleven contributors to this volume have impressive credentials. Together, they compose a potent mix of security scholars and practitioners. In addition to Lahneman himself, of special note are William Zartman and John Steinbruner. Zartman is the Jacob Blaustein Professor of International Organizations and Conflict Resolution, and the Director of Conflict Management at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. John Steinbruner, Director of the Center for International and Security Studies at the School of Public Policy, University of Maryland, is also the author of The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton Univ. Press, 2002), a seminal work in the study of decision making.

Military Intervention examines six cases of military intervention: Somalia (1992), Bosnia (1991–94), Haiti (1994), Rwanda (1994), Sierra Leone (2000), and East Timor (1999). A seventh case involving Cambodia is also provided, although in this instance, rather than focusing on a single intervention, the authors examine interventions from 1806 to 2003. Lahneman’s stated intention was that each case be examined through the lens of nine discrete questions, ranging from the nature of the intervention force to the extent to which nonmilitary aspects of the intervention were necessary and sufficient to produce a lasting peace. As analytical approaches go, this one seems well suited to support comparative analyses and cross-case lessons. Unfortunately, as is sometimes the case with a collection of essays, some authors approached this requirement with more rigor than others. The essay on Rwanda, written by Gilbert M. Khadiagala, follows the formula most closely; the chapter on