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Military Intervention: Cases in Context for the 21st Century

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issues and means of evaluation are different. While practitioners and consumers should necessarily be encouraged to learn the lessons and benefits of deception, perhaps this section should be coupled with the one devoted to open-source analysis to discuss the still unwieldy problems of the future of intelligence—reams of information from a variety of unknown sources that current “INT” equipment and methods are not ready to handle.

Overall, this book is remarkably valuable to any course dealing with the intelligence community. As it is used in classes, the outcomes of the debates it will inevitably create should themselves become anthologies for future readers.

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Most students of international affairs would agree that understanding the causes and results of military interventions is one of the more pressing security issues facing the United States in the early years of the twenty-first century. William Lahneman, program coordinator of the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, has assembled a gifted group of analysts to examine seven instances of military intervention and, through the use of a common set of pertinent questions, attempt to reach a deeper understanding of interventions, while identifying ways to increase the chances of success in an intervention.

The eleven contributors to this volume have impressive credentials. Together, they compose a potent mix of security scholars and practitioners. In addition to Lahneman himself, of special note are William Zartman and John Steinbruner. Zartman is the Jacob Blaustein Professor of International Organizations and Conflict Resolution, and the Director of Conflict Management at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. John Steinbruner, Director of the Center for International and Security Studies at the School of Public Policy, University of Maryland, is also the author of The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton Univ. Press, 2002), a seminal work in the study of decision making.

Military Intervention examines six cases of military intervention: Somalia (1992), Bosnia (1991–94), Haiti (1994), Rwanda (1994), Sierra Leone (2000), and East Timor (1999). A seventh case involving Cambodia is also provided, although in this instance, rather than focusing on a single intervention, the authors examine interventions from 1806 to 2003. Lahneman’s stated intention was that each case be examined through the lens of nine discrete questions, ranging from the nature of the intervention force to the extent to which nonmilitary aspects of the intervention were necessary and sufficient to produce a lasting peace. As analytical approaches go, this one seems well suited to support comparative analyses and cross-case lessons. Unfortunately, as is sometimes the case with a collection of essays, some authors approached this requirement with more rigor than others. The essay on Rwanda, written by Gilbert M. Khadiagala, follows the formula most closely; the chapter on
Cambodia veers the farthest from it. Editing a volume of this nature can be a thankless task, but Lahneman would have been better served by insistence that his contributors specifically answer his questions. The lack of such consistency may obscure elements the cases have in common, resulting in a missed opportunity to increase a systemic understanding of intervention.

That said, this volume is a useful addition to the body of work that, to paraphrase Alexander George, attempts to bridge the gap between the realms of academic theory and practical application. Of particular value in this regard is the first chapter of the book, written by Steinbruner and Jason Forrester. The authors confirm what many security professionals have long believed, that “civil conflicts are actually economic battles over the control of resources waged under conditions in which allocation can not be managed by legal methods or legitimate government domination.” Other chapters are less useful. First, with the possible exception of East Timor, there are deeper and more complete descriptions of the crises to be found than those in this book. Second, in some cases, the author’s conclusions raise questions that beg to be answered but are left hanging. For example, David Laitin, writing on the intervention in Somalia, argues that “early, decisive action” could have been taken. Yet he acknowledges the political will for such early action was lacking and does not address how such resolve might have been created. Laitin also fails to ask how an early intervention operation in Somalia could have been terminated. Could the applicable mandate have been achieved, or would long-term stability have required the presence of peacekeepers? Furthermore, Laitin perpetuates the idea that only eighteen U.S. servicemen were killed in the battle of Mogadishu. This number does not take into account the deaths of two soldiers assigned to the reaction force, nor does it acknowledge the Malaysian soldier who lost his life during the rescue effort. This may seem a small point, but it raises troubling questions about the depth of Laitin’s research.

Steven Burg’s analysis of the intervention in Bosnia reveals different shortcomings. The key point of the chapter—that states do not mount serious interventions unless national interests are involved—is widely accepted. However, Burg’s chapter contains both unsupported assertions and a lack of detail concerning aspects of the case that may not be familiar to the lay reader. Still, his identification and description of seven stages of intervention is both thought provoking and useful.

As mentioned earlier, the case on Rwanda is well written and argued. Khadiagala does not insult the reader’s intelligence by asserting that Western states could not have intervened in time—he clearly attributes their failure to act in Rwanda to a lack of political will. More debatable is his assertion that both sides in the conflict were counting on external actors to save them from a weak peace agreement. The evidence presented seems sketchy, especially given the Revolutionary United Front’s reluctance to allow any effort at a political settlement until it had conquered the country.

The cases on Haiti, East Timor, and Sierra Leone are straightforward. Their respective conclusions include the ideas that fostering peace is conducive to long-term U.S. security, that valid political processes are central to peace, that
military intervention alone is not enough to “end a conflict whose basic cause is state collapse,” and that peacekeepers may be better served by developing successful strategies to transfer power than by focusing on “exit strategies.” These conclusions are well supported, and it is difficult to argue with any one of them.

The case of Cambodia, presented in such a different fashion, concludes that future military intervention in Cambodia is unlikely. The analysis predicts that other interventions—notably exploitative economic ones—will increase and that the forces of globalization will prove injurious to the average Khmer. Unfortunately, the chapter ends before explaining these findings in detail.

The final chapter, written by Lahneman himself, is in many ways the most valuable. Lahneman provides his own summary of the book’s cases, then identifies a variety of challenges and prescriptions associated with intervention operations. These findings range from the commonsense (“A coalition of willing states should conduct military intervention”) to the provocative (“Operations taken solely for humanitarian reasons tend to be too little and too late”).

In the final analysis, Lahneman’s book is less useful for the insights it provides into the specifically examined cases than for the questions it raises that should be answered before any intervention is ordered. This work is also an invitation to deepen the current national discussion on intervention and nation building. As Lahneman suggests, this discussion is too important to be confined to the ivory tower; the invitation should not go unanswered by the academic and security communities.

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Moore, Jeffrey M. Spies for Nimitz: Joint Military Intelligence in the Pacific War. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2004, 336pp. $29.95

Despite its title, this book is not about spies but about what is referred to in today’s parlance as “intelligence preparation of the battlefield”: a sustained process of research and analysis, based on all source collection efforts, that identifies important aspects of potential combat environments. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield provides planners and commanders with “combat intelligence”—about the terrain, weather conditions, enemy order of battle and dispositions—needed to conduct an upcoming operation. For instance, without knowledge of tidal conditions, currents, the composition and slope of a beach, or the location of underwater obstructions and mines, amphibious operations can be doomed to failure before they begin.

In this history of the performance of U.S. intelligence in the Pacific during World War II, Jeffrey Moore links the intelligence provided to planners by the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area (JICPOA) to the outcome of the major amphibious assaults against Japanese-occupied islands. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield, always important, was of great strategic significance in the “island hopping” campaign undertaken by the United States. Planners had to identify atolls or islets that were lightly defended by the Japanese yet possessed the anchorages, landing strips, and flat terrain that made them suitable as operating bases for the next stage in the campaign. When intelligence analysts provided accurate pictures of the battlefield, operations