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The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050

Brian R. Sullivan

MacGregor Knox

Williamson Murray

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entire region will be increasingly involved in dealing with a more ambitious and yet dissatisfied Communist state, since China still recalls the humiliations of the nineteenth century when it was ‘sliced’ like a melon among rival imperialists and still shares disputed land and sea borders with many countries.” America’s potential problems with China have been exacerbated in recent years by the disappearance of the European powers from Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, and Macao, and the precipitous decline of Russia in Northeast Asia, making China the only “possible contender for the American laurels.” Buckley, a Hong Kong–born, British-educated, and Japan-based scholar, is generally friendly to the United States and supportive of its East Asian policies. However, he has his fair share of criticism for U.S. policy makers, in particular Franklin Roosevelt’s “casualness” in his dickering with Stalin at Yalta, Harry Truman’s huge military reductions immediately prior to the Korean War, and Lyndon Johnson’s and Richard Nixon’s “humiliating” defeat in Vietnam. In the near term, Buckley warns, in addition to remaining the bulwark of Asia Washington must initiate wider regional interdependence among East Asian countries. Asian nations, instead of focusing on the United States as the Holy Grail for everything from democracy to human rights to capitalism, might do better to look at “British, European and Anglo-Pacific approaches to such issues” in order to spread their cultural horizons. To the extent that “globalization is frequently equated with Americanization,” Buckley warns, the Asia-Pacific region may one day resent such influence as an unwelcome American intrusion.

This book went to press immediately before “9/11” and the war on terror. As a result, Buckley underestimates Japan’s potential naval contribution to any multinational military effort, suggesting instead that “Japan appears most unlikely to deploy its so-called self-defense forces for anything much beyond the rescue of its own citizens in emergency situations abroad.” Buckley’s emphasis on the close interaction and interdependence of U.S. security and economic policies throughout the Asia-Pacific region are, however, as relevant now as ever. Buckley concludes by warning that Americans must energetically face up to the myriad of risks—chief among them the growing threat from China—associated with being the dominant Asia-Pacific power.

BRUCE A. ELLEMAN
Naval War College


The editors of this slim volume of essays have wide ambitions. In 194 pages of text, they seek to define the nature of military revolutions; describe the tripartite sources of the concept in the still-controversial work of historian Michael Roberts on seventeenth-century European land warfare, Soviet military theory, and studies by Andrew W. Marshall’s Office of Net Assessment; and critique contemporary developments in American ground and air warfare. Furthermore, to support their arguments, Knox and Murray present case studies from seven centuries of
armed conflict in the West. Between their introductory essay on the concept of a revolution in military affairs (RMA) and their concluding analysis of the shortcomings of the “American RMA,” Knox and Murray place eight chapters on historical examples of military revolutions. There is one essay each by Knox and Murray (on the French Revolutionary army and the German blitzkrieg, respectively). The others are by equally prominent military historians: Clifford J. Rogers on fourteenth-century military developments under England’s Edward III; John A. Lynn on Louis XIV’s army; Mark Grimsley on the U.S. Civil War; Dennis E. Showalter on the mid-nineteenth-century Prussian army; Holger H. Herwig on changes in naval warfare, 1885–1914, exemplified by the British and Germans; and Jonathan B. A. Bailey on the creation of modern warfare in World War I. The accuracy, comprehensiveness, and thoughtfulness of every essay are outstanding—a rare achievement in an anthology. The editors deserve commendation.

Each part of this volume is excellent, yet Knox and Murray have set themselves such a daunting goal—to integrate coherently arguments based on episodes of Western military history with contemporary defense policy analysis—that they fall somewhat short. While all the essays are fine offerings, Rogers’s essay fits awkwardly alongside case studies of RMAs from the time of Louis XIV to the present, and Herwig’s accentuates the absence of other essays on the transformations of naval warfare in the age of sail and after 1918. Historical examples drawn almost exclusively from British, French, German, and American military history suggest a certain cultural bias; the selection neglects significant contributions over the past four and a half centuries to transforming western military theory and practice by the Dutch, Danes, Swedes, Spanish, Italians, Poles, and Russians. Since the editors stress the Soviet contribution to the RMA concept, their failure to include a Red Army case study seems egregious. The origins of the book in papers delivered at a small conference at Quantico in 1996 help explain its limitations. Nonetheless, a work of such ambitious intellectual scope would have benefited from double or even triple the number of chapters, with a greater geographical and topical inclusiveness.

Paradoxically, this reviewer’s disappointment arises from the great contributions this book does make to understanding RMAs and redirecting present American efforts to achieve one. As all the authors emphasize, and as Knox and Murray reiterate in their conclusion, military revolutions are not actually based on technology. In fact, an RMA can occur without major technological innovation at all, as in late-eighteenth-century France. Instead, a military revolution is a reshaping of military institutions to solve strategic and political challenges. Adopting new weapons and equipment alone, without institutional reconfiguration, produces armies such as the British and French fielded against the Wehrmacht in May 1940. The editors present convincing arguments that the U.S. military has adopted new technologies without interservice integration or, far more important, without attempts to relate weapons systems, doctrine, force structure, and training to the strategic problems facing the nation. In mitigation,
Knox and Murray admit that achieving an RMA in the absence of an identifiable foe as the focus of strategy presents enormous difficulties. Be that as it may, they warn, the obstacle the United States presents to the ambitions of entities outside the Western alliance could make it the object of someone else’s RMA. Perhaps that is the greatest warning to arise from the coincidental appearance of this book following 11 September 2001. *The Dynamics of Military Revolution* raises critical questions about how the United States might reshape its military to counter strategies based on asymmetrical warfare. Beyond the valuable contribution the book makes to military history, one hopes this volume will also help shape the national security debate currently in progress.

BRIAN R. SULLIVAN
Vienna, Virginia


Since the fall of Saigon in the spring of 1975, Americans have sought to understand how their government could have lost the Vietnam War. Given the enormous gap in resources between the United States and the Vietnamese revolutionaries, it is difficult for even scholars of the war to explain why this nation’s mighty military machine failed to defeat its enemy’s forces. Many who have written about the war have focused on the alleged mistakes of American civilian and military leaders, arguing that more enlightened policies, such as fewer restrictions on military operations or more emphasis on pacification, would have turned the tide in South Vietnam. The purpose of the eight essays in this volume is to place American policies in a broader context—or, as Gilbert writes, to recognize that “the outcome of that war was determined less at MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] and Washington than by the persistence of the enemy on the battlefield and in political cultures of the Saigon regime, the National Liberation Front, and its partners in Hanoi.”

The most original essays in this volume, by William J. Duiker, George C. Herring, and Robert K. Brigham, pursue aspects of this theme. Duiker traces the efforts of the government in Hanoi “to manipulate the international and diplomatic environment to its own advantage” and its complicated relations with China and the Soviet Union, allies whose aid was vital to the North Vietnamese war effort. Herring emphasizes the international dimensions of America’s defeat, noting how the inability of the Lyndon Johnson administration to gain support from European allies undermined the U.S. war effort. Brigham challenges the traditional distinction between northerners and southerners, arguing that it is misleading to divide “the struggle along geographical lines that have no cultural or historical precedent.” Northerners, he argues, did not make all of the key decisions in the war; rather, southerners came to dominate party councils in Hanoi and were able to convince their northern comrades to pursue a more aggressive strategy in the South.

The other five essays focus, with varying degrees of success, more on the American side of the war. In a forcefully argued