

2003

Dictionnaire de Stratégie

Carnes Lord

Thierry de Montbrial

Jean Klein

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

Recommended Citation

Lord, Carnes; de Montbrial, Thierry; and Klein, Jean (2003) "Dictionnaire de Stratégie," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 56 : No. 2 , Article 21.

Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss2/21>

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

power to review the administration, curricula, and faculty of the Army War College with an eye toward ensuring that the institution is able to address contemporary issues effectively and is positioned to adapt and change.

Stiehm organizes her conclusions and recommendations around the three thematic issues of “training and education,” “civil-military relations,” and “war and peace.” The first deals with the basic function of the institution. Carlisle’s mission statement is focused on the preparation and education of selected military, civilian, and international leaders. Is the mission of Carlisle to train or to educate? The differences are not subtle. Stiehm argues that the nature and composition of the faculty, design of the curriculum, and manner of course presentation all lead one to conclude that Carlisle is a training institution, not optimized for education, and that if the mission of Carlisle is in fact education, significant changes are required.

The second deals with the most basic constitutional issue of civilian control of the military. Stiehm concludes that the Army War College does not adequately prepare future senior leaders for the complications of *realpolitik*. She posits that there is an erosion of civilian control of the military and that this erosion is partially the result of the failure by the senior service colleges to ensure that graduates appreciate the unique position of the military, as it relates to government officials elected by the citizenry.

The third issue deals with the notion that we preserve the peace by preparing for war. Stiehm concludes that the Army War College may be spending too much time preparing for the wrong war

and is unresponsive to today’s security environment. She argues that the college could become a powerful change agent for military strategy, structure, and procurement, if certain of her recommendations were adopted. Among her recommendations are increased hiring of civilian Ph.D.s rather than retired military officers with doctorates, who, according to Stiehm, are of limited utility; increased independent research by the faculty; redesign of the curriculum to create “discomfort” (that is, to cause students to think outside of their comfort zones); and offer master’s degrees to only a limited number of students.

Stiehm provides much grist for the intellectual mill and does the Army War College a service by creating a framework for professional dialogue and offering recommendations for future improvements.

BILL BROWN
Colonel, U.S. Army



de Montbrial, Thierry and Jean Klein, eds. *Dictionnaire de Stratégie*. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2000. 604pp. \$130.92

At a moment when American and French perceptions of security threats and appropriate policy responses in the Middle East are in apparent collision, it is well to be reminded how little Americans in the defense intellectual community know of their French counterparts. Yet as this volume shows, strategic studies in France are not only alive and well but well informed, intellectually sophisticated, and surprisingly free of anti-American animus.

Thierry de Montbrial, director of the prestigious French Institute of

International Relations (IFRI), and Jean Klein, a professor at the Sorbonne, have assembled a wide-ranging collection of articles emphasizing the historical and theoretical dimensions of strategy, though without neglecting such current topics as terrorism, the Yugoslav crisis, NATO, or the revolution in military affairs. There are substantial pieces on various national schools of strategic theorizing, beginning with the ancient Greeks, Romans, and Chinese, and ending with the Soviets and the “Anglo-Saxons.” Carl von Clausewitz is given due deference throughout, but the book also broadly acknowledges the reality of “culture” in shaping strategic rationality. There is a good general article on “strategic culture,” as well as useful separate essays on Chinese and Asiatic strategic culture by Valérie Niquet, author of a treatise on Chinese strategy (*Les fondements de la stratégie chinoise*, Paris, 1997) that ought to be more widely known on this side of the Atlantic.

Great commanders (even Napoleon) are given short shrift by the editors except as contributors to the development of the art of war, but there are individual articles on strategic thinkers both minor and major. From the Anglo-Saxon world, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian Corbett, J. F. C. Fuller, T. E. Lawrence, Liddell Hart, Bernard Brodie, and Herbert Rosinski make up what is perhaps not an obvious selection. (Particularly interesting is the appreciation of Rosinski, a German refugee who, while on the faculty of the Naval War College, produced notable

yet today almost completely neglected works on the historical development of strategy and on naval strategy.) From the French tradition, there are the standard figures—Antoine Henri Jomini, Ardant du Picq, Ferdinand Foch, Charles de Gaulle, Raymond Aron, Raoul Castex (the foremost French naval theorist), André Beaufre, Pierre Gallois, and others; there are also obscure yet interesting names, like Paul-Gédéon Joly de Maizeroy (1719–80), who apparently introduced the term “strategy” in reference to the higher component of the art of war, and the contemporary strategist Lucien Poirier.

Montbrial’s own substantial essay on the theory of strategy deserves particular attention. Montbrial distinguishes his own view from that of certain of the other contributors, defining strategy in a broad sense to encompass aspects that transcend the art of war as such. He is well versed in game theory and the American business strategy literature, yet, unusually, reserves a place for “glory” in the strategic calculus. Of the other contributors, mention should also be made of Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, author of a *Traité de stratégie* (Paris, 1999) as well as a number of works on naval history and strategy, and François Géré, who has produced studies of American strategy and military policy and of psychological warfare. It is to be hoped that this material will not forever remain untranslated.

CARNES LORD
Naval War College