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Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future

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believes the United States might experience. He finds that the most likely form of conflict will be Kosovo-like peace operations, and he explains why operations addressing these conflicts are so difficult. This section provides some of the most dramatic and compelling information and analysis in the book, particularly concerning his operational distinctions between conflict suppression and state building (the latter being the most problematic for this country). *When America Fights* concludes with a recommendation of realistic internationalist national strategy based on five major influences of modern grand strategy, and it offers the reader fifteen guidelines on how to increase the probability of success in peace operations.

The book provides a consistent thread of argument and analysis on the use of American armed force. However, notwithstanding the author's preface, *When America Fights* is a highly opinionated work. It does not comprehensively analyze the implications of other possible points on the spectrum of conflict, nor does it pursue alternative or possible conflictual guidelines that might be generated by applying the theoretical framework to those other types of conflict. Further, the two-tier world concept simply is neither the only way nor the most widely accepted one of attempting to organize the chaos of the post-Cold War international environment. Finally, the conclusion that there are two types of armed force employments—of necessity (forced on the nation) or of choice (at the nation's discretion)—is most intriguing (I have already adopted the lexicon in my courses) but it is not the only typology that one might consider.

There are two admittedly minor but irritating faults in the book. First, being a

very old-fashioned academic, this reviewer appreciates the value and information provided by footnotes; they are totally lacking in this work. True, there is a bibliography following each chapter, but that is an empty vessel for serious research. Second, Ralph Peters, a most insightful strategist of the current age who is quoted in the last chapter, is a retired Army, not Air Force, officer.

When America Fights is an excellent book on the use of armed force as applied to peace operations. It is a book with a point of view and a strong theoretical base. Regardless of whether one agrees with the author on the flow and form of his argument, the reader will find the material engrossing and invaluable—even though this nation is now engaged in what Snow has viewed as the less likely scenario for force employment, that of necessity.

JONATHAN E. CZARNECKI
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Carter, Ashton B., and John P. White, eds. *Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001. 326pp. \$50

This book “addresses a need widely recognized but long neglected: to adapt and modernize the system by which the United States manages the largest and most successful security establishment in history.” Do not be misled into thinking that the word “managing” in the title suggests a dry treatment of managerial practices requiring extensive change. *Keeping the Edge* deals with that, but it primarily examines many key organizational strategy issues; these studies will have comprehensive value to anyone within academia or the national security

environment wishing to improve what the authors regard as management and organizational shortfalls that impede implementation of wise strategy and policy choices. Collectively, the distinguished editors and authors contend that, if unattended, these shortcomings will seriously diminish our unmatched military capability. At the same time, they hold that the “national security establishment is deficient not so much in deciding what to do” as in lacking the means to implement defense policy effectively.

The book is organized into eleven chapters, each of which discusses deficiencies in a key area of national security. Each chapter describes the changing security environment relevant to the subject of discussion, then offers comprehensive suggestions to improve the execution of whatever policy choices are made. Most of the chapters also provide superb insight into what future policy choices should be. Among the chapters are: “Managing Defense for the Future,” “Keeping the Edge in Joint Operations,” “Exploiting the Internet Revolution,” “Keeping the Edge in Intelligence,” “Countering Asymmetric Threats,” “Keeping the Technological Edge,” “Advancing the Revolution in Business Affairs,” “Ensuring Quality People in Defense,” “Managing the Pentagon’s International Relations,” “Strengthening the National Security Interagency Process,” and “Implementing Change.” Each chapter is comprehensive and would serve as an excellent guide to new policy makers who wish actually to see their policies implemented. I doubt that any organizational or managerial improvement has been omitted.

The material in the book resulted from a research collaboration project between the Kennedy School of Government,

Harvard University, and Stanford University. The list of contributors represents a who’s who in national security experience and in the study of national security processes: Ashton B. Carter, David Chu, Victor A. DeMarines, John Deutch, Robert J. Hermann, Arnold Kanter, Michael J. Lippitz, Judith A. Miller, Sean O’Keefe, William J. Perry, Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, Brent Scowcroft, John M. Shalikashvili, and John P. White. The core group of authors have occupied practically every senior position in the national security environment, while others have dedicated their professional lives to the study of national security policies and supporting structures. They speak with as much authority as one could possibly find in a single book.

This book addresses those in policy positions who wish to reform organizations and practices that, according to the authors, increasingly sap the vitality of our military capability; it is concrete as well as comprehensive in its recommendations. *Keeping the Edge* will also help people who are not currently in positions to affect policy to understand the substantial flaws in the anatomy and physiology of the organizations that implement national security policies. Experienced national security scholars and practitioners will respond to the authors’ contention that existing policy-implementing practices themselves are a threat to future U.S. national security.

The book must be read by anyone interested in improving these processes and structures; it contains important guides for people who can marshal the influence at least to begin organizational and managerial change, if only on the margin. The preface warns that the authors have no illusions that the chronic organizational

and management problems will be solved any time soon. One can only hope, nevertheless, that this book's comprehensive recommendations will encourage and guide courageous leaders to make a start.

WILLIAM E. TURCOTTE
Naval War College



Steinbruner, John D. *Principles of Global Security*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. 270pp. \$44.95

Unconvincing—that one word accurately describes this effort of the prolific author and former Brookings fellow John Steinbruner to explain why and how the “potentially catastrophic consequences of traditional security practices” mandate radical changes in U.S. defense policies.

Steinbruner argues that discontinuities in the international system make obsolete the realist view that nation-states need to rely on military power for their security. From this premise, he implies that the United States should not seek to maintain military superiority over potential opponents. In this new formula, deterrence, which he describes as a Cold War doctrine, should be “subordinated to the countervailing idea of reassurance.” Globalization, Steinbruner holds, has made it “too expensive to rule by force,” and competition among nations or societies is being replaced by cooperation; therefore, the whole notion of needing a strong military defense is dangerous. Unfortunately for his premise, Steinbruner then turns around and uses a pseudo-realist argument to explain why other nations would “naturally” seek to oppose and confront American military superiority in a world in which they are

benefiting from United States–led globalization.

At its core, the book's fundamental problem is that it approaches all military issues as if they were but subsets of strategic nuclear deterrence. The irony of this approach—Cold War thinking at its grimmest—appears completely to have eluded the author, who spent much of his scholarly career worrying about issues of deterrence theory and nuclear command and control. At the same time, Steinbruner does not see the end of the Cold War as a victory for deterrence or democratic ideology. Referring to it rather as an unexpected “spontaneous event” that took everyone involved by surprise, he sees it as the result of “the working of very large forces”—presumably the forces of globalization, although he is never very clear on that.

Steinbruner's treatment of globalization itself—which he describes only in terms of advances in technology and population dynamics—is disappointing. Others have written much better treatments. The book does not contain a serious examination of the direct impact of globalization on national security or military forces, only a continuing assertion that globalization has effects and that, whatever they are, they justify adoption of the author's “reassurance” policies. These policies are similar to, but more radical and seemingly less practical than, those put forward as “cooperative security” by former secretary of defense William Perry. He certainly would not agree with Steinbruner that all national militaries must be equalized in capabilities and force structure. Steinbruner cites the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the founding of Nato as examples of reassurance and equal treatment of nations in regard to security, but he forgets to