Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century

Barney Rubel
resolve. The authors leave us with the (lukewarm) lesson that airpower, properly employed, is a necessary, albeit insufficient, tool of defense and foreign policy.

The Kosovo war provides today’s students of international affairs a textbook case in the traditional art of statecraft in the world of realpolitik. Many old lessons are emphasized: strategy must be driven by policy, coercive diplomacy works only when one possesses military might and resolve, armed forces must be given proper strategic direction, and alliance solidarity is crucial.

However, Winning Ugly adds new lessons as well, because Kosovo was Nato’s principal test to date in conducting military operations outside its borders against a sovereign nation for essentially humanitarian purposes. Nato’s performance in Kosovo may have helped define the practicality and desirability of this role in the twenty-first-century world. This book enhances our understanding of what may become the future of Nato as well as some part of the future of war.

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A retired Army officer formerly on the faculty of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Jonathan House has written an updated edition of a text he authored in the 1980s to support the education of Army officers. His express intentions are to strip the jargon in order to make the subject intelligible to a more general readership, and to update the book with an analysis of combined-arms progress in the 1990s. The result is a readable and lucid analysis of combined-arms warfare in the twentieth century, a work that a layman can follow without keeping a dictionary of military terms handy.

For those with a genuine interest in military affairs, this book is ultimately rewarding. However, it is more about organizational dynamics than about battles and tactics, and that may prove tedious to the casual reader. House methodically traces the development of combined-arms practice in the major armies of the world, offering just enough description of battles and campaigns to illustrate the effects of the various technical and organizational developments over the years.

House tends to focus his analysis through the lens of organizational design (an inclination shared by this reviewer) and comes up with some interesting results that do not always conform to conventional wisdom. For instance, he makes the case that the French and British defeat in the 1940 Battle of France can be adequately explained by their centralized and “stovepiped” organizational structure, which inhibited the formation of flexible combined-arms task forces. Moreover, the lack of experience in defending against a fluid combined-arms offensive caused the allies to create a rather brittle, forward-focused defense instead of the defense in tactical and operational depth that was later found effective against the blitzkrieg. In addition, the failure of the German advance into the Soviet Union in 1941 was due not so much to the oft-cited reduction in panzer divisions (which House cites as an actual advantage, in that it created more balanced divisional structures) as to the
failure of the Wehrmacht to prepare logistics support suited to the resulting depth of the theater.

If the book has a fault, it lies in the numerous maps and organizational charts that accompany the text. Though House’s prose is clear and straightforward, the maps do not help the layman really grasp the dynamics of the battles. Similarly, although House thoughtfully includes a key to the numerous symbols that soldiers use to depict units on maps and tables of organization, he leaves out a number of the more esoteric ones that inhabit the book. This is a minor irritant—in general the book is well supported by a glossary of technical terms and acronyms, liberal annotations, and an extensive bibliography—but it should be fixed in the next edition if the book is to be considered a true introductory text.

House has a clear thesis that permeates his analysis: combined-arms structure (comprising tanks, artillery, infantry, helicopters, engineers, etc.) should be integrated at the lowest practicable level and balanced to provide the most flexibility to the commander. (In practice, this seems to occur only at the division or sometimes the brigade level.) The commander can then select various types of units to form combined-arms task forces that can address the type of operations planned. House’s discussion of the long and painful history of armies’ struggles to achieve this balance and flexibility brings to mind the equally painful attempts at jointness among services.

House inevitably addresses the issue of air support as a piece of the combined-arms puzzle. He analytically describes the objections airmen have to integrating airpower into a combined-arms ground organization, but in his conclusions he argues against separate, air-only campaigns. Although his points are otherwise well made, on this issue he seems to overreach a bit.

In summary, Jonathan House has produced a useful and readable text for anyone who wants a better understanding of how modern armies fight.

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This is not a technological history of the U.S. Navy per se but rather an exploration of how the dominant culture of the Navy’s leadership drove specific technological choices in the transition from the sailing ship of the line to the battleship and then to the aircraft carrier. McBride’s thesis centers on two points: that the organization and culture of the U.S. Navy have traditionally been defined by its capital ships; and that new technologies challenging the relevance of the current capital ship are generally resisted by senior leaders, who seek both to maintain control over change and to inhibit any developments that suggest a transfer of power to individuals with the skills, functions, and organizational relationships of a new “technological paradigm.”

These themes are familiar to those who follow the academic literature on technology and culture, but McBride is undoubtedly correct in his contention that there is no widespread understanding of the specific impact of the dominant service culture on technology selection. A thorough appreciation of the full range of forces that drive technological choices would appear to be particularly