Fourth of July fireworks as seen over Luce Hall (in a recent summer, less rainy than the one just past, when the celebration had to be postponed). Dewey Field, on the south side of Luce Hall, is a popular spot from which to watch the fireworks display, which the city of Newport puts on annually over the harbor, just to the south of the Naval War College.

Photograph by PHC Jon H. Hockersmith, U.S. Navy.
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Rear Admiral Rempt assumed duties as the forty-eighth President of the Naval War College on 22 August 2001. Relieved on 9 July 2003 by Rear Admiral Ronald A. Route, he reported for duty as Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy, in the grade of vice admiral, on 1 August 2003.

Vice Admiral Rempt is a 1966 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. Initial assignments included deployments to Vietnam aboard USS Coontz (DLG 9) and USS Somers (DDG 34). He later commanded USS Antelope (PG 86), USS Callaghan (DDG 994), and USS Bunker Hill (CG 52). Among his shore assignments were the Naval Sea Systems Command as the initial project officer for the Mark 41 Vertical Launch System; Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) staff as the Aegis Weapon System program coordinator; director of the Prospective Commanding Officer/Executive Officer Department, Surface Warfare Officers Schools Command; and Director, Anti-Air Warfare Requirements Division (OP-75) on the CNO’s staff. Rear Admiral Rempt also served in the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, where he initiated development of Naval Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, continuing those efforts as Director, Theater Air Defense on the CNO’s staff. More recently, he was Program Executive Officer, Theater Air Defense, the first Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Theater Combat Systems, the first Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Missile Defense, and Director, Surface Warfare (N76) on the CNO’s staff. He holds master’s degrees in systems analysis from Stanford University and in national security and strategic studies from the Naval War College.
IT IS DIFFICULT TO DESCRIBE concisely the mission of institutions like the Naval War College, but if one were called upon to do so in three words or less, it would be to create new ideas. New ideas are incredibly powerful, and for this reason they are frequently viewed with skepticism and wariness. An old adage says that the only thing more difficult than getting a new idea into a mind is getting an old one out!

New ideas can arise from many sources, and they can be driven by everything from desperation to quiet contemplation. It can be argued, however, that the best ideas are born from study, reflection, and careful analysis of options—plus passion and drive. It is this process that we seek to nurture at the Naval War College.

The Newport complex, which includes the Naval War College, the Navy Warfare Development Command, and the CNO’s Strategic Studies Group, serves as fertile ground for creativity. This process is facilitated by:

- Faculty, student, and staff research and experimentation activities that are conducted in a free and risk-accepting atmosphere.
- The study of current global security events within the context of relevant historical precedents and classical principles of war.
- Mentorship from a world-class faculty that includes proven scholars/educators and experienced military operators.
- Close and frequent interaction and seminar discussions among students from all military services and key civilian agencies within the national security arena.
- The opportunity to understand better, learn alongside, and socialize with top-quality military officers from more than sixty different nations.

A mind once stretched by a new idea never regains its original dimension.

—Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
Sharing ideas with visiting lecturers ranging from service chiefs and combatant commanders to world-renowned authors, statesmen, and jurists.

Having the luxury to step back from operational demands for a year to concentrate exclusively on professional development and intellectual growth.

Taking advantage of superb academic resources such as the Eccles Library, extensive historical archives, and an informative museum and naval curator.

Participating in sophisticated war games and crisis exercises with joint and fleet staffs, and with senior federal, state, and local government officials.

Seeing concepts developed, gamed, tested in fleet experiments, and introduced to the theater of war with great effect.

Working and studying in a unique collegial atmosphere where new ideas are welcomed and new perspectives are encouraged.

**MISSION**

The Naval War College serves the nation by providing graduate and professional maritime and joint military education, advanced research and study, gaming, and public outreach programs, to:

- Educate future leaders
  - Prepare U.S. and international military officers and civilians to meet national security challenges as senior leaders in naval, joint, interagency, and multinational arenas.
  - Enable students to develop and execute the national military strategy and conduct maritime and joint operations applying sound strategic and operational art.

- Define the future Navy
  - Develop advanced strategic and operational concepts for employment of naval, joint, and multinational forces.
  - Assist the Chief of Naval Operations in defining the future Navy and its role in national security.
  - Provide leadership in shaping the global maritime order to foster peaceful use of the world’s oceans.

Creative license exists, in part, as the result of the academic freedom that underpins all of the College’s activities. This is reflected in the college’s formal guiding principles, which include the following statement:

In order to maintain the quality of an NWC education and the ability to engage in research and other scholarly activities at the highest standards, we are guided by our commitment to:

- Safeguard individual academic freedom and the academic integrity of the institution.
- Maintain our academic independence and ownership of our curriculum.
No one can count, track, or document the host of new ideas and concepts that arise from this intellectual crucible. But in recent months we have seen evidence of creativity in efforts that served as the foundation for the Navy's vision known as "Seapower 21"; in the development of operational concepts for the employment of a new class of Littoral Combat Ships; and in dozens of point papers and crisis-management games that have helped establish the nation's new homeland security posture. Countless other innovations and concepts have no doubt emerged in the seminar rooms, auditoriums, and game cells of the Newport complex and its extended locations around the world.

As Justice Holmes so astutely noted, once the habit of developing new ideas is developed, it will help generate new ideas for the rest of a career and over an entire lifetime. Education early in one's career guarantees the maximum return on the investment represented by the time and effort dedicated to it. For our Navy and our officers, it is our investment in the future.

In the final analysis, education generates new ideas. New ideas are needed to transform the military services to meet new challenges effectively—and it is transformed forces that will best be able to protect the nation in the demanding and uncertain decades ahead.

Rodney P. Rempt
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
General Richard B. Myers became the fifteenth chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 October 2001. In this capacity, he serves as the principal military adviser to the president, the secretary of defense, and the National Security Council. Prior to becoming chairman, he served as vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for nineteen months.

General Myers was born in Kansas City, Missouri. He is a 1965 graduate of Kansas State University and holds a master’s degree in business administration from Auburn University. The general has attended the Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama; the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; and the Program for Senior Executives in National and International Security at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

General Myers entered the Air Force in 1965 through the Reserve Officer Training Corps program. His career includes operational command and leadership positions in a variety of Air Force and joint assignments. General Myers is a command pilot with more than 4,100 flying hours in the T-33, C-37, C-21, F-4, F-15, and F-16, including six hundred combat hours in the F-4.

As the vice chairman from March 2000 to September 2001, General Myers served as the chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, as vice chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board, and as a member of the National Security Council Deputies Committee and the Nuclear Weapons Council. In addition, he acted for the chairman in all aspects of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, including participation in the Defense Resources Board.

From August 1998 to February 2000, General Myers was Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Space Command; Commander, Air Force Space Command; and Department of Defense manager for space transportation system contingency support at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. As commander, General Myers was responsible for defending America through space and intercontinental ballistic missile operations. Prior to assuming that position, he was Commander, Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii, from July 1997 to July 1998. From July 1996 to July 1997 General Myers served as assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Pentagon; and from November 1993 to June 1996 he was Commander of U.S. Forces Japan and Fifth Air Force at Yokota Air Base, Japan.
SHIFT TO A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

General Richard B. Myers, U.S. Air Force

In ancient India, six blind men encountered an elephant for the first time and quickly began to squabble about the nature of elephants;
The first blind man bumped into the elephant’s side and declared that the beast was like a wall;
The second, discovering the ear, concluded it was like a fan;
The third blind man came across the tail and thought the elephant to be very much like a rope;
The fourth, encountering the elephant’s leg, was sure the animal resembled a tree;
Finding the tusk, the fifth blind man proclaimed the elephant to be like a spear;
And the sixth, grasping the elephant’s trunk, concluded the giant pachyderm most resembled a snake.

We all know from the ancient Oriental story of the six blind men and the elephant that how we perceive something determines our understanding of it and, by implication, our response to it. With that in mind, the U.S. military must shift from a regional to a global view of our security environment in order to understand and respond better. In the past, America’s security needs were served adequately by having its uniformed leaders in Washington maintain the global vision, while the majority of U.S. military organizations maintained a regional or functional focus. However, to provide effectively for the nation’s defense in the twenty-first century, we must all come to understand and appreciate the global perspective.

Examining trends in the global security environment and the ways in which the U.S. military has organized to deal with past challenges provides the foundation for understanding the implications for America’s armed forces today, as we transform our military into one that is ready to provide effective missile defense,
information operations (IO), space operations, and other capabilities that do
not respect our traditional regional boundaries.

TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
During the last decade of the twentieth century, we witnessed dramatic shifts in
the global security environment. Revolutionary technological advances and mon-
umental political changes rendered our world safer in some ways, though less pre-
dictable and arguably less stable. While students of international affairs have
debated the broader meaning and impact of globalization, defense professionals
have worked to understand the security implications of these global trends.

Technological changes since 1990 have occurred at an extraordinary pace.
Consider for a moment where you were and what you were doing as the Berlin
Wall came down. How many people at that time owned a cellular phone or a per-
sonal computer, had logged onto the Internet, or knew what a global positioning
satellite system was? Whereas television news coverage of the Vietnam War took
thirty-six to forty-eight hours to reach American viewers, stories of the Gulf War
were broadcast around the world instantaneously. During the Gulf War, the Ca-
ble News Network was unique in providing continuous coverage of global news.
Now, several major networks in the United States provide coverage of global
events as they happen, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a
year—not to mention the variety of international news programs produced and
broadcast by foreign broadcast corporations. Al-Jazeera provides programming
that shapes perceptions of the United States in much of the Arabic-speaking
world. Imagery satellites capable of better than one-meter resolution were the
sole purview of superpowers but are now operated by companies in the United
States and Europe for the benefit of whoever is willing to pay for the images. In
August 2002, commercial satellite images of airfields in the Horn of Africa were
broadcast around the world, allegedly showing potential staging areas for at-
tacks against Iraq. For those who missed the news, the satellite photographs were
available on the Internet.

The political changes in the 1990s were no less staggering. As a fighter pilot, I
spent the first twenty-five years of my Air Force career studying Soviet fighter
aircraft that NATO would have had to confront in deadly combat if the Cold War
ever heated up. Now Soviet fighters that could be seen in the West only in classi-
fied photos are performing at air shows over America’s heartland. Today, officers
from the former Soviet Union pursue professional military education at our
staff colleges and war colleges, and three former Warsaw Pact states have joined
NATO. The end of the Cold War lowered the threat of nuclear Armageddon and
brought an end to many of the proxy wars through which the two sides struggled
to exert their influence. But the Cold War imposed on international affairs a
certain element of stability and predictability that no longer exists. There is an alarming number of customers—including states and nonstate actors—seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, including long-range ballistic missiles. In short, the technological and political changes that have improved our quality of life and brought us all closer together can also be perverted to empower those who would do us harm.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
As we chart our way ahead, we do not begin with a clean sheet of paper. We must first understand how we arrived at our current way of organizing for national security if we are to understand why we are better off organizing functionally or globally for some mission areas rather than relying entirely on regional combatant commands. At the same time, we should appreciate, not abandon, the value of regional expertise in implementing our national security strategy and national military strategy.

The experiences of the Second World War and early Cold War helped to dispel lingering illusions about America’s security and its proclivity for isolationism; those experiences drew America’s new international responsibilities into tighter focus. Responding to America’s changed role in the world, Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947, creating the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense. While Congress legislated the overarching security structure, President Harry S. Truman established the first Unified Command Plan (UCP), creating our regional and functional combatant commands. Among these newly created commands were U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), U.S. Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM), and the Strategic Air Command (SAC). The containment policy our armed forces helped to support was a global one, but there was arguably little need for our regional commanders to focus globally. In any case, the regional commanders lacked the technological means to gain and maintain a global perspective.

The first Unified Command Plans merely codified the command structures that existed at the end of the Second World War. What had once been General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s command became USEUCOM; General Douglas MacArthur’s command became Far East Command; and Admiral Chester Nimitz’s command became USPACOM. There were other regional commands with responsibilities for Alaska, for the Caribbean, and for guarding the north-eastern air approaches to the United States, but there were also vast areas of the world not assigned to any combatant command.¹ When our first combatant commands were established, the service chiefs played an active role in the commands and served as the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s executive agents in overseeing the commands.
From the outset of the Cold War, regional commands focused on their regions while the Joint Chiefs of Staff kept a global perspective. Although this arrangement served the nation well enough to see us through the Cold War, there were signs of trouble as early as 1951, when President Truman dismissed General MacArthur in the midst of the Korean War. After serving as Chief of Staff of the Army in the 1930s, MacArthur had lived in Asia until his dismissal by President Truman in 1951. He first served as military adviser to the Philippine government. Then, during the Second World War, he was made commander of U.S. troops in the southwest Pacific area. After the war, MacArthur became military governor of Japan, overseeing its occupation and reconstruction. With the outbreak of the Korean War, General MacArthur’s Far East Command provided the U.S. underpinning to the United Nations war effort. In response to MacArthur’s protest against limited objectives in the Korean War—“no substitute for victory”—the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley, informed Congress that he and the Joint Chiefs unanimously agreed that in the global struggle against communism, a wider war in Asia represented “the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.” Though partly a clash over the utility of limited objectives in war, the disagreement largely reflected the two sides’ differing perspectives—MacArthur’s Asia-centric regional perspective and the Joint Chiefs’ global perspective, which had to account for Europe as well as Asia.

In the fifty-six years since the first Unified Command Plan, our combatant command structure has been expanded geographically and empowered legally. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act strengthened the role of our combatant commands, and with UCP ‘02, the last remaining unassigned regions of the world—Russia, the Caspian Sea, Antarctica, and the countries of North America—were finally placed within our combatant commanders’ areas of responsibility (AORs). Now the entire globe is encompassed within the AORs of our five regional combatant commands—U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), and U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM).

In addition to regional combatant commands, the United States has had functional combatant commands since the inception of the UCP. In fact, Strategic Air Command was technically the first, formally becoming a combatant command just two weeks before USPACOM, USEUCOM, and USLANTCOM. Still, today’s functional unified combatant commands are relatively recent creations that began with the establishment of U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) in 1985. In the decade and a half that followed, successive administrations established U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM),
U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). The rise of these functional commands highlights the reality that some military missions or responsibilities can be better fulfilled by carving out functions from our regional commands’ responsibilities than by having the functions dispersed among our regional commands.

The newly established USSTRATCOM—formed by joining the capabilities and resources of USSPACECOM and the original USSTRATCOM—is taking on some missions that had been unassigned previously and that overlap the responsibilities of our regional combatant commands. USSTRATCOM’s nuclear focus broadened considerably with the latest Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), signed by the secretary of defense in December 2001. In addition to specifying the road ahead for America’s nuclear arsenal, the 2001 NPR also introduced a new strategic triad. The old triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles has given way to a triad of strategic offensive capabilities, strategic defenses, and the infrastructure and research and development needed to sustain America’s strategic capabilities. Strategic offensive capabilities include nonnuclear, even nonkinetic, strikes as well as traditional nuclear force employment. As described in the NPR, the new triad is enabled by command and control (C2), intelligence, and planning capabilities. The president’s decision to combine USSPACECOM and USSTRATCOM to form a new U.S. Strategic Command was a major step in fulfilling the vision for a new strategic triad. Despite its familiar name, the new command is as different from the former USSTRATCOM as it is from the former USSPACECOM. It is an entirely new command—and greater than the sum of its two predecessors. Obviously, the new USSTRATCOM will have global responsibilities, and its commander and staff must have a global perspective for dealing with threats to U.S. security.

USSOCOM has also been given new responsibilities and a greater role in the global war on terrorism. The very expression “global war on terrorism” highlights the global approach needed for dealing with the problem of terrorism. At the first Defense Department press conference of 2003, the secretary of defense announced the change of focus at USSOCOM, pointing out that “Special Operations Command will function as both a supported and a supporting command.” In the past, USSOCOM has, with very few exceptions, been the supporting command to our regional combatant commands. Obviously, terrorist networks today have a global presence, with members and cells around the world, and we can no longer adequately counter the scourge of terrorism by relying solely on regional strategies. We also need a global approach to the problem.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. MILITARY

The establishment of a new USSTRATCOM and an expanded role for USSOCOM does not come at the expense of our regional combatant commands. This is not a zero-sum equation. Our regional combatant commands provide essential regional expertise; they provide an enduring basis for U.S. presence around the globe; they are the keys to successful theater security cooperation with our allies and friends; and they provide the basis for pursuing multinational interoperability and military coalitions. In peace and in war, our regional combatant commands provide direction to, and C2 over, U.S. military activities around the world. The challenge for our armed forces today is to balance these regional responsibilities with the need to address missions that are global in nature.

Whether we divide our combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities along functional lines and address them on a global basis or instead choose to deal with them along regional lines, we create “seams.” Seams—that is, the discontinuities where one command’s responsibilities end and another’s begin—are unavoidable, unless we take the impractical step of making one commander responsible for everything, everywhere, all the time. However, seams can become vulnerabilities that our adversaries might exploit. Therefore, when organizing our combatant commands, we strive to place seams where it makes the most sense to place them—where they provide us the greatest effectiveness and efficiencies and present our adversaries with the least opportunity to do us harm.

Missions that cross all regional boundaries require a global approach. One of those is computer network defense. Electrons do not respect geographic boundaries, and requiring each of our geographic commands to plan independently for protecting computer networks would create unacceptable seams. Recognizing this, we assigned the lead for computer network defense to USSPACECOM in 1999. This assignment of a global mission to a commander with a global perspective was a precursor of the new missions assigned to the new USSTRATCOM.

Many inherently global military mission areas are of increasing importance to our security and cannot be addressed well from a regional perspective. Military mission areas that are inherently global include the following: integrating missile defense across areas of responsibility; certain elements of information operations; space operations; global strike operations; certain intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities associated with global strike, missile defense, IO, and space operations; and countering terrorism.

Missile defense is a responsibility of all of our regional combatant commands. However, no regional combatant command, even the newly established USNORTHCOM, is better suited than any other to integrate missile defense
operations across AORs in support of the president’s stated goal of providing protection for the U.S. deployed forces, allies, and friends. When missiles in a distant theater can be used against targets anywhere on the globe, the United States needs global ISR and global command and control to integrate its missile defense capabilities—which, by the way, include offensive capabilities to preempt or prevent missile attacks. We cannot afford to think of missile defense merely in terms of actively intercepting missiles after they have been launched.

Certain elements of information operations similarly require a global perspective and better integration of our nation’s capabilities. While information operations should become a core warfighting capability of all of our combatant commands, certain IO activities could create effects of such a magnitude that focusing on regional consequences would be unnecessarily restrictive and ultimately unhelpful. Even when the effects of information operations are limited to a single area of operations, a global perspective will be needed to ensure that theater IO is compatible with IO in other AORs. A global perspective will often provide the essential starting point for success, whether we are attempting to get a message across to an adversarial audience that spans more than one theater, conducting electronic warfare activities to inhibit long-distance communications, performing computer network operations, or carrying out military deception programs. Even within a single theater, USSTRATCOM will provide “value added” to the regional combatant commands by integrating efforts that have previously tended to be “stovepiped” in different organizations (e.g., C2 warfare, psychological operations, electronic warfare, computer network attack).

Space operations present another military mission area where a regional focus is inadequate and a global perspective is needed. Given the vital role space operations play in global communications, one cannot always determine precisely where space operations end and information operations begin. In the past, the supported-supporting relationships between regional combatant commands and U.S. Space Command were predominantly one-way, with USSPACECOM supporting the regional commands. In the future, we are much more likely to see regional commands supporting the new USSTRATCOM to ensure the success of military operations in space. This change in roles will require our regional combatant commands to develop a deeper appreciation for the global perspective of America’s security needs.

Given the nature of threats facing America in the twenty-first century, including fleeting targets, such as mobile ballistic missiles or leaders of terrorist networks, we must develop the ability to undertake appropriate military action rapidly anywhere on the globe. Such action could be taken by today’s long-range bombers, shipborne weapon systems, or special forces, but new global capabilities will be needed in the future. Regional combatant commands could play
supported or supporting roles in global strike operations, depending on the scenario and weapon systems involved. However, one need look no farther than our current global war on terrorism to appreciate the need for a global perspective in planning for and prosecuting global military operations.

Global intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities will be needed for gathering indications-and-warning data and otherwise to enable global strike, space operations, certain elements of IO, and integrated missile defense. Moreover, global C2 capabilities are needed to enable integrated global missile defense, facilitate global strike, integrate regional operations with global operations, and integrate regional operations in one area of operations with those of another. Knitting together various regionally focused ISR activities is unlikely to yield a coherent global perspective. Simply put, a relevant global perspective cannot be obtained without ISR activities that are, to some degree, globally coordinated and directed—a function the Defense Intelligence Agency performs. What is new is that given the low-density/high-demand nature of many of our ISR resources, regional combatant commands are more likely than before to be required to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities in support of global operations tasked to USSOCOM or USSTRATCOM.

Often discussions about the need to shift from a regional focus to a global perspective lead to debates about supported-supporting relationships, and inevitably someone will make the claim that functional combatant commands should always support regional combatant commands. Implied, if not stated, is the belief that conducting operations or executing missions is the sole purview of regional combatant commands and that no functional combatant command should conduct operations in a regional combatant commander’s AOR. Such hard-and-fast rules have never existed, and supported-supporting relationships continue to depend on the situation and mission objectives. That is why supported-supporting relationships are spelled out in planning orders, deployment orders, execution orders, in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, and in operations plans and concept plans. Moreover, the term “supported” does not imply sole responsibility for execution. A supporting combatant commander can execute or conduct operations in support of the supported commander—something USTRANSCOM does every day. Our combatant commanders ultimately support the president and the secretary of defense in the pursuit of American security, and the array of possible command relations between combatant commanders should not be constrained unnecessarily. To the extent we can harness the ability to observe and operate globally, without self-imposed artificial limitations, we will generate new military capabilities to add to the ones that we have
today, thereby yielding a greater number of military options from which the president can choose.

The president and secretary of defense must maintain a global perspective, and so must the military officials charged with supporting them. While communications from the president and the secretary of defense to the combatant commanders normally pass through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs and the chairman are not in the chain of command. If there was ever a time when our nation’s security could be adequately provided by having uniformed leaders in Washington maintain a global perspective while commands around the globe kept exclusive focus on their regions, that time has long since passed into history. To fulfill faithfully the “commander’s intent” from the president on down, combatant command staffs, service staffs, the Joint Staff, and U.S. officials serving on allied staffs must appreciate our commander in chief’s perspective—a global perspective. If we attempt to do otherwise, we will surely end up like the six blind men of the ancient Eastern parable in their first encounter with an elephant, endlessly disputing the nature of something we fail to perceive fully. By shifting our view from a regional perspective to a global perspective, we will better comprehend and respond to America’s security needs in the twenty-first century.

NOTES


3. Prior to the formation of USSPACECOM in 1985, purely functional combatant commands tended to be “specified commands,” meaning that all of their forces came from a single service. Strategic Air Command was an example of a specified command. The last specified command, USFORSCOM, became the Army component to U.S. Atlantic Command in 1993. (U.S. Atlantic Command became USJFCOM in 1999.)

For a decade, the U.S. Department of Energy has worked cooperatively with Russia to install modern nuclear security systems for weapons-usable material. The effort is known as the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program; its mission is to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism by rapidly improving the security of all weapons-usable nuclear material in forms other than nuclear weapons in Russia, the NIS (newly independent states), and the Baltics. The program has substantially increased security for large amounts of vulnerable nuclear material. Hardening storage facilities against outside but also, even especially, inside threats is a high priority. Site-tailored and integrated enhancements include such features as entry/exit barriers and control measures (such as traps, gates, locks, and portal monitors), personnel access controls, intrusion detection systems, alarm communications, video surveillance, response measures, and computerized systems for nuclear material accounting.

Notwithstanding successes achieved against the threat of nuclear theft, however, the bulk of the proliferation challenge remains; hundreds of metric tons of nuclear material lack improved security systems. As of March 2003, the Department of Energy (DoE) had assisted Russia in protecting about 228 metric tons, or...
38 percent, of its weapons-usable nuclear material. The vast majority of the remaining material is at sites in the nuclear weapons complex where, due to Russian national security concerns, access has been limited and DoE has not been able to initiate work.

The Department of Energy alone now administers in Russia more than a dozen distinct nonproliferation programs designed to reduce the risk of nuclear material or expertise falling into the hands of terrorist organizations and “states of concern.” But there has been an unfortunate tendency to view the various nonproliferation programs one by one rather than all together. According to Leonard S. Spector, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, there is a need for an approach that recognizes and addresses cross-program synergy, impacts, and investment opportunities. Indeed, in March 2003 the U.S. General Accounting Office recommended that the DoE reevaluate its plans for securing Russia’s nuclear material and, with DoD, develop an integrated plan to ensure coordination of efforts to secure Russia’s nuclear warheads.

This article examines the sources of the extraordinary progress of the naval security upgrades for the fresh, unirradiated naval fuel and nuclear weapons, and attempts to balance justified security concerns with the need for openness. The progress made suggests that valuable lessons can be learned from the U.S.-Russian naval security upgrade program, lessons that could improve on the mere formalization of access substitutes and contribute to other security upgrades as well, possibly even to other nuclear nonproliferation activities.

Inherent and legitimate security concerns, however, effectively limit the information that can be made public from the naval MPC&A program. In fact, the progress to date could not have been made had not the American and Russian sides found an effective way to share and at the same time protect sensitive information.

The assessment is based on interactions with key personnel and on the (limited) open-source information available on naval MPC&A upgrades. The article starts with a brief overview and a summary of the historical background and current status; it then proceeds to an evaluation of the pros and cons of the naval MPC&A approach. The final section describes future challenges and steps, and presents recommendations for applying elsewhere the experience of naval Material Protection, Control, and Accounting.

OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES

From the very beginning, access to Russian nuclear sites has been a significant stumbling block for U.S.-Russian cooperation on fissile-material security and nuclear weapons. There has been a lack of clarity on both sides as to kinds of
access needed, when, for whom, and most importantly, for what purposes. As a result, for instance, all new security contracting at the most sensitive nuclear-weapons complexes has been suspended since the fall of 1999, pending decisions and agreements on access.

The Russians have been reluctant to grant the U.S. access to buildings in the nuclear weapon complexes because of national security concerns and domestic laws and regulations. The idea of “substitute” arrangements, or “assurances”—whereby, for instance, photos and video would supplement or substitute for physical access to sensitive facilities—is under investigation and has been applied at some Russian sites. High-level talks and working groups between DoE and the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy (MinAtom) have been initiated to negotiate overarching and acceptable agreements for the provision of necessary assurances. Such solutions are intended to be a pragmatic way of avoiding the most profound sensitivity issues, but they may not address fully the underlying problems of distrust.

As of January 2003, U.S. teams had obtained or anticipated obtaining access to thirty-five of the estimated 133 buildings with nuclear material in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex. At the remaining buildings (74 percent of the total), DoE had no access to design or confirm the installation of security systems. The level of access has thus changed very little since February 2001 (see table 1). In reality, therefore, progress has been limited for much of the most proliferation-attractive material in the nuclear weapons complex. In contrast, the American team working on security upgrades for the Russian navy reports access to all sensitive facilities having fresh highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel (see table 1). DoE has made significant progress protecting buildings at civilian and naval fuel storage sites and is nearing completion of its security upgrades at these sites. As of January 2003, DoE had completed work at 78 percent (eighty-five of 110) of the buildings at these locations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1</th>
<th>ACCESS TO FISSION MATERIAL SITES</th>
<th>Percentage, as of January 2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russian Civilian Sites</td>
<td>Russian Naval Fuel Sites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings to Which U.S. Teams Lack Physical Access</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The naval MPC&A team has clearly been better able to overcome distrust and deal with sensitivity issues. It has been given access despite the secrecy and classification of the design and composition of Russian naval reactor fuel. DoE has forged productive working relationships with officials of the Russian navy, overcome security concerns, and negotiated access appropriate to verify installed physical protection and accounting systems. On the basis of this trust, in 1999 the teams moved from protecting fissile material to naval nuclear weapons. By January 2001, security upgrades were initiated at forty-one of forty-two naval weapon sites. As of March 2003, DoE reported that security had been improved at thirty-three of thirty-six naval weapon sites, the needed access having been provided. The United States expects to finish security upgrades for four thousand Russian naval nuclear warheads by 2005. DoE has, however, scaled back its plans to assist operational naval sites that support deployed nuclear weapons, to comply with January 2003 U.S. interagency guidelines that preclude assistance to most operational sites.

HISTORY AND STATUS OF NAVAL MPC&A

Russia may hold as much as eighty to eighty-five metric tons of HEU for submarine fuel. The fuel’s enrichment levels make it a proliferation risk, and economical and political turmoil has put fissile material management in the former Soviet Union under unprecedented stress. In the post-Soviet period, the Russian navy has had severe problems providing satisfactory storage and protection for its fresh reactor fuel. Originally, decaying fences and simple padlocks often provided the only security.

After less than a half-decade of work, however, the DoE MPC&A program for fresh Russian naval fuel storage facilities has made good progress in reducing the vulnerability of large amounts of HEU—all at highly sensitive installations—to theft or diversion. According to DoE, all the fresh fuel of the Northern Fleet and at the Pacific Fleet has now been consolidated at two modern storage bunkers, expanded and secured with U.S. assistance. In addition, the United States has assisted in physical protection upgrades for storage ships and auxiliary ships involved in refueling operations. The first fresh fuel–storage security enhancement, at the SevMash submarine production plant in Severodvinsk, was completed in the fall of 2001. In early 2001, a second facility at the plant was added to the list to receive security upgrades. By June 2003, these security upgrades were in their final stages.

The HEU naval fuel reduction line at the Machine Building Plant at Elektrostal, outside Moscow, remains outside the U.S.-Russian cooperative MPC&A scope, though some work has been done on the facility’s low-enriched uranium line. From Elektrostal, the fuel is transported by rail to naval storage
facilities, where it is stored until needed. The fuel is shipped by truck to refueling locations. Fuel consolidation made transportation security a more pressing issue; security enhancements for truck shipments of fresh naval fuel, including armored trucks, have been completed. Security for rail shipments, on the other hand, is being considered as part of a separate transportation security project with MinAtom.

The foundations for Russian naval MPC&A were laid in March 1995 when the then commander in chief of the navy, Admiral Gromov, requested assistance and cooperation between the Navy, the Moscow-based Kurchatov Institute, and possibly the United States on upgrades for naval fuel storage and handling. (The Kurchatov Institute, which provides a wide range of services for the Russian navy, had by then become a key player in U.S.-Russian security cooperation; the institute operates independently from MinAtom and is free to initiate cooperation and sign contracts and agreements with external parties.) The month before, Admiral Gromov had participated in a MPC&A demonstration and technical discussions at the institute. U.S. cooperation through the separate Russian-American Laboratory-to-Laboratory MPC&A Program was explored over the ensuing months. (It produced the first security upgrades at the institute itself, to Building 116, late in 1994.)

Since July 1993, attempts to steal nuclear fuel had occurred in the Northern Fleet (as of early 1996, five known attempts. Since then, no new thefts have been reported; see table 2). All of these thefts involved “insiders” with direct or indirect access to and knowledge about the material. Cooperation with the DoE through the Kurchatov Institute was a way for the Russian navy to deal with the problem. In September 1995, the first MPC&A discussions between U.S. technical experts and the Russian navy were held at the institute. By the end of the year, all necessary approvals had been obtained to allow the collaboration to go forward. In 1996, this cooperation advanced beyond the talking stage and began to achieve concrete results.

In February 1996 a course in U.S. approaches to vulnerability assessment was conducted through the Kurchatov Institute; it included a demonstration of “Assess” software for the Russian navy. The next month, representatives from the Russian navy visited the United States. In May the same year, representatives from the DoE and U.S. national laboratories, the Kurchatov Institute, and the Russian navy met in Moscow. A protocol establishing the scope and approach of MPC&A work was signed. The American program leader and the Russians agreed that there should be one small, coherent, and experienced U.S. team to handle all projects. The U.S. side therefore put together a four-person team, with highly qualified personnel from four different national laboratories, to work directly with the Russian navy.
The U.S. side saw and managed the entire “naval sector” as one integrated program. There was a need to move fast and efficiently, as the Russian navy was watching developments closely. Following a visit by Admiral Gromov to the United States in April 1995, American experts had been invited to Site 49, the main storage site for fresh fuel near Murmansk since May 1994. In cooperation with the Kurchatov Institute, the new expert team designed a set of security upgrades for the facility, provided necessary new technologies, and funded construction. In parallel, the U.S. team was working at Murmansk Shipping Company (MSCo) to secure the fresh fuel of the nuclear-propelled icebreaker fleet. Necessary upgrades focused on the auxiliary ship *Imandra*—moored at the Atomflot harbor, north of Murmansk—which carried fresh nuclear fuel; on port perimeter security enhancement; and on access control. The work at MSCo began with a site visit in June 1996, followed in September by the first-ever U.S.-Russian vulnerability assessment. By the end of 1996 the U.S. and Russian teams had a conceptual design ready.

In July 1996, the Russian navy, the Kurchatov Institute, and DoE issued a joint statement that they would “cooperate to ensure the highest possible standards of control, accounting and physical protection for all storage locations of the Navy of the Russian Federation, containing fresh highly enriched uranium fuels for naval nuclear reactors.” The statement solidified cooperation and a protocol achieved in a meeting in Moscow in May the same year.

### TABLE 2
THEFTS OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM, NORTHERN REGION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Material Stolen</th>
<th>Enrichment</th>
<th>Perpetrators</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andreeva Bay</td>
<td>July 1993</td>
<td>Two 4.5 kg fuel elements</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>2 naval officers (Radiation Protection Dept.)</td>
<td>Charges against 2 others withdrawn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sevmorput shipyard fuel storage, Murmansk</td>
<td>November 1993</td>
<td>Three 4.3 kg fuel elements</td>
<td>Approx. 20%</td>
<td>Three officers</td>
<td>Recovered, thieves sentenced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SevMash yard, Severodvinsk</td>
<td>July 1994</td>
<td>3.5 kg uranium dioxide</td>
<td>20–40%</td>
<td>4 local businessmen</td>
<td>Trial in progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SevMash yard, Severodvinsk</td>
<td>October 1994</td>
<td>Fuel element(s)</td>
<td>Highly enriched</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zvezdochka yard, Severodvinsk</td>
<td>July 1994</td>
<td>Fuel element(s)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nor. Fleet Contractors</td>
<td>Suspects seized before removal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zvezdochka yard, Severodvinsk</td>
<td>January 1996</td>
<td>Fuel element(s)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nor. Fleet Contractors</td>
<td>arrests</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A comprehensive agreement with the Russian navy for MPC&A at all naval sites was formalized in a high-level protocol signed in December 1997 by a new commander in chief of the Russian navy, Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, and the secretary of energy, Federico Pena. On this occasion the Russians again stressed the importance of maintaining a cohesive and highly qualified team, leaving the U.S. side with little choice but to keep the original personnel. The Russian navy deemed the threats to the Northern Fleet the most severe. When, two years later, DoE established a similar, but more limited, set of projects for the Pacific Fleet, it was with the same team.

In January 1999 the scope of nuclear material protection, control, and accounting cooperation with the Russian navy was expanded. New initiatives included further upgrading of nuclear fuel storage facilities, a feasibility study for dismantling aging submarines, and the securing of naval spent fuel that represented a proliferation threat. The program was broadened to include a naval training facility in Osninsk. More importantly, the security upgrades discussed above were to be extended to the Russian navy’s nuclear weapon installations as well as fuel sites.

On 31 August 2000 an “umbrella” agreement was signed between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Russian Ministry of Defense solidifying this realm of cooperation and outlining expanded future joint work in nuclear material security. By this agreement the Russian navy formally became the Russian executive agent for implementing the cooperative program.

Other U.S. agencies are far from reaching the level of collaboration with the Russian Ministry of Defense that DoE has achieved. The Russian Ministry of Defense has not provided the U.S. Department of Defense with any access to nuclear weapon installations. However, 34 percent of the fencing paid by the United States has been installed to address external threats at fifty-two Russian nuclear weapon sites. In sum, the progress of the Defense Department’s “Weapons PC&A program,” with the Twelfth Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense, has been limited. For the most part, the Defense Department has hardly been able to move beyond testing the MPC&A equipment to be installed. The high-level agreement between the DoE and the Russian defense ministry was thus a very important breakthrough.

An overview of completed and ongoing DoE naval facility security upgrades as of June 2003 is given in tables 3A and 3B.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF SUCCESS IN NAVAL MPC&A
The examination that follows of the reasons for the progress made in U.S.-Russian naval security upgrades is based primarily on interviews with key American personnel. There are essentially five reasons, all of which are likely to
play important roles in the final outcome of the program: strategic goals and approaches; organizational structure and work methods; compliance with domestic laws and with licensing and certification requirements; high-level involvement and support; and finally, sustainability.

**Strategic Goals and Approaches**

For the fresh-fuel security upgrades, the Russian and American sides shared interests and purposes from the beginning. Several thefts of naval HEU fuel prompted the Russian navy to make contact with the United States, and the Americans were eager to limit the diversion of the proliferation-attractive material. The efficiency achieved in implementation was a direct consequence of the work done for the Murmansk Shipping Company at Atomflot and on board the

### TABLE 3A

**U.S.-SUPPORTED NAVAL MPC&A UPGRADES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>MPC&amp;A Activity</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Severomorsk</td>
<td>Consolidated Nor. Fleet storage</td>
<td>Storage annex⁴</td>
<td>May 96–Sep. 99⁶</td>
<td>Main fuel storage for Northern fleet; possibly already at capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Near Vladivostok</td>
<td>Fresh fuel storage</td>
<td>Building replaced⁶</td>
<td>Spring 99–Sep. 2000⁶</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Colloc. with Sites 34, 86</td>
<td>Irradiated, damaged fuel</td>
<td>Integ. system upgrades⁶</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>Colloc. with Sites 32, 34⁴</td>
<td>Irradiated fuel</td>
<td>Integ. system upgrades</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM 63</td>
<td>SevMash, Belomorsk naval base, Severodvinsk</td>
<td>Auxiliary vessel⁶</td>
<td>Shipboard, pierside upgrades</td>
<td>1998–May 2000⁹</td>
<td>First upgraded ship; PM 12, PM 74 same class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM 74</td>
<td>Near Vladivostok</td>
<td>Submarine refueling vessel⁷</td>
<td>Shipboard, pierside upgrades</td>
<td>Comp. Sep. 2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


c. New building has same upgrades as Site 49, with hardened entrance portal.


e. Detection, communications, intruder delay, response, control, and accountability.


g. Large capacity for fresh and spent fuel, liquid radioactive waste.


i. Carries submarine fuel from Chzhma ship repair facility to Gornyak shipyard. Ibid., p. 146.
Imandra. The Russian navy appreciated the demonstrated U.S. interest and commitment, and as a result, for the first time the Department of Energy had an opportunity to work directly with the Russian Ministry of Defense.

At the outset of the cooperation with the Russian navy, a step-by-step approach was chosen, in which the Russians decided upon each next step. Every project thus depended on the success of the previous one, and progress was closely watched. As one of the American project members stated, “There was zero tolerance for failure.” Later, urgent improvements (generally finished within six months) were pursued in parallel with preliminary design work on comprehensive security upgrades at the same locations. The comprehensive projects would be negotiated and then implemented according to the agreed plans.\(^{41}\) As the upgrades proceeded, it became more and more apparent to each party that its counterpart was committed to make the program work.

Organizational Structure and Work Methods
The initial organization chosen for the naval upgrades was “flat,” a pragmatic, highly efficient structure. Communication was free among all parties involved. U.S. team members could personally contact high-level Russian navy counterparts. This drastically increased interaction and allowed for quick problem solving when needed.

The naval MPC&A program was thus a true child of the teamwork spirit of the early days of U.S.-Russian cooperation.\(^{42}\) The new MPC&A approach included willingness to use Russian equipment and contractors.\(^{43}\) The program also offered a more flexible approach to verification. Instead of a strict on-site inspection regime, a more cooperative and less adversarial approach was chosen. American and Russian MPC&A experts would sit down together and jointly assess the situation before and after the security upgrades. What the U.S. team might lose in terms of insight through formal inspections it was likely to gain through a voluntary and informal flow of information.

Cooperation between DoE and the Russian navy is governed by confidentiality agreements. Information shared within the joint working group that has not previously been published in the public domain can be released only by consent of all parties involved. This effectively precluded external assessment or supervision, but it probably helped increase significantly the information flow within the group.

The naval MPC&A upgrades are supported by formal documents on all levels and at all stages of the work. Everything from working plans to protocols and agreements had (and has) to be approved by all parties. This arrangement allows formalized delegation of responsibilities and a transparent working environment. Some overarching agreements have, however, been put in place after the
projects were well advanced, either to boost or expand ongoing activities or for corrective reasons. The Russian side identifies facilities in need of upgrading. In the design of optimal security solutions, however, the two sides work together. A joint vulnerability assessment is performed with the Assess computer model, after discussions on the input data. Design consensus is not only sought but essential before implementation of individual upgrades. For example, one facility lacked a sufficient guard force. No money was released nor further work authorized before the Russians increased the guards there. (It was this experience, moreover, that made the Russians realize the need to consolidate the fuel at fewer sites, as no upgrades would be made at other facilities without similar guard force improvements.)

The Kurchatov Institute serves as a general contractor and an agent for the Russian navy, as the navy itself is not allowed to sign contracts with U.S. laboratories. In addition, the institute often executes work tasks. Vulnerability

### TABLE 3B
**U.S.-SUPPORTED NAVAL MPC&A UPGRADES (cont’d)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>MPC&amp;A Activity</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy 2d (Nor. Flt. storage)</td>
<td>Nor. Fleet storage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Planned before consol. at Site 49; not started</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SevMash shipyard</td>
<td>Severodvinsk</td>
<td>New upgrades</td>
<td>New and integrated upgrades&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1st phrase started 1998, complete. 2d phase started 2001, near completion June 2003</td>
<td>2d phase upgrades Bldg. 438 at submarine assembly facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murmansk Shipping Co.</td>
<td>Atomflot, north of Murmansk</td>
<td>Auxiliary</td>
<td>Physical barriers, port security</td>
<td>July 96–Sep. 99&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Icebreaker upgraded by Norway, Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murmansk Shipping Co.</td>
<td>Atomflot, north of Murmansk</td>
<td>Nuclear-propelled civilian icebreakers</td>
<td>Security upgrades onboard the ships</td>
<td>Work initiated 1999&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Funds for the upgrades provided by Norwegian, Swedish, and British authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy nuc. wpn. sites&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>42 sites&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Nuclear weapon storage</td>
<td>As for fresh fuel</td>
<td>Planned; to be finalized by 2005</td>
<td>Locations classified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Upgrades for detection, intruder delay, response, and material accounting.


<sup>c</sup> Upgrades completed on three (Sovjetsky Soyuz, Vaigach, Yamal) out of eight ships as of summer 2003.


<sup>e</sup> Northwestern Russia and Far East, locations unknown. All are inside operational naval bases. Total 260 metric tons of nuclear material, number of warheads unknown.
assessment and preliminary designs are typically assigned to Kurchatov, as is the establishment of training programs. The institute can subcontract negotiated tasks; it is the parent company of Atomservice (AS), which performs all types of civil engineering and construction work. Other security subcontractors are Eleron and Escort Center; the American team can go directly to these firms if the Kurchatov Institute is not involved.

The United States pays only for work completed, and not for overhead costs to the Russian participants. Completed security upgrades are certified in writing by the Russian navy and are generally inspected by American representatives. All work performed must be documented and results demonstrated prior to payment. Every contract is negotiated separately. U.S. laboratories now sign contracts directly with their Russian counterparts, after approval by Department of Energy headquarters. However, attempts have been made to centralize these contracts on the U.S. side, as part of an attempt to track negotiations more closely and to streamline and expedite contacts.

Compliance with Domestic Laws and Regulations
Security systems are designed in accordance with vulnerability assessments and technical specifications jointly agreed upon. Russian contractors then build the systems to the agreed design. The systems typically consist of a wide range of components, including foreign equipment bought in Russia. However, as long as these components are precertified by relevant Russian authorities, final designs and systems are regarded as Russian. This eases often-complex issues related to certification, taxation, and maintenance.

In parallel with the upgrades, a documentation project has been initiated to assess the current MPC&A regulatory status of the Russian naval materials and to determine what the governing regulations and guidelines are. While the United States recognizes the relevance of Russian laws and regulations, it is not likely to pay for measures not indicated by vulnerability assessments even if they are required by Russian law. The Russians are, however, free to include such features themselves. One example is radiation monitors; Russian law calls for them, but because they do not directly improve security, they are not normally installed at U.S. expense.

High-Level Involvement and Support
The Russian navy’s Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety and Security plays an essential role in this collaboration. The inspectorate is led by Admiral Nikolai Yurasov. The admiral is well regarded within the Navy, and his interest in and promotion of these security upgrades have been instrumental in the success and progress of the program. Russian high-level support extends to the head of the Northern Fleet, a fact that has eased interactions with headquarters-level
bureaucrats and military opponents of this collaboration. It has, moreover, created an important vehicle for communication with other Russian agencies, like the forces of the Ministry of Interior, which protects facilities of the Russian Economic Ministry, and the Federal Security Service (FSB).

The fact that the Navy quite early acknowledged an internal security problem and declared a genuine interest in fixing it has been important for the support it has received. MinAtom, in contrast, has tended to put less emphasis on the inside threat and to regard MPC&A deficiencies as primarily an economic problem. International expertise and cooperation thus easily become secondary in MinAtom’s eyes to obtaining domestic funding for upgrades. Cultural and organizational differences in the two organizations are also likely to have played a role. A naval chain of command seems to have eased communication of and reinforced directives from Moscow to the facilities where installations were to take place, limiting the effect of any local intransigence.

On the American side, however, if the naval MPC&A program had top-level support in DoE, it may have lacked high-level interest. In the beginning, the small program was not perceived as very important and was more or less “left alone.” This may have actually, if paradoxically, helped in the initial stages of the program, as it gave the U.S. side discretion to build the strong foundation its Russian counterpart was looking for. The American team was not afflicted by personnel replacements, and all participants soon knew each other. Internal rules establishing a well defined process, mode of cooperation, and working structure were quickly put in place. That experience of building up working groups contrasts, to some degree, with DoE collaborations with MinAtom.

There, in an attempt to manage the program and prevent personnel “burnout,” the U.S. side has changed personnel and administrative procedures quite frequently, probably to the detriment of the long-term effort.

The role of the U.S. Navy in the early stages of the naval MPC&A cooperation has been given little or no attention. The initial hope was to get the U.S. Navy “on board” and initiate reciprocal visits and activities for Russian counterparts to American naval bases. This, however, has been unacceptable to the U.S. Navy, so much so that the American MPC&A community is concerned that the whole collaboration would fail if the Russians asked for such visits. (They have never demanded or requested any such reciprocity.) Further, to limit the risk to sensitive nuclear information, the U.S. Navy has insisted that only personnel unfamiliar with its activities be involved in cooperation with the Russian navy. (The American team members, handpicked from national laboratories, had indeed little knowledge of U.S. naval secrets.) These initial objections having been met, the U.S. Navy backed the program. Its endorsement was of great importance in
terms of domestic political and bureaucratic support for the program. Throughout the project, the U.S. Navy has been regularly updated as to progress.

Until recently, and while DoE has always dealt with overall policy issues and provided oversight, the American team has continued to enjoy a fairly free and open environment with respect to discussions with Russian counterparts on technical issues. However, as the naval MPC&A program has grown and matured, so also has high-level interest on both sides, and with it requirements for oversight and control. The recent expansion of MPC&A upgrades to naval nuclear-weapons installations has also produced closer follow-up and tighter reins. Further, on the American side, increasing interagency and congressional interest has required closer project management and an increase in staff at the federal level. The result has been more complicated and lengthy procedural approaches, and in turn slower processes and prolonged negotiations, all of which create frustration at the working level. It has, moreover, limited the interaction and communication among technical project participants on both sides, reducing the possibility of quick problem solving when needed.

**Sustainability**

The training of Russian naval personnel is an integral part of the MPC&A program, vital to its long-term operation. A goal of the training program is to instill in managers a culture of sustainable commitment to MPC&A activities. A series of two courses has been developed and presented at the Kurchatov Institute. An MPC&A fundamentals class consists of class lectures and practical training at various facilities. The objective of the second training course is to prepare naval personnel to work independently in their particular areas at naval facilities.

In addition, to validate the long-term performance of the installed systems, a program has been initiated to deal with their life-cycle management. The Kurchatov Institute has been given this task under a separate contract. The program provides a structured way of ensuring the performance and integrity of all components (including the guard force) of an upgraded system, through regular (annual) testing, and the program has been the preferred approach of the Russian Ministry of Transportation. The program reveals whether everything is in place and identifies special needs, like additional training, maintenance, or spare parts, as well as problems with software, hardware, or procedures. Life-cycle management is a quantifiable way of addressing long-term risk reduction and sustainability of measures put in place. Moreover, structured follow-up reinforces the sincerity and commitment to the joint cooperation of all involved.
FUTURE CHALLENGES AND THE WAY AHEAD

The naval MPC&A program now having been successfully implemented, and in view of the remaining challenges in fissile material security, the theme for the future must be expansion. Specifically, the scope of the naval MPC&A cooperation could be extended, and the naval approach could be extended to U.S.-Russian MPC&A cooperation as a whole.

Expanding the Scope of Naval MPC&A Cooperation

Notwithstanding the accomplishments of naval MPC&A, there is unfinished business, as well as room for further improvement in the cooperation with the Russian navy. As Russian naval facilities are not subject to any form of independent supervision or licensing, the long-term quality and sustainability of the measures now in place are hard to evaluate and protect. Thus, an independent review of the overall integrity of the integrated systems put in place would be highly desirable.

The life-cycle management program now introduced is a step in the right direction, but there is a risk that the highly pragmatic U.S. approach taken has neglected Russian laws and regulations—and in a way that may undermine the long-term security goals of all parties. Certainly, due to budgetary constraints and the necessity for speed, none of the security systems installed are likely to meet domestic American standards. The installed accounting systems for fresh fuel were developed without access to classified Russian fuel information, making their value somewhat uncertain. Moreover, the guard force is an integral component in the MPC&A system, yet its mode of employment is novel for Russian security forces and still poorly understood.

Further, spent naval fuel may contain both plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and therefore may constitute a proliferation risk; in particular, naval fuel with low burn-up and extended cooling periods is potentially attractive to would-be proliferators, both states and subnational groups. Currently, the U.S. MPC&A mandate excludes all of this material. Irradiated Russian naval nuclear fuel in fact remains highly enriched, taking into account its cooling time, it does indeed pose a threat from a proliferation standpoint. This threat will only increase with time.

Moreover, while the Russian navy has declared that all its fresh fuel in the northern region has been consolidated into one building, Site 49, where it is protected, there has been no independent verification. As recently as 1996 the number of storage facilities to be covered was not known; anecdotal reports indicate that fresh fuel dumps had been established on the Kola Peninsula as backups for crises. Thus, there is a risk that the Russian navy has not included all depots needing upgrading—and Site 49, though newly expanded, is reportedly already
full. No U.S. teams have visited even the known old facilities to verify that noth-
ing was left behind in consolidation. Again, therefore, an independent review
analysis would be highly desirable, to increase confidence in system perfor-
mance and coverage. Such an overall, independent assessment should also be of
interest to the Russian navy, as it would boost security and possibly strengthen
the prospects of expanded American funding.

The inclusion of nuclear weapon sites in the naval MPC&A program is an im-
portant and particularly gratifying development. Russia has indicated that it
would like improved security systems installed at additional weapons locations.
However, as of March 2003, Russia has provided only limited information about
new nuclear weapon locations and security conditions. The needed informa-
tion ought to be presented as soon as possible, again to secure future funds and
allow prudent long-term planning.

Finally, the naval program’s establishment of close working relations and
consolidation of fuel at centralized storage facilities has created a sound basis for
an overall Russian HEU accounting exercise. The naval MPC&A may therefore
act as a springboard to increased transparency and possibly future nonintrusive
verification measures for highly sensitive fuel cycles—that is, material with clas-
sified parameters, like the fuel used for naval propulsion or excess fissile material
from dismantled nuclear weapons.

**Extending the Naval Approach**

Russia and the United States have come a long way in their nuclear security co-
operation. Yet, as mentioned, the majority, and probably the most challenging,
of the needed MPC&A upgrades in the Russian Federation lie in other coopera-
tive programs for protection of weapon-usable material. Several calls have thus
been made for the need to revitalize U.S.-Russian nonproliferation cooperation.

In this regard, there is a particular need for a comprehensive review of coopera-
tive security programs to assess strengths, weaknesses, successes, and failures.
The focus should be on identifying lessons and determining how to use them to
solve current and future problems.

The pragmatic, coherent, and flexible stepwise approach of the initial naval
MPC&A upgrades has pointed to a highly efficient way of solving access prob-
lems and achieving results at sensitive facilities. Naval MPC&A would be a useful
“case study,” a source of working methods that might be fruitful at other sensi-
tive facilities in the Russian nuclear-weapon complex. Currently, however, such
unusual program approaches are not held up to broad scrutiny, except on a
piecemeal or even accidental basis, since there is no regular discussion of policy
implementation standards.
Ideally, the naval MPC&A experiences could be shared in the forum of a joint, overarching U.S.-Russian technical committee overseeing the MPC&A program, and then distributed to other MPC&A personnel through seminars or guidelines on achieving program objectives. Policy makers and bureaucrats could be invited to workshops and briefed on different MPC&A working approaches. This not only would help them identify best practices and pertinent differences in national safety and security cultures but could create a foundation for extended and coordinated threat-reduction support from a wider range of contributors, such as Western Europeans, who have a self-interest in seeing all MPC&A programs sustained and strengthened. Naval MPC&A experience could, moreover, be fed into ongoing access discussions and negotiations between the Russian and American parties, to help them better determine what kinds of access are needed, to what, and to what ends.

In the early stages of the U.S.-Russian MPC&A cooperation, a joint steering group dealt with overall planning and discussions, and developed a joint plan (including a section on the flexible-assurances approach). This coordinating group was eliminated in the fall of 1995, after internal disagreements on the Russian side about who should be in charge of the group. One option would be to revive this group, making sure that its composition met the criteria of all parties. A twofold approach could be considered. A U.S.-Russian MPC&A steering group could deal with the policy aspects and coordination of MPC&A activities. An equivalent joint technical coordinating group could, on the basis of the naval approach, identify and refine technical approaches that have been valuable.

Sustainability is typically seen as a “Russian” issue, one of merely overcoming deterioration due to organizational, structural, technological, and cultural factors. However, there seems to be a need to address the sustainability of sound MPC&A policy and practice as well. It may be hard to rebuild the collaboration if it is somehow destroyed; the benefits of maintaining the novel U.S.-Russian working relationships achieved seem obvious. In recent years, bureaucratic factors have hampered the effective implementation of U.S. nonproliferation policies in Russia.

With the expansion of security upgrades to the area of naval nuclear weapons, and with increased U.S. and Russian federal interest in the project, further changes of the “rules of the game” may be deemed necessary to allow high-level authorities on both sides to follow the developments more closely. If so, much care should be given to avoiding new procedural difficulties. The future of U.S.-Russian naval security upgrades, and the MPC&A program in general, may strongly depend on how well trade-offs are chosen between progress and strict oversight.
The results of the naval upgrades confirm that U.S. and Russian experts working together in a spirit of partnership and mutual respect can significantly reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation by improving systems of nuclear material protection, control, and accounting. As evidenced by the naval MPC&A program, a flexible and nonadversarial cooperative approach is likely to avoid many of the problems other parts of the MPC&A program are facing and thus to achieve the shared long-term goals of sustained nuclear security.

NOTES

9. The idea of assurances is not new but dates back to mid-1994, in the U.S.-Russian Lab-to-Lab program. DoE has, for instance, used video and photographs instead of physical access at Snezhinsk; GAO, Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 30.
12. Due to current Russian economic hardship, the Russian nuclear fleet is at an all-time low in terms of operation and readiness. Nonetheless, to increase security the Russian navy has taken steps that have resulted in increased transparency of its nuclear propulsion programs.
13. GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material Improving; Further


21. Under this program, Russian fresh naval fuel is consolidated into two central facilities, one for the Northern Fleet (Site 49, at Severomorsk) and one for the Pacific Fleet (Site 34, at Primorye).


25. Sukhoruchkin et al.


27. The Russian navy’s nuclear program originated at the Department of Ship Propulsion Reactors at the Kurchatov Institute. Ties to naval reactor propulsion continue to be strong, through, for instance, criticality calculations, naval reactor research and development, and training of sailors in reactor physics.

28. Building 116, which contains HEU, served both as a test and a demonstration site for U.S.-Russian cooperative security upgrades.


30. Sukhoruchkin et al.


32. Shmelev et al.

33. Moltz and Robinson, p. 80.


35. Generally, the same approaches and tools for security upgrades are used at weapons installations as for fuel sites, though in a somewhat more stringent manner. A vulnerability assessment is performed, and on the basis of the result a system is designed with the necessary integrated security components: alarms, detectors, barriers, and communications.

36. Under the agreement, technical assistance may be rendered for “improving physical protection at nuclear fuel storage facilities of the Russian Navy Pacific and Northern Fleets ashore and afloat” and for “creating systems of accounting, control and physical protection of nuclear materials at nuclear
submarine bases as well as Russian Federation Navy enterprises.” An English version of the agreement may be found at cns.miis.edu/db/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/doe_mpc\a\ doe2000/mpca00en.htm.

37. GAO, Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 32.

38. This program (like the DoE MPC&A) grew out of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. The implementing arm on the U.S. side is the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, DTRA.

39. With some exceptions, the U.S. Defense Department tests all its equipment at designated sites in Russia prior to putting them in service.


41. Vladimir Sukhoruchkin (presentation to the 42nd Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Material Management, Indian Wells, California, 16 July 2001).

42. The director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory from 1986 to 1997, Siegfried S. Hecker, emphasized that much of the success of the initial Lab-to-Lab program was due to the trust and friendship developed with Russian nuclear scientists. “Russian-American Collaborations to Reduce the Nuclear Danger,” Los Alamos Science, no. 24 (1996), p. 3.

43. In the early days of the cooperation, it was all “Buy American,” and all tasks were assigned to U.S. laboratories.

44. One example is the August 2000 agreement. An “umbrella agreement,” it is the strongest so far, covering past cooperative actions and security upgrades at naval nuclear-weapon facilities.


46. The ministry owns the SevMash production facility, where most Russian nuclear submarines are built. The Russian navy protects its own bases. All contact with the FSB is through the Russian navy; there has been no direct interaction with the FSB in the program.

47. Shmelev et al. The paper includes an overview of the course curricula.

48. Russians provided the inputs themselves, and the parties agreed only upon the structure of the database. The Kurchatov Institute served as a main contractor for the project.

49. Due to residual heat and highly radioactive fission products, spent naval fuel needs cooling. The radiation from the fission product creates for decades a self-protecting barrier against theft and diversion. This barrier, however, will diminish over time, potentially making the fuel—and thus the highly enriched uranium and plutonium—accessible to intruders. For proliferators, see Ole Reistad and Knut Gussgard, “Russian Spent Marine Fuel as a Global Security Risk” (paper presented at the International Conference on Security of Material Measures to Prevent, Intercept and Respond to Illicit Uses of Nuclear Material and Radioactive Sources, International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Stockholm, Sweden, 7–11 May 2001).


51. Lambert et al.

52. Sukhoruchkin et al.

53. GAO, Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 32.

54. For example, nuclear material containers could be equipped with computerized barcodes and tamper-resistant seals that would allow site personnel to perform quick inventories and would raise confidence that none of the containers were tampered with. GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation, p. 12. For other nonintrusive transparency options on naval fuel, see Morten Bremer Maerli, “Transparency Technologies and the Naval Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” Proceedings of the Institute of...


58. See, for example, Galya Balatsky, Sustainability Issues: Russian Aspects, Report LA-UR-01-1683 (Los Alamos, N.Mex.: Los Alamos National Laboratory, 2001).

59. Gottemoeller, p. 31.

60. Based on the early prospects of the U.S.-Russian cooperation presented in Sukhoruchkin et al.
WHY RUSSIA AND CHINA HAVE NOT FORMED AN ANTI-AMERICAN ALLIANCE

Richard Weitz

Since the Cold War’s end, many analysts have expected China and Russia to cooperate vigorously to counter U.S. geopolitical superiority. Although Chinese and Russian leaders have collaborated on some issues, substantial obstacles have impeded their forming an anti-American bloc. This failure of the two strongest countries with both the capacity and (arguably) incentives to counterbalance U.S. power and influence in world affairs suggests why the United States continues to enjoy unprecedented global preeminence. This article analyzes why Russia and China have not allied against the United States and offers policy recommendations on how to avert such an anti-U.S. bloc in the future.

At their third November summit in 1997, Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin (then the presidents of their respective countries) set for their two countries the goal of establishing a “strategic partnership for the twenty-first century.” During subsequent meetings, they reaffirmed this commitment and jointly criticized NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, U.S. plans to develop ballistic missile defenses (BMD), and other American policies they opposed. The many comparable statements by representatives of the two governments, the large number of meetings between senior Chinese and Russian officials, and Russia’s extensive arms sales to China intensified expectations that the two governments would form an anti-American bloc. At this time, U.S. intelligence agencies undertook a major initiative to analyze evolving Chinese-Russian relations and their implications for the United States.
Notwithstanding these plausible expectations, however, the normalization of Chinese-Russian relations during the past decade has proceeded for reasons mostly unrelated to any joint effort to counterbalance the United States. For instance, the quality of Russian arms purchased by China has been impressive, but these transactions alone do not constitute a Chinese-Russian military alliance. Furthermore, the two countries’ policies on a range of important issues have been uncoordinated and often conflicting. Finally, although the two governments have signed border and other security agreements signifying the end of their Cold War hostility, nondefense economic ties and societal contacts between Russia and China have remained minimal compared to those found between most friendly countries, let alone allies.

POST–COLD WAR IMPROVEMENTS IN RUSSIAN-CHINESE RELATIONS

Chinese-Russian relations improved along several important dimensions during the 1990s, but how one assesses the extent and significance of these changes depends on what metric and starting point one uses. For example, ties between Moscow and Beijing might be said simply to have experienced a “regression toward the mean” from their excessively poor state during the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s. The changes look so impressive only because Sino-Soviet relations were so problematic before Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union in 1985. Ties between Russia and China have come to resemble those one would expect to exist between two neighboring countries sharing important interests and concerns but differing on many others. Indeed, despite recent improvements, relations between China and Russia remain less harmonious than those existing between Germany and France, the United States and Mexico, or Russia and India.

Border Stability and Arms Control

During the past decade, China and Russia largely have resolved the boundary disputes that engendered armed border clashes in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and they have demilitarized their lengthy, 2,640-mile shared frontier. (The section to the east of the Russian-Mongolian border is 2,606 miles long; that to the west is thirty-four miles.)

Border demilitarization talks began in November 1989. They soon split into parallel negotiations, one on reducing military forces along the Chinese-Russian frontier, the other on establishing confidence and security building measures in the border region. In July 1994, the Russian and Chinese defense ministers agreed to a set of practices to forestall incidents. These measures included arrangements to avert unauthorized ballistic missile launches, prevent the
jamming of communications equipment, and warn ships and aircraft that might inadvertently violate national borders. In September of that year, Chinese and Russian authorities pledged not to target strategic nuclear missiles at each other. They also adopted a “no first use” nuclear weapons posture with respect to each other. In April 1998, China and Russia established a direct presidential hot line—China’s first with another government. China has also signed multilateral security agreements with all the adjoining former Soviet republics.

These security agreements reflect a common Chinese and Russian desire to manage instability in the volatile neighboring region of Central Asia. At their December 1999 encounter, Jiang told Yeltsin, “China is ready to cooperate with Russia, and make use of the meeting mechanism between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and the links with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, in order to promote stability in Central Asia.” Both governments fear ethnic separatism in their border territories, emanating in part from Islamic fundamentalist movements in Central Asia. Russian authorities dread the prospect of continued instability in the northern Caucasus, especially Chechnya and neighboring Dagestan. China’s leaders worry about separatist agitation in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, where deadly uprisings have occurred since the 1980s. Of the ten million non-Han Chinese in Xinjiang, eight million are Turkic and have ethnic and religious links to neighboring Turkic populations in Central Asia. From Beijing’s perspective, the security agreements also facilitated the favorable revision of its borders with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Chinese and Russian policy makers also have worried about the activities of Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United States in Central Asia.

The institutional manifestation of these shared Chinese and Russian interests in Central Asia initially was the so-called “Shanghai Five,” a loose grouping of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. On 26 April 1996, the five governments signed in Shanghai a treaty on military confidence-building measures that imposed restrictions on military deployments and activity within a hundred-kilometer (sixty-two-mile) demilitarization zone along their mutual frontiers. On 15 June 2001, these governments, along with Uzbekistan—a country that had not participated in the original Shanghai Five, which initially focused on border security, because it does not adjoin China—formally established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). (Both India and especially Pakistan also have expressed interest in joining.) Building on the arms control achievements of the Shanghai Five, the SCO has sponsored extensive, senior-level consultations on several issues, including crime, narcotics trafficking, economic development, transportation, communication, energy, the war in Afghanistan, and terrorism, which has become its most important issue.
of concern. The parties are establishing concrete mechanisms to facilitate such cooperation—including annual meetings of their defense, foreign, and prime ministers—as well as formal structures to interact with nonmember governments and other international institutions. In particular, they agreed in September 2002 to form a SCO secretariat in Beijing, which will be headed by Zhang Deguang, China’s current Russian-speaking ambassador to Moscow, who will serve a three-year term as the SCO’s secretary general, supervising a four-million-dollar budget. The previous year, they established a regional antiterrorist center to share intelligence and coordinate responses to terrorism. The latter agency has an initial staff of approximately forty and resides in the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek, where a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) antiterrorist center already functions. The SCO members also signed a formal twenty-six-point charter in St. Petersburg on 7 June 2002, and a “Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism” at their June 2001 summit. (The juxtaposition of these three terms highlights the priority the organization’s members place on countering ethnoseparatism and antigovernment dissent as well as terrorism per se.) In October 2002 China and Kyrgyzstan conducted the first bilateral antiterror exercise within the SCO framework, involving joint border operations by hundreds of troops. It marked the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s first maneuvers with another country’s military. The Chinese military also transferred small arms, ammunition, and other military equipment to Kyrgyz security forces, and they have not opposed neighboring Kyrgyzstan’s permitting Russian warplanes to deploy at Kant airbase, near Bishkek, or the basing of U.S. forces at Manas International Airport. Other SCO members have announced their intention to conduct analogous exercises.

Since the USSR’s collapse, Chinese leaders have favored a preeminent security role for Russia in Central Asia, as a hedge against untoward changes in the region’s political status quo and the growth of radical Islamic and American influence. They also believe a Russian-dominated regional security environment would allow for the region’s economic development by Chinese and other firms, especially in the important realm of energy, and permit China to concentrate on more vital issues—such as Korea and Taiwan. The Russians have sought and welcomed this Chinese support. Through the SCO, Moscow recognizes as legitimate Chinese interests in Central Asia, and China finds a mechanism to promote these interests, in close cooperation with Russia. The newly independent states of Central Asia have become not objects of rivalry between Moscow and Beijing, as was once expected, but a major unifying element in Chinese-Russian relations.
Mutually Supportive Policy Statements
During the past decade, Chinese-Russian joint statements typically have criticized various American policies. Although these pronouncements normally have not referred explicitly to the United States, the target was obvious. In place of an American-dominated international system, the two governments frequently have called for a “multipolar” world in which Russia and China would occupy key positions, along with Europe, the United States, and perhaps Japan. They evidently have hoped that such a system would establish a geopolitical balance that would prevent one great power (e.g., the United States) from dominating the others.

Chinese and Russian officials also regularly endorse each other’s domestic policies. Russian representatives have not challenged China’s human rights practices in Tibet or elsewhere, and they have not backed American-sponsored UN resolutions criticizing its internal policies. For their part, Chinese officials have expressed understanding for Russia’s military operations in Chechnya despite other foreigners’ complaints about excessive civilian casualties. Such statements have reflected both governments’ commitment to uphold traditional interpretations of national sovereignty, which severely limit the right of external actors to challenge a state’s internal policies. Russian and Chinese officials likely have found it easier to interact with each other than with their Western interlocutors, who constantly importune them to improve their human rights and other domestic practices.

Beijing and Moscow also frequently express a desire to strengthen the role of the United Nations in international security. As permanent members of the Security Council, their vetoes (or even the threat of them, as was the case in March 2003 concerning the then-imminent Iraq invasion) allow them to prevent the United States and its allies from obtaining formal UN endorsement of any military operations they oppose. NATO’s decision to intervene in Kosovo without UN approval evoked outrage and dismay in both capitals. China, Russia, and the other governments of the Shanghai Five publicly affirmed at their July 2000 summit that “they will unswervingly promote the strengthening of the United Nations’ role as the only universal mechanism for safeguarding international peace and stability” and that they “oppose the use of force or threat of force in international relations without the UN Security Council’s prior approval.”

Russian Arms Sales to China
Russia’s arms sales to China have constituted the most salient dimension of the growing security cooperation between the two countries. Since the two governments signed an agreement on military-technical cooperation in December
1992, China has purchased more weapons from Russia than from all other countries combined. Estimates of the annual value of these deliveries range from seven hundred million to a billion dollars during the 1990s, and 1.5 to two billion dollars during the three years ending in 2002. Since the resumption of Russian arms sales, China has ordered Su-27 and Su-30 advanced fighter aircraft, Mi-17 transport helicopters, Il-72 transport aircraft, A-50 warning and control aircraft, SA-10 and SA-15 air defense missiles, T-72 main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, Kilo-class diesel submarines, several Sovremenny-class destroyers (equipped with supersonic Sunburn SS-N-22 antiship missiles), and other advanced conventional military systems or their components. In 2002 alone, China reportedly ordered two Sovremenny destroyers and eight Kilo submarines, and sought to buy forty Su-30 fighter-bombers. Furthermore, in February 1996 China bought a multiyear license from Russia to assemble two hundred Su-27s (without the right to export them to third countries). Keeping these systems operational will require China to import Russian spare parts for years.

Economic rather than strategic considerations largely explain Russia's decision to sell advanced conventional weapons systems to China. Russia has both surplus arms stocks and excess defense production capacity. This combination has resulted in widespread insolvency among Russian defense firms, and high unemployment and low wages in regions that had heavy concentrations of defense enterprises in Soviet times. From 1991 to 1995, Russian government orders for products of a military character fell by more than 90 percent. In 1998, the Russian armed forces did not buy a single tank, aircraft, or nuclear submarine. Russia's leaders believe, however, that if it is to remain a great military power, their country needs to maintain a healthy defense industry. They appreciate that many Russian companies require increased investment to develop the advanced systems that proved so effective for Western militaries in the Persian Gulf, the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. They also have proven susceptible to defense managers' arguments that a revived Russian military-industrial complex would help promote recovery in other economic sectors. Since the impoverished Russian government cannot place enough orders to keep its defense enterprises healthy, Russian officials have encouraged the firms to sell their wares abroad. By the end of the decade, Russian defense firms exported approximately four-fifths of their armaments production.

China and Russia, however, engage in other forms of military cooperation besides arms sales. A 1993 agreement permitted the Chinese to recruit Russian weapons specialists to work in China, and Russian aerospace institutes have employed Chinese ordnance experts. A Hong Kong newspaper reported in 2000 that Chinese enterprises had hired more than 1,500 weapons specialists (including many in nuclear physics and aerodynamics) from the former Soviet Union.
Another Hong Kong paper claimed that “hundreds” of Russian experts have helped develop China’s missile technology. The two countries also regularly exchange officers and defense information expertise. In October 1999, for example, the Chinese and Russian defense ministries agreed to discuss changes in their military doctrines and to organize joint training. Frequent visits take place between senior military officials, including annual meetings of defense ministers. Contacts between midlevel military officers, especially those in charge of border security units and military units in neighboring Chinese and Russian territories, have grown as well. From 1991 to 1997, 5,205 Russian military advisers went to China and 1,646 Chinese defense specialists graduated from Russia’s military academies. The first Chinese-Russian naval exercise, between two warships of the Russian Pacific Fleet and vessels of the Chinese East Sea Fleet, based in Shanghai, occurred in October 1999.

IMPEDIMENTS TO DEEPER GEOPOLITICAL COOPERATION
Managing their lengthy border demands a minimal level of cooperation between China and Russia. Their governments have had to work together to regulate trade and migration flows, resist such illegal transnational activities as smuggling and narcotics trafficking, curb international terrorism and regional separatism, and implement arms control and demilitarization agreements that permit them to redeploy or reduce military units. They also perceive mutual benefits (and a mutual dependence) in their arms trade. The Chinese government seeks military modernization, and Russian companies need the money.

Nonmilitary Economic Ties Remain Limited
Russian-Chinese economic exchanges not involving arms sales also have grown during the last decade, but much less dramatically. Russian consumers, unable to afford newly available but expensive Western imports, initially showed great interest in acquiring cheap Chinese products. The Russian government, besides desiring to satisfy this demand and help China generate income to purchase Russian arms, has also sought to entice Chinese investment in the impoverished Russian Far East. A member of a Russian delegation visiting Beijing in March 2000 explained, “Russia wants to balance its trade with China so that it does not depend so much on military sales. [It] also hopes to attract Chinese investment into Russia.” Although most Chinese investors prefer more enticing opportunities in Southeast Asia, Chinese merchants have eagerly sought to sell goods, including food and services, to Russian consumers.

Despite these mutual interests, economic intercourse between Russia and China has remained limited. Bilateral trade did triple between 1988 and 1993 (from $2.55 billion to $7.68 billion). The initiation of Russian arms sales to
China provided the main impetus for this upswing, but a March 1992 bilateral trade agreement and a relaxation of visa requirements, which encouraged private traders to shuttle inexpensive manufactured goods and agricultural products across the border, also helped. This economic recrudescence resulted in China’s becoming Russia’s third-largest export market and its second most important trading partner after Germany. (Russia became China’s seventh-largest commercial partner.)

Nevertheless, while Russian manufacturers have been able to sell weapons to China, as well as some advanced technology in the fields of nuclear energy and aerospace, Chinese importers have preferred to acquire most other categories of advanced technology from the West. Russian government and business leaders reacted with dismay in 1997 when the Chinese rejected their tender to help construct hydroelectric power generators for the Three Gorges Dam. Rather than reward Russia for its political and military cooperation, the Chinese government selected on commercial grounds a consortium of European firms for the $750 million contract. Grandiose Russian proposals to sell oil, gas, and surplus electric power in Siberia to China also remain unfulfilled. The ineffective legal, regulatory, financial, and insurance systems of both countries confront traders and investors with additional obstacles. As one Russian analyst lamented, Sino-Russian trade continues to “rely disproportionately on ‘shuttle-traders’ and arms dealers.” As of the end of 2002, only 1,100 firms involving some Russian capital have invested in China (with an estimated $250 million), and less than five hundred enterprises with some Chinese capital have invested in Russia (with approximately the same $250 million volume of investments). Few of the many registered Russian-Chinese joint ventures have become functional.

As a result of these impediments, Chinese-Russian trade flows have fallen far short of the ambitious goal their presidents established at their April 1996 summit—twenty billion dollars by the year 2000. When Jiang and Vladimir Putin, Russia’s new president, met in Beijing in July 2000, they termed their bilateral economic and trade relations “unsatisfactory.” The chairman of the Russian Duma’s International Affairs Committee, Dmitri Rogozin, acknowledged, “Moscow and Beijing are primarily concerned at the imbalance between political and economic cooperation, which is effectively zero today.” Much commerce still involves barter arrangements rather than the hard currency deals Russia, which typically enjoys a substantial trade surplus with China, so desperately wants. Even arms sales suffer from this problem. In 1993 China remitted four-fifths of the purchase price of Su-27 aircraft in the form of goods. Arms purchases also produce constant disagreements over the prices and technical specifications of weapon systems, as well as Chinese pressure for offsets (favorable nonfinancial side-agreements, such as licenses). Russians prefer to sell
off-the-shelf items, while the Chinese favor joint or licensed production arrangements that transfer Russian technology and manufacturing capabilities to China.\(^4\)

The discrepancy between China’s stagnant economic relations with Russia and its burgeoning commercial ties with many other countries has been reflected in a steady shrinkage in the percentage of Chinese foreign commerce involving Russia. The bottom line is that whereas during the heyday of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1950s over half of China’s total annual trade involved Russia, the corresponding figure today is approximately 2 percent. (In 2000 and early 2001, only 3–5 percent of Russia’s trade was with China.)\(^4\) From Beijing’s point of view, its annual bilateral trade with the United States and with Japan, each worth over a hundred billion dollars, towers over its yearly trade volume with Russia, which has never exceeded eleven billion. Revealingly, China and Russia largely ignored each other when seeking to enter the World Trade Organization (Russia has yet to become a full member). Notwithstanding the complementary nature of their arms sales, both countries are basically competitors for foreign investment from American and other Western sources.

**Still a Top-Down (and Skin-Deep) Process**

Encounters between Russian and Chinese leaders have become institutionalized. A pattern of annual summits between presidents developed during the 1990s. Furthermore, the prime ministers of the two countries agreed in December 1996 to meet biannually in a format similar to the “Gore-Chernomyrdin” framework initiated by the former American vice president and the Russian prime minister. This structure employs a preparatory committee, headed by vice prime ministers, that addresses a range of security and nonsecurity issues. Bilateral working groups of lower-level officials iron out details and manage implementation of agreements. Meetings also regularly occur between Chinese and Russian foreign, defense, and economic ministers. The two countries have signed over a hundred intergovernmental agreements and a comparable number of interregional and interagency accords.\(^4\)

But contacts among the two countries’ regional authorities and private citizens have lagged far behind those of senior officials. For many years, local political dynamics in the Russian Far East presented serious barriers to cross-border trade and other contacts between Russians and Chinese. Although Russians living near China desired Chinese consumer goods, many of them feared illegal Chinese immigration could lead to their de facto incorporation into China.\(^4\) Former Russian defense minister Pavel Grachev even remarked that “persons of Chinese nationality are conquering the Russian Far East through peaceful means.”\(^4\) A few years later, in February 1998, Chinese prime minister Li Peng felt compelled to say that the increased flow of Chinese citizens into Russia did not
represent a “secret colonization.” In fact, aside from those few Chinese business people who find Russian spouses, most Chinese traders see Russia mainly as a place to make money—not as a home.

The source of much anti-Chinese feeling in Russia has been the demographic and economic disparities existing between Russians and Chinese, which have encouraged Chinese migration to Russia. The seven million inhabitants of the Russian Far East (representing about 5 percent of Russia’s total population, and about five hundred thousand fewer inhabitants than in 1992) live in a region of 2.4 million square miles (representing around 28 percent of the Russian Federation’s total area), a mean population density of only 1.3 persons per square kilometer. In contrast, over a hundred million Chinese live in the border provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning, resulting in a population density fifteen to twenty times greater. Furthermore, China’s rapid economic growth has obscured the fact that its standard of living still lags behind that of Russia. Northeastern China has not experienced the rapid economic growth or prosperity of the southeastern part of the country, and its aging heavy industries cannot provide adequate employment for local workers. Chinese laborers who work in Russia typically earn higher wages than they would at home.

The failure of economic and social exchanges to follow the paths desired by the two central governments represents a telling example of the top-down nature of the Chinese-Russian rapprochement. The improved relations between their leaders have not extended to the larger societies. Igor Ivanov, Russia’s foreign minister, recently revealingly described “genuine people-to-people diplomacy” between Russians and Chinese as “an untapped potential for further consolidation of our relations.” Even at the elite level, the men and women who once lived and studied in the former USSR are yielding their leading positions, through retirement or death, to English-speaking technocrats. Unlike among Europeans, or between Europeans and Americans, grassroots ties linking ordinary Russians and Chinese remain minimal. Tourism, cultural exchanges, and other unofficial contacts lag far behind the growth in security relations. In terms of popular values and culture, the two nations also sharply differ. The partnership between the Chinese and Russian governments remains a largely elite-driven project that, lacking deeper social roots, could wither as easily as the earlier Sino-Soviet bloc.

Anti-U.S. Cooperation: Rhetoric versus Reality
Foreign policy cooperation between Russia and China has been much more visible in their joint approach to Central Asia than in other important areas—despite their leaders’ calls for foreign-policy “coordination.” Their genuine desire to counter what both consider excessive American power and influence in the
post–Cold War era manifests itself mostly rhetorically. Since the early 1990s, the two governments have issued numerous joint communiqués in which they have denounced various U.S. policies and called for a multilateral rather than a unilateral (i.e., American-led) world. They also jointly sponsored resolutions in the United Nations urging respect for the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which limited the U.S. ability to deploy defenses against Russian (and, by extension, Chinese) ballistic missiles. Most recently, they urged the United States and its allies not to intervene militarily in Iraq without UN (e.g., their) approval.

Despite their common rhetoric, the two governments have taken no substantive, joint steps to counter American power or influence. For example, they have not pooled their military resources or expertise to overcome U.S. ballistic-missile defense programs. One Chinese official threatened such anti-BMD cooperation shortly after Yeltsin’s December 1999 visit to Beijing. The Director General for Arms Control of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Sha Zukang, repeated the warning in May 2000. But such threats ended after Putin, on his July 2000 visit to Italy, proposed that Russia and NATO cooperate to defend Europe against missile strikes—despite prior acknowledgment that Chinese officials were “suspicious about Russian initiatives to create a non-strategic missile defence system in Europe.” When asked about the prospects of a joint Chinese-Russian response after the December 2001 U.S. decision to withdraw formally from the ABM Treaty, President Putin told journalists, “Russia is strong enough to respond on its own to any changes in the sphere of strategic stability.”

An important indicator of the shallowness of Sino-Russian ties has been their failure, despite the Russia-China “partnership,” to adopt a mutual defense agreement such as the treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance that Moscow and Beijing signed in February 1950. Representatives of both governments have consistently dismissed the suggestions of such Russian analysts and politicians as Roman Popkovich, chairman of the Duma Committee for Defense, and A. V. Mitrofanov, chairman of the Duma Committee on Geopolitics, that a genuine military alliance be established. Although both governments agreed in July 2000 to begin drafting a Sino-Russian Treaty of Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation, and signed it in July 2001, they made clear that neither party had sought a military component in the accord. In addition, the Chinese and Russian militaries have neither trained together nor taken other steps that would allow them to conduct joint combat operations—even if their governments wanted them.

**Diverse Approaches toward Asia**
The limits of foreign-policy harmonization between China and Russia are most visible in East and South Asia, where the two governments have adopted sharply
divergent positions on important issues. For instance, despite their mutual concern about the May 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, Russia and China have persisted in supporting their respective Cold War allies—India in the case of Russia, and Pakistan in the case of China. PLA analysts and other Chinese security specialists continue to see India as a potential threat to China’s security. For these reasons, the Chinese have expressed irritation at Russia’s commitment to provide India with nuclear reactors for its civilian nuclear power program. The Chinese also have resented Russia’s willingness to sell India advanced weapons that Moscow has not offered to China, including certain fighter planes and other military technology. Russian representatives reportedly have urged the two governments to improve their relations, but with seemingly little effect. In July 2001, a Russian newspaper reported that “informed sources” believed that the Indians had rejected “through diplomatic channels” an effort by one of the directors of the Russian aviation industry to involve the Chinese in a Russian-Indian effort to develop a “fifth-generation combat aircraft.”

Although Russia and China share important concerns on the Korean Peninsula, they have pointedly declined to coordinate their policies there. Neither country desires a war or the use of weapons of mass destruction in Korea. They both also want to keep the North Korean government mollified as they improve their own ties with South Korea. But in both 1994 and 2002–2003, they resisted separately U.S. threats to impose international sanctions against North Korea to deter Pyongyang from developing nuclear weapons. Moscow refused to renew the 1961 Soviet–North Korean Friendship and Mutual Assistance Treaty, which had a military intervention clause, when it expired in September 1996. The two governments agreed only to a watered-down treaty of friendship, good-neighborliness, and cooperation in February 2000. The new document provides for nothing more than consultations in the case of security threats. Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov described military cooperation and sales between Russia and North Korea as of mid-2000 as “virtually absent,” owing to the latter’s financial problems. Russia began in 1996 to provide South Korea with “defensive weapons,” to cover the commercial debt with Seoul that it had inherited from the USSR. In contrast, former president Jiang Zemin stated that China had no plans to abrogate its defense treaty with North Korea. As a result, China has become North Korea’s closest ally.

Most tellingly, Chinese representatives resisted giving Russia a formal role in the four-party negotiations on establishing peace in Korea. As leaders of a state bordering the peninsula, Russian officials were understandably concerned about the implications for their security of either Korea’s nuclearization or reunification. Although neither development would necessarily have threatened Russia directly, either could have affected U.S. and Japanese defense interests,
which in turn would have influenced China’s security policies, all of which would have affected Russia. For these reasons, Russian representatives complained that the agenda, goal, and membership of the four-party talks were too narrow and declared that the future of Northeast Asia “cannot be decided unless all countries in this region participate.” In July 2003, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson said that Russia’s participation in any multilateral talks regarding the situation on the Korean Peninsula would be “logical.”

With respect to Japan, Russia and China likewise have coordinated only rhetoric—and their statements have not always converged. Although the joint April 1997 Russian-Chinese declaration did affirm opposition to “enlarging and strengthening military blocs,” Russian officials have evinced much less concern about U.S.-Japanese security ties than their Chinese counterparts. (Chinese leaders desire neither a strong U.S.-Japan alliance, which could work to contain China, nor a weak alliance, which might collapse and lead to Japan’s remilitarization.) On a visit to Japan in May 1997, then Russian defense minister Igor Rodionov even praised the Japanese-American alliance as contributing to regional security, an assessment shared by other Russians anxious about China’s increasing economic and military strength in East Asia. From Moscow’s perspective, periodically joining Beijing to denounce U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation elicits, at minimal cost, Chinese declarations against NATO enlargement and other Western policies the Russian government opposes. The appearance of an embryonic Russian-Chinese united front toward Japan also encourages Tokyo to moderate its claims of sovereignty over the Russian-occupied southern islands of the Kurile chain—Habomai, Shikotan, Etorofu, and Kunashiri, known in Japan as the “Northern Territories.” One could expect the Japanese to recall that they were the principal target of the three previous treaties between Moscow and Beijing (in 1896, 1924, and 1950). During the last decade, Chinese officials have expressed renewed support for Russia’s position on the Kurile issue. After supporting Japan during the 1970s and 1980s, the Chinese government adopted a neutral stance in the 1990s following the USSR’s disintegration. The status quo, in fact, best promotes China’s security interests. The unresolved Kurile dispute impedes a close Russian-Japanese relationship and helps place Beijing in the advantageous position of having better relations with Moscow and Tokyo than they have with each other.

Furthermore, Russia has offered only declaratory and symbolic support for China’s stance on Taiwan. In September 1992, Yeltsin recalled Russia’s unofficial diplomatic mission from Taipei and signed a decree committing Russia to a “one-China” policy. He made these decisions after Beijing had protested that a Yeltsin aide had visited the island and signed an accord on exchanging semiofficial representation between Russia and Taiwan. During his visit to the
People’s Republic of China three months later and subsequently, he said that Russia would maintain only nongovernmental relations (i.e., nonofficial economic and cultural links) with Taiwan. The connection between Chinese support for Russia’s policies in Chechnya and Russian support for China’s position on Taiwan manifested itself clearly in the text of the December 1999 joint communiqué following the second informal summit between Yeltsin and Jiang: “The Russian Side supported the principled position of the People’s Republic of China with regard to Taiwan. The People’s Republic of China voiced its support to the Russian Federation’s actions aiming to fight terrorism and separatism in Chechnya.” As with Beijing’s own relations with Taipei, however, these political differences have not impeded substantial economic ties between Moscow and Taipei. Taiwan regularly ranks on an annual basis as Russia’s fourth-largest trading partner in Asia. Furthermore, Chinese officials have complained repeatedly that local Russian officials have established excessively close links with the Taiwanese government.

The question of which country would lead a Chinese-Russian alliance presents a major psychological impediment to the formation of any formal bloc. Unlike in the 1950s, Chinese authorities will no longer follow Moscow’s guidance in international affairs as a matter of course. Influential Russians in turn have evinced little interest in according Beijing primacy. Foreign policy analyst Dmitry Trenin observed that China, rather than Russia, would likely lead any geopolitical coalition against the United States: “Having refused to become the USA’s junior partner, Russia could turn into the PRC’s vassal.” This impediment likely becomes stronger as Russia’s military power, its main source of political influence in East Asia, declines and China’s economy surges ahead. During the 1990s, whereas China’s GDP increased by 152 percent, Russia’s declined by 47 percent. As Putin himself noted, this divergence in growth rates has resulted in a stark transformation in the balance of economic power between the two countries since 1990, when China and Russia had approximately equal GDPs. Today, although the Russians’ per capita gross domestic product is still approximately four times greater than that of the Chinese, China’s aggregate GDP is four or five times Russia’s. Many influential Russians fear the long-run implications for Russia’s security of China’s growing economic and military potential.

For their part, Chinese leaders have displayed more reluctance than their Russian counterparts even to suggest that they aim to establish an anti-American bloc. They studiously ignored then Russian prime minister Yevgeni Primakov’s suggestion of a tripartite alliance among China, Russia, and India. The Chinese describe their relationship with Russia as a “strategic partnership,” the same phrase they use to characterize their ties with the United States. They have characterized China’s approach to Japan in similar terms.
Chinese representatives repeatedly affirm that “three noes” govern their policy toward Russia: “no alliances, no oppositions, and no targets against a third country.”

The current global war on terrorism has provided a further telling example of how China and Russia have failed to unite to counter American preeminence—even in the neighboring region of Central Asia. Neither government actively opposed the vast increase in the U.S. military presence there, which has seen Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and several other governments host U.S. military bases on their territory. Rather than offer joint or even unilateral resistance, the Russian and Chinese governments have contented themselves with gaining Washington’s tolerance for their respective “antiterrorist” campaigns in southern Russia and western China. The Russian military even assisted allied operations in Afghanistan with intelligence and other support. Although Russian leaders opposed the U.S.-British invasion of Iraq, their diplomats cooperated more with the French and German governments than with their Chinese colleagues in seeking to avert the attack.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
The decade-long improvement in Russian-Chinese relations has yet to evolve into an anti-American bloc—and it probably won’t. Although both governments complain about various U.S. economic and security policies, their opposition on specific cases has been largely uncoordinated and rhetorical. While they denounce “hegemonism” and use other code words to criticize American foreign policy, they have preferred to deal with the United States bilaterally rather than as a united front. Even their mutual opposition to NATO’s military campaign against Serbia, which the allies justified on human rights grounds that Russian and Chinese officials feared could later be used against them, did not prompt them to create an anti-U.S. or anti-NATO alliance. Instead, Russian officials eventually pressured the Serbian government to yield to Western pressure. Similarly, neither the May 1999 U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade nor the April 2001 midair collision between an American EP-3E surveillance aircraft and a Chinese fighter induced Beijing to seek still closer strategic ties with Moscow. After failing to extract concessions from Washington on unrelated disputes (such as the terms for China’s entry into the World Trade Organization), Chinese authorities decided to downplay the events. They evidently feared that their outcries about the bombing and the midair incident, combined with the negative fallout from the Chinese nuclear spy scandal in the United States, were excessively damaging Chinese-American ties. Moscow and Beijing also eventually accepted the U.S.-led military operation against Iraq and supported a new U.N. Security Council resolution that authorized the occupying powers to govern the country until a new indigenous government emerged.
Cooperation between China and Russia has remained limited, episodic, and tenuous. The two countries support each other on some issues but differ on others. Thus far, their fitfully improving relationship has not presented a major policy challenge to the United States or its allies. Russian arms sales have not been of sufficient quantity or quality by themselves to enable China to defeat the more technologically advanced militaries of Taiwan or Japan. In fact, China has imported less military equipment in dollar terms than either of those countries. The PLA typically buys small quantities of advanced weapons in order to learn about their technologies and how to counter them.\(^{90}\) As a result of this practice of selective modernization, only a few “pockets of excellence” exist within the PLA. Most of the Chinese military still relies on pre-1970s Soviet defense technology. China’s ability even to maintain its complex, imported weapons systems or make the doctrinal and organizational changes necessary to employ modern military technology optimally in combined arms operations remains questionable.\(^{91}\) The expected increase in the quality of China’s defense industries, the continued decline of Russia’s military-industrial complex, and Russia’s stated refusal to sell its most advanced weapon systems to a modernizing PLA could decrease the importance of the Sino-Russian arms trade in the future.

The Chinese-Russian rapprochement appears so prominent largely because it contrasts so vividly with their recent enmity and because they both lack close allies. Resentful about lying outside the core American-European-Japanese axis now dominating international politics, they naturally both try to gravitate toward the West and simultaneously seek mutual solace for their isolation in each other’s loose embrace. In some respects, they are following the path set by Germany and the USSR during the 1920s with their Rapallo Treaty and cooperative military programs. Ironically, the better ties between the two countries, as well as Russia’s improved relations with France and Germany, may work in Washington’s favor by reassuring foreign observers concerned about potential American hegemony.

The U.S. government nevertheless should pursue several policies designed to prevent Russia and China from developing a genuine strategic alliance, which could impede the attainment of important American foreign-policy goals. Although the probability of such a bloc is low, the negative consequences for U.S. policies in East Asia and elsewhere could be quite severe should one emerge. Washington also needs to hedge against the possibility that unanticipated factors beyond its control will engender such an anti-American coalition.

Continued efforts to maintain strong U.S.-Japanese security ties represent an essential hedging strategy against a Chinese-Russian military bloc, however improbable. The U.S.-Japanese alliance, unlike the weaker Sino-Russian alignment, involves extensive cooperation, and not only in the military sphere.
generally, U.S. officials should continue to retain robust military forces in the Asia-Pacific region. Reductions in the size of the U.S. military presence in the western Pacific could prove possible or even necessary, but they should proceed in a deliberate manner and in close consultation with other governments. Regardless of the numbers involved, the military presence, combined with nonconfrontational commercial policies, reassures Asian countries about the value of maintaining good relations with the United States. The likelihood that most countries neighboring China and Russia would side with the West against a Sino-Russian bloc presumably deters these two governments from seeking one.

U.S. policy makers also should continue to encourage reconciliation between Russia and Japan. Better ties between Moscow and Tokyo would give Moscow an alternative to aligning with China on Asian security issues. Furthermore, better commercial ties between Moscow and Tokyo could improve the prospects that the two countries will satisfactorily resolve the Kurile Islands dispute, perhaps through some creative shared-sovereignty arrangement. But most Japanese and other foreign investors will not enter Russia until Russian lawmakers create a more favorable domestic economic climate. In the interim, enhanced cooperation to deal with such mutual, low-level threats as drug trafficking and environmental degradation might help start a reconciliation between these logical economic partners.

Additional arms control measures could substantially improve regional military transparency. Unfortunately, East Asian militaries traditionally have shown little enthusiasm for arms control. Clarifying the quantity and quality of Russian arms sales to China warrants top priority. Seeking to guard against a worst-case scenario, other countries might respond to the sales by increasing their own defense efforts, which in turn could heighten security anxieties in China and perhaps Russia. From such security spirals, dangerous arms races can arise.

American officials should try to deprive their Chinese and Russian counterparts of opportunities to confront the United States jointly. When negotiating divisive issues with these two countries, U.S. representatives should employ institutions in which either China or Russia, but not both, are members. For this reason, the new NATO-Russian Council or the Organization for the Security and Cooperation of Europe (OSCE) would provide a better framework than the UN Security Council for resolving military differences between NATO members and Russia. Similarly, Russian and Chinese concerns over American TBMD, or U.S. complaints about Chinese and Russian commercial and legal practices (such as those affecting intellectual property rights), are best handled bilaterally. In this respect, the current practice of excluding Russia from the four-party peace talks on Korea has the advantage of not encouraging concerted Chinese-Russian action on that issue.
As a general rule, however, Washington should try to include Russia in East Asian institutions or negotiations. Such a policy would recognize that two-thirds of Russia’s territory lies in Asia and that many Russians identify their nation as Eurasian. Overtly trying to circumscribe Russia’s role in East Asia would encourage Moscow to turn more toward China. Integrating Russia into East Asia’s numerous (though weak) institutions would provide for Russian representation independent of Beijing.

Two objectives that might well come into conflict are limiting joint Chinese-Russian institutional involvement and pursuing important arms control goals. China’s exports of ballistic missiles and technologies related to nuclear weapons already work against U.S. nonproliferation objectives. Furthermore, China’s refusal to participate in strategic nuclear arms control negotiations could impede U.S.-Russian progress in this area. Inviting Chinese representatives to enter into exclusive trilateral arms control talks with Russia and the United States might induce their participation, since it would underline China’s status as a great power. Issues warranting trilateral discussions could include reducing strategic nuclear forces, banning antisatellite weapons, and especially managing ballistic missile proliferation.

In this regard, U.S. ballistic-missile defense programs should not even appear to undermine the viability of Russia’s or China’s nuclear deterrents. The fact that both Russia and China possess secure retaliatory nuclear forces removes a common factor underpinning most military alliances—shared vulnerability. Each state can defend itself, by itself. China’s and Russia’s assured capacity to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike against the United States or other countries (including each other) allows them to regard U.S. military superiority with a degree of equanimity. No currently envisaged U.S. BMD architecture could negate this capacity, and the quixotic pursuit of one would drive China and Russia closer together.

American efforts to dissuade Russia from selling arms to China will have to focus on especially disruptive systems. For reasons discussed earlier, Russians will want to continue to sell weapons to China. A comprehensive U.S. attempt to block Russian arms sales would prove counterproductive, but reasoned arguments about the need to avoid transferring weapons that could enhance the PLA’s ability to project military power far beyond China’s borders might persuade some Russian policy makers worried about harming Russia’s relations with Washington or its Asian allies.

Russia and China will continue to work together to pursue common goals, but if the events of the last few years—especially the U.S. military interventions in Serbia, Afghanistan, and Iraq—have not galvanized them to form an anti-American alliance, it is hard to envisage what will. The global war on terrorism should if
anything improve relations among China, Russia, and the United States because their governments all consider radical Islamic terrorism their most pressing security threat. Just as fears of a revanchist Russia or an expansionist China have faded in official Washington during the past year, so policy makers in Moscow and Beijing have become preoccupied with problems other than potential American hegemony. If a new great power alliance emerges in Eurasia, the United States will more likely be its member than its target.

NOTES


2. In practice, such a bloc would entail close, frequent, and deep cooperation between the two governments to counter U.S. power and influence on many important issues.


5. These agreements are largely symbolic. They were not accompanied by any verification or enforcement procedures, and either country can rapidly retarget its ICBMs.


10. For a description of the land transfers to China from the three Central Asian states, see Martha Brill Olcott, “Taking Stock of Central Asia,” Journal of International Affairs 56, no. 2 (Spring 2003), p. 7.


17. The Chinese government already has announced plans to import oil from Kazakhstan, but financial costs and the region’s political and ethnic tensions, which have discouraged foreign investment, have delayed construction of a proposed pipeline; see Robert M. Cutler, “Kazakhstan-Xinjiang Pipeline: On Hold Forever?” Central Asia–Caucasus Analyst, 2 February 2000; Amy Myers Jaffe and Steven W. Lewis, “Beijing’s Oil Diplomacy,” Survival 44, no. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 61–62.

18. In the communiqué following the Chinese-Russian summit of April 1996, for instance, China expressed its “support” for the “measures and actions” Russia was undertaking in Chechnya. Chairman Jiang issued a similar endorsement during his December 1999 meeting with Yeltsin.


21. American Foreign Policy Council, China Reform Monitor, no. 479 (7 January 2003).


31. Li Ku-cheng, “Russia Has Taken a Hand in War Crisis at Taiwan Strait,” Kai Fang, 5 June 2000, FBIS document CPP20000613000037.


36. In July 1988, the Soviet and Chinese governments established a visa-free travel regime for tourists and business representatives undertaking short-term stays.


41. Segodnya, 6 July 2000, FBIS document CEP20000706000090.


49. The research of the Migration and Citizenship program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, cochaired by Galina Vitkovskaya and Kathleen Newland, suggests that the actual number of Chinese residing in all of Russia is less than one million.


60. Article 9 requires only that both parties “hold consultations” in cases of perceived threats to either party’s interests or security. Nikolai Sokov analyzes the treaty’s provisions in “What Is at Stake for the United States in the Sino-Russian Friendship Treaty?” PONARS Policy Memo 200 (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, September 2001).


68. Evgeny Afanasiev [Russian ambassador to the ROK], “New DPRK-Russia Treaty Contributions to Peace on Korean Peninsula,” *Taehan Maeil* (Internet version), 23 February 2000, FBIS document KPP2000023000111. Russia’s policies toward the Koreas during the 1990s are assessed in Harada, *Russia and North-East Asia*, pp. 61–69, and in many of the essays in Blank and Rubinstein, eds., *Imperial Decline*.


73. For a history of this dispute and the past efforts to resolve it, see Trenin, *End of Eurasia*, pp. 213–19.


76. Bakshi, “Post–Cold War Sino-Russian Relations,” p. 82.


78. RIA in English, 10 December 1999, FBIS document FTS19991210000573.


81. Bakshi, “Post–Cold War Sino-Russian Relations,” p. 84.


84. See, for example, Alexander A. Pikayev, “Moscow’s Matrix,” *Washington Quarterly* 23, no. 3 (Summer 2000), p. 189.


86. Michael Yahuda, “China’s Search for a Global Role,” *Current History* 98, no. 629 (September 1999), p. 269.


89. See, for example, the Russian-French-German joint statement of 15 March 2003.


94. Their vast territory and the absence of plausible invaders also contribute to their sense of security. Robert J. Art, “Creating a Disaster: NATO’s Open Door Policy,” *Political Science Quarterly* 113, no. 3 (Fall 1998), p. 387.
GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE AGE OF TERROR

Ideas, Domestic Politics, and the International System of States

Donald Abenheim

As the shock waves in the realms of ideas and geopolitical strategy rolled outward from Ground Zero on 11 September 2001, the edifice of German-American security and collective defense shuddered and soon piled up collateral damage in Washington, New York, Paris, Berlin, and beyond. In the aftermath of the terror attacks, culminating in the spring 2003 Anglo-American-Australian-Polish blitzkrieg against Baathist Iraq, the German-U.S. bond, a basic element of the Euro-Atlantic security order that has prevailed for more than a half-century since the end of World War II, seems to be in the process of collapse. Germany and the United States are publicly at odds, and the ties that bind our countries appear to have disintegrated into vituperation and invective that recall the world of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. If this cornerstone of the international system of states changes further for the worse—and any significant German retreat from the U.S. and North Atlantic orientation that has sustained liberal democracy and prosperity in and around the Federal Republic of Germany for decades counts as “for the worse”—unpredictable consequences will follow for the United States and the world order most congenial to it.
What accounts for the rift between Washington and Berlin at present? No single cause emerges from an examination of this situation that hopes to go beyond the facile, reactive, if not jingoistic, analyses of the chattering classes in Berlin and Washington. Rather, the current strain is wrought of a convergence of forces, complicating manifestations of history, ideology, experience, and ambition that have always swirled around the German-American relationship, however inchoately. For a variety of reasons, these factors have coalesced to exacerbate tensions and produce a troubling reaction in the last several months since the American coalition against terror marched to war, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. This article examines these complicating factors and the circumstances that have made them so virulent of late.

The following focuses on the German side of the problem, first tracing the role of ideas in German politics and society, the ideological framework on which the current debate is built. Simply put, in the first instance, since the origins of such ideas in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there have endured mutually negative images in Germany and the United States as concerns politics, society, and culture among political elites; these well-worn negative images have taken on a new virulence in the present crisis because of the upswing in nationalist sentiment on both sides of the Atlantic in the wake of Bin Ladenist terror. Secondly, these ideas interact with domestic political figures and factors that, in the German case, have been particularly important in the transformation of external relations since the waning phase of the first Gerhard Schröder cabinet after 11 September 2001. That is, Schröder is very different from Helmut Kohl as concerns German-American relations, and his source of power and influence in German politics differs from those of his Atlanticist predecessors. Thus, the analysis here turns to the role of German domestic politics in Berlin’s external policy today, developments that have not always met with much understanding among foreign policy elites on these shores.

Third, there is the matter of security and defense policy in Germany, particularly the German aversion to extraterritorial operations—an aversion that, although such policy has given way to a much more global orientation since 1990, continues to brake German enthusiasm for sending soldiers overseas compared to, say, the British and French. As we shall see, in the formation of security and defense policy in Germany and the United States, the forces dubious about U.S. diplomacy and strategy in Germany find their echo, as it were, in those figures and institutions skeptical of the phenomena recently caricatured by Robert Kagan.

Finally, the article takes up the implications for the future of a continuing or worsening German-American split. This issue is central to the emergence of “New Europe” versus “Old Europe” and the long-term effects of this diplomatic revolution in the wake of 11 September 2001.
FROM ENTENTE TO CONFLICT

The U.S.-German amity that now seems so precarious is hard won and vitally important to the United States and to the world. The security and defense ties between Washington and Bonn, and later Berlin, represented the success of statecraft that for the first time in modern history forged a durable Central European bond to the Anglo-Saxon and Atlantic realm, a connection that had been impossible in the years from 1848 until 1949. Whereas the rise of German might in the era 1870–1939 was a leading source of concern for American makers of policy in the era of the world wars, the integration of German power into the international system of states became a symbol of peace and stability in the years from 1945 until 1990. It also drove the reconstruction and reorientation of Western Europe, which formed a reliable—and reliably democratic—ally for the United States during and after the Cold War.

The high point of the German-American relationship came in May 1989, as the border that divided Germany and Europe first began to hemorrhage denizens of the East bloc intent on a better life in the West. In the Rhineland city of Mainz, the first President Bush gave a speech in which he identified the United States and the Federal Republic as “Partners in Leadership” and inaugurated an era of good feeling that obtained through October 1990 and German unification. The events of this period and G. H. W. Bush’s estimation of the German-American bond marked a fitting conclusion to the Cold War and the century of world wars.

Of course, for all the mutual esteem that Germany and the United States fostered for each other in the years after World War II, the leaders of both countries endured in their personal diplomacy episodes of strife and discord that affected German-American relations. In the first years of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the Americans wrongly thought that Kurt Schumacher, the leader of the socialist opposition to Konrad Adenauer’s Atlantic statecraft, was a nationalist holdover, if not a neo-Nazi. After the climax of the Berlin crisis in the summer of 1961, Adenauer believed that John Kennedy had lurched away from the Atlantic statecraft and nuclear strategy of the Eisenhower administration; Adenauer himself shifted toward Charles de Gaulle at the end of his tenure. Ludwig Erhard’s chancellorship ended abruptly in 1966, partly as a result of Lyndon Johnson’s overbearing attempts to make Germany shoulder additional burdens of Western defense in the era of the Indochina war. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger believed that Willy Brandt ventured too far toward Moscow in 1969–70 with his abandonment of Adenauer’s Cold War policies toward Central and Eastern Europe. Helmut Schmidt and Jimmy Carter, despite their shared
left-of-center political views, disagreed sharply about the means and ends of North Atlantic Treaty Organization strategy in the second half of the 1970s.\footnote{15}

Still, clashes of personality and vision did not disturb the depths of German-American affinity. Not so very long ago, news reports carried images of Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President Bill Clinton, two large men meeting over heart-attack-inducing plates of fettuccini in Georgetown as they consolidated the gains of statecraft that had emerged from the end of the Cold War. There and later, amid the organ-meat-oriented delicacies of Kohl’s home region, the Palatinate, the conservative German leader and the Democratic American president later expanded NATO and led German-American diplomacy to new heights of cooperation and effectiveness. It may be, though, that these feasts heralded the last hurrah of the comfortable transatlantic entente.

The present condition of the German-American connection surely contrasts with the recent, but seemingly long gone, past. The German chancellor waged a populist campaign against U.S. foreign policy to win reelection in 2002. American and German diplomats have been on opposite sides of the green felt tables at the United Nations Security Council and the North Atlantic Council amid name-calling and feats of diplomatic sleight of hand that do no honor to the memory of Dean Acheson, Konrad Adenauer, or Lucius Clay. A senior American official has grouped Germany with Libya and Cuba as examples of countries opposed to U.S. interests. Other voices are calling for boycotts of German goods—demands echoed in sporadic, informal refusals by German companies to supply goods to the U.S. market—or punitive acts of defense “realignment” that will greatly weaken the German-American bond. Beyond giving vent to frustrations at a relationship gone seriously awry, such rhetoric augurs a troubled future. Moreover, these pronouncements, as well as the yellow journalism of the tabloid electronic press, recall the escalation of words and events between the sinking of the \textit{Lusitania} in the spring of 1915 and the U.S. entry into World War I in 1917.

The present breakdown in German-American relations began to take shape after the initial shock of September 2001 dissipated and U.S. armed forces counterattacked the terror network in the Hindu Kush; at the same time the United States gave short shrift to any substantial NATO support in the Afghan operation, putatively as a means of avoiding the perceived setbacks of the 1999 NATO campaign in Kosovo. This phase has reinvigorated in part of the American body politic an anti-European and anti-German feeling not seen for decades, doing at the same time much the same among certain elites in Germany who have been anti-American in times past, notably from the mid-1960s until the early 1980s. If this development had antecedents in the past, however, never did these phenomena cross the threshold in bilateral relations that was traversed in 2002.
IDEAS AND THEIR CONFLUENCE IN GERMAN DOMESTIC POLITICS

This writer was in Slovenia on 11 September 2001, as part of the construction of what in other circles is now called “New Europe.” While waiting to return to the United States from Vienna, he watched the reactions of people in Central Europe to the calamity here. One saw sympathy for America, the victim, and fear of further attacks targeting other Western powers—a combination that led to expressions of solidarity that echoed the North Atlantic Council’s invoking of Article V of the NATO pact within hours of the attack. Such compassion was surely genuine, but in some sectors other sentiments soon emerged. From the earliest moments of the aftermath, one also saw the beginnings of misunderstanding based on old anti-American prejudices in both the popular discourse and political formulations of certain elites and makers of opinion. This misapprehension concerns the inability of certain Germans to interpret fully American history and U.S. ideas about policy and war that appear to contradict what has become, for more than a few members of the present generation of power holders in Germany, a dogma of peace in all circumstances. Professor Jeffrey Herf has best described this phenomenon as, first, an underestimation among the German left of the vices of appeasement in the era 1933–39—that is, the inability to understand the failures of the West to preempt the Nazi regime and the high price the world was to pay; and second, as the tendency to engage in a form of Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik (“transformation through proximity,” a term coined in 1963 by Brandt’s press spokesman, Egon Bahr) in every conceivable diplomatic situation, whether such statecraft is warranted or not. The present German leadership views events inflexibly in terms of its own distinct ideological legacy.

German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder holds office as a Social Democrat, a representative of Germany’s largest center-left party, in coalition with the Green Party, the latter having emerged in the political and social upheaval of the late 1960s and 1970s, and now part of the political establishment. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) is also the country’s oldest political party, in the sense that its members today trace their direct organizational and ideological roots to the middle of the nineteenth century, the era of Bismarck’s German unification and the nation’s tumultuous first republican experiment. The SPD is also the party that most stoutly resisted the Nazi march to power in 1930–33. It is a party with a strong pacifist tradition, or at least a deep skepticism about the use of armed force. Nonetheless, in the 1950s and 1960s, key Social Democratic figures had signal roles in the establishment of a new army in the FRG. In no small part because of the party’s experiences with the totalitarian left both before and after the Nazi regime, the SPD, unlike many European socialist parties, actively
resisted communism before 1933 and after 1945, particularly in the form of parties led more or less openly from Moscow during the Cold War.

At the same time, however, the party remained dubious of the free market, seeing itself as the arbiter of a “third path” to resolve the tensions of capital and labor, as well as the geopolitical conflict between the capitalist West and the totalitarian East. Before and after the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, this habit of thought translated to resistance to American antisocialist influences in western Germany, while the new center-right party, the Christian Democratic Union, at pains to distinguish itself from the reactionary and nationalist tradition of the prewar right, adopted a strong, pro-American stance. Helmut Kohl represented such policy from 1982 until 1998, as does the present leader of the opposition, Angela Merkel. The fondest Social Democratic notions of an independent, neutral Germany, forging a middle way between great powers, endure in the SPD’s theoretical substance today. At the same time, the anti-Soviet, pro-Atlanticist wing of the SPD that held sway from the end of the 1950s until the early 1980s—best represented by the career of Helmut Schmidt (chancellor 1974–82)—has no effective successors in Schröder’s cabinet or in the left-of-center camp of German politics as a whole.

In this vein, the present German-American troubles might be said to have their distant origins a quarter of a century ago when Helmut Schmidt passed the apogee of his power and many of the personalities on both sides of the present German-American tensions perhaps first developed antipathies for one another. These developments transpired in the second half of the 1970s, amid the collapse of superpower détente and the revival of the Cold War in 1979–80, the period of the Iranian hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the election of Ronald Reagan. Before the present epoch of terror, then, the potential for a German-American clash came into starkest relief during the debates between 1977 and 1987 about the deployment of the so-called Euromissiles, NATO’s response to Soviet nuclear blackmail. The answer of the German left to such statecraft reflected a misreading of the 1930s by pro-détente forces transmuted into the late 1970s and early 1980s. German advocates of an opening to Moscow misunderstood the fact that the Soviet attempt to overawe the West with the SS-20 medium-range rocket was born of motives that brooked no compromise. Further, the far left in Germany failed to appreciate the efficacy of the North Atlantic strategy of the dual-track approach of the Harmel doctrine—which, beginning in December 1967 and continuing until 1989, fostered a reduction of East-West tensions but also sufficient NATO defense in the face of the Soviet theater and strategic buildup. The sudden end of the Cold War obviated the debate amid national unification in peace, but the return of war to Europe and elsewhere in the 1990s revealed that the discordance of thinking about force
and statecraft had hardly vanished. Despite what seems to be consensus in the FRG on the Schröder cabinet’s refusal to back the “coalition of the willing” in the war against Iraq, this German conflict about force and statecraft has grown far more intense since 11 September and will likely persist in the wake of the annihilation of the Iraqi armed forces in March–April 2003.  

This phenomenon of a far left that can conceive of statecraft only with an explicit critique of U.S. policy of strength has a Doppelgänger in a strain in American political thought that is ascendant at the moment. The opposite of an anti-American Gerhard Schröder is the anti-European and especially anti-German-socialist dogma that might be said to exist among the foreign-policy elites of the American right. Beyond traditional doubts in some U.S. quarters about European and German socialists, or outright opposition to them, a Europhobic school of thought has operated in part of the American foreign-policy elite since at least the early 1970s. This group originally doubted the goals of Willy Brandt’s statecraft and later deplored any lessening of tension with the Warsaw Pact—which, in their view, could only lead to the “Finlandization” of Western Europe. This school also worried in 1983–84 that a red-green coalition would result in a new diplomacy à la Tauroggen and Rapallo, with the FRG marching alongside the USSR against the West. Surely the work of Robert Kagan, which asserts unbridgeable ideological differences between Europe and the United States—that is, the pithy Venus-and-Mars analogy of strategic geography—takes more than a page from the book of these Europhobes and the strategic debates of their day. In other words, Germany’s leftist anti-Americanism collides in the United States with rightist anti-German or anti–continental European sentiments in the current debate over grand strategy. These two notions cause an escalatory diplomatic blow and counterblow of name-calling and invective, as witnessed in the months before the outbreak of war in late March 2003.

THE PRIMACY OF DOMESTIC POLITICS IN GERMANY’S FOREIGN POLICY

With the beginning of the new century, the political burdens arising from the conjuncture of German unification and weaknesses of the German social market economy (which were detectable even before 1989) became ever more daunting. The tasks of economic and social renewal preoccupy the national leadership amid a widespread sense of social and political entropy and crisis. These concerns receive little or no sympathetic analysis among political elites in the United States, who dismiss the advent of peace along the European Cold War battlements and the extension of NATO and the European Union as a sideshow at best. This circumstance leaves Atlantic-minded Germans feeling abandoned by their elder sibling, the United States.
In this vein, for instance, the catastrophic floods of summer 2002 in the five new federal states only served to make Germans more concentrated on their own affairs versus the wider world. Much like the Chernobyl explosion of 1986, the event accentuated the importance of ecological international relations—that is, the floods in Dresden seemed an augur of global warming, a threat more palpable than al-Qa’ida kamikazes in jetliners. More enduringly, Schröder’s attention is dominated by Germany’s economic straits, as the country comes to resemble 1970s Britain before the Thatcherite free-market coup de main. In the last decade, the economic growth rate in Germany has averaged 1.6 percent—the rate in 2002 was a dismal 0.2 percent. Officially, unemployment hovers near 12 percent, a figure that includes neither the underemployed nor women who, though now jobless, can be counted as housewives. In the eastern part of the country, where workers by law earn no more than 80 percent of the wage that a western German worker makes for the same job, the unemployment rate is much higher, and disaffection for the state and society, expressed through extreme politics and violent gang activity, runs concomitantly high.

It goes without saying, then, that the German leadership has plenty to worry about at home. Interestingly, the war in Iraq may ultimately help ease Germany’s economic woes, as it might activate an “exception clause” in the European Union’s Stability and Growth Pact, which the Germans could cite as a reason for suspending strict criteria that the Federal Republic cannot meet in its current condition. Under the exception clause, hefty fines for recent violations would be dismissed, and the way for increased deficit spending to spur the economy would be cleared. Nonetheless, the head of Germany’s labor office, a Social Democrat, insists that the war and “geopolitical uncertainty” are hindering recovery.

The political cast of the wartime economic analysis in Germany continues the basic domestic-political fact of anti-Americanism as a campaign issue. Chancellor Schröder stood for reelection in the summer of 2002. His once-popular cabinet had by then become enfeebled by the national economic sclerosis, unable and increasingly unwilling to free itself from the vise grip of the trade-union movement, where many cabinet members found their ideological home, to say nothing of their electoral support. However, the economy—particularly the dramatic policy initiatives that the moribund German market would require—made for difficult contests for politicians interested in being all things to all voters.

As the German election campaign took shape—and as the focus of U.S. counterterror strategy shifted from the Afghan expedition against the Taliban and al-Qa’ida to preparations for the military overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime—the SPD also found itself circumscribed by the pacifism of its coalition partners. These partners were the Green Party and the so-called Party of German Socialism (PDS), the Stalinist successor to the former communist party of
the German Democratic Republic. The PDS kept a strong hold on voters’ hearts and minds in the eastern part of the country—in part by promising the anti-American peace platform that the East German leaders had always talked about but never delivered.

Thus, when Schröder’s challenger from the center right, Edmund Stoiber, the Bavarian minister-president (governor), asserted on the campaign stump that Germany should support the United States against Iraq in the war on terrorism, Schröder found himself another issue. Schröder’s camp seized on Stoiber’s position to exploit several factors in domestic politics. With his ever more strident expressions of opposition to U.S. strategy, the incumbent chancellor appealed to pacifists and to skeptics of Germany’s Western orientation in the ex-GDR. Further, he put the pro-American heirs of Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl on the defensive and, either by accident or by design, emboldened the fringe right and left in their latent anti-American phobias. At the climax of the September campaign Schröder’s justice minister, Herta Däubler-Gmelin, long critical of the administration of justice in the United States, in a talk to union members in the southwestern German state of Baden-Württemberg likened the American president to Adolf Hitler—just one week after the first anniversary of the 11 September attacks. Her comments brought about her resignation from the Schröder cabinet immediately after he won reelection, but her swift departure did nothing to diminish the escalation of vitriol and bad feeling between Berlin and Washington.

Herein reemerged the dilemma of German socialism and state power, force and statecraft, that has operated since the end of the nineteenth century. Once more, then, the unhappy experience of German socialists with armed power and the international system loomed within domestic politics. Surely in years to come the Schröder election strategy of 2002 and its attendant effects will stand alongside earlier episodes that tore the SPD apart. The most recent of these ultimately self-destructive allergic reactions to the use of armed force occurred when the left wing of the SPD sandbagged Helmut Schmidt over NATO strategy in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. When the dust and rhetoric settled, the Social Democrats no longer held the chancellor’s office and the new German leaders faced some long-term repair work to the German image abroad, particularly in the eyes of the U.S. policy elite. Schröder’s version of the new era, however, might yet prove to be even more profound in its long-term effects.

SECURITY AFFAIRS IN THE GERMAN VIEW

The November 2002 North Atlantic Council summit in Prague invited seven “Partnership for Peace”/Membership Action Plan countries to accede to NATO. To the extent that the meeting played out cordially, it falsely presaged a lull in the name-calling between Washington and Berlin. However, the American
rejoinder to the Schröder election campaign soon followed; a senior Washington official compared Germany’s resistance to U.S. policy on Iraq (alongside that of France in the UN Security Council) to the actions of such rogue states as Libya and Cuba. Not to be outdone, Europe-bashers in Congress called for the boycott of German goods as well as the withdrawal of U.S. forces from that country. The Federal Republic, along with France, constituted, in the view of certain senior American officials, “Old Europe,” an epithet intended to highlight a disparity with the newly democratic nations of Central and Eastern Europe, which constituted a “New Europe.” This “other” continent formed a pillar of the U.S.-led coalition against terror and weapons of mass destruction. To underscore this new diplomacy the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, and several Central and Eastern European countries declared their support for the U.S. campaign against Iraq in the Wall Street Journal of 30 January 2003. Henceforth Madrid, Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, and Warsaw would be the leading European partners of the United States. As the military buildup against Iraq gained speed in late February 2003, an American effort within the North Atlantic Council to provide for the collective defense of Turkey as well as the protection of facilities in Western Europe prompted a nonconsensus demarche by Belgium, France, and Germany. This diplomatic impasse briefly appeared to herald the final collapse of the 1949 Washington Treaty establishing NATO and the success of French statecraft to detach the Federal Republic of Germany from its Atlantic foundations and erect an anti-Anglo-Saxon continental bloc.

The crux of the problem for the Germans lies in the knotted issues that attend combat outside their borders, as well as the abhorrence of war by the body politic and nearly all foreign-policy elites, who regard armed conflict solely in terms of futile tragedy. The anti-Washington and anti-London diplomacy visible in Berlin and Paris in the first weeks of 2003 derived most immediately from the collapse of transatlantic consensus about terror and weapons of mass destruction—in addition to the increasing personal antipathy between Schröder and Bush. However, German refusal to be dragged into other people’s fights is proverbial, going back to Bismarck and his attempts in 1879–88 to keep the second German Empire out of the Habsburg adventures in the Balkans that would have alienated Petersburg and thus shattered Bismarck’s European system. Even in 1914–18 and 1939–42 there remained a certain grand strategic misunderstanding or indifference to areas beyond continental Europe narrowly defined (that is, the so-called Kontinentalblick), notwithstanding the Flottenverein (imperialist Navy League) and Vaterlandsparitei (wartime pre-Nazi Fatherland Party) war aims of 1916 and Nazi propaganda of 1941.

Such indifference and caution reemerged in the Federal German leadership after 1949. This policy was dictated by national division, as well as by the
strategic conditions of the Cold War that impelled Bonn to keep the United States and the United Kingdom linked to the defense of Central Europe but at the same time to avoid French colonial warfare, later that of the United States, in Indochina. Indeed, skepticism of what later was called “out of area” (a reference to the geographical limits embodied in Article VI of the Washington Treaty) was central to the defense clauses of the German constitution, the Basic Law, drafted in the 1950s. The Basic Law banned the waging of a war of aggression, made collective security through the United Nations the highest goal of statecraft, and limited the mission of the armed forces to defense. Statements by the German cabinet as recently as the early 1980s insisted that the Germans would stay out of non–Article V contingencies and adhere to the NATO battle lines of the Thuringian Salient and the North German Plain. Of course, at this same time, the United States became increasingly engaged in the Middle East because of the Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran and Leonid Brezhnev’s Afghanistan.

When the precursors of the first Gulf War occurred in the summer of 1990, amid the process of German unity, the Kohl government watched the United States withdraw a significant portion of its forces from the FRG and hurl them into combat against Iraq, while the United Kingdom and France sent their soldiers to the Gulf as well. For their part, the Germans provided behind-the-scenes logistical and financial support—measures that bestirred much domestic furor about “out of area” adventures and a militarization of German foreign policy.

The next years saw a fight between the Kohl government’s interventionist interpretation of Article 24 and the SPD opposition’s constructionist adherence to Article 87a—that is, the Bundeswehr exists solely for national defense in the narrowest sense. As the war in ex-Yugoslavia grew more awful, Germans appalled first by Saddam Hussein’s missile bombardment of Israeli cities and now by Slobodan Milosevic’s sieges of Vukovar and Sarajevo turned the political momentum toward an alteration of the constitutional status quo.

Finally, in the summer of 1994, the Federal German constitutional court decided in favor of the Kohl cabinet. The “no to out of area” syndrome was abated by a policy of gradual steps—from a hospital in Cambodia to the expeditionary force in Somalia, to the German peacekeeping task in Bosnia, to the combat role in Kosovo and its aftermath, and most recently, to the security-building phase of the campaign in Afghanistan. The Bundeswehr of 2003 maintains some nine thousand troops outside of Germany, which, granted the decline of its strength since 1990, is a substantial number. Nonetheless, this accomplishment tends to be denigrated by Americans who perpetually misunderstand, for partisan reasons, such issues of defense-burden sharing.

This transformation of German security and defense to responsibilities beyond the horizons of Central Europe received little positive recognition in the
United States, just as the social and economic burdens of national unification have often been overlooked. In the view of some it is as if the management of the FRG has failed, in its hostile takeover of a failed rust-belt industry, to treat its newly acquired property with sufficient sangfroid. The West had won, and Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” had eventuated. Why did the Germans persist in wringing their hands and nattering about the economic consequences of unification when a real, free-market liberal-democratic ally would, in a phrase, “just do it”?

In fact, German unification revived an old American habit to overestimate and simultaneously underestimate—which is to say, generally to misunderstand—the situation of the Germans. This issue goes back to the era of Teddy Roosevelt and Kaiser William II, whose conflicting attitudes about the Monroe Doctrine and the fate of the Caribbean revealed this phenomenon of misunderstanding and overestimation of power.

The syndrome continued through Franklin D. Roosevelt’s assumption, circa late 1940, that the Germans would soon march on the Amazon Basin as a means to strike at the United States. Similarly, during World War II, the U.S. side overestimated the ardor of Nazi Germany’s attempt to secure atomic weapons, and it overboldly expected Hitler, the Waffen-SS, and the Hitler Youth to fight to the death until 1948 in the Bavarian Alps. The American project of denazification in 1945–47 also proceeded from a serious misunderstanding of how German society had operated in the Third Reich. Nothing symbolized such crossed purposes as the simultaneous war-crimes trials against German political and military figures and hiring by the U.S. Army of German military officers to write studies on how to fight a war against the Soviet Union (a project that proved a prelude to the armament of the FRG).

When unification was at hand in 1989–90, there was impatience with the tentative, circle-and-sniff approach that German lawmakers took to assimilating the erstwhile East. On the other hand, there arose, at least in certain quarters of the chattering classes in 1989 and 1990, nightmare suspicions that a unified Germany would revert to the imperialist policy goals of Himmler’s SS Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt (SS Race and Settlement Office, home of the SS racial imperialists). In contrast to these fears was the reality of a policy of incremental change in the Federal Republic of Germany’s force and statecraft, beginning in the summer of 1990 and accelerating over the decade to come.

Such a process accorded fully with the pattern of German civil-military relations that took shape at the beginning of the 1950s and has obtained, perhaps, until quite recently. That is, the formation of U.S. and Atlantic strategy has been surprisingly open to German interests since 1948; its periodic major shifts (for example, the armament of the FRG, the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons into NATO strategy and force posture, the advent of Flexible Response, the
diplomacy of unification in 1989–90) subsequently require the laborious formation of consensus in German political parties and other groups. This process of consensus building usually progresses with less turbulence when Germany’s external context—especially official American opinion—is clear and stable. Where, as in the later half of 2002 and into the present, old tensions collide with new uncertainties, the immediate outcome has been less predictable.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY, AND THE WORLD

One might conclude with the generalization that German-American relations have gone off the rails in the age of terror, in part (but only in part) because of the problematic state of politics and society in Germany as it affects external relations. Such a pronouncement does not suggest that all guilt rests with the Schröder cabinet and the pie-eyed, if not wrongheaded, adherence by some German elites to the principles of Egon Bahr, laudable ideas in 1963 (when he was press spokesman of West Berlin and soon to become a chief architect of Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik and a leading figure in SPD politics) that may be dysfunctional four decades later amid a radically changed international context. One should be grateful that because the reality of a Volk in Waffen (nation at arms) proved such a disaster in 1914–45, the Germans are dubious about the efficacy of war. Only an abject disregard for the past allows serious irritation with the contemporary German reluctance to take up arms in the wider world. Thus, the Europhobes inside the Beltway who beat their drums of scorn do so for their own amusement and domestic political profit, not to set sound policy for the United States.

To be sure, the Schröder government, in the face of a stagnating society and politics, has given in to the temptation to flirt with nationalist extremes. The present German government appears to have forgotten the role of common sense in sound diplomacy, as well as of the long view of statecraft in Central Europe. A more advised view argues for the simultaneous orientation of the FRG to a peaceful Western Europe, including a Gaullist France, and also to the United States and the Atlantic dimension. However, this analysis does not fully explain the wreckage of U.S.-German relations since 2001.

The United States, particularly in the preemptive campaigns to come in the war against its terrorist foes, must better perform the trick of evoking gratitude in statecraft from Europeans while also instructing them in the vitality of U.S. interests. Since the 1999 NATO campaign against the Serbs in Kosovo, if not long before, the American school of thought that puts national interests first—and that touts its refrain of “the mission defines the coalition”—has brought a return to the bad habits and messy, if not brutal, customs of the Atlantic burden-sharing fights
of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. The difficult diplomacy about collective defense, national prestige, nuclear and conventional arms, and balance of payments between London, Washington, and Bonn that no doubt enraged people on both sides in 1963 may have been appropriate in the context of that year, just as Bahr’s idea of détente may have been, as well. That was then, however. Since 11 September 2001 the postmodern revival of Lyndon Johnson’s burden-sharing headlock of a hapless Ludwig Erhard has become excessive.

Such unhelpful practices, customary to the secondary, technical level of bilateral relations, must have their counterweight in statecraft that comprehends the strengths as well as the limitations of military power and that assesses realistically the respective civil-military potential of each democratic nation. One must grasp without illusion what a given country can and cannot do in the realm of defense, in terms not just of force strength and hardware but also political and social realities. Only thus can one avoid the exaggerations of over and underestimation, as have recently had such acrimonious effect. To be sure, this writer regrets that the Germans have not, and will not, increase their defense spending, as they did in the years 1960–80. But one cannot expect the same performance on this score from a now unified, but nonetheless self-preoccupied and encumbered, Germany as one can from a United States on the march. To embrace a punitive policy by which Germany, the most populous and important country in Europe, should be outflanked by Spain and Poland may be an efficacious tactic in the short term, but it will surely backfire over time. It will become increasingly clear that something must operate to limit American global power; meanwhile, what has been the fringe phenomenon of nationalism will intrude into the center of domestic German politics.

The present war against terrorism may have implications beyond the obvious—the collapsed World Trade Center and the toppled statues of Saddam Hussein. If one is to believe the idea of new Europe versus old Europe, implying the marginalization of Germany by the United States, the defense bond to Germany will decline. This contingency would mean a diplomatic revolution for both Germany and the United States, a foreign relations scenario that was always the subject of intellectual inquiry but never took on the life and depth that it seems to have in the last year. A United States cut off from Germany and vice versa, while the former somehow tenuously anchors itself more to the latter’s neighbors (and victims of the nineteenth and twentieth century), may well reinforce baleful trends in the evolution in peace and security in Europe. This assertion reflects no criticism of Poles, Danes, or Czechs, or of the Romanians and Bulgarians, either, who were victims of a different kind. The United States and the entire project of Western liberal democracy need the newly democratized states of Central and Eastern Europe. However, the U.S.-German bond
continues to have a particular significance in this connection. Germany can reach out to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and they respond in kind, because of the Atlanticist foundation that has operated for more than a half-century—such has been the central goal of American policy since 1945. Although it may sound peculiar in 2003 to those ignorant of the history of Europe, Germany’s peace and security have relied on its bond to America and France simultaneously, much in the way that Prussia’s and later Germany’s good fortune from 1815 until 1888 relied on the bond with czarist Russia. In the latter case, the northern courts had been a force for stability and order, as well as peace of a kind—a peace and an international system that, despite its faults, proved far better than the fragmented European system that arose thereafter and culminated in world wars. The world order anchored by the U.S.-German relationship has integrated Germany into Europe without more bloodshed, brought the transformation of communist Europe, and visited prosperity—and the political and demographic stability that go with it—on a part of the world that could easily have found itself mired in the kind of enduring strife that tore asunder ex-Yugoslavia and roils Israel today. There is rather more to lose here than Hummel figurines and wooden nutcrackers in the tourist shops of Garmisch-Partenkirchen and the sticky French pastries at NATO headquarters in Brussels.

Indeed, the passing of the post-1945 order poses a vast question mark over the brave new world of Machtpolitik and the vigorous pursuit of U.S. interests by first strikes and punitive expeditions. Germany will be cut loose, no longer fully settled in a complete European structure that can hold it. France, Belgium, and Luxembourg plainly do not constitute the totality of Europe, and the new Europe of Prague, Budapest, Bratislava, Tallin, Sofia, and Bucharest cannot function sensibly—or democratically—without its central and western portions. The danger exists that this new system, which appears to have lurched into existence through secondary causes, will face an enduring test of grand strategic effectiveness—that is, to provide a durable and lasting peace that has been the criterion for the system crafted in the years after 1945.

This question of the grand strategic efficacy of the “coalition of the willing” within the Euro-Atlantic sphere is the final issue, when one gets past the collective lunacy represented by boycotting German meat products, McDonald’s, Coca-Cola. One need only recall that the collapse of the European system in the 1890s began with tariff fights over food and like, disputes later instrumentalized by demagogues and zealots who railed against the limitations and musty diplomacy of the old world. The results were appalling—two world wars, a riven Europe, and all the opportunities that these circumstances cost. This insight is one to bear in mind, even in the blast of war and the rapture of victory.
NOTES


2. This analysis is particularly indebted to Dan Diner, Verkehrte Welten: Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main: Eichhorn, 1993). This investigation also follows Jeffrey Herf, War by Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles (New York and Toronto: Free Press, 1991), which remains an excellent treatment of ideas, German domestic politics, and international security with relevance beyond the period of the 1970s and early 1980s.

3. For the origins and character of negative images of Europe in U.S. diplomacy, a useful point of departure is John Lambert Harper, American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George Kennan and Dean Acheson (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994); for German-American diplomacy in the era before 1989, see Manfred Jonas, The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1984).

4. For German foreign policy until unification in 1989–90, see Wolfram Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1989); Klaus Hildebrand, German Foreign Policy from Bismarck to Adenauer: The Limits of Statecraft, trans. Louise Willmot (London: Routledge, 1989), esp. pp. 199ff. For foreign policy since unification, see Helga Haftendorn, Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung (Stuttgart and Munich: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 2001).

5. An introduction to German security policy is John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy after Unification (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1998). Also of note are a study from the early 1990s, Hans Adolf-Jacobsen et al., eds., Bundeswehr und europäische Sicherheitsordnung (Bonn: Bouvier, 1991), and a later work, Franz H. U. Borkenhagen, Außenpolitische Interessen Deutschlands: Rolle und Aufgabe der Bundeswehr (Bonn: Bouvier, 1997). The official statement of security and defense policy of the Kohl cabinet is Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (BMVg), ed., Weißbuch 1994: zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zu Lage und Zukunft der Bundeswehr (Bonn: BMVg, 1994); a similar document for the Schröder cabinet is BMVg, ed., Bundeswehr 2002: Sachstand und Perspektiven (Bonn: BMVg, 2002).


9. Among a wide literature on this matter, see Helga Haftendorn, Deutsche Außenpolitik; Frank Trommler et al., eds., Deutsch-amerikanische Begegnungen: Konflikt und Kooperation im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart and Munich: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 2001); Klaus Larres et al., eds., Deutschland und die USA im 20. Jahrhundert (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgemeinschaft, 1997); Heinz Bude et al., Westbindung: Amerika in der Bundesrepublik (Hamburg: Hamburger Editionen, 1999); Dieter Mahncke, ed., Amerikaner in Deutschland: Grundlagen und Bedingungen der


17. The assertion of a rigid left-inclined viewpoint among certain of Germany’s political elite does not suggest that all Germans or even all German socialists and Greens are so oriented; the point is simply that key figures in the present generation have derived very specific doctrines from their political experience since the early 1960s until 1989 and these ideas find their application in the post–11 September realm. For more on the related theme of SPD views of the United States, see Dietrich Orlow, “Ambivalence and Attraction: German Social Democrats and the United States, 1945–1974,” in The American Impact on Postwar Germany, ed. Reiner Pommerin (Providence, R.I.: Berghahn Books, 1995), pp. 35–52.


21. For a résumé of this school of thought in the present, see Richard Lambert, “Misunderstanding Each Other,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 2 (March/April 2003), pp. 62–74.

22. The phrase “Europhobe” is from Harper, American Visions, pp. 60ff. Although used here to refer to contemporary political thought, the antecedents of such an idea can be said to have existed since the eighteenth century. See Felix Gilbert, To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1961).


24. In the December 1812 Convention of Tauroggen (modern Taurage, Lithuania) the Prussian general Yorck von Wartenburg, commanding a corps of Napoleon’s Grande Armée then retreating from Russia, on his own initiative declared his troops neutral and thus permitted the Russians to continue their pursuit of the French. The April 1922 Treaty of Rapallo (in Italy) established normal relations between Germany and the Soviet Union and abandoned all mutual financial claims. See Beate Braitling, ed., Ploetz Lexikon der deutschen Geschichte (Freiburg: Ploetz, 1999), pp. 398, 482.

25. Kagan’s tendentious generalizations about peaceful Europeans might, perhaps, apply to some Germans, but these assertions surely fail...
to comprise the reality of attitudes about force and statecraft in Europe in its totality. Further, his oversimplification of the statecraft of defense burden sharing reveals significant flaws in his analysis. Nonetheless, his thesis fits the mood among certain foreign policy elites in much the same way that the generalizations of Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington did in the 1990s. In this connection, one is nostalgic for the reasoned writings on diplomacy of Walter Lippman, Dean Acheson, George Kennan, and Henry Kissinger.


27. For up-to-date figures on German unemployment, see, e.g., “Germany’s Unemployment Rate Hits 5-Year High,” DW-World.de, 5 March 2003, available at www.dw-world.de/english/0,3367,1430_A_772191,00.html [accessed 10 May 2003].


30. See “Däubler-Gmelin weist Vorwürfe zu Bush-Hitler-Vergleich zurück,” ZDF Heute, 20 September 2002, available at www.heute.t-online.de/ZDFheute/artikel/3/0,1367,POL-0-2015619,00.html [accessed 10 May 2003]. Däubler-Gmelin was quoted in the Schwäbisches Tagblatt as saying of the U.S. war plans, “Bush wants to distract [attention] from his domestic-political difficulties. It is a popular method. Hitler did it, too.” The justice minister claimed first that the newspaper misquoted her, but the editor in chief claimed personally to have received Däubler-Gmelin’s authorization to use the quote. Later, Däubler-Gmelin insisted that she meant only to compare the approach to political leadership, not the men.


32. This rhetorical contrast of “old” and “new” Europe—perhaps unwittingly—echoed Woodrow Wilson as well as alluding to the nationalism of Central and Eastern Europe against the 1815 settlement of Napoleon’s wars on the continent, especially as realized by the northern courts of Petersburg, Vienna, and Berlin. Such references were all the more ironic, as the phrase today serves to underscore differences and divisions in Europe and, apparently, to negate long-standing goals of U.S. foreign and security policy.


37. On the “out of area” problematic of the late 1970s, see Douglas Stuart et al., The Limits of


41. See BMVg., ed., *Bundeswehr 2002*—on operations outside of Germany and Europe in support of international collective security and collective defense organizations, see pp. 6–12; on personnel issues of conscription and term of service, see pp. 28–30, 53–55.


GLOBALIZATION AND NATURAL-RESOURCE CONFLICTS

Scott Pegg

High-profile recent conflicts involving lucrative natural resources in such countries as Angola and Sierra Leone have drawn increasing attention to the link between natural resources and violence. While recent strategic, media, and academic attention has understandably focused on Iraq, the United States currently imports 15 percent of its crude oil from Africa, a figure that is forecast to increase to 25 percent by 2015. The Gulf of Guinea is poised to grow in strategic importance for the United States, and senior military and diplomatic officials are reportedly in advanced discussions with São Tomé e Príncipe about establishing a regional U.S. Navy base there.¹ This article argues that natural resource–related conflicts in places like West and Central Africa are not well understood. While such conflicts are unlikely to pose substantive operational risks to U.S. military forces, a failure to understand the dynamics underlying them risks exposing U.S. forces to smaller-scale Somalia-like military problems and, perhaps more importantly, to serious public relations and reputational risks.

One of the factors that makes natural-resource conflicts especially noteworthy is the alleged role played in them by leading private-sector actors. The sovereign governments of Angola and Sierra Leone both hired the services of Executive Outcomes, a private military company. De Beers has faced mounting pressure over its purchase of diamonds from these...
war-torn areas. Oil companies in Burma, Colombia, Nigeria, and the Sudan have been directly linked to state violence against local host communities.

Traditional security studies have generally neglected profit-oriented natural-resource conflicts. One recent large-scale empirical survey on conflict notes that nine of the thirteen wars identified in 1998 took place in Africa. Its authors posit that “this might be related to the phenomenon of weak states, to the increased erosion of boundaries, and to open or clandestine intervention from neighboring countries.” They make no mention of any role that natural resources or private-sector involvement might play in generating these conflicts. Similarly, this project limits its definition of armed conflicts to conflicts that result “in at least 25 battle-related deaths.” Thus, it lists no armed conflicts for Nigeria, because the thousands of fatalities suffered in recent years by groups like the Ijaw and Ogoni in violence surrounding oil extraction in the Niger Delta are not considered “battle related.” Policy makers and senior members of Western armed forces might be inadvertently misled by such studies into thinking that resource-rich West African countries are far more peaceful than they really are. With a broadening, or loosening, of this “battle related” criterion, the Ogoni from 1993 to 1995 and the Ijaw from 1998 to 2001 would merit inclusion under this survey’s categories of “intermediate armed conflict” or even of “war.”

The cited survey also limits itself to two types of conflict—incompatibility concerning government and concerning territory. As there is no category for wars to control natural resources, countries such as Angola and Sierra Leone are classified as incompatibilities concerning government. This neglect of natural resources is stunning, given that a recent World Bank study found that “the extent of primary commodity exports is the largest single influence on the risk of conflict.” Three-quarters of sub-Saharan African states still rely on primary commodities for half or more of their export income.

Our focus here is on how the global economic incentives surrounding valuable natural resources facilitate and influence intrastate conflicts. One leading scholar has observed that “viewing the international system in terms of unsettled resource deposits . . . provides a guide to likely conflict zones in the twenty-first century.” Nonetheless, the argument advanced here does not extend to traditional interstate conflicts (water wars in the Middle East), let alone systemwide strategic geopolitics (great-power conflicts in the Caspian and South China Seas). Natural resources are increasingly important determinants of contemporary violence; they will not, however, necessarily produce “a new geography of conflict, a reconfigured cartography in which resource flows rather than political and ideological divisions constitute the major fault lines.”
TOWARD A TYPOLOGY OF NATURAL-RESOURCE CONFLICT

The diversity of civil wars is widely noted. One theorist observes, “The reasons for which civil wars are fought, the levels of organization among the various contesting parties, the degree of involvement by external powers and the political outcomes of such contests have all varied widely.” Much the same can be said for the smaller subset of natural-resource conflicts. These conflicts vary widely along a number of dimensions, including culture, religion, and location (cases can be found in Africa, Asia, and Latin America); the nature of the resource being contested (e.g., diamonds in Sierra Leone, hardwood forest products in Cambodia, oil in Nigeria); and the nature of the participants (degrees and types of corporate involvement, the presence or absence of organized opposition groups). We can construct a typology of natural-resource conflicts by focusing on three different variables: the nature of the resource being contested, the public-private composition of the resource extractors and the security providers, and the nature of the instigators and targets of violence.

The nature of the resource being contested and, specifically, how capital-intensive its extraction is influences the form that natural-resource conflicts take. As one observer notes, “Economic violence among rebels is more likely when natural resources can be exploited with minimal technology and without the need to control the capital or machinery of the state.” Thus, rebels are more likely to be able to fund their operations from easily mined gems than they are to control more capital-intensive processes, such as oil extraction. Angola was an interesting example of this phenomenon, in that the late Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA rebels were concentrated in areas where diamonds could be mined easily with minimal equipment and sold by the briefcase or small plane load at a time while the government depended on revenues from the much more capital-intensive oil industry to fund its war effort. Thus, one is more likely to see a weak state losing control of its territory and calling in private-military assistance, à la Sierra Leone, when easily mined gems or minerals are at stake. Conversely, situations in which large corporations find themselves dependent on the protection of state security forces are more likely when the extraction of lucrative resources (like oil) requires huge investments.

Obviously, this “easily mined”/“capital-intensive” dichotomy is not absolute. One cannot, for example, rule out the possibility of large corporations involved in the extraction of surface mineral deposits or guerilla forces directing their efforts toward capital-intensive industries. By one estimate, Colombian guerillas attacked pipelines and other oil industry infrastructure 985 times between 1986 and 1996. The type of resource involved does, however, suggest the likely nature of the resource extractors and security providers, as well as the instigators and targets of violence.
The mixture of public and private involvement in the extraction of resources and the provision of security can be visualized in a two-by-two matrix (see the table) where the columns represent the resource extractors and the rows represent the security providers. Each category can be divided into public and private participants.

Moving in a clockwise direction from top left, it is the second box (corporations depending on state security services) and the fourth box (states depending on private military companies) that have received the most academic attention to date, albeit in isolation from one another. The purely public activities in the first box have traditionally been viewed solely in terms of domestic human rights abuses, while the purely private activities in the third box have generally been discreet enough to escape attention. Viewing natural-resource conflicts in terms of such a matrix breaks down the artificial separation between similar phenomena—that is, the second and fourth boxes.

The third dimension to consider in constructing a typology of natural-resource conflicts concerns the participants, instigators, and targets of violence. An important distinction here is between violence that is unidirectional and violence that is multidirectional. In this sense, “unidirectional” refers to violence that flows primarily in one direction—from an instigator to a target. “Multidirectional” refers to violence that flows back and forth between competing parties. These categories should be seen as ideal types representing different ends of a continuum, with many points in between. For example, the violence directed against the Ogoni in Nigeria was unidirectional in the sense that the Ogoni were the recipients of violence (more than two thousand civilians were killed) but were not instigators of violence (no Shell employees or Nigerian security personnel are known to have been killed by the Ogoni). The violence in Colombia, on the other hand, has tended to be multidirectional—comprising, for instance, government violence against rebels, rebel violence against the government, rebel violence against corporations, and corporate financial support for government violence against rebels.

The participants also vary. In some countries, like Colombia and Sierra Leone, sovereign governments face viable, well-organized competitors. In such
situations, state officials and private corporations may act both as instigators and targets of violence. In other cases, such as Ecuador and the Niger Delta, the competitors that sovereign authorities face are seeking better terms from the exploitation of natural resources on their land but do so primarily through peaceful means. In these cases, indigenous host communities are likely to be the primary targets of violence.

LINKING RESOURCES AND VIOLENCE

In discussing the dynamics of for-profit violent resource extraction, it is important to consider what is and is not new about this process. While there have been some important changes since the end of the Cold War, there are also definite historical continuities. The practice seen in Nigeria by which state troops protect corporate operations goes back at least as far as 1707, when the German state of Wurttemberg provided troops to the Dutch East India Company. The same company also hired Japanese mercenaries to subdue local opposition to its dominance of the spice trade in what is now Indonesia. Describing the rubber boom in the Belgian Congo, one leading historian observes that “the entire system was militarized. Force Publique garrisons were scattered everywhere, often supplying their firepower to the companies under contract. In addition, each company had its own militia force.” Contemporary cases thus have long historical antecedents.

The end of the Cold War has, however, brought about changes that account for the seemingly increased importance of natural resources to both sovereign authorities and their nonsovereign challengers. In particular, faced with superpower disengagement and a more liberalized world economy, both sovereign and nonsovereign leaders have been forced to adopt market-oriented strategies in order to survive.

In and of themselves, lucrative commodities are not either creative or destruc- tive forces. They do, however, seem to encourage particularly poor policy making on the part of government leaders. The fact that many diverse states that are richly endowed with resources have produced dismal economic and political results has variously been described as the “resource curse thesis” and the “paradox of plenty.” In terms of sovereign states, while the resource curse has a number of different aspects, we will focus on three here: the internationalization, centralization, and privatization of the state. In the interaction of these three factors one can find reasons why lucrative natural resources often encourage state rulers to embrace violence.

The internationalization of a state signifies the increasing dependence of state leadership, particularly in the absence of Cold War superpower backing, upon the revenue earned by such fully internationalized commodities as diamonds,
oil, and hardwood forest products. Such commodities are “fully internationalized” in the sense that their revenues are derived from the external global economy and are paid in dollars. The presence of such hard currency rents obviates the needs for domestic taxation and state building. This internationalization strategy is appealing, because “the ruler finds that encouraging these various external actors to align themselves with his political network’s private interests maximizes the resources available to clients, reinforces his personal capacity to control resource distribution and hence increases the political authority at his command.”

A state becomes centralized “as a mechanism of accumulation and distribution.” In most tropical countries, the state claims exclusive ownership over valuable natural resources. The monies earned from these commodities are frequently paid directly into the central government’s treasury. Local and regional authorities tend to have little, if any, claim on these revenue streams. In Nigeria, for example, the percentage of revenue allocated to regions of derivation declined from 50 percent at independence to a low of 1.5 percent in the early 1990s (it is presently 13 percent). The centralized receipt of natural-resource revenue encourages corruption and cronyism. The state is simultaneously amplified and destabilized as central power increases but “is typically combined with weak authority and limited administrative and institutional capacity in the context of intense competition for state resources.”

Finally, a state is privatized in the sense that rulers increasingly abjure formal bureaucracies and institutions in favor of their own, personalized networks of control. The result is the emergence of “strong networks of complicity between public and private-sector actors” outside formal state institutions. The wealth generated from such networks is then translated into political resources to reward cronies and punish enemies.

Leaders of internationalized, centralized, and privatized resource-rich states depend upon commercially successful exploitation of natural resources for their survival. This dependence upon the revenue streams generated by natural resources promotes and encourages violence. The frequent end result of such vested interest in the efficient and uninterrupted exploitation of profitable resources is that “militaries, paramilitary organizations, and state agencies often create or exacerbate resource-based conflicts by their participation in protective activities, their involvement as actors, or their coercive tactics.”

The ending of Cold War financial support also shifted the calculus of guerilla movements in a more market-oriented direction. As one observer points out,
the decline in external support and patronage “has not led guerrilla movements to conclude that they should stop fighting: it has just made them realize that their war economies have to change completely.”

Thus, rather than trying to woo foreign patrons, opposition groups have increasingly focused on controlling remunerative commodities that can be traded globally. Gems and diamonds are ideal, in that they are easy to extract, can be transported economically, and, at least after processing, are difficult to identify by region of origin. Successful examples can be found throughout Africa. Between 1992 and 1998, UNITA obtained an estimated minimum revenue of $3.72 billion from diamond sales.

In the early 1990s, Charles Taylor’s “Greater Liberia” earned an estimated eight to ten million dollars a month from various corporations extracting rubber, timber, iron ore, gold, and diamonds from territory it controlled. Based on their demonstrated and long-standing abilities to finance themselves, one suspects that former warlords like Jonas Savimbi and Charles Taylor make reliable business partners.

The shift toward natural resources–based funding for rebel groups has had two distinct results, both of which lead to increased levels of violence. First, this shift has encouraged a fragmentation and proliferation in the number of rebel groups. Control over lucrative natural resources increases local actors’ freedom of maneuver. During the Cold War, rebels had incentives to remain united—to assure outside supporters and enjoy the benefits of external funding, which usually came through a centralized channel. Today, however, financing “is directly raised at a local level by individuals who have less and less reason to accept the control of any hierarchy or authority.” This change is reinforced by the proliferation in light arms and the resulting buyers’ market for such weapons: “Individuals and small groups can now easily purchase and wield relatively massive amounts of power.”

The second shift concerns changes in the types of rebel groups. Employing a distinction between “stationary” and “roving” bandits, one scholar argues that the participants in today’s resource-based conflicts are increasingly likely to be of the roving variety. Whereas stationary bandits depend on the prosperity of their host communities and thus have reason to establish viable systems of governance, roving bandits “merely extract resources from areas and move on. They will therefore tend to be extremely predatory and destructive.” This argument is correct about the predatory nature of today’s rebel groups but wrong, at least in the context of natural-resource conflicts, about who it is that has to “move on”—it is the local civilian population that is forced to flee. Thus, the traditional guerilla emphasis on winning popular support has given way to a more vicious strategy of territorial control through population displacement. The growth in the number of rebel groups and their increasingly
predatory nature contribute to the escalation of violence surrounding natural-resource extraction.

While both states and rebel groups have incentives for violence, each ultimately depends upon the availability of willing corporate partners if it is to transform resources under its control into hard currency. Conflict-ridden tropical countries would initially appear to be unappealing locations for foreign investment. Poor enforcement of property rights and inability to guarantee physical and legal protection of assets effectively bar entry for most service and manufacturing firms. As one theorist maintains, “the former requires a government that can enforce property rights and prosecute infringement on them. The latter requires political stability that allows foreign business to operate and recoup investments.” Such concerns do not, however, affect self-sufficient, self-contained resource-extraction operations to the same degree. These enclaves do not depend on local firms as suppliers, nor do they require local markets for their goods. Their basic requirements are just secure working facilities and access to ports or airports from which their products can be transported to the global marketplace. The cash flow generated by lucrative resource extraction means that “firms earning resource rents can afford to pay criminal gangs, private militias, or nascent rebel armies for the private enforcement of their property rights while still earning a normal profit.” Such firms can also, as in the second quadrant of our table, afford to pay “field allowances” to sovereign militaries and, if necessary, purchase weapons for them.

The ability to cordon off operations from problems in the local economy and the fact that resource-extraction firms must go where the resources are allow these companies to bear political risks of a different order of magnitude than other firms will consider—thus Shell’s decision in November 1995 to announce a three-to-four-billion-dollar investment in Nigeria a week after Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni leaders were hanged, and the continued refusal of companies like Total and Unocal to disengage from Burma long after other well known firms, like Levi Strauss, Motorola, and Pepsi, have done so. As one former oil executive puts it, for a resource-extraction firm, “dealing with the regime in place, regardless of its nature, is comparable to dealing with the owner of a property which is needed for a project.” One might add that the “regime in place” may or may not be a recognized sovereign government.

The interesting question here is just how much of a role corporations play in the violence surrounding natural-resource conflicts. As one leading scholar argues, much of the “resource curse” literature treats criminal gangs and private
militias as exogenous—that is, the decision of resource firms to employ them does not influence the strength, prevalence, or behavior of such groups. Yet in settings where the rule of law is already tenuous, “the presence of resource firms may help these groups form (or enable preexisting groups to expand) by giving them lucrative opportunities for extortion. Just as the presence of monopoly rents tends to foster rent-seeking behavior, the presence of resource rents may foster the rise of extralegal organizations that seek out ‘protection rents.’”

While this argument focuses exclusively on “extralegal organizations,” the second box in our table (private resource extractors, public security providers) illustrates that this logic applies equally well to sovereign security forces that take advantage of these “lucrative opportunities for extortion.” Some resource-extraction firms subcontract their security functions to rebel groups or private military companies; others utilize sovereign armies. The underlying logic remains the same.

Another way of framing this question is to ask whether corporations actively play a role in creating, maintaining, or exacerbating violence or whether, as the firms themselves would have it, they are merely innocent bystanders, complying with all relevant domestic regulations. In fact, and even beyond the enormous financial support they offer governments and rebel movements, the centrality of corporations in creating and exacerbating security threats to local populations can be demonstrated in two main ways.

First, corporations have a catalytic effect, tending to bring local populations into confrontation with military forces. Looking specifically at oil companies, in the Burmese case it is estimated that the troops stationed where the Yadan gas pipeline was constructed increased from five battalions in 1990 to more than fourteen in 1996. In the Nigerian case, it was corporate actions, such as polluting the environment and refusing to pay compensation for such pollution, that led to community protests in the first place. On numerous occasions, such community protests have brought security-force abuses, often “right next to company property or in the immediate aftermath of meetings between company officials and individual claimants or community representatives.” Perhaps the ultimate expression of this corporations-as-catalysts logic comes from the Sudan. The correlation there between planned corporate oil-exploration sites and subsequent Sudanese military offensives is striking:

Military operations against rebel forces in Western Upper Nile and military operations designed to secure the oil fields are not distinct from one another. In fact, they are the same. Oil facilities and infrastructure are de facto military facilities, the oil fields are the most heavily militarized locations, oil company property and personnel are viewed as military targets by rebel forces and indigenous rural communities are considered security threats by forces protecting oil company property.
Second, companies can have a direct effect on the security of local host communities. Oil companies have been accused of purchasing weapons for state security services in Colombia and Nigeria. They have also (in Burma and Nigeria) transported military troops in their helicopters and boats and (in the Sudan) shared airport facilities with helicopter gunships. Furthermore, corporations may make specific requests for military assistance, or not, as they choose. Oil companies have directly requested assistance from the Nigerian security services in a number of episodes that have subsequently resulted in the deaths of nonviolent protestors. These companies claim credit for the peaceful resolution of disputes when they ask the military authorities not to intervene forcibly. Yet they disclaim responsibility for fatalities when they do request intervention, arguing that they are required to do so by domestic law. Companies are not powerless actors. They make choices that directly affect the security or insecurity of local populations.

Unlike state leaders and guerilla groups, however, corporations are arguably the only leg of this tripod of actors on which in recent years incentives for less violent behavior have increased. In 1997, following a torrent of bad publicity in the wake of the Ogoni hangings in 1995, Royal Dutch/Shell became the first energy company publicly to declare support for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The following year, the company explicitly addressed human rights issues in the first of a series of annual reports on the firm’s financial, social, and environmental responsibilities. Texaco withdrew from operations in Burma in 1997. De Beers has recently announced plans to transform the way it conducts its business in the wake of mounting public opposition to its purchase of diamonds from rebel groups in Angola and Sierra Leone.

The extent of such changes should not, however, be exaggerated. The British firm Premier Oil, for example, chose to remain in Burma for more than two years after the British government took the unprecedented step in April 2000 of asking it to withdraw from the country. TotalFinaElf and Unocal still remain in Burma today. The Malaysian state oil company Petronas maintains investments in Angola, Burma, Chad, and war-torn southern Sudan. Even after the bad publicity surrounding Shell’s links to the Nigerian military, Chevron transported military troops on two separate occasions in 1998 and 1999 that resulted in the deaths of unarmed civilians. When asked at a shareholders meeting in May 1999 whether the company would officially demand that the Nigerian military not shoot protestors at Chevron facilities, the chairman and chief executive officer gave a one-word response: “No.”

Western armed forces might be misled into thinking that resource-rich West African countries are far more peaceful than they really are.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND SCHOLARSHIP

Conflicts surrounding the extraction of lucrative natural resources are becoming increasingly prevalent, but there are two particular reasons for caution before a decision to intervene. First, local rebel and guerilla movements consider the large revenue streams generated by natural resources worth fighting for. While such forces may not pose serious operational risks for the U.S. military, the possibility is very real of daring raids or ambushes meant to produce a few dozen U.S. casualties, as in Somalia, to undermine civilian support for the intervention. Second, and perhaps more importantly, engagement in such conflicts potentially opens U.S. forces to serious risks with respect to public relations and reputation. Activists, nongovernmental organizations, and what some observers have labeled “transnational advocacy networks” have proven increasingly adept at networking with local host communities in oil-rich regions like the Niger Delta and southern Chad and at “telling their story” to the outside world. As local residents in such areas typically live in abject poverty, without access to piped drinking water or electricity, when billions of dollars of (say) oil wealth are being taken from their lands, that story is likely to resonate well. It is not difficult to envision a scenario in which U.S. forces intervening to preserve access to oil or other vital mineral supplies end up being portrayed, rightly or wrongly, as the military wing of large transnational corporations or as willing accomplices of corrupt and repressive regimes like those in Angola or the Democratic Republic of Congo. The public relations aspects of natural-resource conflicts will likely prove far more challenging for U.S. forces than the military, operational, or strategic aspects.

In terms of general policy, such bold and dramatic suggestions as the recent proposal to manage global resource stockpiles collaboratively, through the establishment of new international organizations, seem implausible. Instead, the greatest leverage for improvement lies perhaps in pressuring private-sector actors to end their complicity in the violent extraction of lucrative natural resources. This strategy is certainly not guaranteed to succeed, but there are clear cases in which large corporations have changed (or at least acknowledged the need to change) their behavior. As a group, private-sector actors would seem more amenable to moral suasion than are either state leaders or guerillas.

There is the danger, however, that larger corporations obliged by public pressure to disengage from volatile regions will simply subcontract that business to smaller and less scrupulous operators. This was one of Shell’s responses to calls to pull out of Nigeria: “If we leave,” the company said in effect, “the oil will still be taken out, but by companies that are less open to responsible dialogue than we are.” On one hand, this argument should be rejected summarily. As one philosopher comments on oil investment in the Sudan, “Providing strategic
resources and moral cover to a regime which is committing crimes against humanit... is wrong. No one should be involved in it, regardless of what anyone else does.” On the other hand, however offensive and self-serving such a corporate rationale, there is some truth to it. While companies like Shell and Chevron may have much to answer for, fly-by-night proxies are not necessarily desirable alternatives. Indeed, in companies like Petronas and Unocal we may already be seeing the emergence of a new breed of second-tier transnationals with business models premised on their comparative advantage in unsavory markets where more socially responsible companies fear to tread. Still, the conclusion remains that for those concerned with improving human and environmental conditions in resource-rich regions, private-sector corporations offer the best prospect for positive movement of any of the three legs of the violent-resource-extraction triangle.

A number of theoretical implications also emerge. The first is the need to direct analytical attention toward the economic rationality underlying these conflicts. Theoretical explanations that focus on ancient hatreds or primordial ethnic differences are unlikely to be of much use in explaining the market-oriented behavior of participants in violent, for-profit extraction of natural resources.

While much of the academic international relations literature has focused on “failed” or “collapsed” states, the dynamics of natural-resource conflicts suggest a different focus. A more fruitful avenue of inquiry might be the de facto privatization of the state by warlords, state leaders, and their global corporate partners. Very few states actually collapse. Even those that do, like Cambodia, Lebanon, and Somalia, are propped up juridically by the international society of sovereign states, which has a compelling interest in their at least nominal preservation. The institution of sovereignty is not in widespread decline and we should not expect to see large numbers of states collapsing in the coming years: “The main danger lies less in the disappearance of States than in their takeover by business interests.” Juridical states will continue to survive; the idea and practice of the nation-state, however, “will become ever more marginal to deals negotiated between local chiefs and transnationals, an imbalance in bargaining power if ever there was one.”

Theories of international relations are often presented in universal terms. In reality, their relevance may be limited to very specific regions or time periods. The insights generated by our focus on natural resource-related conflicts do not apply globally. Such factors as the simultaneous internationalization, centralization, and privatization of the state, and pressure on opposition groups to shift toward more market-oriented strategies, simply are not present in many instances. Nonetheless, if whatever theories are ultimately developed to explain the link between violence and resources are not universal, they will be relatively
broadly applicable across an equatorial belt of resource-rich states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Moving beyond this preliminary exploration of the conceptual issues surrounding natural resource–related conflicts, one of the first tasks would be to refine the typologies employed here and to see what (if any) generalizations, however contingent, emerge from them. In other words, is the violence surrounding natural resources higher or lower, or more or less amenable to peaceful settlement, when certain types of actors or resources are involved? Are there contingent generalizations that hold across particular subsets or types of natural resource–related conflicts?

A goal for further research should be to clarify how broadly or narrowly such contingent generalizations apply. It is still an open question whether or not economies based on commodities other than oil, like those of Botswana or Papua New Guinea, can fruitfully be compared to those of petro-states like Iraq and Venezuela. 48 Can all resource-rich or mineral-exporting states be treated similarly, or do, for example, diamond states have distinctly different dynamics than oil states? Recent empirical work suggests that both oil and other non-oil resources have strong and substantive anti-democratic effects, but clearly more needs to be done here. 49 Similarly, there is a potential selection bias at work toward cases like Angola, Burma, Colombia, and Sierra Leone. The danger here is that “in examining only cases of conflict, one is likely to find at least partial confirmation of whatever one is looking for.” 50 To address this problem, further research needs to be conducted into the question of why some resource-rich countries, like Botswana and Chile, have been able to avoid such conflict.

NOTES

3. Ibid., p. 605.
4. Accurate casualty figures for the Ijaw and Ogoni are difficult, if not impossible, to come by. Most estimates are that between two and three thousand Ogonis were killed from 1993 to 1995. According to Patterson Ogon of the Ijaw Council for Human Rights, approximately 2,600 Ijaws were killed in oil-related protests or repression between December 1998 and November 1999. An additional 1,763 Ijaws were killed in the town of Odi alone in November 1999. Personal interview, Port Harcourt, Nigeria, 15 January 2001.


Imagine a great metropolis covering hundreds of square miles. Once a vital component in a national economy, this sprawling urban environment is now a vast collection of blighted buildings, an immense petri dish of both ancient and new diseases, a territory where the rule of law has long been replaced by near anarchy in which the only security available is that which is attained through brute power.\(^1\) Such cities have been routinely imagined in apocalyptic movies and in certain science-fiction genres, where they are often portrayed as gigantic versions of T. S. Eliot’s Rat’s Alley.\(^2\) Yet this city would still be globally connected. It would possess at least a modicum of commercial linkages, and some of its inhabitants would have access to the world’s most modern communication and computing technologies. It would, in effect, be a feral city.

Admittedly, the very term “feral city” is both provocative and controversial. Yet this description has been chosen advisedly. The feral city may be a phenomenon that never takes place, yet its emergence should not be dismissed as impossible. The phrase also suggests, at least faintly, the nature of what may become one of the more difficult security challenges of the new century.

Over the past decade or so a great deal of scholarly attention has been paid to the phenomenon of failing states.\(^3\) Nor has this pursuit been undertaken solely by the academic community. Government leaders and military commanders as well as directors of nongovernmental organizations and intergovernmental bodies have attempted to deal with faltering, failing, and failed states. Involvement by the United
States in such matters has run the gamut from expressions of concern to cautious humanitarian assistance to full-fledged military intervention. In contrast, however, there has been a significant lack of concern for the potential emergence of failed cities. This is somewhat surprising, as the feral city may prove as common a feature of the global landscape of the first decade of the twenty-first century as the faltering, failing, or failed state was in the last decade of the twentieth. While it may be premature to suggest that a truly feral city—with the possible exception of Mogadishu—can be found anywhere on the globe today, indicators point to a day, not so distant, when such examples will be easily found.

This article first seeks to define a feral city. It then describes such a city’s attributes and suggests why the issue is worth international attention. A possible methodology to identify cities that have the potential to become feral will then be presented. Finally, the potential impact of feral cities on the U.S. military, and the U.S. Navy specifically, will be discussed.

DEFINITION AND ATTRIBUTES
The putative “feral city” is (or would be) a metropolis with a population of more than a million people in a state the government of which has lost the ability to maintain the rule of law within the city’s boundaries yet remains a functioning actor in the greater international system.

In a feral city social services are all but nonexistent, and the vast majority of the city’s occupants have no access to even the most basic health or security assistance. There is no social safety net. Human security is for the most part a matter of individual initiative. Yet a feral city does not descend into complete, random chaos. Some elements, be they criminals, armed resistance groups, clans, tribes, or neighborhood associations, exert various degrees of control over portions of the city. Intercity, city-state, and even international commercial transactions occur, but corruption, avarice, and violence are their hallmarks. A feral city experiences massive levels of disease and creates enough pollution to qualify as an international environmental disaster zone. Most feral cities would suffer from massive urban hypertrophy, covering vast expanses of land. The city’s structures range from once-great buildings symbolic of state power to the meanest shantytowns and slums. Yet even under these conditions, these cities continue to grow, and the majority of occupants do not voluntarily leave.

Feral cities would exert an almost magnetic influence on terrorist organizations. Such megalopolises will provide exceptionally safe havens for armed resistance groups, especially those having cultural affinity with at least one sizable segment of the city’s population. The efficacy and portability of the most modern computing and communication systems allow the activities of a worldwide
terrorist, criminal, or predatory and corrupt commercial network to be coordinated and directed with equipment easily obtained on the open market and packed into a minivan. The vast size of a feral city, with its buildings, other structures, and subterranean spaces, would offer nearly perfect protection from overhead sensors, whether satellites or unmanned aerial vehicles. The city’s population represents for such entities a ready source of recruits and a built-in intelligence network. Collecting human intelligence against them in this environment is likely to be a daunting task. Should the city contain airport or seaport facilities, such an organization would be able to import and export a variety of items. The feral city environment will actually make it easier for an armed resistance group that does not already have connections with criminal organizations to make them. The linkage between such groups, once thought to be rather unlikely, is now so commonplace as to elicit no comment.

WHAT’S NEW?
But is not much of this true of certain troubled urban areas of today and of the past? It is certainly true that cities have long bred diseases. Criminal gangs have often held sway over vast stretches of urban landscape and slums; “projects” and shantytowns have long been part of the cityscape. Nor is urban pollution anything new—London was environmentally toxic in the 1960s. So what is different about “feral cities”?

The most notable difference is that where the police forces of the state have sometimes opted not to enforce the rule of law in certain urban localities, in a feral city these forces will not be able to do so. Should the feral city be of special importance—for example, a major seaport or airport—the state might find it easier to negotiate power and profit-sharing arrangements with city power centers to ensure that facilities important to state survival continue to operate. For a weak state government, the ability of the feral city to resist the police forces of the state may make such negotiations the only option. In some countries, especially those facing massive development challenges, even the military would be unequal to imposing legal order on a feral city. In other, more developed states it might be possible to use military force to subdue a feral city, but the cost would be extremely high, and the operation would be more likely to leave behind a field of rubble than a reclaimed and functioning population center.

Other forms of state control and influence in a feral city would also be weak, and to an unparalleled degree. In a feral city, the state’s writ does not run. In fact, state and international authorities would be massively ignorant of the true nature of the power structures, population, and activities within a feral city.
Yet another difference will be the level and nature of the security threat posed by a feral city. Traditionally, problems of urban decay and associated issues, such as crime, have been seen as domestic issues best dealt with by internal security or police forces. That will no longer be an option.

**REASONS FOR CONCERN**

Indeed, the majority of threats posed by a feral city would be viewed as both nontraditional and transnational by most people currently involved with national security. Chief among the nontraditional threats are the potential for pandemics and massive environmental degradation, and the near certainty that feral cities will serve as major transshipment points for all manner of illicit commodities.

As has been noted, city-born pandemics are not new. Yet the toxic environment of a feral city potentially poses uniquely severe threats. A new illness or a strain of an existing disease could easily breed and mutate without detection in a feral city. Since feral cities would not be hermetically sealed, it is quite easy to envision a deadly and dangerously virulent epidemic originating from such places. As of this writing, the SARS outbreak of 2003 seems to offer an example of a city (Guangdong, China) serving as a pathogen incubator and point of origin of an intercontinental epidemic. In the case of SARS, the existence of the disease was rapidly identified, the origin was speedily traced, and a medical offensive was quickly mounted. Had such a disease originated in a feral city, it is likely that this process would have been much more complicated and taken a great deal more time. As it is, numerous diseases that had been believed under control have recently mutated into much more drug-resistant and virulent forms.

Globally, large cities are already placing significant environmental stress on their local and regional environments, and nowhere are these problems more pronounced than in coastal metropolises. A feral city—with minimal or no sanitation facilities, a complete absence of environmental controls, and a massive population—would be in effect a toxic-waste dump, poisoning coastal waters, watersheds, and river systems throughout their hinterlands.

Major cities containing ports or airfields are already trying to contend with black-market activity that ranges from evading legal fees, dues, or taxes to trafficking in illegal and banned materials. Black marketeers in a feral city would have carte blanche to ship or receive such materials to or from a global audience.

As serious as these transnational issues are, another threat is potentially far more dangerous. The anarchic allure of the feral city for criminal and terrorist groups has already been discussed. The combination of large profits from criminal activity and the increasing availability of all families of weapons might make it possible for relatively small groups to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
terrorist group in a feral city with access to world markets, especially if it can directly ship material by air or sea, might launch an all but untraceable attack from its urban haven.

GOING FERAL
Throughout history, major cities have endured massive challenges without “going feral.” How could it be determined that a city is at risk of becoming feral? What indicators might give warning? Is a warning system possible?

The answer is yes. This article offers just such a model, a taxonomy consisting of twelve sets of measurements, grouped into four main categories. In it, measurements representing a healthy city are “green,” those that would suggest cause for concern are “yellow,” and those that indicate danger, a potentially feral condition, “red.” In the table below, the upper blocks in each category (column) represent positive or healthy conditions, those at the bottom unhealthy ones.

THE HEALTH OF CITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Healthy (“Green”)</td>
<td>Enacts effective legislation, directs resources, controls events in all portions of the city all the time. Not corrupt.</td>
<td>Robust. Significant foreign investment. Provides goods and services. Possesses stable and adequate tax base.</td>
<td>Complete range of services, including educational and cultural, available to all city residents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginal (“Yellow”)</td>
<td>Exercises only “patchwork” or “diurnal” control. Highly corrupt.</td>
<td>Limited/no foreign investment. Subsidized or decaying industries and growing deficits.</td>
<td>Can manage minimal level of public health, hospital access, potable water, trash disposal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going Feral (“Red”)</td>
<td>At best has negotiated zones of control; at worst does not exist.</td>
<td>Either local subsistence industries or industry based on illegal commerce.</td>
<td>Intermittent to nonexistent power and water. Those who can afford to will privately contract.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first category assesses the ability of the state to govern the city. A city “in the green” has a healthy, stable government—though not necessarily a democratically elected one. A democratic city leadership is perhaps the most desirable, but some cities governed by authoritarian regimes could be at extremely low risk of becoming feral. City governments “in the green” would be able to enact effective legislation, direct resources, and control events in all parts of the city at all times. A yellow indication would indicate that city government enjoyed such authority only in portions of the city, producing what might be called “patchwork” governance, or that it exerted authority only during the day—“diurnal” governance. State authorities would be unable to govern a “red” city at all, or would govern in name only. An entity within the city claiming to be an
official representative of the state would simply be another actor competing for resources and power.

The second category involves the city’s economy. Cities “in the green” would enjoy a productive mix of foreign investment, service and manufacturing activities, and a robust tax base. Cities afforded a “yellow” rating would have ceased to attract substantial foreign investment, be marked by decaying or heavily subsidized industrial facilities, and suffer from ever-growing deficits. Cities “in the red” would have no governmental tax base. Any industrial activity within their boundaries would be limited to subsistence-level manufacturing and trade or to illegal trafficking—in smuggled materials, weapons, drugs, and so on.

The third category is focused on city services. Cities with a “green” rating would not only have a complete array of essential services but would provide public education and cultural facilities to their populations. These services would be available to all sectors without distinction or bias. Cities with a yellow rating would be lacking in providing education and cultural opportunities but would be able to maintain minimal levels of public health and sanitation. Trash pickup, ambulance service, and access to hospitals would all exist. Such a city’s water supply would pass minimum safety standards. In contrast, cities in the “red” zone would be unable to supply more than intermittent power and water, some not even that.

Security is the subject of the fourth category. “Green” cities, while obviously not crime free, would be well regulated by professional, ethical police forces, able to respond quickly to a wide spectrum of threats. “Yellow” cities would be marked by extremely high crime rates, disregard of whole families of “minor crimes” due to lack of police resources, and criminal elements capable of serious confrontations. A “yellow” city’s police force would have little regard for individual rights or legal constraints. In a “red” city, the police force has failed altogether or has become merely another armed group seeking power and wealth. Citizens must provide for their own protection, perhaps by hiring independent security personnel or paying protection to criminal organizations.

A special, overarching consideration is corruption. Cities “in the green” are relatively corruption free. Scandals are rare enough to be newsworthy, and when corruption is uncovered, self-policing mechanisms effectively deal with it. Corruption in cities “in the yellow” would be much worse, extending to every level of the city administration. In yellow cities, “patchwork” patterns might reflect which portions of the city were able to buy security and services and which were not. As for “red” cities, it would be less useful to speak of government corruption than of criminal and individual opportunism, which would be unconstrained.
CITY “MOSAICS”
The picture of a city that emerges is a mosaic, and like an artist’s mosaic it can be expected to contain more than one color. Some healthy cities function with remarkable degrees of corruption. Others, robust and vital in many ways, suffer from appalling levels of criminal activity. Even a city with multiple “red” categories is not necessarily feral—yet. It is the overall pattern and whether that pattern is improving or deteriorating over time that give the overall diagnosis.

It is important to remember a diagnostic tool such as this merely produces a “snapshot” and is therefore of limited utility unless supported by trend analysis. “Patchwork” and “diurnal” situations can exist in all the categories; an urban center with an overall red rating—that is, a feral city—might boast a tiny enclave where “green” conditions prevail; quite healthy cities experience cycles of decline and improvement. Another caution concerns the categories themselves. Although useful indicators of a city’s health, the boundaries are not clearly defined but can be expected to blur.

_The Healthy City: New York._ To some it would seem that New York is an odd example of a “green” city. One hears and recalls stories of corruption, police brutality, crime, pollution, neighborhoods that resemble war zones, and the like. Yet by objective indicators (and certainly in the opinion of the majority of its citizens) New York is a healthy city and in no risk of “going feral.” Its police force is well regulated, well educated, and responsive. The city is a hub of national and international investment. It generates substantial revenues and has a stable tax base. It provides a remarkable scope of services, including a wide range of educational and cultural opportunities. Does this favorable evaluation mean that the rich are not treated differently from the poor, that services and infrastructure are uniformly well maintained, or that there are no disparities of economic opportunity or race? Absolutely not. Yet despite such problems New York remains a viable municipality.

_The Yellow Zone: Mexico City._ This sprawling megalopolis of more than twenty million continues to increase in size and population every year. It is one of the largest urban concentrations in the world. As the seat of the Mexican government, it receives a great deal of state attention. However, Mexico City is now described as an urban nightmare.  

Mexico City’s air is so polluted that it is routinely rated medically as unfit to breathe. There are square miles of slums, often without sewage or running water. Law and order is breaking down at an accelerating rate. Serious crime has doubled over the past three to four years; it is estimated that 15.5 million assaults now occur every year in Mexico City. Car-jacking and taxi-jacking have reached such epidemic proportions that visitors are now officially warned not to use the cabs. The Mexico City police department has ninety-one thousand officers—
more men than the Canadian army—but graft and corruption on the force are rampant and on the rise. According to Mexican senator Adolfo Zinser, police officers themselves directly contribute to the city’s crime statistics: “In the morning they are a policeman. In the afternoon they’re crooks.” The city’s judicial system is equally corrupt. Not surprisingly, these aspects of life in Mexico City have reduced the willingness of foreign investors to send money or representatives there.

**Johannesburg: On a Knife Edge.** As in many South African cities, police in Johannesburg are waging a desperate war for control of their city, and it is not clear whether they will win. Though relatively small in size, with only 2.9 million official residents, Johannesburg nevertheless experiences more than five thousand murders a year and at least twice as many rapes. Over the last several years investors and major industry have fled the city. Many of the major buildings of the Central Business District have been abandoned and are now home to squatters. The South African National Stock Exchange has been removed to Sandton—a safer northern suburb. Police forces admit they do not control large areas of the city; official advisories warn against driving on certain thoroughfares. At night residents are advised to remain in their homes. Tourism has dried up, and conventions, once an important source of revenue, are now hosted elsewhere in the country.

The city also suffers from high rates of air pollution, primarily from vehicle exhaust but also from the use of open fires and coal for cooking and heating. Johannesburg’s two rivers are also considered unsafe, primarily because of untreated human waste and chemicals leaching from piles of mining dross. Mining has also contaminated much of the soil in the vicinity.

Like those of many states and cities in Africa, Johannesburg’s problems are exacerbated by the AIDS epidemic. Nationally it is feared the number of infected persons may reach as high as 20 percent of the population. All sectors of the economy have been affected adversely by the epidemic, including in Johannesburg.

Although Mexico City and Johannesburg clearly qualify for “yellow” and “red” status, respectively, it would be premature to predict that either of these urban centers will inevitably become feral. Police corruption has been an aspect of Mexico City life for decades; further, the recent transition from one political party to two and a downswing in the state economy may be having a temporarily adverse influence on the city. In the case of Johannesburg, the South African government has most definitely not given up on attempts to revive what was once an industrial and economic showplace. In both Mexico and South Africa there are dedicated men and women who are determined to eliminate corruption, clean the environment, and better the lives of the people. Yet a note of caution is appropriate, for in neither example is the trend in a positive direction.
Further—and it should come as no surprise—massive cities in the developing world are at far greater risk of becoming feral than those in more developed states. Not only are support networks in such regions much less robust, but as a potentially feral city grows, it consumes progressively more resources. Efforts to meet its growing needs often no more than maintain the status quo or, more often, merely slow the rate of decay of government control and essential services. All this in turn reduces the resources that can be applied to other portions of the country, and it may well increase the speed of urban hypertrophy. However, even such developed states as Brazil face the threat of feral cities. For example, in March 2003 criminal cartels controlled much of Rio de Janeiro. Rio police would not enter these areas, and in effect pursued toward them a policy of containment.

FERAL CITIES AND THE U.S. MILITARY
Feral cities do not represent merely a sociological or urban-planning issue; they present unique military challenges. Their very size and densely built-up character make them natural havens for a variety of hostile nonstate actors, ranging from small cells of terrorists to large paramilitary forces and militias. History indicates that should such a group take American hostages, successful rescue is not likely. Combat operations in such environments tend to be manpower intensive; limiting noncombatant casualties can be extraordinarily difficult. An enemy more resolute than that faced in the 2003 war with Iraq could inflict substantial casualties on an attacking force. The defense of the Warsaw ghetto in World War II suggests how effectively a conventional military assault can be resisted in this environment. Also, in a combat operation in a feral city the number of casualties from pollutants, toxins, and disease may well be higher than those caused by the enemy.

These environmental risks could also affect ships operating near a feral city. Its miles-long waterfront may offer as protected and sheltered a setting for antishipping weapons as any formal coastal defense site. Furthermore, many port cities that today, with proper security procedures, would be visited for fuel and other supplies will, if they become feral, no longer be available. This would hamper diplomatic efforts, reduce the U.S. Navy’s ability to show the flag, and complicate logistics and supply for forward-deployed forces.

Feral cities, as and if they emerge, will be something new on the international landscape. Cities have descended into savagery in the past, usually as a result of war or civil conflict, and armed resistance groups have operated out of urban centers before. But feral cities, as such, will be a new phenomenon and will pose security threats on a scale hitherto not encountered. It is questionable whether the tools, resources, and strategies that would be required to deal with these threats exist at present. But given the indications of the imminent emergence of feral cities, it is time to begin creating the means.
NOTES

1. I am indebted to my colleague Dr. James Miskel for the “petri dish” analogy.


4. Perhaps the most arbitrary component of this definition is the selection of a million inhabitants as a defining characteristic of a feral city. An earlier approach to this issue focused on megacities, cities with more than ten million inhabitants. However, subsequent research indicated that much smaller cities could also become feral, and so the population threshold was reduced. For more information on concepts of urbanization see Stanley D. Brunn, Jack F. Williams, and Donald J. Zeigler, Cities of the World: World Regional Urban Development (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), pp. 5–14.

5. Such a pattern is already visible today. See Brunn, Williams, and Zeigler, chap. 1.


7. The issue of pollution stemming from coastal cities is well documented. For example, see chapter two of United Nations Environmental Program, Global Environmental Outlook—2000 (London: Earthscan, 2001).

8. The profits involved in such enterprises can be staggering. For example, the profits from smuggled cigarettes in 1997 were estimated to be as high as sixteen billion dollars a year. Among the identified major smuggling centers were Naples, Italy; Hong Kong; and Bogota, Colombia. Raymond Bonner and Christopher Drew, “Cigarette Makers Are Seen as Aiding Rise in Smuggling,” New York Times, 26 August 1997, C1.

9. A similar approach was used in Miskel and Norton, cited above, for developing a taxonomy for identifying failing states.

10. This is not to imply that such a city would be 100 percent law-abiding or that incidents of government failure could not be found. But these conditions would be the exception and not the rule.

11. Not that this would present no complications. It is likely that states containing a feral city would not acknowledge a loss of sovereignty over the metropolis, even if this were patently the case. Such claims could pose a significant obstacle to collective international action.


14. Compiled from a variety of sources, including BBC reports.

15. Brunn, Williams, and Zeigler, p. 37.

16. Interview, Dr. Peter Liotta, with the author, Newport, R.I., 14 April 2003.

17. While the recent successful rescue of Army Private First Class Jessica Lynch during the 2003 Iraq War demonstrates that success in such operations is not impossible, U.S. experiences with hostages in Iran, Lebanon, and Somalia would suggest failure is a more likely outcome.

18. It is predicted that 60 percent of the world’s population will live in an urban environment by the year 2030, as opposed to 47 percent in 2000. Furthermore, the majority of this growth will occur in less developed countries, especially in coastal South Asia. More than fifty-eight cities will boast populations of more than five million people. Brunn, Williams, and Zeigler, pp. 9–11.
Between 1968 and 1971, Whitehall assigned the Royal Navy an unusual mission—to defend a series of disputed Persian Gulf islands while the United Kingdom was selling arms to and conducting naval exercises with Iran, the very country that threatened to invade them. The ownership of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb—three islands astride the western approaches to the Strait of Hormuz—was as controversial in the late 1960s as it is today. The current controversy has its roots in complicated historical claims and the way Great Britain defended, and ultimately negotiated a handoff of, the three islands. Today it is possible to gain a far more refined understanding of Britain’s naval and diplomatic strategy for protecting and then disposing of the contested islands. Hundreds of formerly secret British military and diplomatic documents have been declassified and released on the subject since 1999. They are a rich resource for understanding the controversies associated with British naval planning to defend the islands and London’s undertakings to its former charges when it finally withdrew from the Gulf in 1971.

Richard Mobley, a retired naval intelligence officer, was assigned to the Defense Intelligence Liaison Office in London between 1998 and 2001. A graduate of the National War College and Georgetown University (M.A., history), he completed a series of overseas assignments in the Middle East and Asia. He was assigned to the staff of Commander, Middle East Force, and also made several Mediterranean and Indian Ocean deployments. Since his retirement from the Navy, he has served as an intelligence analyst for the U.S. government.

BACKDROP
Tehran and London had long disputed ownership of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. For over a century, Britain had engaged in “indirect rule” of the Arab states abutting the Gulf. Under treaties signed with tribal leaders, the United Kingdom would handle defense and foreign policy but leave domestic affairs to the emirs themselves. By 1970, the defense policy
required a commitment of forces to defend such Gulf client states as Bahrain, Qatar, and the Trucial States. The United Kingdom prepared contingency plans (such as HELIX, or Reinforced Theatre Plan [Gulf] No. 1) to protect such states against their neighbors—Iraq, Iran, and each other). The plans required a relatively small presence of British air, naval, and ground forces, which were based primarily in Bahrain and Sharjah (now one of the emirates of the United Arab Emirates). The long-standing plans relied on timely alertment, rapid implementation, and speedy reinforcements from outside the Gulf.2

All such contingency plans became harder to implement in January 1968, when Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced that Britain would withdraw from its defense commitments east of Suez. Its defense obligations and military presence in the Gulf were to cease by December 1971. The key players on the military side, notably the Chiefs of Staff Committee and Commander, British Forces Gulf, accordingly began planning for a “run-down” of British forces. This task was particularly challenging because Britain remained obligated to defend the Gulf client states until the withdrawal was complete, no matter how much the British overseas force structure had shrunk at any given time—and, as the table shows, the withdrawal from the Gulf was to occur rapidly.

However, the Royal Navy also relied on a naval “covering force” from the Far East. As of September 1971, an attack carrier would be able to respond to Gulf contingencies within two weeks. In November 1971, an attack carrier was scheduled to be able to respond within five days; a helicopter assault ship (LPH) could enter the Gulf within eight days.3

While in the process of withdrawing, the United Kingdom would also continue to craft foreign policy on behalf of its clients. Unfortunately, anticipating the imminent departure, Iran, ruled by Shah Reza Pahlavi, began immediately more forcefully asserting its long-standing claim to Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. Tehran claimed legal ownership of the islands and declared a desire to ensure stability of the Gulf (and protect sea lines of communication through the Strait of Hormuz) by occupying them. In response, the United Kingdom, on behalf of the emirates of Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah, asserted that all three islands were Arab territory. London explicitly backed Sharjah’s claim to Abu Musa and Ras Al Khaimah’s claim to the Tunbs. With its security obligations scheduled to lapse by the end of 1971, however, Great Britain attempted to resolve the islands dispute, while fostering the creation of the new United Arab Emirates (UAE).4
The British were well aware of the conflicting interests involved in the southern Persian Gulf. The Foreign Office repeatedly described the high stakes inherent in the British intermediating position. On one hand were large British arms sales to Iran, Iranian support for maintaining regional stability via the Central Treaty Organization, and Tehran’s acquiescence to Bahraini independence and, in late 1971, the founding of the United Arab Emirates. On the other side of the ledger was London’s desire to retain influence in the Arab world and foster stability in the Persian Gulf even after Britain’s military withdrawal from the region.  

Accordingly, Britain crafted a military strategy designed to straddle the fence. Commander, British Forces Gulf (CBFG) would monitor Iranian approaches to the islands and intensify air and naval patrols should the shah seem too interested in them. Beyond such posturing, the extent to which Britain should go to defend the islands was controversial. Faced with debates within Whitehall and between London and its representatives in the field, the United Kingdom crafted a compromise, top secret plan designed to bluff any Iranian invading force away from Abu Musa (Great Britain considered the Tunbs indefensible)—that is, to deter Iran without alienating it. A second plan was formulated to retake the islands (and thereby forestall an Iranian invasion) should they be seized by Arab guerillas.

Britain’s different approach to the three islands was based in part on geography. Abu Musa is closer to Arab shores (lying south of a notional median line that the United Kingdom was arguing could be used to divide the Gulf) and more salient to Arab clients; the Tunbs were closer to Iran. Abu Musa was larger than the other two islands, and oil and gas reserves were suspected to lie about six miles to the southeast. From an Arab perspective, the Tunbs had little to offer.

The Tunbs are seventeen miles southwest of Iran’s Qeshm Island and forty-six miles northwest of the nearest point on the UAE coastline. Greater Tunb is roughly 2.5 miles in diameter and had at the time a population of approximately 150 Arabs. Lesser Tunb is eight miles to the southwest; it was barren, waterless, and uninhabited. Neither had airstrips, jetties, or fuel supplies. The shah, however, had long focused his attention on the Tunbs, and in the late 1960s he began to press his claim to Abu Musa with equal vigor. Abu Musa suffered from the same lack of militarily useful facilities as did the Tunbs.

**PENSUM**

When Prime Minister Wilson announced the end of British treaty commitments east of the Suez Canal (a position that Edward Heath’s Conservatives would sustain when they assumed power in 1970), the shah became more vocal about Iranian claims to the islands. He argued that only Iran could now ensure safety and stability in the Gulf, including freedom of shipping through the Strait of
Hormuz, and that to do so Iranian forces would have to garrison the islands. London worried that Iran might seize the islands even before Britain left the Gulf. In January 1968, the United Kingdom did not even have a contingency plan to defend the islands and lacked basic knowledge about beaches it might have to assault. This would change when the Imperial Iranian Navy began operating close to the Tunbs.

The first “mini-crisis” started on 12 January 1968, when a photo-reconnaissance Royal Air Force (RAF) Canberra sighted and photographed the Iranian frigate *Bayandor* anchored approximately one mile east of the Tunbs. (Commander, British Forces Gulf routinely reconnoitered the disputed islands and monitored southern Gulf waters to prevent illegal immigration and arms smuggling into the Trucial States.) An RAF Shackleton, a propeller-driven maritime patrol aircraft, quickly corroborated the sighting. Fearing that Iran would occupy Tunb, CBFG prepared to deploy elements of the Trucial Oman Scouts to defend it—if Iranian troops were not already there. The scouts were put on four-hour alert. However, when London’s emissary to the Trucial States arrived on the island from Dubai the next day, *Bayandor* was gone. Instead of garrisoning any of the islands, CBFG settled for continued aerial surveillance of the surrounding waters.

The Royal Air Force’s interest in Iranian shipping near the Tunbs provoked an Iranian warning. *Bayandor* had manned and trained its guns on the Shackleton that overflew it near the Tunbs on 12 January. Great Britain and Iran both protested the incident. The United Kingdom declared that it was “deeply disturbed” that the Iranian navy had violated the territorial waters of the Tunbs (i.e., those of Ras Al Khaimah). Iran for its part protested repeated “harassing flights” over an Iranian naval vessel operating in “Iran’s coastal waters.” An Iranian diplomatic note warned that such surveillance was “unfriendly” and that if the flights continued the Iranian ship would “take such action as considered necessary in accordance with international law.”

A month went by before the next development in this crisis, when British maritime patrol aircraft flew repeated surveillance passes near the Iranian naval auxiliary *Tahmadou* in the southern gulf. Admiral Rasa’i, commander of the Iranian navy, complained to Commander, British Forces Gulf that a large RAF
aircraft (presumably a Shackleton) had repeatedly overflown Tahmadou as it operated near the Tunbs. He asked for an explanation for the incidents, which might be “misinterpreted” in Tehran. When debriefed, the Shackleton crew explained that it had initially approached the vessel about midday on 22 February, no closer than 440 yards, at an altitude of four hundred feet. Recognizing it to be a naval auxiliary, the Shackleton stood off. The two subsequent passes had approached no closer than a mile away. Rasa’i accepted the explanation but asked that British patrol aircraft stand off at least three miles from Iranian warships unless they had prior permission to approach closer.\textsuperscript{16}

On the British side, the seeming Iranian threat to the Tunbs sparked an internal debate about how to defend the islands. A dialogue between Sir Stewart Crawford, the political resident (the senior diplomatic official in the theater, responsible for orchestrating British foreign policy in the Gulf), and Frank Brenchley and M. Weir, in the Foreign Office Eastern Department, framed the argument. Crawford, with the agreement of CBFG, concluded that the best way to defend the islands against Iran was by stationing troops on them. He wanted at least to erect a radio transmitter on Greater Tunb to speed the flow of information from this remote island. The Foreign Office Eastern Department countered that a confrontation might escalate and “seriously endanger our considerable interests in Iran, commercial (including oil) and military (overflying).” (The best way for the United Kingdom to support its forces in the Far East entailed flying through Iranian airspace.)\textsuperscript{17} The Foreign Office held that garrisoning the islands would be too provocative. Indeed, the Eastern Department considered relations with Iran so important that it questioned whether Great Britain should resort to any kind of military force to protect the islands. If Iran invaded the islands, Weir’s version of “defense” was merely to lodge a diplomatic protest in the United Nations and perhaps suspend arms deliveries to Iran: “I should find it difficult to approve a recommendation to put troops on the islands even if an Iranian move appeared imminent.”\textsuperscript{18}

The political resident, in response, cited Britain’s repeated pronouncements that it would defend the Trucial States. What would London say if one of the trucial sheikhs asked for British reassurance as an Iranian threat developed? “Either the Minister of State and the Prime Minister meant what they said in stating that so long as we had the capability we should continue to honour our obligations, or they did not.”\textsuperscript{19}

A second mini-crisis, however, seems to have forced the United Kingdom to begin planning to defend the islands militarily. On 29 March 1968, the Foreign Office received a report (from uncited sources) that Iran might try to seize the Tunbs over the next two days. Abandoning the Eastern Department’s earlier passivity, the Foreign Office requested immediate Royal Navy patrols off the
disputed islands. CBFG consequently ordered two minesweepers to make a day-light transit past the northern side of Tunb Island on 30 March. Either the assault ship HMS *Intrepid* or the frigate HMS *Tartar*, or both, would also steam by the islands on the thirty-first, while Shackletons reconnoitered the area. (Ironically, *Intrepid* had just been conducting assault landings with the Iranians.) None of these units were to do anything other than report back to Whitehall if Iran invaded the islands. After the transits, the Defence Ministry warned the theater commander that the “situation . . . is still very delicate and all provocative action is to be avoided.” Iran never attempted to occupy the islands during this episode.20

Using the just-ended crisis as a scene-setter, Sir Stewart made his case for a formal plan to defend the island. He argued that the shah remained a threat to the islands despite diplomatic warnings and air and naval patrols. The United Kingdom could defend the islands by preemptively landing troops before the Iranians could arrive. He reasoned that Iran might attempt to seize the Tunbs first, given their relative proximity to Iran and perceived strategic importance to the shah. If Iran took the Tunbs, Crawford believed, CBFG should land on Abu Musa before the Iranians could arrive there as well.21

Accordingly, in April the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence directed the preparation of a contingency plan for British troops to occupy Abu Musa should Iran threaten or occupy the Tunbs. The Foreign Office explained its change of heart to the defense minister. It admitted that the United Kingdom had previously ruled out landing on the islands to deter an Iranian assault. Now, however, it argued, a British failure to take more than diplomatic action would “rally Arab opinion against us, again with severe damage to our interests, including difficulties over the military withdrawal from the Gulf.”22 However, Whitehall continued to foreclose the obvious solution of simply stationing a permanent garrison on the islands, because such a move would provoke Iran. Moreover, a British garrison would have to be withdrawn when Great Britain left the Gulf, whereas a garrison manned by Trucial Oman Scouts could simply be overrun once the United Kingdom departed.

From this debate emerged PENSUM, the United Kingdom’s primary plan to deter Iran from invading any of the disputed islands; it remained effective from spring 1969 until the United Kingdom withdrew from the Gulf in December 1971. It called for a military bluff—a show of force in which British units would be prohibited from actually attacking Iranian invaders. To deter Iran from seizing the Tunbs, CBFG would merely increase sea and air patrols around them. A Royal Navy frigate or minesweeper could be on station as well with twenty-four hours’ notification. The British combatant would advise Iranian ships approaching to within three miles of the island (and apparently intending to land
troops) that they were within Ras al Khaimah’s territorial waters. The Royal Navy would formally protest the landing, but its warship on the scene would not attempt to prevent it. Neither would British troops land on either island, under any circumstances. As for Abu Musa, CBFG would also increase patrol activity. If the Iranians seized the Tunbs, two Wessex helicopters could transport a platoon of up to thirty-two people from Sharjah to Abu Musa—provided the Iranian army had not already arrived there. (If CBFG belatedly discovered an Iranian military presence on Abu Musa, the British assault platoon would turn around and helicopter back to base.) The remainder of an infantry company (presumably the platoon’s parent company) could reinforce the platoon. Assuming the British military got to the island first, the British commander would warn the Iranian commander that Abu Musa was Arab territory under the protection of the United Kingdom and that his force was not to land. If the Iranians landed anyway, the British platoon was to “endeavor to restrict their further movement from the point of disembarkation without using force.” In no case were British military units to attack Iranian forces, whether or not they overran Abu Musa, except in self-defense or to defend the lives of island inhabitants.

BUDLET/ACCOLL

Great Britain never had to implement PENSUM. However, the Royal Navy soon found itself in the middle of a battle among three emirates, two international oil companies, and Iran. This third mini-crisis began in the spring of 1970, when the rulers of the emirates of Umm al Qaywayn and Ajman permitted the Occidental Petroleum Corporation to start exploratory drilling 6.5 miles southeast of Abu Musa. Unfortunately, unbeknownst to any of the participants, Sharjah had extended its claimed territorial limit around Abu Musa from three to twelve miles in September 1969, and it had awarded a drilling concession of its own for the same area, to the Buttes Oil and Gas Corporation.

Word of the conflicting drilling leases and territorial claims spread, and Iran entered the act. The Iranian foreign minister warned that his nation’s warships would prevent Occidental from drilling in the disputed zone. Nevertheless, the firm’s drilling operation moved toward Abu Musa late in May 1970. Occidental initially advised that drilling would not start before 1 June. Meanwhile, RAF Hunters (fighters) deployed to nearby Sharjah, and Shackletons flying daily surveillance missions searched for Occidental’s derrick barges, survey vessels, and tugs, as well as for Iranian warships that might be en route to the contested drilling zone. The Royal Navy committed four minesweepers to the operation.

The United Kingdom was determined to prevent a maritime blowup. To stop Occidental from drilling, the Foreign Office used diplomatic pressure but also
requested CBFG to stand by to tow away the drilling platforms and take other actions to prevent drilling operations. Royal Navy units were to “obstruct” the drilling platforms if they attempted to work in the disputed areas. Royal Marines embarked aboard the minesweeper HMS *Gavinton* to board the barges should Occidental insist on drilling despite British warnings. The political agent in Dubai warned Occidental on 31 May that drilling would violate an edict of the ruler of Umm al Qaywayn. Next day, the Royal Navy warned Occidental that it was not to begin drilling in the disputed area for at least three months. After two days of intense diplomacy, Occidental agreed. On 3 June, its drilling barge departed for Khafji, Saudi Arabia.27

Commander, British Forces Gulf considered the outcome favorable. The British ships and aircraft had “exerted a stabilising influence” by demonstrating London’s intention and ability to prevent drilling operations (and discourage “precipitate” Iranian naval action). Occidental, however, was less impressed and initiated legal action against the Royal Navy and other elements of the British government. The firm claimed that the United Kingdom had illegally hindered its operation and in the process damaged a drilling rig.28

Eight months later, the shah intensified pressure on London and its client states. In February 1971 he gave a public interview echoing what he had said privately—Iran would simply seize the three islands if a diplomatic solution was not forthcoming. Iranian naval activity buttressed his warnings. Iranian warships thrice violated the territorial limits of the Tunbs that month. In a fourth instance, an Iranian vessel put a landing party onto Greater Tunb Island.29

Over the next month, London concluded that the risk of Iranian invasion of the islands before the final British departure had grown. The Chief of Defence Staff reminded his staff as well as senior service leaders that the Joint Intelligence Committee had recently concluded that “there [were] substantial reasons” why Iran might invade the islands before the British withdrawal.30 In particular, he and the Foreign Office worried that Iran’s increased pressure over the Tunbs might produce an unconventional response from radical Arab states (such as Iraq) or a state-sponsored guerilla group. The diplomats specifically feared that to preempt an Iranian invasion, an Arab guerilla
force of perhaps fifty men landing from dhows might seize one or all of the islands. Iran might respond by invading the islands, potentially while they remained under British protection. The Foreign Office confirmed to the military that Iran should understand “that our protection of the disputed islands is not merely nominal, but will be real and effective up to the date of our departure.”

Whitehall thus wanted to be able to block seizure of the islands by unconventional warfare forces—either Arab or Iranian.

Accordingly, the Defence Ministry in March 1971 directed that the theater commander prepare a new plan. Commander, British Forces Gulf quickly realized that information on landing beaches on the Tunbs was lacking. On the night of 13 April 1971, the minesweeper Puncheston conducted a clandestine beach survey. With the intelligence the ship collected, CBFG completed a contingency plan known as BUDLET/ACCOLL in May. BUDLET addressed the prevention of a landing of up to fifty guerrillas on all three of the islands. If the guerrillas succeeded anyway, British forces were to “evict” them under subplan ACCOLL. In this event the Royal Navy would blockade the islands and warn the intruders to surrender or to leave the islands. If the warnings were unheeded, helicopters and ships would deploy a squadron of the Trucial Oman Scouts to the islands. Hunter aircraft would provide close air support. Unlike in PENSUM, British forces were not restricted by ACCOLL from engaging the enemy.

Interestingly, the Foreign Office felt that the United Kingdom might choose not to implement the plan even if guerrillas invaded the islands. Rather, the Foreign Office opined hopefully, an Arab guerrilla invasion might provide an opportunity for Iran and the emirates to cooperate in evicting the insurgents. It concluded in a memorandum for the record that “political considerations” might “militate as strongly against preemption as they do against garrisoning of the islands.”

The real purpose of the plan, of course, was to convince the shah that he did not need to invade the islands while the British were defending them. In May 1971, the ink barely dry on BUDLET/ACCOLL, Sir William Luce of the Foreign Office flew to Tehran to pursue further negotiations and to reassure the shah that the United Kingdom now had contingency plans to defend the islands.

By 15 November, after energetic negotiation by Sir William, Iran and Sharjah had reached “virtual agreement” on Abu Musa. Iran and Sharjah would occupy separate parts of the island; there would be a twelve-mile territorial limit around Abu Musa, and the inhabitants could fish in both countries’ zones. Sharjah would designate a company to exploit the oil resources off Abu Musa; Iran and Sharjah would split the revenues. In a separate agreement, Iran would provide aid to Sharjah for nine years. A memorandum of understanding
from Sharjah to the United Kingdom (and agreed to by Iran on 25 November 1971) summarized all this.

Luce foresaw that with the agreement signed with Abu Musa and with Ras al Kaimah’s refusal to cede the Tunbs to Iran under any circumstances, Iran would simply station forces on all three islands a day or so before the agreement was announced—most likely between 30 November and 3 December 1971. In fact, they landed on the thirtieth. Sharjah sent a representative to greet the Iranian troops. However, the Iranians encountered token resistance when they landed on the Tunbs, with the result that four Iranians and Arabs were killed.

“REASONABLE HOPES FOR STABILITY”?
The residual military presence in the Gulf and the flurry of contingency planning between 1968 and 1971 doubtless afforded some reassurance in Whitehall as Britain pursued a diplomatic resolution of the islands dispute. However, to maintain the status quo Great Britain ruled out what it knew to be the most directly effective means of protecting them—establishing garrisons. PENSUM could well have backfired; from the tone of his statements, it is hard to believe that the shah would have backed down once having decided to invade Abu Musa. The image of a British platoon begging the shah’s troops not to land on Abu Musa is not an attractive one. Would the posturing envisioned in PENSUM really have been better than doing nothing?

BUDLET/ACCOLL at least reflected a coherent strategy and a reasonable matching of means (the residual British force in the Gulf) and ends (removal of a small guerilla band). The Chiefs of Staff Committee believed the operation could be completed within a month. Rapid and effective action might have forestalled an Iranian invasion.

At the end of the day, the cabinet viewed the episode as a success story. In December 1971 Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the foreign minister, told the cabinet that “there were [now] reasonable hopes for stability in the Gulf area, an outcome for which our emissary, Sir William Luce, deserved warm congratulations.”

The conspicuous Royal Navy and Air Force presence had supplemented British diplomacy in deterring Iran. Iran ultimately invaded the islands, but on the last day of British protectorate; it had not humiliated the United Kingdom by doing so months earlier, when the islands had been manifestly under British protection. (Presumably Tehran was concerned to allow responsibility for the “loss” of the islands to fall on London rather than on the emirates themselves—which accordingly were not honor bound to seek reprisals or reverse the situation.)

Today, despite the Royal Navy’s efforts in 1971, the status of the islands remains controversial. In 2003 testimony before the International Court of Justice, the United States accused Iran of using Abu Musa as a base for helicopter and
Boghammar speedboat attacks against commercial shipping during the “tanker war” of the 1980s. In 1992, the United Arab Emirates accused Iran of violating understandings reached when Sharjah allowed Iranian forces onto Abu Musa (Ras Al Khaimah, now part of the UAE, never accepted Iranian occupation of the Tunbs). Specifically, the UAE protested Iran’s attempts to limit access to Abu Musa, and Iran evidently became concerned that the UAE might even invade the islands (with outside assistance). Indeed, when the United States surged forces into the Gulf in response to renewed Iraqi threats to Kuwait in the fall of 1994, Iran reportedly increased its defenses on Abu Musa. Tehran’s hold on these islands is likely to remain a sensitive point as the United States occasionally “surges” naval forces into the Gulf, as well as intensifies its rhetoric, in its campaign against the “axis of evil.”

NOTES


2. Chiefs of Staff Committee, “Reinforcement of British Forces Gulf from 1 November 1970 until Completion of Withdrawal,” 15 October 1970 (DEFE 5/187). [All British documents cited in this essay are stored in the Public Record Office in Kew Gardens.] Commander British Forces Gulf (CBFG) prepared HELIX to reinforce the Gulf between 1 November 1970 and withdrawal. The plan would have reinforced CBFG with two infantry units, an armored vehicle squadron, and a light artillery battery. Initial units would arrive in Bahrain or Sharjah within seventy hours of the execute order.

3. Ibid. In fact, the final withdrawal of British forces from the Gulf in December 1971 relied upon a flotilla (carrier included) that entered the Gulf.


9. Bahrain to FO, 5 April 1968 (DEFE 25/265); “Measures to Counter an External Arab Threat.”


12. CBFG message date-time group 121800Z January 1968 (FCO 8/54).
13. FO memorandum, "Record of a Meeting between the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and the Iranian Ambassador," 15 January 1968 (FCO 8/54).
14. FO to Tehran, 26 January 1968 (FCO 8/54).
15. Diplomatic note from Iranian embassy to foreign minister, 15 January 1968 (FCO 8/54).
17. FO to Bahrain, 14 February 1968 (DEFE 11/549).
24. Ibid.
25. N. Barrington, FCO, to P. Moon (Prime Minister’s Office), 28 May 1970 (DEFE 25/244); FCO background note on Abu Musa/Iran dispute, 28 May 1970 (DEFE 25/244); CBFG, letter to Secretary to Chiefs of Staff Committee, “The Abu Musa Incident,” 13 June 1970 (DEFE 28/576).
27. Ibid.; CBFG message date-time group 010745Z June 1970, “Abu Musa Sitrep No. 3” (DEFE 25/244).
33. Bahrain Residency message date-time group 160915Z April 1969 (DEFE 28/576); “Measures to Counter an External Arab Threat.”
35. FCO to ACDS (Ops) Staff, 3 May 1971 (DEFE28/576).
38. American embassy Tehran message date-time group 150803Z November 1971, NSC files, box 602, Nixon Collection, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
40. Cabinet meeting minutes, 2 December 1971 (CAB 128/49/61).

42. In March 1995, the Defense Department announced that Iran had increased its military presence on the islands from a few hundred to over a thousand troops. It had also emplaced a Hawk surface-to-air missile battery, some artillery, and ten older tanks. See Kenneth Bacon’s press conference of 2 March 1995, available at www.defenselink.mil.
Dr. Liotta is the Jerome E. Levy Chair of Economic Geography and National Security at the Naval War College. A former Fulbright scholar to Yugoslavia during its breakup as a nation-state and attaché to the Hellenic Republic, he has lived in and traveled extensively throughout the former Soviet Union, Central and Southwest Asia (including Iran), Europe, and the Balkan Peninsula. He has received a Pulitzer Prize nomination, a National Endowment for the Arts literature fellowship, the International Quarterly Crossing Boundaries Award, and the Robert H. Winner Award from the Poetry Society of America. His recent work includes Dismembering the State: The Death of Yugoslavia and Why It Matters (2001) and The Wolf at the Door: A Poetic Cycle Translated from the Macedonian of Bogomil Gjuzel (2001). Forthcoming work includes The Fight for Legitimacy: Democracy Versus Terrorism and Cry, the Imagined Country: Legitimacy and the Fate of Macedonia, as well as The Uncertain Certainty: Human Security, Environmental Change, and the Future Euro-Mediterranean.

Professor Timothy E. Somes’s efforts as the founding chairman of the Naval War College’s Department of Joint Military Operations were instrumental in the subsequent success of the Naval War College in obtaining master’s degree granting authority and certification as a joint professional military educational institution. After his retirement from active naval service he was a professor of strategy and force planning in the Department of National Security Decision Making for many years. In the course of his thirty years of active duty with the U.S. Navy, he served in a number of submarine command and postcommand billets during the Cold War, subsequently occupying the Naval War College’s Charles H. Lockwood Chair of Submarine Warfare. He has coedited numbers of articles and textbooks on security, strategy, and force planning, including the widely used text Strategy and Force Planning (1st through 3rd editions) and the earlier three-volume Fundamentals of Force Planning, both published by the Naval War College Press. His articles on force planning and maritime related matters include "Musing on Naval Maneuver Warfare" and "Force Planning, Military Revolutions and the Tyranny of Technology," “The Art of Strategy and Force Planning," which he coauthored, introduced generations of Naval War College students to what they have affectionately labeled the “Bartlett Donut.” He recently became professor emeritus at the Naval War College. His retirement marked the conclusion of forty-eight years of service in and for the U.S. Navy.
“Scenarios give . . . [decision makers] something very precious: the ability to reperceive reality.”

—PIERRE WACK

In the days when pharaohs ruled Egypt, a temple stood far up the Nile, beyond the cataracts in Nubia, in what is now the northern desert of the Sudan. Three tributaries joined together in that region to form the Nile, which flowed down one thousand miles to produce a miraculous event each year, the flooding of its river basin, which permitted Egyptian farmers to grow crops in the hot, rainless midsummer.

Every spring, the temple priests gathered at the river’s edge to check the color of the water. If it was clear, the White Nile, which flowed from Lake Victoria through the Sudanese swamps, would dominate the flow. The flooding would be mild, and late; farmers would produce a minimum of crops. If the stream appeared dark, the stronger waters of the Blue Nile, which joined the White Nile at Khartoum, would prevail. The flood would rise enough to saturate the fields and provide a bountiful harvest. Finally, if the stream showed dominance by the green-brown waters of the Atbara, which rushed down from the Ethiopian highlands, then the floods would be early and catastrophically high. The crops might drown; indeed, Pharaoh might have to use his grain stores as a reserve.

Each year, the priests sent messengers to inform the king of the color of the water. They may also have used lights and smoke signals to carry word downstream. Pharaoh then knew how prosperous the farmers in his kingdom would be, and how much he could raise in taxes. Thus, he knew whether he could afford to conquer more territory. As Pierre Wack . . . would say, the priests of the Sudanese Nile were the world’s first long-term forecasters. They understood the meaning of predetermined elements and critical uncertainties.¹
What possible connection could this vignette have with the practice of strategic and future force planning? The answer might be more surprising than you think.

Since our focus in this essay centers on planning for the future and strategic uncertainties, while not losing sight of the challenges and opportunities that face us today, we have paid attention most to what the nation needs to both defend and protect its interests in a time of discontinuous change. Yet just like the priests of ancient Egypt, we also argue that strategies and policy makers need to understand and recognize the constants, trends, and shifts that will shape and determine the future security environment. In many ways then, one’s best “guesstimate” must be informed by an ability to read the “river of change,” just as the ancient priests were able to “read” the Nile. Thus, to provide reasonable analysis and information to decision and policy makers, we believe that almost always we have to let the facts get in the way of our opinion. Therefore, our own assumptions, prejudgments, and even what we thought was a clear understanding of the world must be questioned. It may be a cliché, but it is also an evident truth that how we view the world subtly but definitely affects how we act in it. After all, the root from the ancient Greek for “geography” betrays the idea of a “mental map,” an illustration of the world as we choose to see it. All of us, whether we admit it or not, come equipped with a “mental map.” However, if we are to be worth anything at all in making analyses and decisions in an increasingly complex security environment, we must be willing to change that mental map over time.

This essay thus attempts to integrate some of the ideas of Peter Schwartz, whose book *The Art of the Long View* was used at the Naval War College for many years, along with the ideas of Schwartz’s mentor, Pierre Wack, and others, with elements and issues of special interest to the student of national security affairs and future force planning.²

**GETTING THE DECISION MAKER TO REPERCEIVE**

The challenge for strategic planners is to help decision makers understand what the future security environment might look like, to affect their perceptions, in essence, to help them “reperceive.” Wack, who gained some fame as a strategic planner during the oil crises of the 1970s with his ability to get the senior executives in Shell Oil to understand what might happen in the energy business, wrote in the *Harvard Business Review* some years later:

Scenarios deal with two worlds: the world of facts and the world of perceptions. They explore the facts but they aim at perceptions inside the heads of decision makers. Their purpose is to gather and transform information of strategic significance into fresh perceptions. This transformation process is not trivial—more often than not it does not happen. When it works, it is a creative experience that generates a heartfelt
“Aha!” from you . . . [decision makers] and leads to strategic insights beyond the mind’s previous reach.⁴

In short, to think and act effectively in an uncertain world, people need to learn to reperceive—to question their assumptions and their understanding about the way the world works. By questioning those assumptions and rethinking the correct way to operate under uncertainty, we often see the world more clearly than we otherwise would. Wack summarized his goals as a strategic planner and developer of scenarios by stating:

I have found that getting to that [decision makers’] “Aha!” is the real challenge of scenario analysis. It does not simply leap at you when you’ve been presented all the possible alternatives . . . . It happens when your message reaches the microcosms of decision makers, obliges them to question their assumptions about how their . . . world works, and leads them to change and reorganize their inner models of reality.⁵

Secretary of State Colin Powell, when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs during the first Bush and the Clinton administrations, often valued such analyses as setting the context for a “strategic conversation” so that real, and often difficult, decisions could be made about the future.

WHAT SCENARIOS ARE AND WHAT THEY ARE NOT
Scenarios help decision makers select alternative courses of action. Literally, scenarios create a “story line” so that analysts and decision makers can understand a narrative “flow,” from which they can examine and question the constants, trends, and shifts that are taking place in the security environment. It seems useful to recall that the roots of both words “history” and “story” spring from the same Greek word *historia*. Just as the traditional “story” of history helps to examine and better understand the past, scenarios can help us to examine and question our choices for the future.

THE PROCESS OF CREATING SCENARIOS: DRIVING FORCES, PREDETERMINED ELEMENTS AND CRITICAL UNCERTAINTIES
As Schwartz puts it, scenarios are a tool for ordering one’s perceptions about alternative environments where future decisions must be played out.⁶ On the surface, scenarios may look like a set of stories, but they are built on carefully constructed “plots” that make significant elements stand out by how they differ within each specific story line. Creating and examining scenarios is a disciplined way of thinking about the world.

While we emphasize that examining scenarios is a disciplined way of thinking, it is not a formal methodology, nor are they predictions, but they can help us understand the future. It is folly to try to predict the exact outcome of the future.
The old Arab proverb “He who predicts the future lies even if he tells the truth” is accurate. However, scenarios provide alternative projections and possibilities for the future. Creating and understanding scenarios is an art form that can help us to better recognize plausible outcomes and how to act on and better plan for them in advance.

For example, in the 1980s, few in the business of assessing the long-term global security environment forecasted the demise of the Soviet Union. (Those who did were ridiculed within their organizations.) Instead, most assessments and research saw the Cold War trends of the previous four decades as continuing indefinitely. Beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and later with the Soviet Union’s collapse, the U.S. defense establishment found itself in a significant force drawdown and witnessed the cancellation of countless billions of dollars of planned purchases. Though many strategic assessments at the beginning of the twenty-first century focused on American vulnerabilities and the potential danger of “asymmetric” warfare, these assessments seriously underestimated the damage that dedicated terrorists could inflict on the United States (“9/11”), and the world.

Finally, the scenarios we are talking about are not the limited threat-based planning scenarios common in defense planning. Threat-based scenarios, generally based on assessments of current or postulated threats or enemy capabilities, determine only the amount and types of force needed to defeat an adversary. (Similarly, capabilities-based planning seeks to avoid the perceived limits of threat-derived scenarios.) In contrast, the scenarios we want to consider should look well beyond current evaluations of threats. If future military force capabilities are derived from the kind of scenarios we are discussing, they must encompass the full range of possibilities, with a commensurate weighing of benefits, costs, and risks. Accomplishing this is a difficult but essential challenge, if decision makers are to come to any informed, perceptive conclusions for the future.

In Wack’s words, “Scenarios serve two purposes. The first is protective—anticipating and understanding risk. The second is entrepreneurial—discovering strategic options of which one was previously unaware.” Often, and probably naturally, decision makers prefer the illusion of certainty to understanding risk and realities. But the scenario “builder” and analyst should strive to shatter the decision maker’s confidence in his or her ability to look ahead with certainty at the future. Scenarios should allow a decision maker to say, “I am prepared for whatever happens,” because we have thought through complex choices with a knowledgeable sense of risk and reward.

Some scenario builders, including Pierre Wack, refuse to give definitions for the discrete aspects, or elements, of the story line. Their argument to refuse to
identify or separate specific aspects of the story suggests that it could be dangerous, even trivial, to reduce it to its bare bones. Instead of looking only at the skeleton, they argue that we should also examine the flesh and blood of the story line in its entirety. As such, they emphasize the complex interdependence among elements of a story and de-emphasize focusing on specific definitions.

Others, however, especially Peter Schwartz, suggest that offering definitions up front can be both helpful and necessary to aid our own perceptions, or misperceptions, of reality. For Schwartz, the heart of “understanding” the process is the identification and exploration of driving forces, predetermined elements, and critical uncertainties. Yet while literally thousands of former students at the Naval War College have found these concepts useful, many have also misunderstood them.

Driving Forces: What We Know We Care About

One such driving force was the rain. It fell upstream on the Nile’s tributaries, and affected the balance between them. That, in turn, influenced the fate of thousands of people whom the Pharaoh might conquer that year. There was a second driving force, as well—the dependence on Nile flooding to grow crops. Had the Egyptians had irrigation canals and fertilizer, they could have planted crops further out in the desert. They would not have had to worry about the river flow at all.

Wack suggests that scenario analysis demands first that decision makers understand the forces driving their organization, and their future choices. Power and insight come from understanding the forces behind the outcome in any scenario. Schwartz insists that if one fails to recognize the driving forces, there is no way to begin thinking through a scenario. These elements of the scenario hone one’s initial judgment and helps one to decide which factors are important.

Driving forces are the elements that move the plot of a scenario and directly influence the story’s outcome. If we return to the vignette at the beginning of this essay, we can better understand what the Egyptian priests were doing, by examining how they recognized the forces driving the movement of the Nile River. In essence, the specific color of the water’s stream made it possible to guess the effect on the floods downstream. If each tributary that flowed into the Nile were the same color, the priests would not have been able to project future outcomes with as much certainty. So identifying and assessing driving forces is both a starting point and an objective of the scenario method. Without an initial understanding of driving forces, there is no way to begin thinking through a scenario.

In the same way, a senior defense leader needs to appreciate and attempt to comprehend the huge complexities of the global security environment, the state of the economy, technological advances in military systems, the movement of oil and dependence on resources, and potential adversaries’ capabilities, to name
just a few. The key is to decide in each scenario which driving forces are significant.

As a teaching methodology, we present various frameworks in seminars at the Naval War College that are intended to help students look for driving forces for future national security related scenarios. Also, according to Schwartz, and others, there are several categories one should look for to discover driving forces that can make a difference in the story line: society, technology, economics, politics, environment, and the military and defense infrastructures. Schwartz, Wack, and many other long-range planners claim that it is helpful to work as a team in developing meaningful scenarios. Individuals see things differently; a member of a team will identify factors as key driving forces that will not be obvious to others. Often, this “leap or surprise”—the unexpected insight—can lead to further insights and discoveries.

**Predetermined Elements and Critical Uncertainties:**

**Understanding Their Differences**

*Put yourself now in the position of a priest on the river, watching the water turn brown and green. To warn Pharaoh of a devastating flood required supreme confidence. Being wrong was breaking a religious sacrament and would also, no doubt, have meant losing one’s life. Priests had that confidence, however, because the fate of the floods that year was predetermined. Nothing could change its impact on the crops, even though the impact would not be felt for months later. The priests may or may not have known why the color of the water affected the power of the flood. They may or may not have been aware of the driving force—the rainfall pattern which caused one river, or another, to dominate. But they knew the predetermined elements of flooding as well as they knew anything.*

Scenarios structure the future into both predetermined and uncertain elements. Any good scenario “reading” explores and seeks to comprehend these elements. Often, events that are “already in the pipeline,” such as demographic shifts or energy dependency, bring consequences that have yet to unfold, and these consequences may have immense impact.

Schwartz provides one example to illustrate the shortcomings of conventional forecasting and trend analysis:

[Consider] the U.S. birthrate. In the early 1970s it hovered around 3 million births per year; forecasters at the U.S. Census Bureau projected that this “trend” would continue forever. Schools, which had been rushed into construction during the baby boom of the fifties and early sixties, were now closed down and sold. Policymakers did not consider that the birthrate might rise again suddenly. But a scenario might have considered the likelihood that original baby boom children, reaching their late thirties, would suddenly have children of their own. In 1979, the U.S. birthrate began
to rise . . . in 1990 [it was] almost back to the 4 million of the fifties. Demographers also failed to anticipate that immigration would accelerate. To keep up with demand, the state of California (which had been closing schools in the late 1970s) . . . [had to] build a classroom every day for the next seven years. 16

Assessing and developing the two fundamentals—predetermined elements and critical uncertainties—when building a scenario may be among the more valuable aspects of this process, or at least on what strategic planners spend much of their time. Yet experience tells us that many of our war college students, initially introduced to this art of scenario “reading,” find of particular value the process of deciding what are predetermined elements, as opposed to critical uncertainties. When we examine geostrategic regions, for example, we may strive to recognize which elements of each region are predetermined, such as geography, and which may be critical but uncertain identities, such as how the predetermined “importance” of geography can be made less important, or even irrelevant, by the uncertainty and influence of technology.

It is characteristic of the U.S. military that it spends considerable time refining definitions of anything it feels is important. Yet the very nature of scenario building suggests that there is no clear distinction between the building blocks of driving forces, predetermined elements, and critical uncertainties. These separate elements of the scenario are not set in concrete; they can shift and change over time and space.

Let’s consider another example: the fact that this technology is having an impact on the military is clear, yet many of the specific implications it will have on the future of war remain unclear. Good, sound strategy should therefore adapt, and seek to operate, at the nexus of the predetermined elements of accelerating technology and the critical uncertainty of the pace of innovation. Thus, the “predetermined” intersection between technological innovation and how, and to what degree, it may contribute to the transformation of the American military and its way of conducting war remain a critical uncertainty.

**Predetermined Elements: What We Know We Know**

In the arena of national security affairs, it remains imperative to identify key predetermined elements. As recent events in the security environment emphasize, the United States, partially because of its immense power and influence, will remain politically engaged in many regions of the world. This recognition, in turn, continues to lead to the involvement of various elements of the U.S. military in many places in the world on a regular, and in some cases, continuous basis. Although there have been some who advocate a significant reduction to the overseas commitment of U.S. forces, the events of 11 September 2001 again confirm that their presence there will likely continue. The U.S. military can accept as
a predetermined element that global engagement in some form, by the United States, will continue in the foreseeable future, placing on it demands that will be commensurate (if not greater) with those of the 1990s.

Certainly, in developing any realistic scenario of value, other predetermined elements would include the realities of demographics, key geographic parameters including distances in certain theaters of operations, climatic challenges, and such other “nontraditional” aspects as the identity and form of governance within societies and the rising significance of environmental, human, and even “social” security. Schwartz offers some ways to look at these various aspects:

- **Slow-changing phenomena.** These include population growth, building a physical infrastructure, and resource development.

- **Constrained situations.** For example, Japan must maintain a positive trade balance because its aging population, spread out on four main islands, does not possess the resources to feed, clothe, warm, or transport itself.

- **In the pipeline.** Today we know almost exactly how large the teenage population in the United States will be in the near future. They are “in the pipeline” already. The only uncertainty is immigration and how it will affect these overall figures.

- **Inevitable collisions.** During the 1980s deficit, the American public refused to provide the government with higher taxes just as they also refused to give up any public benefits. Once the federal “gridlock” began, there was no way out.17 (Again in 2000, when the United States thought it had eliminated the federal deficit, it resurfaced just two years later. Thus the competition for limited budget resources, and the inevitable conflicts and collisions that will occur, may well be intractable, predetermined elements of a national security scenario.)

There is also the possibility that the United States fears predetermined elements because it prefers to deny them. Schwartz illustrates this point by examining the reality of traffic gridlock that took place in large cities in the United States in the mid-1990s. He calculated that if the number of people of driving age were multiplied by the average number of cars per person in the United States, the increased road mileage generated, planned highway construction, and the length of time it takes to build highways (several years, at least), the conclusion would be that gridlock could not be avoided and is thus a predetermined element. Subsequent events proved him correct.

Similar examples are widely available in the area of defense planning. The continued lack of adequate Navy ships to meet national commitments might be one case in point. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that American
national leadership, with its continued emphasis on global engagement, will attempt to maintain a level of naval presence in the oceans roughly on par with that of the past decade. However, because of an insufficient number of ships, the U.S. Navy is unable to meet this requirement. The war on terrorism has exacerbated the demand for more ships. Since ships take years to design, fund, and build, a predetermined element in many maritime oriented scenarios is the lack of adequate ships for many years.

Similar practical realities exist whenever military systems will take years to build and field, whether the area of concern be space systems, missile defense systems, major aircraft programs, or other comparable projects.

Critical Uncertainties: What We Thought We Knew but Didn’t—or, the Demons Who Come in the Night

For five-thousand years, the waters of the Nile rose and fell predictably. The dynasty of the pharaohs declined; other governments emerged and they too declined, but the means for predicting floods remained basically the same. Then in the early 1960s, the Aswan High Dam was built. It was a remarkable feat of engineering, five-hundred miles downstream from where the fierce Atbara joined the Nile. Now if priests had still kept vigil at their temple (or government clerks a monitoring station at the same locale upstream), they would have lost their ability to foretell. Whether the water was blue, white, or green-brown, the result would be the same: the flow would reach the Aswan Dam and stop. The fate of the flood plains below is now in human hands.

One could perhaps, based on knowledge of Egyptian politics, make an educated guess about the flooding level. It would now depend on two competing driving forces: the farmers’ same need for water, and a new need by Egyptian consumers for electricity from the dam. Regulating the dam was a political act, subject to pressure from both sides. The flooding as a result became an “uncertainty.” If you wanted to know how much money the Egyptian government could raise in taxes from farmers this year, you could not simply tell from the color of the water. You had to find out what the people in the dam’s control tower would do.

Critical uncertainties come from predetermined elements. You often find these uncertainties by questioning your assumptions about what you thought was certain, or “predetermined.” Not meaning to sound too abstract, we like to think of these critical uncertainties as being “things you thought you knew but didn’t know at all.” Examples would include: the assumption that the United States will continue as the sole economic, military, and political superpower in the foreseeable future; that overseas presence will always determine future force structure for the military; and that defense budgets will be available to fund adequately the “transformation” of the military. In addition, while we argued earlier
that the events of 11 September again confirm that the presence of U.S. forces overseas will likely continue, there are circumstances and conditions in which this might not be true. Finally, while many believed and argued that the United States was increasingly vulnerable and likely to suffer some form of asymmetric attack prior to 11 September, no one sufficiently anticipated the horribly precise orchestration and execution of those attacks.

Examples of critical uncertainty from history include some important realities that have had a deep and lasting impact, such as: until 1989 it seemed that the Cold War was going to continue as it had for almost five decades and that the Soviet Union was not going to go away any time soon; during World War II, Admiral Raymond Spruance, while at Midway, knew the Japanese fleet was headed toward Hawaii and that his challenge was to find it and strike it before the Japanese found him; equally, the German leadership knew the Allies planned to land on the coast of Europe, but not when or where.

In every scenario, regardless if it focuses on history, culture, economics, politics, or military force, there are critical uncertainties that must be assessed and reckoned with. Moreover, after recognizing the uncertainties, one should also begin to consider options and strategies for dealing with them.

THE ART OF REPERCEIVING

The relationship between driving forces, predetermined elements, and critical uncertainties is complex, but important to understand, as we learn to “read the flow” of what is occurring in useful scenarios. As Schwartz points out, “I sometimes think of the relationship between predetermined elements and critical uncertainties as a choreographed dance. You cannot experience the dance just by knowing the sequence of steps. Each dancer will interpret them differently, and add his or her unpredictable decisions.” In terms of national security and defense, one cannot anticipate the nature of a war merely by looking at the military orders of battle, even if you know your plans and those of the enemy. In the same fashion, by developing scenarios oriented to a more distant future, the interrelationship between that which is predetermined and that which is uncertain may be equally open to interpretation and changing factors. Pierre Wack offers several thoughts with respect to the use of scenarios as tools:

I have found that scenarios can effectively organize a variety of seemingly unrelated economic, technological, competitive, political, and societal information and translate it into a framework for judgment—in a way that no model could do. . . . Decision scenarios describe different worlds, not just different outcomes in the same world. . . . You can test the value of scenarios by asking two questions: (1) What do they leave out? In five to ten years . . . [decision makers] must not be able to say that the scenarios did not
warn of important events that subsequently happened. (2) Do they lead to action? If scenarios do not push managers to do something other than that indicated by past experience, they are nothing more than interesting speculations.20

We are experiencing a world of dynamic change where even the most mind-numbing, dramatic events do not impress us for long. Yet any good strategist and planner must be able to help the nation’s leaders see more clearly the different futures that may occur. To operate in an uncertain world, we need to reperceive—to question our assumptions about how the world works, so that we see the world more clearly. The purpose of this is to help us make better decisions about the future.

Perhaps one way to think about this is to overthink George Santayana’s famous saying about learning from history by changing our perception of things that are yet to come, by suggesting that “those who do not learn from the future are destined to make mistakes in it.” To be able to understand that future, we have to have a “mental map” flexible enough to consider plausible alternatives and possibilities we might not otherwise consider.

In the end, we can be certain of one thing: the future is not likely to be boring.

NOTES


4. Ibid. (emphasis added to the original).


9. Ibid., p. 34.

10. Wack, p. 140.

12. Ibid.

13. Two such frameworks we present at the college are: Richmond M. Lloyd, “Strategy and Force Planning Framework,” in Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, chap. 1, pp. 1–15; and Henry C. Bartlett, G. Paul Holman, and Timothy E. Somes, “The Art of Strategy and Force Planning,” in ibid., chap. 2, pp. 18–33. In particular, the Bartlett framework proves useful in its simple examination of six contending factors that are in a state of continual tension—goals, security environment, strategy, constrained resources, tools, and risks. We argue that one cannot seriously consider strategic uncertainty or strategy itself without recognizing how these factors shape and influence meaningful driving forces for national security or defense-related scenarios.

14. Schwartz, p. 37. The authors have included “Military Forces and Defense Infrastructure” in what Schwartz call his “familiar litany of categories.”

15. Ibid., p. 39.

16. Ibid., p. 31.

17. Ibid., p. 41.

18. Ibid., p. 43.

19. Ibid., p. 44.

“Command at sea is the ultimate goal of ambitious naval line officers, but only a chosen few obtain it. An officer proves worthy of command by performing well as a subordinate officer aboard a variety of ships in a variety of duties.” These words, written by Tom Buell in his renowned biography of Admiral Raymond Spruance, apply to his own naval career as well.

A graduate of the Naval Academy class of 1958, Buell began his commissioned life as first lieutenant aboard USS Hamner (DD 718), a World War II Gearing-class destroyer. He then detached for duty with the commissioning crew of USS Ernest J. King (DLG 10) and afterward went on to attend the weapons curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School, which he put to good use as weapons officer aboard USS Brooke (DEG 1/FFG 1). After a stint at Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Buell served as executive officer in USS John King (DDG 3). He later wrote that a ship’s first crew “became her brains, her blood, and her spirit, for through them the ship was transformed from an inert mass of dirty, rusty steel into a living personality.”

Buell attended the Naval War College, where he was a 1971 honor graduate of the College of Naval Command and Staff, and then served as a member of the Naval War College’s faculty before reporting as commanding officer to USS Joseph Hewes (DE/FF/FFT 1078). The Hewes initially proved to be an engineering challenge, with an attendant string of inspections and surveys, but it was made sufficiently reliable to undertake a six-month Indian Ocean deployment on independent steaming; showing the flag culminated with the first U.S. Navy operational transit of the Suez Canal after it reopened in 1975. From there Buell was assigned to his twilight tour, teaching military history at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.

Buell liked to go to sea. He was, in the great tradition of those in command, a fine ship handler, although like C. S. Forester’s Hornblower, he fell prey to seasickness. He ran a friendly, though not informal, wardroom. Buell liked a quiet, businesslike bridge. Those occasions when his temper was on the rise were presaged by the pulsing of a vein in his forehead, providing ample warning to the offending officer or sailor. Officers who proved themselves professionally competent were rewarded with
increasing levels of trust and responsibility. For example, his combat information center officer and operations officer had the con through most of the Suez transit. Buell understood and venerated naval tradition. Independent steaming while in command of USS Hewes afforded him ample opportunities to engage in diplomacy after a fashion more akin to that of the nineteenth century than the twentieth—and he was good at it.

However, command of a warship at sea was not the peak of Buell’s professional contributions to the Navy. Early in his career he had shown a flair for writing, publishing his first article, “To Build a Better Ship—on Time,” about his experience aboard USS Brooke, in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, which also published his second article while he was serving in Norfolk. Both were good efforts, the sort one expects from a junior officer—well defined on technical or procedural problems but arousing no particular controversy—and were tolerated by Navy seniors.

While at Annapolis, Buell became aware of Admiral Raymond Spruance and his accomplishments. Researching a paper for the Naval Postgraduate School led him to an afternoon’s conversation with the admiral at his Carmel, California, home, which was such a “profoundly moving experience” for young Buell that when at the Naval War College he produced a monograph on Admiral Spruance. It was the genesis for his subsequent biography, The Quiet Warrior (Naval Institute Press, 1974), researched and written in only fifteen months. Based on extensive primary sources, it is eminently readable and evocative of person and place, clearly informed by Buell’s own professional experience with the admiral. It went into print just as Buell assumed command of USS Hewes. The Quiet Warrior serves as the model for a biography of a military leader and has been widely recognized as such. All four military services have placed the book on their professional reading lists. The Naval Institute Press reissued it in 1987 for its Classics of Naval Literature series; the Naval Order of the United States bestowed on Buell its Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison Award for Distinguished Contribution to Naval Literature; and the Navy League awarded Buell its Alfred Thayer Mahan Award for Literary Achievement. However, the most telling evidence of its enduring value is that it is still in print three decades later.

Buell went on to write two more books: Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Naval Institute Press, 1980, reissued in 1995 for the Classics of Naval Literature series), written while he was at West Point; and the iconoclastic appraisal of the Civil War Union and Confederate combat leadership The Warrior Generals: Combat Leadership in the Civil War (Crown, 1997), now coming into its own as one of the best historical works on the Civil War. Buell’s last published work was the fine monograph Naval Leadership in Korea: The First Six Months, written for the Naval Historical Center. At the time of this
writing, there are in press two co-edited volumes that are to appear in the West Point History series on World War II. When Buell died he was at work on a sea warrior trilogy, using three pivotal naval battles—Lake Erie, Hampton Roads, and Guadalcanal—to address the issue of how naval leaders have responded to the stress of battle. Running throughout each of his works is the fundamental question of what makes a good, effective military leader, to which he provides significant and useful answers.

Buell was in great demand as a public speaker and as a panelist at conferences, where he showed that he was not only knowledgeable but also had the rare ability to distill complex subjects to their essential components, communicating them effectively to both professional and general audiences. Moreover, he could usually be counted on to offer a perspective of people and events that caused his audiences to look at a subject in a new way.

Individuals capable of and skilled at both action and reflection are rare in any profession. The Navy has not always rewarded reflection. An 1855 statement by Senator Stephen Mallory in reference to oceanographer Matthew Maury still has currency: “We think of the seaman as a mariner of the deep to whom we entrust the honor of our flag, to carry it abroad on the high seas; we never think of him as a philosopher.” Yet as John Dewey pointed out, it is the reconstruction of experience that creates the practical knowledge necessary for effective future action. Buell acted and reflected, and did both well, to his credit and to the benefit of the Navy.

Did Buell’s books change the way officers think? No definitive answer is possible for this sort of question. However, that his books are still in print and widely read suggests that value is yet found in them regarding some of the cardinal virtues of effective naval officers. They are well written, lively biographies that deliver lessons in a palatable form.

Commander Thomas B. Buell, USN (Retired), commander of destroyers and author, slipped his cable on 26 June 2002.
From the Department of Defense Korean War Commemoration

SC42993 U.S. TROOPS NEAR CH’ONAN

Army truck mounting a .50-caliber M2 HB Browning machine gun, camouflaged with rice straw.


Cpl. John W. Simms is shown bidding his wife and their son goodbye as he leaves for Korea, 1950. Washington Post. (USIA)

Flight nurse Capt. Irene Wiley, East Chicago, Indiana prepares medicine for one of her Chinese litter patients aboard a C-54 “Skymaster” air evacuation plane enroute to Formosa from Okinawa, 26 January 1954.
Among the many lessons “9/11” has taught is the one that the United States is a vulnerable nation. This is especially true on its sea frontiers. President Franklin D. Roosevelt understood this; he made a point of it during his first “fireside chat” after Germany invaded Poland, plunging Europe into war in September 1939, twenty-seven months before the U.S. Navy was attacked at Pearl Harbor. American security was, he said, “bound up with the security of the Western Hemisphere and the seas adjacent thereto.” It still is. “We seek to keep war from our firesides by keeping war from coming to the Americas.” Today, we are engaged in a different war, one that has already come “to our firesides.” To help prevent its return Americans must again attend to the security of the seas and their ports. This is doubly true for, despite the emergence of the information age and the decline of the U.S. merchant marine, the United States is still a maritime nation; the security of its harbors and seaports is still of first importance to the well-being of this country. Americans are very dependent on maritime trade, as was recently demonstrated by the significant economic damage done by the short dock strike on the West Coast. It is easy to envision that the economic cost and social impact of simultaneous terrorist attacks on two or more American ports would be huge.

The nation is attempting to grapple with this problem, which is ultimately one of global scope. One part
of that problem—but a step that is both critical and manageable in the short term—is to maintain the security of its ports. The United States needs to track and identify every ship, along with its cargo, crew, and passengers, well before any of those vessels and what they carry enter any of the country’s ports or pass near anything of value to the United States. This article proposes a system that would provide that tracking capability, as well as a means to meet any related emergency with an appropriate response. This proposal—the result of months of war games, conferences, and working groups dealing with the maritime aspects of homeland security—is intended to be a strawman, a thought starter, a means of generating informed debate on how and why the United States might build a maritime counterpart to the flight-following systems of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).  

Not everyone supports this idea. Some believe it is too difficult, or not worthwhile, or both. Admiral Vern Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations, is not one of these; he has twice called for the creation of a “maritime NORAD.” He first urged its creation on 26 March 2002 during a conference on homeland security issues sponsored by the Coast Guard and the Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis at Cambridge, Massachusetts. Parts of his speech resemble an early version of the white paper this article is drawn from, written by the author and forwarded to the Navy Staff in November 2001. Other powerful members of the U.S. government also spoke, but it was Admiral Clark’s words that the press highlighted. The CNO’s second call for a maritime tracking system came on 15 August 2002, at the Naval-Industry R&D Partnership Conference in Washington, D.C. This time the press missed it:

In conducting homeland defense, forward deployed naval forces will network with other assets of the Navy and the Coast Guard, as well as the intelligence agencies to identify, track and intercept threats long before they threaten this nation.

I said it before and I’ll say it again today: I’m convinced we need a NORAD for maritime forces. The effect of these operations will extend the security of the United States far seaward, taking advantage of the time and space purchased by forward deployed assets to protect the United States from impending threats.

What, some ask, does the admiral mean by “forward deployed assets”? If he means units deployed overseas, the problem is significantly more difficult than if he means units under way (in fleet operating areas, for example) a few hundred miles off the U.S. coasts. A maritime NORAD-like system could be built from existing technology to solve the “detect, ID, track and interdict as appropriate in the coastal-belt” problem. That belt could extend from fifty to a thousand miles offshore, or some other similar area, to provide sufficient time for
early detection, analysis, and determination of the threat potential or the probability of involvement in illegal activity of vessels en route to the United States. A maritime traffic tracking system as outlined below would require almost no additional tactical assets and would make the ones that are there substantially more effective. The overseas, far-forward problem is a closely related, but separate, issue. Its multinational political dimension alone makes it substantially more difficult. However, it is not significantly more difficult technically, once we get foreign ships in foreign waters to install the proposed transponders, which, it must be admitted, would indeed be a very tough sell. The proposed system would, most assuredly, assist in the forward-deployed situation, but, in any case, the problem of security at home needs to be solved first. It may be possible to expand overseas the tracking capabilities required once they are in place in U.S. coastal waters and economic exclusion zones, but it would be nearly impossible to do the reverse—to establish the required tracking capabilities in foreign seas and then extend them back to the coast of the United States. To attack the overseas environment before the near-home coastal problem would result in a huge waste of time and national resources, both manpower and money, and would leave our ports still vulnerable.

THE PROBLEM
The United States has 185 deepwater ports. Every day over two hundred commercial vessels and twenty-one thousand containers arrive at eighteen of these deepwater ports. The container-carrying ships are largely concentrated in less than a dozen ports that have the proper handling equipment, but most ports can accept a few containers. Additionally, approximately five thousand vessels of all types, pleasure boats, fishermen, tugs with or without tows, oilfield-support vessels, and research ships are active every day in the vast area from fifty to a thousand nautical miles offshore. All of these vessels are large enough to carry significant cargoes. They sail to and from not only the 185 ports mentioned but also an even larger number of smaller moorings and anchorages. Some of these vessels, which are of all sizes and types, are involved in illegal activities, such as drug and immigrant smuggling, illegal fishing, or environmental pollution.

The concern since “9/11” is that there may be other vessels with even more sinister objectives. This concern is heightened by the fact that tens of ocean-crossing-capable commercial vessels disappear every year. Some sink because of weather or unseaworthiness. Others probably “disappear” for insurance purposes. More than a few are attacked by pirates. Additionally, older but serviceable ships of considerable size can be purchased in many places for less than the terrorists probably spent to execute the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Any of these vessels could carry enough explosives to destroy
or substantially damage a port’s infrastructure, including bridges, chemical and petroleum plants, processing, handling and storage facilities, and such high-value vessels (and thus high-payoff targets) as aircraft carriers and liquid natural gas carriers. Indeed, the easiest way to put a weapon of mass destruction into large urban areas such as New York, Los Angeles, or the Hampton Roads area of Virginia is to send it by ship. A relatively small explosion onboard a small ship with a deck cargo of even a few smallish bags of anthrax or some other evil substance in a major city port might only kill a few thousand or even just a few hundred people, but the terror it would cause would be devastating to our economy, if not our national psyche. The threat to our ports is especially true now that the airport and container security has been significantly enhanced worldwide.

These facts make it apparent that the United States needs a better means than it now has of identifying and tracking all vessels, as well as their cargoes, crew, and passengers, as they approach the coasts of the United States or its territories. The country does not now have a system that will give full “situational awareness” of the surface of the seas surrounding it. It needs to create one now. We need to know the name and ownership, position, course, speed, and intended port of call of every vessel; the identity of everyone onboard; and a description of its cargo or function—just as is required for all aircraft, private and commercial alike. In other words, what is needed is a requirement for a “float plan” (the maritime equivalent of an aviation flight plan) and a means of positively identifying each vessel well before it nears our coasts (e.g., the maritime equivalent of an “identification friend or foe,” or IFF, system). Moreover, the float plan and the maritime IFF system must be linked together. Such an infrastructure might be a “North American Maritime Defense Command.” Various proposals are under investigation by the governments of the United States and Canada via a Bi-National Maritime Awareness and Warning Working Group based at NORAD. Others have suggested changing NORAD to the “North American Defense Command” (with the same acronym), with air, land, and sea components.

HOW CAN THIS BE DONE?
Once we have a workable long-range maritime IFF, we can use several existing technologies to gather, process, analyze, and fuse data from all useful sources so those who must daily make decisions can reliably make the right ones in a timely manner and take appropriate action. As already noted, the proposal centers on a maritime analog of the FAA and NORAD, as well as the U.S. Customs flight-following systems and the development of a long-range maritime IFF. This is the critical initial step in building a maritime equivalent of NORAD. Though it does not address adequately the very difficult problems of tracking the cargo and the people onboard, this increment will provide an “information backbone” with
which data on the contents of a vessel—its cargo, crew, and passengers—can be melded, as it absolutely must be. Though this article focuses primarily on a maritime IFF system and the needed information backbone, it also addresses the other issues, i.e., the gathering, processing, analyzing, fusion, and provision of data, to provide a context and to outline issues to be considered for an end-to-end “system of systems.”

The tracking of ships bound for the United States is a task for the U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Customs Service. Whereas ship tracking is now undertaken only by exception, when extraordinary circumstances warrant, this article proposes that it be done on a routine basis. Indeed, given today’s technology, its comparative low cost and substantial capabilities, it would not be excessively expensive to put a transceiver or transponder on every ship and track it (as will be discussed below). However, even if a transponder could be placed, at a reasonable unit price, in every container bound for the United States, the aggregate cost could well prove prohibitive. But the payoffs of even just vessel tracking for the struggle against terrorist threats (as well as drug and illegal-immigrant smugglers and polluters) could be substantial, far outweighing its cost.

Surveillance under the proposed system would be focused on the belt from fifty to a thousand miles offshore, or some other similar zone. (Vessels on voyages originating and terminating within U.S. waters would be of interest only if they ventured more than fifty miles offshore.) Vessels in that belt would be forbidden to approach U.S. shores closer than twelve nautical miles (the international recognized limit of territorial waters) without having switched on and operated a maritime IFF system for at least the previous ninety-six hours. A ship departing a foreign port less than ninety-six hours from the coastal waters of the United States would have to have the system operating as it gets underway.

Also, all vessels bound for U.S. waters would be required to file a float plan (with the information detailed in the sidebar) and have a registration receipt from the U.S. Coast Guard before reaching a point ninety-six hours (about a thousand miles, at ten knots) out. Those who did not comply would risk being stopped, searched, and denied entry to U.S. ports for a minimum of two days. The float plan could be forwarded via e-mail or any other record-producing communications system. Most shipping companies already do something similar to this internally to keep track of assets and maintain business flow. This is an expansion of the field of vessels for the Advanced Notification of Arrival (ANOA) now required by the Coast Guard for large vessels entering our ports. It is in any case a good idea from a safety view, as a float plan tells someone ashore where a vessel is headed and when it expects to get there; if the vessel does not arrive on schedule, a search can be initiated. (In two recent cases, men sailing alone spent more than three months adrift in disabled boats because no one knew to
look for them.) Many smaller ships operating offshore already have communications devices that support e-mail; those that do not could use a marina’s e-mail before departure. It would, in any case, be the operators’ responsibility to make the necessary reports and to obtain the necessary documents. Given the widespread availability of communications systems, however, this requirement should not be arduous. The cost of the transponders and the minimum monthly fee for U.S. citizens could be funded with an income tax credit. In that most of the proposed transponders would also have at least e-mail capability, additional usage of the system would be the vessel operators’ responsibility, like exceeding a monthly allocation of cell-phone minutes.

These reporting requirements are consistent with international practice regarding freedom of navigation on the high seas. Indeed, the U.S. Coast Guard already has a ninety-six-hour Advanced Notification of Arrival requirement in effect, dictating that large commercial vessels broadcast their intentions well before they cross the thousand-mile line. Once within a thousand miles the proposed maritime IFF system would update a vessel’s position at specified intervals as it closed the coast. The fifty-nautical-mile inner boundary eliminates from surveillance the vast majority of pleasure and fishing boats and other coastal commercial vessels that normally do not routinely venture far offshore. The boundaries, both far and near, could be easily adjusted as needs and experience dictate.

Those areas that abut neighboring countries’ borders will need special attention, including the establishment of radar identification zones. The areas include where the coasts of Texas and California meet Mexico; where Washington State and Maine meet the Canadian coast; the Strait of Florida, which abuts the territorial waters of Cuba; and the vicinity of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Radar surveillance in these high-interest, potential high-threat areas would greatly facilitate the positive identification of all maritime traffic, especially if very-long-range (110 nautical miles–plus) high-frequency surface-wave (HFSW) radar is employed. Indeed, means are already at hand in most of those places to provide the close surveillance required. The one thing they are lacking is the means to identify positively the many tracks they now have. This proposal solves that problem for the tracking of all law-abiding citizens. The others would become much more conspicuous. Where adequate radar surveillance is not now available, a few well-placed aerostats, like those used in counterdrug operations, would provide sufficient coverage. However, experience indicates that radar tracking is not enough—satellite communications transponders onboard ships, serving an IFF function, are key to solving the ship-traffic management system.
SHIP AND CONTAINER TRACKING

Monitoring the contents and tracking the location of containers are at the heart of shipping security. Many people believe containers, whether arriving by land or sea, represent the greatest potential for security breaches and entry of contraband. The tracking of containers bound for the United States is an important responsibility of the U.S. Customs Service. The U.S. Border Patrol, Drug Enforcement Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation, plus other law enforcement agencies, support Customs in this effort. The people-vetting and tracking problem is even more difficult, and these agencies also assist the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in vetting and tracking the people arriving in the United States via all modes of transportation, including ships. (For some of the currently available technologies, see the appendix, available online at www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/autumn/rd1-a03.htm.)

DRAFT NOTICE TO MARINERS

Be advised: All vessels intending to enter or transit the territorial waters of the United States or its protectorates (Guam, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Samoa) must file the Advanced Notification of Arrival (ANOA), as required by pertinent U.S. Coast Guard regulations, or a float plan as described below with the U.S. Coast Guard, prior to arriving within one thousand nautical miles of the coast of the United States or its protectorates. If the point of departure is within [to be specified] nautical miles, the float plan must be filed a minimum of twenty-four hours prior to leaving the foreign port. The float plan will include:

1. The names and nationalities of all persons onboard
2. List of all Maritime Mobile Service Identifiers (MMSIs) to be used on the voyage
3. Description of any and all cargo
4. Point of last departure
5. Destination
6. Estimated time of arrival
7. Estimated time and location of arrival at a point fifty nautical miles from the coast of the United States or its protectorates.

Additionally, all vessels must also have one of the following systems on and transmitting its identification (MMSI) and location. It must be reporting the vessel’s position and MMSI not less than once an hour when in international waters within [to be specified] nautical miles from the United States or its protectorates. When in international waters within [to be specified] hundred miles of the United States or its protectorates and planning on entering U.S. territorial waters the vessel must broadcast its identification and position four times an hour. Vessels not complying with this directive will be subject to interception and detention for a minimum of twenty-four hours at the limits of U.S. territorial waters.

Potential solutions to these two problems will not be addressed here other than to note that the float plan, systems, databases, and procedures developed to track ships would assist the INS in its people-tracking efforts and the U.S. Customs Service in its cargo-tracking mission as well. In fact, the system proposed here would have much wider applications than port security, or even
counterterrorism generally. As a start, it would also greatly assist in the war on
drugs, help curb illegal immigration, assist in fisheries protection, and support
antipollution operations.

Most of the civilian agencies named above already have at least limited mar-
time surveillance capabilities to cope with such problems. As an example, the
Customs Service has an excellent facility at March Air Reserve Base, near River-
side, California—the Air and Marine Interdiction Coordination Center
(AMICC). It is primarily focused on countering air smugglers and tracks all air-
craft crossing any border in North America. The coverage of the remote radars
(displayed at AMICC via live video feeds) extends far across North America and
well into South America. AMICC currently makes only a minimal effort against
marine smugglers, due to manpower and equipment limitations, but Customs
would like to see that capability expanded. The agency clearly understands what
needs to be done and, given the resources, is ready to do it or to help whatever
other organization gets the job.

At any one moment there are about five thousand aircraft airborne either
over the United States or in its immediate vicinity. The Customs Service’s system
for coordinating multiple reporting entities and the tools it has developed for its
air surveillance task are especially instructive. In the course of a day, seven to
eleven AMICC watch standers routinely select an average of 2,900 tracks (out of
tens of thousands) for special, detailed examination. To assist in that examina-
tion AMICC has developed an excellent set of software tools that allow surveil-
lance system operators to access databases that contain the current flight plan
data and the flight tracks of all flights of the aircraft under special scrutiny in the
past two years, as well as data on anyone of special interest who has been associ-
ated with that particular aircraft. Interestingly enough, the Coast Guard has
much of this same data on over six hundred thousand vessels of U.S. registry in
its Maritime Information for Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE) database. It
also has many of the same types of interfaces to a host of other organizations,
such as commercial insurance databases and international police organizations
as does the AMICC. The AMICC is also a major participant in the Domestic
Events Network (linking the Federal Aviation Administration, NORAD, law en-
forcement agencies, and air traffic control facilities). AMICC’s experience
should prove very valuable in developing a maritime counterpart. If the mar-
time surveillance organization is not collocated at the AMICC, it would need to
have a close interface with AMICC and be a major participant on the Domestic
Events Network. The maritime tracking center would need to be linked to the
MISLE database, which would need in turn to be interfaced to the Global Com-
mand and Control System, which is now under consideration, in order to ap-
proximate what is now in operation at the AMICC.
MODELS AND FRAMEWORKS

Fundamentally, the maritime homeland security/defense mission involves a detect-assess-act cycle. These cycles can be approached in several ways. The most famous model is the “OODA loop,” which consists of the elements observe, orient, decide, and act. Another widely employed model is the “sensor to shooter” paradigm. A third, more recent breakdown of this cycle is the “find, fix, track, target, engage, assess” model. Though each of these models is useful, none fully describes what actually happens in a systems sense. Let us use a slightly different model to describe a vessel-tracking system and its interfaces with a decision-making apparatus so as to produce a system able to take timely action against potentially hostile vessels and to apprehend others engaged in illegal activities.

This model, called “Warfare in the Fourth Dimension,” was developed more than twenty years ago to describe and analyze the importance of time for decisions in combat. It was first used to equate the battle for control of the electromagnetic spectrum with the battle for time, the fourth dimension in physics. The model’s components are the sensors (S), the processors (P), the fusion system (F), the decision maker (DM), and the action taker (AT), as well as the communications links that tie each of those components together. The paradigm closely mirrors what actually happens in all forms of combat, be it an infantryman fighting in very close combat or a ballistic-missile-defense action on the edge of space.

Sensors detect phenomena given off by potential targets and forward data to processors, which feed information to the fusion system. The fusion system provides knowledge to the decision maker. He, in turn, takes all other factors of the environment, including rules of engagement, force status, strategic situation, political alignments, and so on, into account and develops as clear a tactical picture as possible and (ideally) the wisdom applied to it. On this basis the decision maker issues orders to the action taker. The sensors detect the results, or lack thereof, and the cycle starts all over again. A shorthand of the model’s operation is S-P-F-D-A.

In close ground combat, eyes and ears (and hands and noses, if the conflict is very close indeed) are the primary sensors. The processors, fusion system, decision maker, and action taker are all represented within soldiers, and the communications systems are the synapses in their brains. At the other extreme, on the edge of space, the sensors might be infrared or electronic intelligence satellites, linked to their processing centers on the ground by high-capacity data links that are in turn linked to the fusion system via military satellite communications or fiber-optic cable. The fusion systems might, or might not, be collocated with the decision maker. Most likely the decision maker would be linked to action takers via a separate military satellite communication system. Battle damage
assessment uses exactly the same systems, tasked to look for confirming phenomena, after which the S-P-F-D-A process starts all over again.

The requirements for an enhanced tracking system are being widely discussed within the Navy, Coast Guard, and Customs. The basic requirement for overall situation awareness is “maritime domain awareness,” analogous to the airspace awareness afforded by the FAA’s, NORAD’s, and Customs’s flight-following systems. Numerous war games and conferences indicate that various existing systems could be modified to provide the basic building blocks for a system to provide the necessary awareness; this would be the first step in building a North American Maritime Defense Command. Stepping through each of the segments of the S-P-F-D-A model, let us examine how this could be done.

*Sense*

The first step in this chain is to select specific phenomena that can be detected by sensors and processed by the rest of the cycle in a timely manner. This is the heart of the proposal. Beyond the traditional sensors, such as radars, signals intelligence, and acoustic devices, there already exists a set of cooperative reporting systems, communications satellite-based identity and position reporting systems—the InMarSat, ARGOS, and OrbComm, communications satellite systems with midocean coverage—each of which could be adapted for use as a primary sensor for maritime domain awareness. GlobalStar and Iridium communications satellite systems, the only two other systems with similar coverage, are also developing similar transceiving or transponding systems. Yet other companies, Comtech Mobile DataComm and Boatrac as examples, have developed transceiver-based unit-tracking systems that could possibly participate in the envisioned system. Other satellite communications–associated companies and systems probably would also be able to provide basic components of a maritime IFF system.

These systems would need a common vessel-identification scheme, and one is readily available. Several of them already use the Maritime Mobile Service Identifier (MMSI), assigned by the International Telecommunications Union. Discussions with developers of most of the other systems indicate that their systems could be relatively easily modified to broadcast an MMSI as well.

If the envisioned MTTS transponder system is the maritime equivalent of the aircraft system’s IFF, the MMSI is the specific entity’s identification (“squawk”) code. It would become an “electronic license plate.” Aviation IFF was originally interrogated solely by military radar systems, but now it is the primary electronic means of identification of radar tracks for both civilian and military uses. Radar is the vital part of the IFF system, interrogating unit-based transponders and reading responses. However, a ship-tracking system such as would be
required for a maritime defense command would need to track ships well out beyond land-based radar ranges; communications satellite transceivers and transponders would serve in its place. Of the five communications satellite systems that either now or would soon be able to meet the reporting requirements over a broad ocean area, InMarSat and OrbComm appear able to provide timely position reporting with oceanic coverage. As of early 2003, two other satellite communications systems, GlobalStar and Iridium, were on the threshold of the needed capability. The fifth system, ARGOS, has an oceanic communicating and reporting capability but has significant built-in time-latency. Additionally, once a firm market and a known requirement exist, other satellite companies may well decide to provide the required services, either by adapting existing satellite systems or by including oceanic capability in new ones. (Brief descriptions of the MMSI and the several satellite tracking systems suitable for maritime use are in the online appendix.)

**Process**

The signals containing the unit’s identification and location would be broadcast via a transceiver or transponder onboard every ship desiring to enter the coastal waters of the United States. The signal would be received by one of several communications satellite systems, depending on which transceiver/transponder was installed. Overall course and speed would be calculated at the terrestrial tracking station.

Eventually, the effort could include the Automatic Identification System (AIS)—an excellent, high-fidelity collision-avoidance and traffic management system now coming into use (see the online appendix)—if its transponders were placed in orbit, as has been suggested, or a method were found to route the AIS signal through one of the existing communication satellite systems. The advantages to global shipping control would be significant. However, no satellites now in orbit can receive or process the AIS signal, and it is unclear when, or even if, AIS transponders themselves will be put in space. Manned or unmanned aircraft and aerostats could also be equipped to monitor AIS and used in a surveillance/patrol role, but a space-based approach might well be significantly less expensive.

Earth stations receiving the downlink transmitted by whatever satellite system would forward the generated ship-position data to both the National Maritime Intelligence Center and Coast Guard regional reporting centers of some type.

The functions of regional reporting centers could be served by the two Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers (MIFCs), one on each coast, recently created by the Coast Guard with assistance from the Office of Naval Intelligence. Also, the Defense Information Systems Agency is experimenting with a concept it calls “Area Security Operations Command and Control” (ASOC), by which a
communications and software suite would link many of the organizations involved in homeland security. The MIFC will be linked to Joint Harbor Operations Centers (JHOCs), which will use the ASOC to link to military and other government agencies—for instance, the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Border Patrol—in its area of responsibility. It would be responsible for tracking all vessels in its area, assisting in assessing all contacts and deciding whether a response is required, and orchestrating any tactical response required. It would be assisted by NMIC’s civilian merchant ship section, which is the organization responsible for performing long-term trend analysis as well as maintaining a daily maritime intelligence watch worldwide.

**Fuse**

All-source intelligence fusion would primarily take place at the NMIC, but the MIFCs and battle watch organizations maintained at numbered fleet headquarters would assist. Coordination would be over SIPRNET (the U.S. government secure Internet), but because much of the data is not classified, the World Wide Web could also be used. Data from national collection means, including signals intelligence and acoustic systems, over-the-horizon radars such as the ROTH* and HFSW systems, sighting reports by Navy, Coast Guard, and Customs vessels and aircraft, human intelligence, and acoustic sensors would be melded with the transponder-supplied positions to determine the presence of nonreporting vessels or tracks displaying abnormal behavior or with suspicious histories.

This is not an insurmountable task. As mentioned above, the Customs Service’s Air and Marine Interdiction Coordination Center investigates an average of 2,900 anomalous tracks daily. Careful analysis and prompt information exchange with other governmental agencies and with private entities clears the vast majority of unusual tracks, but almost every day the AMICC initiates intercepts by Customs aircraft. Similarly, in a maritime defense system, Coast Guard or Navy assets, either air or surface, could be dispatched to interdict, interrogate, and determine the status and intentions of the few entities judged sufficiently suspicious by the regional reporting center—vessels not reporting or reporting in anomalous ways (such as using the MMSI of a ship known to have been recently in another part of the world). The patrol units would be linked via UHF satellite communications to the MIFC, which in turn could access the vessel’s “master file” (probably at the National Maritime Intelligence Center). The master file would contain everything known about the vessel and its owners, including type, the current float plan and all previous ones, associated MMSIs, history of ownership, and cargoes and crews, plus any special notes that have been appended in the past, such as association with suspicious entities or activities.

*ROTHR: Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar (AN/TPS-71), a high-frequency radar system.
The patrol unit, which could, in many cases, also determine a vessel’s Maritime Mobile Service Identifier via a standard marine VHF radio equipped for Digital Selective Calling, would query the vessel database using the MMSI, much as a highway patrol officer runs a license plate check. A query to a Department of Motor Vehicles database can tell a patrol officer if a suspicious car should be pulled over; an MMSI check would provide the same benefit to maritime forces. Establishing the MMSI as an IFF-equivalent, an electronic license plate, would be of substantial benefit to Navy, Coast Guard, and Customs patrol units. Of course, complications arise when a Navy unit has to check out a suspicious entity and “pull it over”; the Posse Comitatus Act of 1877 constrains the Navy’s actions in such a situation. That whole issue is under review, however, and in any case legal means can be found to halt a suspicious ship on the high seas. The USA Patriot Act of 2002 at least allows military platforms to collect intelligence on civilian entities in the manner described here.

Establishing the MMSI as electronic license plates and developing the means to track them would be important steps and would fill a substantial void in the nation’s maritime defenses. Getting all units approaching the coast of the United States and its territories to broadcast their MMSIs and position is a different matter, one that would require cooperation. However, the U.S. government can require all vessels desiring to enter U.S. ports to commence broadcasting their MMSIs, within either a specified distance of the coast or time of entering port. Vessels complying would enjoy the greater safety that accrues from track following. Any ship not filing a float plan or broadcasting its identifier and location (which should be immediately obvious to patrolling units) would be subject to interception, inspection, and the likelihood of significant delays in entering port, if indeed they were allowed to enter port at all. Thus the incentive to comply would be substantial. Delay costs all vessel owners, especially shippers, money—more money than acquiring communicating systems (that their ships should already have anyway, for safety, as discussed below) would cost them.

The processing system outlined above is an expansion of capabilities already in place at the Joint Inter Agency Task Force facilities on both the east and west coasts of the United States and at the AMICC. Fortunately, software tools in use at the AMICC and at other government agencies such as the National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office have shown that the manning requirements for a full maritime watch can be quite small. New-generation display and decision technology—such as the Anti-Air Defense Commander (AADC) system developed at Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory, with easily understood symbology and embedded reasoning and data manipulation capabilities, now being deployed on Navy command ships and cruisers—could be used to help the regional reporting center gain and maintain
situational awareness. The reporting center’s display and decision system would be the focus of the data fusion efforts, such as “smart agents” (see the online appendix), software that would sort the huge amount of data flowing in. The envisioned system could also manage communications links into and out of the several reporting and analysis centers.

**Decide**

A correct decision requires a sufficient quality and quantity of information and enough time to fuse that information so as to develop knowledge and thence wisdom. Timeliness dictates that decision makers be able to know when they have the information—from all sources and addressing all aspects of the problem at hand, such as status of own forces, rules of engagement, and the political, strategic, operational, and tactical situations—needed to develop wisdom and issue the appropriate orders. This is by no means a trivial task; indeed, integrating vast amounts of data from heterogeneous sources is daunting for the human mind; fortunately, however, several software tools are now available to help the decision maker.

One of these is the Architecture for Distributed Information Access (ADINA) tool developed at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory—an agent-based architecture for seamless access to and aggregation of heterogeneous information sources. Maritime defense regional reporting centers would use smart-agent tools like ADINA (and Control of Agent-Based Systems, or CoABS, grids, described in the online appendix) both to fuse the data, including the crucial MMSI reports, and to formulate decisions and courses of action, all in close coordination with the U.S. military command structure in the appropriate area.

**Act**

Once the decision is made to interdict a specific vessel, an on-scene commander would be designated; rules of engagement need to be in place and clearly spell out which federal agencies would take the lead in anticipated cases. Forces, possibly including surface and air elements of the Coast Guard, Navy, or Air Force, would be assigned to take appropriate action. Rapid response would be crucial in some situations; for that reason interdiction forces should include such regular and reserve assets as Air Force A-10s and Navy P-3s, equipped and trained for antishipping attack. Their weapons should include optically guided missiles such as Penguin and Hellfire, to allow disabling fire to be focused on the bridges and rudders of rogue ships attempting to enter port with clearly hostile intentions. In extremis, such as the need to stop a ship known or strongly suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction, larger weapons, such as Maverick or Harpoon, must be readily available to sink it. If more time is available and forces are
in position, surface units could effect the interdiction. Helicopter insertion of special operations forces or specially trained units is also a possibility.

Navy, Coast Guard, and Customs vessels and aircraft routinely operating off U.S. shores would not only report all surface vessels in their areas but act as “first responders.” Their reports would be fed into vessel master files and automatically matched with the pertinent float plan. Nonreporting or suspicious vessels would be marked for follow-up.

Because other systems, such as InMarSat-C, AIS, and DSC (described in the online appendix), broadcast position and identification information, it would be beneficial if maritime patrol forces could monitor them. Any vessel in a patrol unit’s vicinity broadcasting on these internationally mandated systems could be quickly and accurately identified, by MMSI. Indeed, all units of the U.S. government assigned to surveillance and interdiction roles should also be equipped to monitor them, if not fully participate.

WHAT WOULD BE REQUIRED?

Putting this proposal into practice would require prenotification of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) but not necessarily its approval. The initial implementation of this system would require the wide promulgation of a notice to mariners directing all vessels out to a thousand nautical miles off a U.S. coast and desiring to enter American territorial waters to broadcast their identification and location at set intervals over one of the approved systems. It would further direct every vessel to broadcast its location as soon as within ninety-six hours of arrival in an American port or whichever happens first. A vessel departing a port less than ninety-six hours out would operate the system as soon as it is under way.

One final word on available technology. The International Maritime Organization already requires units above three hundred gross tons to carry InMarSat-C, as part of the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System and in accordance with the Safety of Life at Sea Convention. InMarSat-C has a built-in ship-polling capability that meets the requirements for a maritime IFF system. The proposed system would provide that capability, all the way down to the smallest vessel capable of open-ocean navigation. These vessels will also be required to have the more expensive and more sophisticated Automatic Identification System by 2004. The purposes of this proposal could be met by either system; in any case, AIS, once it is capable of being monitored from beyond line of sight, may well become the specified system. However, AIS is significantly more expensive than the transponders of the low-earth orbiting satellite communications systems. Those other satellite communications reporting systems that would be suitable include OrbComm, GlobalStar, and Iridium. In any case, installation could be encouraged via a tax credit for American vessel owners. For
foreign owners the cost of entering U.S. waters will indeed increase, but not by an unbearable amount. Operational tests would be needed on each of these systems to ensure they are sufficiently timely and compatible with a national reporting standard. The task is clearly feasible from a technology viewpoint.

A two-tiered tracking system could be quickly emplaced, in which a combined automatic identification and satellite transceiver system sends tracking output via the AMICC or other tracking center to national and regional intelligence centers for further analysis and threat/law violation/encroachment determination, in much the same way as a Federal Aviation Agency regional center tracks aircraft. Regulations would be needed requiring all oceangoing vessels to install satellite communications reporting systems and operate them within a certain distance from the United States if the vessels intend to enter its territorial waters.

It would be very much to the benefit of U.S. security, maritime and otherwise, if the system and legal requirements outlined above were enacted immediately. This proposal is intended as a point of departure for building the maritime portion of the homeland security mission capabilities package. It names specific systems, but if more capable systems become available or a more beneficial alignment of existing systems can be made, so much the better. One way or the other, let’s get on with it. We are at war, and this is a known vulnerability.

NOTES

1. Drafts of this article have been circulated since November 2001 to stimulate focused, informed debate and information exchange. That information exchange has resulted in several major revisions of this article. However, more informed discussion, war games, both technically focused and policy focused, and operational experiments are needed until the concept and procedures outlined here are fully implemented. One disclaimer is appropriate: though this article identifies specific systems to provide points of departure for further investigation, it is not intended to champion any specific system or systems. If there are better, more useful systems available either now or in the near future, then those should be used.


3. The model was developed by the author, as a research fellow at the Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island.
A NEW ORDER, NEW POWERS
Werner Weidenfeld

The war with Iraq has been a turning point in history that will bring massive changes to America’s relations with the rest of the world and relations within Europe. Future historians will characterize the time period between the attack on the World Trade Center and the Iraqi war as the beginning of a new era in the history of the world. They will see the end of the East-West conflict as the incubation period for the full consequences that were not reducible to one concept by its contemporaries. Unsurprisingly, the political response worldwide has been erratic and confused, reflected in the intellectual commentary. The war exposed a lack of orientation. Where it was once fashionable to speak of a paradigm change, one now soberly acknowledges paradigm atrophy.

The demands of our era are too high; too much must be resolved in too many places, and too many previously legitimate assumptions appear to have become irrelevant. Almost everything that seemed to lend world politics the image of a reasonably reliable order is no longer valid. The Iraqi war presents seven consequences for the future of international politics.

In the beginning there was terror. This is not to say that everything is a consequence of terrorism, but the attacks of 11 September released forces, triggered traumas, and made us all look into the abyss of serious dangers previously off in the distance where they were more or less ignored.

The end of the Cold War and the dissipation of communist ideology and its goal of world domination left smoldering conflicts in the background. Phenomena such as religious fundamentalism, the explosion of ethnic tensions, and heated nationalism, which has been contained for so long within the grip of bipolarity, were then suddenly set free, surprising the world community with this new aggressiveness, from the Balkans to the Caucasus, Afghanistan to Pakistan, Iraq to Indonesia and Malaysia.

The second consequence is that terrorism has undermined the premise of our security. The basic principle against terrorism has always been deterrence. An enemy state was to be deterred from attacking with the threat of a counterattack resulting in destruction or at least defeat. Every actor’s move was based on the rationally calculated risk of a counterattack. This ensured peace in the Cold War world for decades.
However, the global professional network of terrorism does not act according to this principle. Its calculations are not based upon this traditional sense of risk, as divine promises are made.

Terrorism is no longer the classic foreign enemy. It lies both within and beyond the borders of the country under attack. Terrorist networks boast a high level of professional training and are well equipped with high-tech capabilities, which are often linked to a transcendence-oriented conviction to bring a new cultural horizon to designated nations. Terrorism has nested itself in many countries, effectively rescinding the traditional distinction between domestic and foreign security. Western societies, particularly the United States, have therefore replaced deterrence with the active search for protection.

In recent years alone, some ninety thousand terrorists worldwide have been trained. The nightmare of 11 September was, against the backdrop of this information, just the beginning of the beginning. Western civilization is facing threats to its very existence.

America’s ability to survive terrorism is the third consequence. Rendered vulnerable for the first time on its own territory, on 11 September the United States was struck at the very heart of its existence. Practically defenseless against attack, the American self-conception made war against terrorism necessary to protect the survival of the nation. That is why the war with Iraq should not be seen as a singular event. It is only one stone, with many more needed to complete the large mosaic of security and stability. First, there was Afghanistan, then Iraq, and others will follow—Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Korea; wherever the roots of threats are found, America will seek to protect its national existence. Should organizations such as the United Nations or NATO wish to be of help, Washington will welcome them; however, should the solidarity of international organizations not bear support for it, Washington will manage it alone. The same goes for international law. When useful, the United States will follow it, but when not, one can go without appealing to its legitimacy. The vital interest of securing America’s existence has priority above all else.

The fourth consequence is that the United States and Europe’s respective basic perceptions of risks and threats to their national security are drifting further apart. This huge divide could lead, at some point, to a rupture in transatlantic culture. To be sure, the common roots of an enlightened society, principles of freedom and reason have not simply withered. A close transatlantic economic relationship and social interconnection continue to be important, but they are strained more and more by dissent over the use of military force by the United States. America guaranteed its European allies sanctuary, which soothed the European soul wounded by two world wars. However, when two societies respond so differently to the key challenges to their basic security, the partnership erodes,
and it is only a question of time before the relationship collapses. The end of the old Atlantic community is at hand.

As for its perception of the rest of the world, the fifth consequence is that the only remaining superpower is prepared to fully realize its hegemonic status. A natural reflex to this has been its attempt to build temporary coalitions that relativize and curb its domination. Only this can explain the current curious alliance between France, Germany, Russia, and China. Within it, each partner has its own interests:

- France sees the chance to bring itself back into the circle of world powers. It is realistic enough to recognize that its strength alone is not enough. France needs partners, even if that means working with an estranged Germany, which can only be considered a junior partner in world political affairs at best.

- Germany senses the need to avert the danger of a German Sonderweg. For historical reasons, Germany requires the anchor of friendly relations more so than other nations. After having estranged itself from old partners, in particular the United States, Germany must forge new alliances. Working together with France, Russia, and China, it can combine the current moods and attitudes of multilateralism, pacifism, and anti-Americanism to its advantage at the voting booth.

- Russia is trapped in ambivalent behavior. On the one hand, wounded by the loss of its superpower status, Russia seeks to benefit from a close relationship with the United States. On the other hand, too close a relationship with Washington threatens to destroy what remains of Russia’s weight in world political affairs. Russia’s claims of solidarity with America were a welcome diversion from domestic attention to Chechnya. However, when core elements of national pride and world political interests are at stake, Moscow knows how to define and claim its own position.

- China is the only power that in the midterm could meet the United States eye to eye. However, it needs a prudent policy that will keep its neighbors from becoming ticking time bombs through U.S. actions. The aggravation of the Indian-Pakistan conflict is one such example. This applies as well to a policy toward North Korea, which could force Japan to become a nuclear power.

Considered together, all four partners share the interest of deflating the world’s only superpower’s magnetism, albeit for different reasons. America’s hegemony is to be tamed through the alliance of a counter power.

The sixth consequence is America’s response to this change in the constellation with a cooperation strategy à la carte. It seeks out specific countries, attracting them with the alluring promises of business and prestige, even at the risk of
damaging such international organizations as NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations. Regarding the EU, the classic strategy of “divide and conquer” has been employed, the symbolic highlight thereof being the letter of solidarity with the United States, signed by eight European states. This piece of paper became a document of the division of Europe. America will honor this document at best with wistful nostalgia, as its basic interests lie elsewhere in the main sources of energy supplies. These markets of the future lie beyond Europe.

The most relevant and potentially dangerous nations with respect to questions of security are in Asia and the Middle East. The political arm of Islamic fundamentalism is based on the Arabian Peninsula. The threat of nuclear arms was an issue in the Indian-Pakistan conflict. It is an issue in Iran, in the Middle East generally, and in North Korea. The time when America needed to protect its primary interests in Europe is gone.

The final consequence is how deeply America’s behavior and the war with Iraq have divided Europe. It would be naïve to assume that the historical successes of European integration will continue. The process of European integration can also fail. The war with Iraq has given rise to basic existential questions, to which European states have reacted with recourse according to their diverse national dispositions. Europe has no common perception of war and peace—each nation’s own historical trauma is too different to permit such a shared basis. Europeans consistently pursue individual national courses alongside their respective relationship to the United States, which explains why Eastern and Central European states are giving in to the magnetism of America’s market and power. It also explains why British prime minister Tony Blair and Spain’s José María Aznar compensate for their limited influence in continental Europe by positioning themselves at the shoulders of the United States and its political and economic prowess.

In the long-term, most importantly, trust among Europeans is being torn asunder. That letter signed by eight countries was an act prepared and carried out in the style of old-time secret diplomacy. Who should trust whom? Should Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder still trust Azner? Should President Jacques Chirac continue to have faith in Blair? Should France and Germany stand together against Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in European politics? The virus of distrust threatens to corrode Europe internally.

Considered together, these points illustrate why it is so difficult to understand clearly and interpret our present situation. There are power conglomerates of a dimension heretofore unknown, societies have become more vulnerable than ever, and the previous world order has become an anarchy of conflicts. The great dramas of human history are apparently still to be written. The reliability of our peaceful experience is a thing of the past.
SUMMARIZING EISENHOWER

Jay M. Parker


I have written you a long letter because I do not have time to write you a short one.
—Blaise Paschal

Anyone who has ever written professionally, whether a novel or an interoffice memo, quickly acknowledges the accuracy of Paschal’s statement. If this is the test of a good writer, it is even more pertinent when the subject is someone larger than life. Dwight D. Eisenhower’s extraordinary achievements have filled volumes, some more adequate than others. Historians of great note have written hundreds of pages about brief segments of his eventful life. Now, three authors have attempted in comparatively slim volumes to define the essential experiences and achievements of one of the twentieth century’s most notable figures.

Of the three books reviewed, Kinnard achieves this task to a greater degree than the other authors. This should come as no surprise to those familiar with Kinnard’s work. A true soldier-scholar, Kinnard has
often achieved the near impossible task of being present for significant moments in history and later proving capable of writing about them with objectivity and careful scholarship. Originally a protégé of General Maxwell Taylor, he went on in his post-Army career to carve a distinct niche in the scholarship on defense politics and national security. His earlier writings on the politics of defense policy in the Eisenhower years still rank among the seminal works on this subject. His classic *The War Managers* (Avery, 1985) is an invaluable addition to the civil-military literature of the Vietnam era. In Kinnard’s latest study of Eisenhower (part of a Brasseys series on great military leaders), he best addresses Eisenhower’s military leadership, with particular attention to his role as supreme allied commander in the Second World War. While he is clear in his praise for Eisenhower’s diplomatic skill and his consistently keen grasp of the bigger strategic picture, Kinnard does not shrink from presenting criticism of Eisenhower’s early failures, particularly in the North Africa campaign. A more thorough discussion of these events and the personalities that shaped them can certainly be found in larger volumes (most notably Carlo D’Estes’s excellent biography *Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life* [Henry Holt, 2002]). However, for so thin a volume, Kinnard’s book covers these topics extremely well.

Less satisfying, however, is his discussion of Eisenhower’s road from Abilene to five stars. All the high points are there—the difficult childhood, the serendipitous opportunity to attend West Point, the long years of service in a small and resource-poor peacetime Army, and the important role played by his mentors Fox Connor and George Marshall. Yet among Eisenhower biographers there are two schools of thought on his early military career. One highlights an almost inevitable march through a succession of key jobs and successful mastery of important opportunities that culminated in his unchallenged appointment with destiny. The other presents a grim parade of brutal staff jobs for often ungrateful bosses (among them Douglas MacArthur) and the series of lucky breaks in what might have been considered the twilight of a mediocre career that led George Marshall to select Eisenhower for command in Europe. Kinnard seems to fall in with the former school of thought.

The truth, of course, lies somewhere in between, and it is difficult to play out important nuances in so short a book. The story of Eisenhower as presented here, however, might have been better served by balancing the great achievements with the hard knocks. For example, who would imagine that a junior officer could survive a court-martial and go on to five-star rank? What career officer would not benefit from the knowledge that an assignment that superbly oriented Eisenhower to his future battlefields (service on the American Battle Monuments Commission) was an assignment Eisenhower neither sought nor welcomed?
Kinnard addresses important facets of Eisenhower’s presidency that served him well: his unique military experiences in diplomacy, the economics of national security, and the domestic politics of defense. In so doing, however, Kinnard is less critical than he might have been of what are generally acknowledged to be the two most significant shortcomings of Eisenhower’s presidency—his failure to challenge Senator Joe McCarthy and his reluctance to intervene on behalf of public school integration in Little Rock, Arkansas. These failures are made all the more puzzling by instances earlier in Eisenhower’s career when he successfully challenged bullies similar to McCarthy when others would not, and when he personally took the high road on civil rights in a racially segregated Army. Again, a short volume does not allow for a full examination of all questions, but Kinnard at least could have raised these issues in his otherwise excellent book.

In Tom Wicker’s short biography (part of a series of short studies of American presidents edited by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.) we see a different emphasis on Eisenhower’s life and career, one far more critical and far less balanced than the picture presented by Kinnard. This is surprising, given Wicker’s well deserved reputation as a political journalist whose carefully crafted writings often meet the standards of the finest scholarly works. His classic JFK and LBJ (revised and updated Elephant paperback, 1991) remains one of the finest studies of presidential exercise of legislative power. This work is even more impressive when one considers that it was a far more flattering picture of Johnson than of Kennedy, though it was written at a time when Kennedy was celebrated and revered as a martyr and Johnson was viewed as a tragically flawed and failed president. However, such balance and insight are not as prevalent in this book.

At 158 pages, Wicker’s book is somewhat longer than Kinnard’s, and as one would hope, given Wicker’s expertise, it places far greater emphasis on Eisenhower’s political career than on his time in the military. But Wicker disappoints on several levels. First, he does not adequately discuss how Eisenhower’s unconventional military career more logically prepared him for the White House than for battlefield command. He seems to embrace the view that Eisenhower came from a rigid, authoritarian, hierarchical profession that did not understand or value the kinds of political nuance necessary to be president. Virtually every authoritative biography of Eisenhower—whether lengthy or short, celebratory or critical—has effectively laid this myth to rest. Wicker, however, seems unconvinced.

In addressing Eisenhower’s successes and failures as a president, Wicker finds many of the latter and a grudging few of the former. Like Kinnard, he addresses the president’s relationship with Joseph McCarthy and the use of federal troops to enforce the court order at Little Rock. But where Kinnard may be too
forgiving, Wicker is too uncompromising. The emotions surrounding the domestic politics of the Cold War (its roots grounded in the Red Scares of the 1920s and ’30s, with the added overlay of the nuclear age) should not be underestimated. Likewise, the task of applying federal force to issues that the Civil War should have decided but that Reconstruction failed to resolve was a monumental challenge that continues to haunt presidents. If Eisenhower did not adequately meet these two demands on his watch, it certainly was not because he was a simple man unable to grasp an obvious solution. In the end, Wicker’s book, which could have been an excellent political bookend to Kinnard’s military critique, falls short.

In the third short volume, Matthew Holland studies Eisenhower’s preparation for leadership, with a particular emphasis on the role played by his military experiences. A retired army officer turned academic, Holland does not have the kind of impressive track record that recommends Kinnard or Wicker. However, there are telling signs of a newer scholar, two of particular note. One is his strongly enthusiastic admiration for his subject. Scholars—despite what they may say—do not approach a subject with total dispassion, and historians and political scientists normally choose those disciplines more from deeply held beliefs than idle curiosity. Holland is to be admired for at least putting his biases up front; however, while true scholars may start with a research question that betrays their particular perspective, they then carefully gather data and, if they are doing their job, let the chips fall where they may. There are countless examples of authors who started a book with a fixed opinion about the outcome, only to be surprised by the eventual conclusion. In this particular instance Holland could have let the facts speak for themselves.

Having said this, the book has much to commend it. Holland weaves together primary archival material and important secondary sources, sometimes providing an important expansion on the works of other writers and, on occasion, correctly contradicting them. While his stated topic is the years before Eisenhower came to power, he links Eisenhower’s background to his later actions, giving us a fuller picture of the man as opposed to the myth. There are critiques of style that can be made. For example, rather than tracing Eisenhower’s biography in chronological fashion, Holland chooses to address key points by topic, such as Eisenhower’s political experience or his personal relationships with mentors and peers. While Holland uses this technique to provide rich, specific, and important details (some of which do not appear in many other comprehensive works), it can be distracting to readers. When Holland covers different topics from the same era in back-to-back chapters, the reader sometimes is inclined to ask, “Didn’t I read this already?”
In sum, Paschal was right: the short text is an author’s most difficult challenge. None of these works should be a substitute for more comprehensive books available on the life of Dwight Eisenhower. Yet all three books demonstrate to a greater or lesser degree that it is possible to provide a solid, valuable introduction to the topic for the serious scholar and an adequate, self-contained work for the casual reader.
A LONG-OVERDUE SERVICE

David E. Graham


In the foreword, retired general Gordon R. Sullivan, a former chief of staff of the Army, notes, “Commanders and staff officers should read this book to see how the Army lawyer’s role has evolved. Judge advocates should read it because it offers a shortcut to knowledge that ordinarily is gained only through experience. Those interested in the Army’s history should read it because it provides details published in no other source.” To this list should be added all who deal with, teach, or are simply interested in the legal aspects of U.S. national security matters.

Military attorneys—judge advocates of all the armed forces—have become increasingly active participants in both operational planning and implementation. In clear and concise narrative, Borch offers the reader a comprehensive explanation of why and how this has occurred. Through his systematic discussion of the evolution of “operational law” (OPLAW) and his use of dozens of vignettes gleaned from over a hundred personal interviews, Borch offers an accurate picture of both the nature of OPLAW and the work of the OP lawyers. In doing so, he performs an important and long-overdue service to the national security community and the general public, who are still largely unfamiliar with this critically important aspect of military legal practice. This “educational” aspect of the book is also of particular contemporary relevance.

Recently, the question has been posed by some, both in and out of the government, whether the enhanced role that judge advocates now play in the operational arena has made war fighting excessively legalistic, thus impeding the successful conduct of operations. While the answer is probably best left to commanders, Borch—through his extensive examination of the manner in which OP lawyers identify and advise on legal issues affecting military activities conducted across the operational spectrum—does much to dispel any notion that judge advocates unduly place obstacles in the path of mission success. It is

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now a certainty that the manner in which a U.S. military operation is conducted invariably will be subjected to intense media coverage (and second guessing); that any deployment of U.S. forces abroad will be highly politicized, both within the United States and internationally; and that, accordingly, all such operations necessarily have become legally intensive. Both commanders and their judge advocate advisors understand fully the environment in which they must operate and succeed. Also understood is the undisputed fact that “judge advocates advise; commanders decide.”

An Army judge advocate and an accomplished author of several books, as well as of numerous articles dealing with both criminal and international law subjects, Colonel Borch has made the task of reviewing *Judge Advocates in Combat* an easy one. In a well structured preface, he informs the reader of what his book is, and is not, about. It is a narrative history of the participation of Army lawyers in a broad range of military operations—from 1959, the beginning of Army judge advocate deployments to Vietnam, to 1996, when Army attorneys returned from a United Nations operation in Haiti. As noted, the book’s principal theme is the process through which Army judge advocates have, during this period, effected a transcension from their peacetime “garrison” mission, providing legal services only in the traditional areas of military justice, claims, legal assistance, and administrative law, to their current practice—a military legal discipline that encompasses all U.S. foreign and international law specifically affecting the conduct of military operations.

Borch addresses this theme in a very personal manner by detailing, through the use of meticulous research and personal interviews, the actions of individual judge advocates in both major and minor operations, at home and abroad. There are individual chapters on Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and Haiti, while the final chapter deals with judge advocate participation in eleven operations other than war. The author asks: “Who was there? What did they do? How did they enhance the commanders’ ability to accomplish the assigned mission?” Borch answers these questions by focusing on the activities of numerous judge advocates over a thirty-year period. With the help of well crafted maps and photos from many of the operations examined, Borch describes the manner in which Army lawyers have dealt with increasingly complex legal issues in jungles and deserts around the world. Of particular importance to our understanding, he has organized these issues under the individual military legal discipline encompassed by this body of law.

When advising the reader what this book is not about, Borch emphasizes that it is neither a history of the Army’s Judge Advocate General’s Corps nor a history of wartime legal issues. This reviewer agrees with this assessment. Borch also gives notice that the book should not be viewed as a collection of legal lessons
learned. This, however, is only partially correct. While certainly not a comprehensive collection of such lessons discerned over the course of the thirty-plus years dealt with, *Judge Advocates in Combat* is, nevertheless, an exceptionally valuable resource for those whose work requires them to draw upon how legal issues commonly recurring in an operational environment have been dealt with by U.S. forces in the field. Indeed, this reviewer is personally aware of several occasions when legal offices within the Department of Defense have already turned to this book for information and guidance.

Colonel Borch has produced a work of enduring value. Absent his efforts, the stories and accomplishments of countless Army judge advocates would not have become an integral part of the history of the Army’s Judge Advocate General’s Corps. Just as importantly, however, he has chronicled the genesis and evolution of operational law within that corps—a legal discipline that has now become the doctrinal bedrock for judge advocates advising commanders on the wide range of legal issues that arise in operational environments around the world. This is a book that should be on the shelves of all who are practitioners or students of U.S. national security law.
BOOK REVIEWS

THE ARABS AND MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS


The U.S. engagement in the Middle East has dramatically escalated due to the recent war in Iraq. These two books provide valuable historical background as well as cogent national security policy analysis that commands attention from military and other national security leaders.

Kenneth Pollack, a highly regarded Middle East analyst, is a senior fellow for Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution and director of research for the institution’s Saban Center for Middle East Policy. Pollack is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations (sponsor of both books), a former CIA analyst, and a former National Security Council staff member. He has been a frequent commentator on the television news and a regular contributor to newspaper op-ed pages, and he has been published in such prominent journals as *Foreign Affairs* and *International Security*. Pollack has considerable expertise in Middle Eastern affairs and skillfully brings it to bear. Both books are well written and easily accessible to a general audience, and they provide strong analysis. *The Threatening Storm* also contains several soundly supported policy recommendations.

The books came out in autumn 2002, contributing constructively to the debate leading up to the recent war with Iraq. Superficially, it might appear that *The Threatening Storm* is outdated, given the fulfillment of Pollack’s recommendation for war. Similarly, the immediate operational value of *Arabs at War* may also seem overtaken by events. However, even though their value was greater prior to the war, discounting their continuing value would be a mistake.

*The Threatening Storm* is an important policy examination that also incorporates a good, concise overview of Iraq and its earlier relationship with the United States. The book’s centerpiece is Pollack’s comprehensive and compelling case for war against Saddam-led Iraq as the best of available policy alternatives. However, he provides more than just an argument for war.
Confident the United States would quickly win a war with Iraq at an acceptable cost, Pollack emphasizes that winning the war would not be enough and therefore provides an outline for American diplomatic, economic, informational, and military efforts to support successful postconflict reconstruction. The war has been won with fewer forces than Pollack and many others would have preferred, but the number of forces sufficient to win the war might not be enough to secure the peace. Hence, Pollack’s postconflict analysis found in chapter 12 (“Rebuilding Iraq”) remains useful. Additionally, in chapter 10 Pollack provides an interesting look into American military operations, particularly regarding airpower in the first Gulf War, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.

*Arabs at War* is an excellent work of military history. Pollack discusses the military performance of six Arab countries—Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Syria—from 1948 to 1991. Although the record is heavily weighted with episodes from the Arab-Israeli wars, there are numerous other conflicts that support the analysis of Arab military effectiveness.

Pollack’s definition of military effectiveness “refers to the ability of soldiers and officers to perform on the battlefield, to accomplish military missions, and to execute the strategies devised by their political-military leaders. If strategy is the military means by which political ends are pursued, military effectiveness refers to the skills that are employed.” Pollack explores nine possible explanations for a remarkable record of Arab military ineffectiveness since World War II: cowardice, lack of morale, training, unit cohesion, generalship, tactical leadership, information management, technical skills and weapons handling, and logistics and maintenance. He concludes that “four areas of military effectiveness stand out as consistent and crippling problems for Arab forces: poor tactical leadership, poor information management, poor weapons handling, and poor maintenance.” Secondary problems such as poor generalship, training, and morale were recurring but not constant. Even when Arabs did well in these secondary areas, there was little increased effectiveness. Pollack observes that cowardice, weak unit cohesion, and bad logistics have not been significant problems for Arab militaries—Arab units and individual soldiers generally have fought hard, but not well.

The book concentrates primarily on Arab armies in conventional war, particularly ground warfare. Although use of air forces is addressed in many of the conflicts, their limited role and their frequent early failure and exit leave little to discuss. Pollack’s assessment of Arab air force performance largely reinforces his general point about the limitations of Arab personnel in handling modern weaponry. Use of naval forces (limited when they exist at all) is inconsequential for the conflict chosen. With the exception of a brief treatment of Libyan-U.S. skirmishes from 1981 to 1989, naval operations play no significant role in Pollack’s analysis.

*Arabs at War* more accurately could be titled “Six Arab States at Conventional War.” Although Pollack is on solid ground asserting that these six states comprise the lion’s share of conventional Arab military experience since World War II, there is little about Arab military effectiveness in unconventional
war, which places an important limit on
the current value of Pollack’s analysis.
What it leaves out is the numerous ir-
regular forces of the Arab world, who
have proven troublesome to foes and
who are often more effective in achiev-
ing political aims. However, a hint of
such analysis shows itself in Pollack’s
description of Arab conventional mili-
tary forces as they faced unconventional
foes—such as Jordan against the PLO
during the “Black September” fighting;
Syria against the PLO and Lebanese
guerrillas; Iraq in numerous clashes with
Kurds; and Libya against various forces
in Chad. Additional examples of un-
conventional Arab military actions in
Algeria, Afghanistan, Morocco, Leba-
non, and Palestine-Israel might profit-
abley be considered to form a more
comprehensive view of Arab military
effectiveness.

This work has a Rashomon-like feel that
results from reading about military ac-
tions one state at a time, even though
several belligerents participated in the
same wars, sometimes even fighting
each other. Pollack’s approach main-
tains a discrete analysis of national mili-
tary efforts but creates a disjointed
presentation of some events. Readers
who are familiar with these conflicts
from other sources will have an easier
time keeping events in context. The
book’s focus is on the effective use of
instruments of war, particularly ground
forces, and provides readers with little
about the interplay of policy and strat-
egy. Coalition dynamics also do not fig-
ure prominently in Pollack’s discussion,
although there are hints that in Arab
military collaboration the coalition
whole was often worth less than the
sum of the parts.

*Arabs at War* and *The Threatening Storm*
are excellent works of history and analy-
sis. *Arabs at War* is a valuable work of
military history for military profession-
als and historians. *The Threatening
Storm*, its main argument now dated,
still serves as a useful history of U.S.-Iraq
relations leading up to the war and re-
mains a valuable guide to the challenges
of postwar reconstruction.

**RICHARD LACQUEMENT**
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Chasdi, Richard J. *Tapestry of Terror: A Portrait of
Middle East Terrorism, 1994–1999*. Lanham, Md.:
Lexington, 2002. 507pp. $80

This is a book only a statistician could
love. This reviewer is not a statistician.
Chasdi, a visiting assistant professor of
international relations at the College of
Wooster, presents a quantitative analysis
of the terrorist phenomena in four re-
gions of the Middle East: Algeria, Egypt,
Turkey, and Palestine and Israel. Pur-
portedly Chasdi attempts to examine the
antecedent events and conditions in the
four subject nation-states with an eye to-
ward understanding why terrorism oc-
curs at the systems or operational level
as well as at the state and subnational-
actor levels. He hopes that in doing so he
will give counterterrorism planners and
policy makers data to help them better
craft counterterrorism policy in the
future. If this sounds complex, it is.
Chasdi’s complicated quantitative analy-
sis coupled with his turgid and at times
unfathomable prose makes the effort
even more difficult.

*Tapestry of Terror* is the second of a pro-
jected trilogy studying the root causes of
Middle Eastern terrorism. In his first volume, *Serenade of Suffering*, Chasdi examines terrorism in the context of the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian-Arab conflict. He throws a wider net in his second work by examining conditions in countries as diverse as Turkey and Algeria, as well as the more widely studied Israeli, Palestinian, and Egyptian varieties of terrorism. Because comparatively less has been written about terrorism in Algeria and Turkey, these two sections are uniquely interesting. In the section relating to Algeria, Chasdi devotes considerable time to the Islamic Salvation Front, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), and some relatively obscure splinter groups of the GIA. Unfortunately, Chasdi’s examination of them falls short. Much of his analysis does not really address the basic questions of who these groups are or what constitutes their ideologies, their political, social, and religious goals, and how they differ from each other. Rather, Chasdi devotes most of his effort to studying the current state of the scholarship on different Algerian terrorist movements. This approach, historically graphical in practice, is unhelpful, because it presumes that the reader is familiar with the differing views of the various scholars he is discussing. Last time I looked, not too many policy makers were steeped in the nuance of Algerian terrorist historiography.

The section devoted to the study of Turkish terror covers such well known groups as the Kurdistan Worker’s Party and some not so familiar organizations, like the Greater Eastern Islamic Raiders and the Anatolian Federal Islamic State. While the information presented on these obscure organizations is interesting and frankly better presented than in the Algerian case, Chasdi once again falls victim to his fascination with the internecine disputes and discussions among scholars. Many times the more immediate questions of who and what these organizations represent are simply not presented in sufficient detail.

Another problem plaguing this book is Chasdi’s basic quantitative approach to the issue of identifying the root causes of terrorism and then using data to predict terrorist incidents. While using quantitative methods to study terrorism has been vetted and is useful in certain instances, Chasdi’s devotion to the methodology almost approaches the religious. With the text littered with such terms as “Pearson chi square values” and “Yates continuity corrections,” Chasdi is for not the casual reader but one who is well versed in statistical research analysis methods. This, of course, harkens back to the original purpose of the book, to assist policy makers in understanding the causality behind Middle Eastern terrorism. Unfortunately, Chasdi has crafted a work so complex and arcane that one must question the real utility of his work to those who shape policy. While the efforts of his scholarship are impressive, one cannot help wondering if the only real audience for Chasdi’s *Tapestry of Terror* is Chasdi himself.

JACK THOMAS TOMARCHIO
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This volume is a collection of sixteen articles originally published in the *Washington Quarterly* in 2001 and 2002. It is part of the *Washington Quarterly* reader series, in which domestic and international perspectives are applied to a topic. Twelve of the articles were solicited from academics around the world. The editor of this book, Alexander T. J. Lennon, is the editor in chief of the *Washington Quarterly*. He offers no explanation of how the twelve were chosen, other than to say that each author is “preeminent” and has spent some time in the United States. The authors were asked to describe their idealized vision of U.S. foreign and national security policy in the future, emphasizing the role they would like the United States to play in their particular regions. The remaining four articles are the reactions of American scholars to those collective visions.

The *Washington Quarterly* typically runs accessible, jargon-free, mainstream articles, and those in this collection are no exception. They are well written and get to the point quickly.

It is a useful exercise for Americans to learn the views of non-American experts on foreign policy. Predictably, many of these academics from other countries emphasize that the United States could do more to understand (and sympathize with) the perspectives and cultures of other countries. Otherwise, the foreign authors tend toward a sanguine view of America as the world’s only true superpower. This could reflect the timing of the articles and their geographic locations.

It is important to note that all twelve articles were published before “9/11” and the war on terrorism. If writing today, perhaps their opinions would be different.

The four articles by American scholars were written after “9/11” and when the war with Iraq was inevitable. Their analyses are both more current and out of alignment with the others. For understandable reasons, they reach beyond the range of their colleagues by paying considerable attention to post–11 September priorities and the fears that accompany them. Having said this, however, they do agree that the United States should be alert to the potential downside of power and compensate by being more politically and culturally sensitive. The Americans also advocate a balance between multilateralism and unilateralism, conceding that drawing this balance is more of an art than a science. Their articles imply that on this point the Americans arrived at their conclusion independently of the views of their foreign counterparts. They appear to be swayed more by the practical aspects of the war on terror and the risk of imperial overreach than by the opening twelve articles.

Christopher Layne suggests that the United States avoid overreaching by “shifting” the burden of maintaining stability to others on the assumption that in some regions U.S. interests are less intense than those of other major powers. He argues, for example, that Japan, China, and India have greater interests in Persian Gulf oil than does the United States and should therefore be responsible for stability in the region. The other American authors, however,
tend more toward sharing the burden with international organizations and other countries rather than totally relinquishing responsibility.

One theme addressed by the Americans is anti-Americanism in the Arab world, the cultural divide between the Arabs and the West. Unfortunately, none of the authors who wrote on the Middle East is an Arab. One is an Iranian, who observes that today the average Iranian has (or perhaps did in the summer of 2001) a “far more positive” view of the United States than the average Arab, and the other is an Israeli. They appear to be unusual choices to represent the region at this juncture in time.

Readers who hoped to learn more about Arab views of American foreign policy should look elsewhere.

JAMES MISKEL
Naval War College


Given the subject, this book appropriately covers a lot of territory. It is more than a treatise on geography; Lindberg and Todd have managed to incorporate fairly substantial discussions on naval strategy, tactics, history, force structure, and ship construction. The central theme is that historical concepts of “distance” remain central to modern naval operations, leading to the hypothesis that “the navies with the longest reach—those with the greatest geographical power-projection capability—are in possession of not just the most sophisticated fleets but the most elaborate infrastructures to boot.” In developing that idea, the authors provide a useful compendium of intellectual rigor to support the strategic prescriptions not only of the U.S. Navy’s Forward . . . from the Sea but also of navies of all sizes, worldwide.

The authors progress from an introduction to the concept of time-distance as related to the maritime environment, comparing land versus sea warfare, to exploring historical case studies of naval warfare on the high seas, the littorals, and riverine warfare, before concluding with some thoughts on the influence of geography on navies. The theoretical background chapter is a generally solid overview of the works of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett, but it also discusses the often-overlooked Sir Halford Mackinder. The historical examples comprise several such obvious scenarios as Gallipoli and Okinawa, as well as many lesser-known ones—for example, the Russo-Japanese War and the Falklands campaign. Riverine warfare was especially interesting, with the arrival of the review copy in time to read the section on the Mesopotamia campaign of the First World War just in advance of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Although necessarily slight, these case studies are far from shallow, drawing out the larger themes in often-novel ways.

In and of themselves, with a few exceptions, the authors’ observations and discussions are hardly profound. However, the judicious combination and interplay of geography, history, and strategy lead to many quite compelling derivations. Prospective readers be warned, however: This is a dense book with tightly spaced pages and is definitely not for the novice. There is a
presumed familiarity with much of the subject matter that makes this work a more appropriate developmental read for the interested professional—for whom it is a must.

If there is a weakness to the book, it is that the terms “brown-,” “green-,” and “blue-water” are not properly associated with their respective naval equivalents of “inland waterways,” “coastal defense,” and “power-projection” fleets until the last quarter of the book, and even then the distinguishing features are not defined but implied. To complicate matters, there is the earlier fleeting introduction of an additional “marginal seas” naval warfare environment that is never again mentioned. The distinctions are important, especially when the authors conclude that the physical configuration of these various environments—their geography—will continue to present challenges to navies and naval operations. Optimistically, they also conclude that far from rendering navies obsolete in the modern battle space, technological improvements and force structure developments derived from a sound understanding of geographical considerations will ensure their continued relevance.

A greater disappointment for a book on geography is the selection of maps. They are barely adequate even for the basic overview they are intended to provide—a number of important place names mentioned cannot be found. More to the point, especially considering the key factor of “distance,” the choice of the common Mercator projection, with all its inherent north-south distortions, is unfortunate. In many cases the scale is not given, and in the littorals the bottom depth contours are not identified. Conic projections could have illustrated many points far more effectively.

That said, this book deserves to be read by naval professionals. Its conclusion that geography will continue to have much the same influence it always has had on navies would be startling only if it were otherwise. However, in arriving at that conclusion, Lindberg and Todd provide many useful reminders that navies do not exist just to impact one another but are part of a larger spatial context of global dimensions.

RICHARD H. GIMBLETT
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Nations in Transit 2001–2002 is a comprehensive fact book that examines the trends of liberalization in East Central Europe and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. The editors claim the book is unique, as the “only . . . comparative study of post-Communist political and economic transition in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia.” This sixth edition covers the period from November 2000 through December 2001; however, the reader will frequently find information from the 1990s.

The book covers twenty-seven nations, attempting to assess each by its level of democratization, rule of law, and economic liberalization. Each of these broad categories contains elements that
provide a structure for the analysis of each nation; this analysis is conducted by one principal author, who in many cases is a native of the country in question.

The political process element in the democratization category has an explanation of the major political parties, their leadership, political agendas, and majorities in the government. Democratization also discusses civil society, focusing primarily on the functioning of nongovernmental organizations. Independent media are also covered, containing information on names, affiliation, content, and audience. This element also includes data on Internet accessibility. The final elements in the democratization category are governance and public administration. These cover the executive-branch workings of the nation, including information on political parties, national and subnational governments, and elections.

The rule-of-law category has two elements. The first is a constitutional, legislative, and judicial framework that details constitutional and judicial issues, to include the court system and human rights. The second is corruption, addressing both the amount of corruption and initiatives to correct this problem. Economic liberalization and social indicators are the last category, which includes economic issues, both domestic and international, tax reform, and employment issues.

The book does have one potential flaw. The authors and editors have included a rating system grading each element on a scale of one to seven, with one being the maximum score. The grades of each element are averaged and recorded to two decimal places to obtain a rating for the category. The movement of each nation along the scales is then tracked, and nations are compared with one another. In the description of this rating methodology, the reader may believe that there is a scientific basis for this scheme. In carefully reading the text, however, one finds that this basis is not fully explained. In fact, lacking any specific information, the conclusion one reaches is that this scale is subjective in nature, which detracts from the editors’ claim of a comparative assessment of these nations. If there is no true objective measure, providing an example of a nation that rates a one in a particular element might mean more. That way, the reader has some basis to understand more clearly what a rating of 4.25 in, for example, independent media means.

Overall, this single weakness does not diminish the worth of Nations in Transit 2001–2002. The great value of this book is that it provides extensive knowledge and current, as well as historical, data on a variety of political, social, and economic issues in East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. Even with all this data, the text is easy to read. This is accomplished with the incorporation of information from the 1990s, which provides a critical strength of this work; the reader need not be an expert on East Central Europe or the newly independent states to use it.

PATRICK LUEB
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This edited volume of essays provides an important set of historical case studies about noncombatant victims of war. From ancient Greece to the French Revolution, to strategic bombings of urban centers in World War II and the Gulf War, these articles address not the ethical or moral dimensions of war but rather the military calculus in planning violence against enemies that could also endanger or kill civilians. This collection gives historical perspective to the concept of collateral damage.

In their introduction the editors state, “This book is about occasions in which soldiers and governments have deliberately attacked the helpless.” The authors provide specific, highly detailed examples, removed from the lens of morality and judgement, of the “whys” of strategic interventions. It is difficult, however, not to document the uncertainty that accompanies military decision making, as author Conrad Crane describes in his article, “Contrary to Our National Ideals.” In spite of the important strategic use of American airpower to exact a toll on cities during World War II, he explains how American public opinion shifted against such ruthless bombings. The concept of “surgical strikes” by airpower was a concept conceived in part to assuage public opinion that rejected the indiscriminate use of force to destroy noncombatants.

Nine essays, originally commissioned as part of a 1993 conference on military history, reveal a central ambivalence by the authors about the impact of military imposed violence on civilians. These historical cases try to balance what generals depict as a military necessity for bombings or invasions against the realities of on-the-ground conditions, which reveal large numbers of civilians getting in harm’s way. What is frequently developed in the name of military necessity is often immoral in practice. Certainly, this is the conclusion of Holger Herwig in his “The Immorality of Expediency,” which takes on German military planning and the exclusion of civilians from such discussions on the eve of World War I. Williamson Murray’s “Not Enough Collateral Damage: Moral Ambiguities in the Gulf War,” extols the use of American airpower to seek “surgical strikes” to minimize the loss of life on the ground but also points out that such an approach does not always produce decisive military victory. He recalls that even in Vietnam, with General Curtis LeMay’s “bomb them back into the Stone Age” approach, such bombing did not persuade the North Vietnamese not to pursue their military course.

While all the essays provide a strong historical overview of how noncombatants have fared in the course of warfare, it is difficult to understand how such a published volume could omit important lessons from the post–Cold War, given the gap of nine years between the commissioning of papers and publications. There is no essay about the genocide in Rwanda, where research shows that a military force positioned in early April 1994 could have averted tremendous loss of life. Moreover, in such intrastate conflicts as Chechnya, where the Russian military has turned on not only rebel guerilla groups but also the civilian population, the nature of these
new wars has also changed the rules about who is a combatant. Even more recent is the case of Kosovo, where Serbian military commanders deliberately targeted civilians as a means of staving off NATO air strikes. It has been precisely the importance of noncombatants as victims in the post–Cold War era that has been the central feature of internal conflicts and has distinguished these recent intrastate wars. Yet no essay in this volume brings the historical cases up to the present.

This anthology is useful for historians looking backward for examples or precedents. However, the book will not work for everyday classroom teaching without supplementation, because the case studies omit some of the more current examples, as mentioned above. Finally, the editors should have added a final essay about the Geneva Conventions and other public humanitarian law. The rules of modern warfare and the centrality of protecting civilians cannot be divorced from the planning of any intervention. As the United States enters a new era of strategic doctrine and preemption, it is especially important that writing about war include not only the details of decision making but also the implications that such acts have on civilians who might be caught in the middle.

JOHANNA MENDELSON FORMAN
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Peace, Security, Human Rights
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Although the Cold War ended more than a decade ago, its impact continues to haunt the international community to this day. These two excellent works from the Naval Institute Press will greatly enhance our understanding of this uncertain period.

Norman Friedman’s Fifty Year War is a broad look at the conflict between East and West. Friedman contends that the Cold War actually began in Spain in 1937, “when Stalin tried to hijack the ongoing civil war.” This divide between the Soviet Union and the West would not come to an end until 1991. Friedman poses several questions: “Should or did the West understand events in the Soviet Union? Did the West in fact defeat the Soviet Union, or did the Soviet Union defeat itself? Was the Cold War, then, about communism versus capitalism or was it about old-fashioned Russian imperialism, cloaked in a largely irrelevant ideology?”

Friedman contends that the Cold War was in fact a “real war” fought in slow motion. It was also a war lost by the Soviet Union for sociopolitical, economic, and ideological reasons. In the end, Friedman sees Mikhail Gorbachev as responsible for its collapse, because he “never understood that his state was built on terror, not on any kind of popular support.”

While making these arguments, Friedman also includes some very scary Cold War near misses, including a 1960 mistake by the new U.S. radar at Thule that interpreted the moon as a Soviet missile attack. Also intriguing is
Friedman’s critical analysis of President John Kennedy’s Cold War leadership. With The Fifty Year War Friedman presents a new, provocative survey of the Cold War from a joint force perspective while keeping both sides of the Iron Curtain in mind. He again demonstrates why he is considered a leading commentator on international security issues.

Unlike Friedman in his broad landscape of Cold War history, David Winkler paints a much smaller aspect of the Cold War canvas. This is a fine work that details the long road to mutual respect, safety, and communication on the high seas between the U.S. and Soviet navies.

Utilizing previously classified official documents, other archival material, and personal interviews with senior participants from both sides, Winkler traces the history of confrontations between U.S. and Soviet naval forces—confrontations that often proved fatal. Eventually, these Cold War incidents demanded a solution lest the next such occurrence escalate into outright war. The solution was found in 1972, in the historic pact, known as the Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA).

INCSEA provided a direct navy-to-navy channel of communication that would help to limit and avoid future occurrences. How necessary was INCSEA? Winkler’s first chapter, “Playing with the Bear,” clearly reveals how “hot” the Cold War actually was, unbeknownst to many at the time. During the Truman and Eisenhower administrations alone, over one hundred Soviet and U.S. airmen were killed in air-to-air contacts.

Throughout 1971–72, studies and negotiations took place that led to the signing of the INCSEA agreement by then Secretary of the Navy John Warner and Admiral Sergei Gorshkov of the Soviet navy. Winkler skillfully illustrates how the successful negotiations were rooted in mutual respect and professionalism. This mutual understanding and respect, along with the signing of INCSEA, would do much to end naval harassment between the Cold War superpowers.

As Winkler points out, INCSEA truly “is one of the positive legacies of the Cold War.” One should note that although Cold War at Sea represents first-class scholarship, the Cold War specialist is more likely to enjoy it than the armchair sailor. Nevertheless, with its superb chronology of Cold War naval incidents and excellent notes, this work will make a welcome addition to any serious Cold War library.

Andrew G. Wilson
The George Washington University


Although ultimately worthwhile and entertaining, Dark Waters suffers from the strange paradox of inadequately describing underwater events that ought to be gripping while simultaneously portraying mundane and ordinary events in a marvelously compelling manner. Lee Vyborny was a new-construction plank-owner and member of the first commissioning crew of the U.S. Navy’s small nuclear-powered submarine NR-1. Don Davis has written or coauthored eleven books.

Overall, the book well rewards its readers, but unevenly. An example of its bumpiness comes early in the prologue.
when the authors state that in World War II “about half the U.S. submarines and the men who served in them were lost,” which, of course, is untrue. Although fifty-two U.S. submarines and over 3,500 of their heroic crewmembers were lost, this number represents a fifth (not half) of the submarines the United States sent to sea during that war.

Further problems arise when the book briefly describes the path that took Vyborny from being an ordinary high school graduate to becoming a crewmember of NR-1—the Navy’s smallest and most mysterious nuclear-powered submarine. The authors certainly do not devote excessive space to this part of the tale, but their telling of Vyborny’s early story is just a bit too self-conscious and self-effacing, lacking the easy confidence and pride that characterizes much of the rest of the book. Another criticism arises from an early passage in which Vyborny relates a 1964 deployment he made as a junior enlisted sailor on the nuclear-powered submarine USS Sargo to the Sea of Japan. Intended, one presumes, to rival the swashbuckling tales told in Sontag and Drew’s Blind Man’s Bluff, the story of the grounding, jam-dive casualty, and operational exploits of the USS Sargo simply are not conveyed in a manner compelling or even believable to those with their own submarine experience. One reads them wondering if they are true. For instance, the authors state that Sargo passed ten feet directly underneath a newly launched Echo II Soviet submarine to “determine if she was powered by standard diesel engines, or a nuclear reactor.” It is curious to think the U.S. Navy would use this method to ascertain the mode of propulsion of a ship class that had already been in service for at least two years.

But these criticisms pale in comparison to Vyborny’s success in relating how he and eleven other immensely dedicated men who made up the first NR-1 crew worked in the physically demanding environment of the Electric Boat shipyard to oversee the construction of the small submarine. This is the section in which the book truly shines, as readers get a rare firsthand glimpse of how a crew, believing with justified conviction that they are elite, come together to become shipmates and expert operators of a complex, expensive, amazing machine. Vyborny and Davis’s work is again excellent when it tells some of the Admiral Hyman Rickover anecdotes that Vyborny witnessed during Rickover’s reign over all the Navy’s nuclear-powered vessels. The authors balance perfectly Rickover’s bizarre idiosyncrasies against his awesome effectiveness and offset the fear he engendered against the respect he earned, neutralizing his routinely acidic abrasiveness with his childlike wonder at the sights of the deep visible from NR-1’s small windows. Also masterful is the authors’ depiction of the routine when operating NR-1, the sacrifices inherent in living for weeks in a small enclosed space, eating preprocessed food for days on end, standing miserable surface watches, and all the other mundane aspects of extended life underwater in close proximity to a nuclear reactor. These portions of the book are indeed well told and will resonate with those who have gone to sea.

As good as their depictions of the ordinary are, Vyborny and David convey the dangers of NR-1’s unusual and exceptional missions and experiences in a less forceful and riveting manner. Perhaps readers have become overexposed
to and jaded by these kinds of exploits, or perhaps *Dark Waters* pulled some of *NR-1’s* punches due to classification considerations. Regardless, the action sections, though worth reading, are not up to the high standards of the rest of the book. Still, Vyborny’s insider account of how *NR-1’s* first crews built and operated their ship fully pays back the reader’s investment. *Dark Waters* should be on every submariner’s bookshelf, even if it tells its extraordinary tale a bit unevenly.

**WILLIAM S. MURRAY**
*Naval War College*

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**Bateman, Robert L. No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War Incident.** Mechanicsburg, Penna.: Stackpole, 2002. 288pp. $22.95

On 11 January 2001, Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced that in June 1950, U.S. soldiers “killed or injured an unconfirmed number of Korean refugees . . . in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.” This announcement preceded the release of an investigation convened in response to an Associated Press article that documented the massacre of hundreds of Korean civilians by U.S. soldiers under orders. The article eventually earned a Pulitzer Prize for the Associated Press and thrust the story to front-page news.

For nearly fifty years, the No Gun Ri incident languished in the backwaters of military history. Despite understandable Korean interest, few American researchers delved into this difficult period until early 1999, when AP correspondents Charles Hanley and Martha Mendoza uncovered a “smoking gun,” a confessed U.S. Army massacre participant, and broke the story to a readership anxious to hear about U.S. wartime atrocities.

The truth is not so simple, however. According to Bateman, the AP was working with inconsistent or incorrect information and knew their version was questionable before the article was published. Concurrent with the Army’s investigation into the incident, Bateman (an experienced infantry officer himself) examined what transpired at No Gun Ri and tried to resolve the discrepancies between what he knew of 7th Cavalry history, the soldiers who were there, and the details of the AP story. From his investigation and his subsequent writings, Bateman has captured important aspects of the military reality of that time, the frustrations associated with presenting unimpeachable history about a fifty-year-old event, and the dangers of a free press run amok.

Bateman’s treatise is divided into two major sections: first, a soldier’s review of the tactical situation at the end of July 1950 and the military record of the events at No Gun Ri; and second, a less relevant examination of the Associated Press’s publication of the original story.

The military analysis is generally solid and clearly backed by an infantry soldier’s appreciation for the life-and-death challenges that faced young men of the 7th Cavalry in the early days of the war. Bateman relies on U.S. primary sources, extensive interviews, and reconnaissance photographs to debunk many “facts” reported by the AP and a group of former Korean refugees who are now parties to a four-hundred-million-dollar lawsuit against the U.S. government. Unfortunately, Bateman also draws a number of conclusions...
(e.g., that communist sympathizers fired at U.S. soldiers from inside a group of civilian refugees) that are supported only by circumstantial evidence. Interestingly, he chose not to refer to Korean primary sources, citing translation challenges and tainted testimony, and used only sources available on this side of the Pacific.

In the second half of the book, Bateman takes issue with the investigative work at the Associated Press and discusses at length his inability to convince the AP of the inconsistencies in its story. While interesting in a voyeuristic sort of way, Bateman’s harsh spotlight on the AP does little to further explain what happened at No Gun Ri. Americans, unfortunately, have become inured to journalistic excesses and biased reporting. Not much is added to the story by belaboring the point. Also, Bateman’s additional cursory discussions of the current sad state of military-media affairs are out of place in a work of serious military history.

Woven throughout both the AP story and Bateman’s book is the strange case of Ed Daily—the “smoking gun.” Purportedly an Army officer who was present at No Gun Ri, Daily told his story to Handy and Mendoza and became an instant media sensation. After the story was published, Daily was interviewed by Tom Brokaw, made appearances at veterans’ gatherings, and had his picture flashed around the world. He was a fraud. Daily had never been an Army officer. He made his living by fabricating an honorable military career. In February 2002, Daily was fined four hundred thousand dollars by a federal court for fraudulent combat-related medical claims, and he admitted publicly for the first time that he had never been at No Gun Ri.

Ed Daily’s deception and Bateman’s conflicting evidence seriously undermine the credibility of the AP story but do not alter one fundamental fact—in the midst of a chaotic tactical withdrawal at the beginning of the Korean conflict, an unspecified number of civilians were fired upon and wounded or killed by U.S. soldiers near a railroad overpass at No Gun Ri. Any serious student of general military history, or Korean military history in particular, will not be surprised to learn that an incident like this occurred. The exact number of casualties is subject to debate but is likely far less than reported by the AP.

In the final analysis, there are four versions of the story: those of the Korean litigants, the Associated Press, the U.S. Army, and Bob Bateman. It is unlikely that we will ever know which of them is correct. Time, fog, fading memories, inadequate Army record keeping, and inflated egos have combined to make this event difficult to understand with confidence and clarity. Yet the event, however it occurred, reaffirms how challenging it is to lead troops in the field under fire, and it underscores the difficult task of combat identification during times of extraordinary stress.

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For authors unschooled in Marine Corps history and newly self-taught in the history of the Korean War, Randy and Roxanne Mills do an acceptable job in following the Reserve Marines of Company C, 16th Infantry Battalion, to Korea and back, from 1950 to 1951. The strength of their homage to their neighbor-veterans of southwestern Indiana is their sympathetic, sensitive reconstruction of personal combat experiences in Korea and the general trauma of sudden war-time service. Its weakness is their handling of contextual and organizational issues. The authors sometimes seem as mystified as their veterans did when they went off to war in 1950.

When Company C formed in 1947, its officers and noncommissioned officers were World War II veterans without troops. They recruited obvious candidates such as Boy Scouts, high school athletes, younger brothers of Marines, and adventurous farm boys. The Millses capture the bucolic, Currier and Ives character of 1950 Indiana (I was there as a teenager visiting my grandparents); the recruits might well have been the Indiana volunteers of 1861. The authors do not press the point, but the reenactment of the draft in 1948 proved a mighty weapon for recruiters—join the U.S. Marine Corps and escape the Army. It was an empty threat, however, although the recruits didn’t know it; virtually no one was drafted into the shrinking Army between 1948 and 1950. It appears that the excitement of field training, company athletics, and a little spending money sufficed as a lure, and the requirements were minimal: drill usually on Monday nights and two weeks annual training duty (“summer camp”). There was no initial active duty training requirement, no boot camp. Company C, not aggressively officered, coasted through its limited training from 1948 through 1950.

No doubt there was tension between regular Army and reservists at the troop level, as the Millses note, but the Marine Corps wanted fresh reservists with no prior experience for its twenty-one infantry battalions, nineteen other combat and combat support battalions, and a mix of independent companies. The 1950 drill-pay reservists numbered almost forty thousand units, a small percentage of the nearly 129,000 Marine reservists, but the best source of unbloodied infantry replacements for a short-handed active duty force. The authors are vague on mobilization demographics, providing a roster of eight officers and 202 enlisted men at the station of initial assignment, Camp Pendleton but no statistics on delays and physical disqualifications.

The Millses are unclear about how Company C fared in its readiness triage at Camp Pendleton as the company disintegrated in three days into a pool of replacements. Reservists and half the drill-pay reserves were judged combat ready by virtue of prior active duty (more than ninety days) or two years of Marine training that included at least one summer camp and no less than thirty-six drills (with two camps). Another 30 percent were judged combat ready after two to four weeks of intensive field training and weapons instruction. Twenty percent went to boot camp and became “real” Marines the
old-fashioned way. The problem with the deployable 65 percent was their rank (too much) and lack of thorough weapons training. Other problems were little more than irritations born by all Marines, which was interpreted as prejudice by the reservists.

After the readiness triage, the book becomes a mishmash of personal Korean War experiences—especially combat in the frozen crucible of the Chosin Reservoir campaign—and operational history. The authors recount the personal experiences well but bungle the general history in several details (none fatal)—for example, Major Courtney Whitney was not FECOM G-2.

Their Indiana Marines have tales to tell, but the stories will not move non-deployable readers. They are nevertheless the true ordeals of real people. There is good coverage of the veterans of Company C that includes forty-three interviews, several with wives. However, apart from the interviews, the Millises use predictable secondary sources, sometimes without much real understanding. (This reviewer served twenty-seven years in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, nine as a commander and staff officer in two infantry battalions, commanding 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, from 1980 to 1981.)

On balance, Unexpected Journey gives the 1950 Marine Corps reserve mobilization a human face and an emotional dimension. As a tribute to Company C, this book succeeds and deserves inclusion in the personal literature on the Korean War.

ALLAN R. MILLETT
The Ohio State University


This charming and insightful memoir is among the most vivid and enjoyable portraits of the late nineteenth and early twentieth–century Navy ever written. Originally drafted in the 1930s following Captain Beach’s retirement, it is the story of the fascinating career of an officer who began at sea by learning to handle sail as a midshipman in 1888 and ended by commanding a seventeen-thousand-ton steel battleship at Scapa Flow during the Great War. Full of equal parts delightful sea stories, harrowing maritime adventures, and thoughtful diplomatic insights, this is indeed a sailor’s story. The volume was edited with loving care by the author’s son, the late Captain Edward L. Beach, Jr., who was known for his famous work Run Silent, Run Deep (Naval Institute Press, Classics of Naval Literature series) and a dozen other histories and novels. Beach the younger inserts many wry and sometimes poignant asides that help to set in context his father’s story.

And what a story! Beginning in the late 1880s, Beach senior served alongside Civil War veterans as he learned his trade in wooden sailing ships. He saw firsthand the naval renaissance of the late nineteenth century, powered by the intellectual energy of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Stephen B. Luce, and the political dynamics of Theodore Roosevelt. Beach began his commissioned service as an engineer and served as such until the merger of the engineering and line communities (amidst much
controversy) in 1897. He met and interacted with every significant naval figure of his time; among the most celebrated were a future commandant of the Marine Corps, John A. Lejeune, his Annapolis roommate, and a young assistant secretary of the Navy, Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

Beach’s career included command of a repair ship, cruisers, and the battleship USS New York, which served as the flagship of the American Battle Squadron of the British Grand Fleet during World War I. Beach also commanded two major shore installations—the torpedo production facility at Newport, Rhode Island, and the Naval Shipyard at Mare Island, California. There are two episodes in his thirty-eight-year career that are particularly worth noting—the battle of Manila Bay, in which Beach served as engineer below decks in the cruiser USS Baltimore, and the destruction of the cruiser USS Memphis in the harbor of Santo Domingo in 1916 while under his command. (This story is brilliantly told in his son’s gripping classic, The Wreck of the Memphis, in the Naval Institute Press, Classics of Naval Literature series.)

What is most striking about this superb memoir are the similarities to our own time. Even as the United States debates the transformation of its military today into an information-based force, the parallels are obvious in Beach’s writing at the turn of the twentieth century: “The whole Navy of this period was enthusiastically interested in the fast-developing technology of warships and the sea. We developed smokeless powder from Russia, ‘built up’ guns from France and England, rapid fire and machine guns of our own invention, hardened armor plant, higher grade steel, the automobile torpedo, and the submarine. There were many other inventions and developments of naval engines and weapons, all of which we worked on eagerly.” Similarly, today, we are actively seeking to develop entirely new concepts of operating warships at sea, and many of the challenges are the same.

Likewise, the political tenor of Beach’s time was similar to that which the United States faces today—a chaotic world with frequent requirements to apply naval power at the edges of the developed world. Beach was repeatedly thrust into diplomatic and military exchanges and, as many U.S. Navy captains do today, found himself developing U.S. policy at a great distance from Washington, D.C.

After retiring from the Navy in 1922, Captain Beach settled into an academic life, teaching history at Stanford University, entering complete retirement in the early 1940s. He described this in typical nautical terms, “And so I have finished my story. Lately, I have come under the domination of a most despotic admiral [his wife], who always makes me wear an overcoat when I go out for a walk, and even insists on my wearing a cap in the house, so I won’t catch cold in my bald head. Our two sons are respectively in the Navy and Army, and so is our daughter, who has become a ‘Navy Wave,’ thereby ranking about even with her two older Lieutenant brothers. The only people left to obey my orders are a collie dog, who takes walks with me every day and thinks I’m wonderful; and a ridiculous cat, who is very insubordinate.”

Beach lived to see the tragedy of Pearl Harbor but maintained faith in his Navy’s ultimate victory until his death in 1943.
There is a comfortable fit to the feeling and tone of this autobiography. The camaraderie of the wardroom, the constant moving back and forth from sea to shore, the hard work and great rewards of command at sea, and the friendly naval gossip are so recognizable that he could be talking about the Navy of today. Indeed, the real charm of this book is in its candid yet loving portrait of one of the truly abiding institutions of the U.S. Navy. Captain Edward L. Beach, Sr., with the nicest of assists from his accomplished officer-author son, has given us not only his own story but a warm insider’s view of our beloved Navy as well. This is a volume that deserves a spot in any serious Navy library.

JAMES STAVRIDIS
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During the War of 1812, the United States attempted to invade Canada three times in separate campaigns and failed on each occasion. Inept leadership, militia and service differences, and lost tactical opportunities marred translation of strategic aims into a workable operational plan. Vastly outnumbered by American troops on the land frontier along the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River, the British and Canadians remained on the defensive until events in Europe released regular reinforcements and ships of the Royal Navy. In 1814, Great Britain applied seapower against the United States and took the offensive. The resulting stalemate eventually brought the two adversaries to the peace table to sign the Treaty of Ghent, whereby British North America’s territorial integrity was preserved for the later confederation of Canada into a nation. This documentary collection, the third volume of a projected series of four to be published by the Naval Historical Center on the naval side of the war, concentrates on the Chesapeake Bay, Great Lakes, and Pacific theaters from 1814 to 1815. The selection of documents, like the two preceding volumes, deals comprehensively with events and persons behind the main battles and campaigns on both sides, as well as with such matters as recruitment, logistics, shipbuilding, and social relations from a wider perspective.

Almost half the book is devoted to the British blockade of the Chesapeake Bay and American defense against the mounting amphibious incursions of General Robert Ross and Admiral Alexander Cochrane into the American heartland. Once the resolve of General William Winder and his sundry troops crumbled at the battle of Bladensburg, Washington was left wide open. The occupying British burned the White House and other public buildings (allegedly in retaliation for burning the provincial legislature at York [present-day Toronto] by American sailors in April the previous year). The documents highlight the flexibility accorded the British to choose when and where to attack from the sea, as well as the significant naval contribution in stiffening American defenses.

The British likewise demonstrated the possibilities of concerted military and naval action on the internal waters of Lake Huron, Lake Ontario, and Lake
Champlain, the high point being Commodore Sir James Yeo’s amphibious raid on the American transfer point at Oswego, and the low point definitely being General George Prevost’s retreat from Plattsburg. On the opposing side, Commodore Isaac Chauncey’s support of American armies on the Niagara frontier took second place to a growing shipbuilding race between the American and British naval commanders. The American land campaign was irrevocably impaired, the hoped-for decisive battle to determine naval ascendancy on Lake Ontario never materialized before peace came, and the republic’s finances were left in tatters. The documents are carefully chosen to show the consequences of confused operational-level decision making and of the failure to pursue joint operations in an effective manner.

If Chauncey inclined toward caution on the Great Lakes, Captain David Porter’s decision to abandon a successful commerce-destruction cruise in favor of seeking out superior British naval forces in decisive combat off the Chilean coast was rash and impulsive. American hopes for challenging the British in the Pacific ended with the frigate _Essex_’s submission to British firepower. In spite of the defeat, Porter returned home to a hero’s welcome, while the officers and sailors whom he left behind faced numerous hardships and another year in British captivity. Inclusion of this small episode in the collection presents a reminder that personal considerations of fame and glory are no replacement for sound strategy.

Porter spent the rest of his life trying to justify his actions.

The collection makes accessible many primary documents used in classical works by Alfred T. Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt, as well as recent monographs by Anthony Pitch, Robert Malcomson, and Barry Gough. For anyone who has struggled to decipher handwriting in the originals, availability of typed and organized documents is a major benefit. Introductory essays to the chapters and subchapters are informative and balanced, while extensive footnotes give more details on people and sources. The index, perhaps the book’s most valuable feature, allows readers to identify specific matters of interest within the documents quickly and efficiently.

The end of each chapter shows the location and source from which individual documents were drawn, with microfilm numbers provided for Washington-area repositories, but no corresponding microfilm numbers appear for Record Group 8 in Ottawa. This discrepancy, though minor, detracts from the book’s usefulness in tracking down originals for the sake of comparison, accuracy, and provenance.

This documentary collection, of which the first volume was published in 1978, will become a standard reference source in most libraries and undoubtedly stimulate awareness and scholarship about this forgotten war on both sides of the international border.

CHRIS MADSEN
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BOOKS RECEIVED


Admirals in the Age of Nelson, by Lee Bienkowski. Naval Institute Press, 2003. 294pp. $36.95

Hitler Attacks Pearl Harbor: Why the United States Declared War on Germany, by Richard F. Hill. Lynne Rienner, 2003. 225pp. $49.95
NEWPORT PAPER 17
A new title in our Newport Papers series is available in print and online—The Limits of Transformation: Officer Attitudes toward the Revolution in Military Affairs, by Thomas G. Mahnken and James R. FitzSimonds, of the Naval War College faculty. Little attention has been paid, the authors find, to the views of military officers on the prospect of dramatic service transformation. The authors argue that these views are important for a number of compelling reasons. What is the level of enthusiasm among officers for transformation? How compelling do they perceive the need for transformation to be? How extensive a change do they believe necessary? How confident are they in the ability of the U.S. military to carry out transformation? To obtain copies of this Newport Paper or to receive all new titles in the series, contact the associate editor, Patricia A. Goodrich, at (401) 841-6583 or associateeditor@nwc.navy.mil.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE FOUNDATION BOOKSTORE
Press books—see our website or call the editorial office for a complete listing—are sold in the Naval War College Foundation bookstore in Founders Hall. To order, call 848-8306 (locally), or toll-free at 1-866-490-3334. For those who would like to visit the store, military I.D. is needed to enter the complex; Foundation members, however, can arrange access by calling the Foundation staff.

ERRATUM
In the print version of our Summer 2003 issue, the first name of the reviewer of Gore Vidal’s Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace is given incorrectly. The reviewer was Capt. Matthew Morgan, U.S. Army. Our apologies for the error, which has been corrected in the online version.
ARTICLE AND GRADUATION PRIZES

HUGH G. NOTT PRIZE
The President of the Naval War College has awarded this year’s Hugh G. Nott Prize, to the authors of the best nonhistorical articles appearing in the Naval War College Review in the 2002 publishing year. This prize is given by the generosity of the Naval War College Foundation.

First Prize ($1,000): Stephen M. Walt, for “American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls,” Spring
Second Prize ($650): Phillip J. Ridderhof, for “Thinking Out of the Box: Reading Military Texts from a Different Perspective,” Autumn

EDWARD S. MILLER HISTORY PRIZE
The President of the Naval War College has also awarded this year’s Edward S. Miller History Prize, to the author of the best historical or history-oriented article appearing in the Naval War College Review in the 2002 publishing year. This prize ($500) is given by the generosity of the historian Edward S. Miller through the Naval War College Foundation. The winner this year is Richard H. Kohn, for “The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today,” Summer.

AWARDS FOR PROFESSIONAL WRITING AND RESEARCH, 2002–2003

Naval War College Foundation Award

First Prize: Lt. Col. Keith W. Moncrief, USAF, College of Naval Warfare, for “Creating a Theater-Based Operational Link between Strategic Mobility and Theater-Level Logistics for the Joint Task Force Commander”

First Honorable Mention: Mr. David F. Blackburn, College of Naval Warfare, for “Use of the United States National Fleet in Maritime Homeland Security and Defense”

Second Honorable Mention: Maj. Paul B. Donovan, USAF, College of Naval Command and Staff, for “JMCC: Theater C2 in Need of Sole.”
Adm. Richard G. Colbert Memorial Prize

First Prize: Lt. Col. Michael G. Dana, USMC, College of Naval Warfare, for “Shock and Awe: America’s 21st Century Maginot Line”

Honorable Mention: Lt. Cdr. Brendan R. McLane, USN, College of Naval Command and Staff, for “Reporting from the Sandstorm: Embedding—An Initial Appraisal.”

J. William Middendorf II Award for Student Research

First Prize: Maj. Jenny A. McGee, USAF, College of Naval Command and Staff


Franklin Reinauer II Defense Economics Prize

First Prize: Lt. Cdr. Scott T. McCain, USN, College of Naval Command and Staff, for “Bolstering U.S. Strategic Sealift through Coastal Shipping.”

Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association Awards:

IW Category

First Prize: Maj. Joseph H. Scherrer, USAF, College of Naval Command and Staff, for “Risks and Vulnerabilities of Network-centric Forces: Insights from the Science of Complexity”

Honorable Mention: Maj. David P. Wells, USMC, College of Naval Command and Staff, for “Managing the Double-Edged Sword of Network-centric Warfare.”

Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association Awards:

C4I Category

First Prize: Capt. Rand D. Lebouvier, USN, College of Naval Warfare, for “Extending Operational Reach with Unmanned Systems.”

Vice Adm. James H. Doyle, Jr., Military Operations and International Law Prize

First Prize: Maj. Scott W. Rizer, USAF, College of Naval Command and Staff, for “Law Enforcement or National Security Forces? A ‘Mix-‘n-Match’ Strategy for the War on Terrorism”

Honorable Mention: Lt. Cdr. Michael D. Sutton, USN, College of Naval Warfare, for “The International Criminal Court: Considerations for the Joint Forces Commander.”

Marine Corps Association Award

First Prize: Cdr. G. W. H. Hatch, RN, Naval Command College, for “Should the USN Contend the Narrower Littoral?”
Honorable Mention: Mr. Brett M. Vaughan, College of Naval Command and Staff, for “Operational Art and the Amphibious Assault: Will OMFTS Break the U.S. Amphibious Assault Sword?”

Robert E. Batemans International Prize

First Prize: Capt. Sudarshan Y. Shrikhande, Indian Navy, Naval Command College, for “‘Vasuki’ and the Dragon: Shaping India’s Maritime Strategy as a Counterbalance to China”

Honorable Mention: Cdr. Juan C. San Martin, Spanish Navy, Naval Command College, for “The Control of the Mediterranean Sea: A Key Issue in the Global War on Terror.”

Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) Award

First Prize: Maj. Christopher L. Fatherree, USMC, College of Naval Command and Staff, for “Intelligence Reachback Requires Analysts Forward.”

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Award

First Prize: Mr. Van W. Garraghty, College of Naval Warfare, for “Social Systems Analysis: The Future of Operational Intelligence?”

Naval Intelligence Foundation Award

First Prize: Lt. Cdr. Michael H. Day, USCG, College of Naval Command and Staff, for “Maritime Domain Awareness: A Modern Maginot Line?”

Red River Valley Fighter Pilots Association Award

First Prize: Maj. Randy L. Kaufman, USAF, College of Naval Command and Staff, for “Precision Guided Weapons: Panacea or Pitfall for the Joint Task Force Commander?”

Honorable Mention: Lt. Col. George D. Kramlinger, USAF, College of Naval Warfare, for “Synchronizing Airpower and Other Operational Fires: The Joint Force Commander’s Role.”

Naval Submarine League Prize

First Prize: Cdr. William R. Merz, USN, Naval Command College, for “The Submerged Battlegroup: A Synergistic Capability for the Joint Operational Commander.”

Jerome E. Levy Economic Geography and World Order Prize

First Prize: Capt. Sudarshan Y. Shrikhande, Indian Navy, Naval Command College, for “The Ballot Bites Deeper than the Bullet: ‘Realpolitik for Real People’”

First Honorable Mention: Lt. Col. Lamont Woody, USA, College of Naval Warfare, for “Taming Dictators and Developing Security: The Caspian Sea Region Arrives on the Global Economy”
Second Honorable Mention: Cdr. Steven A. McLaughlin, USN, College of Naval Warfare, for “Human Migration Issues and Their Economic-Political Impacts.”

2003 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition

Second Place Winner: Lt. Cdr. Grant R. Highland, USNR, College of Naval Command and Staff, for “New Century, Old Problems: The Global Insurgency within Islam and the Nature of the War on Terror”

Third Place Winner: LTC(P) James B. Brown, USA, College of Naval Warfare, for “What Kind of Peace? The Art of Building a Lasting and Constructive Peace.”