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Tapestry of Terror: A Portrait of Middle East Terrorism, 1994–1999

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war, which places an important limit on the current value of Pollack’s analysis. What it leaves out is the numerous irregular forces of the Arab world, who have proven troublesome to foes and who are often more effective in achieving political aims. However, a hint of such analysis shows itself in Pollack’s description of Arab conventional military forces as they faced unconventional foes—such as Jordan against the PLO during the “Black September” fighting; Syria against the PLO and Lebanese guerrillas; Iraq in numerous clashes with Kurds; and Libya against various forces in Chad. Additional examples of unconventional Arab military actions in Algeria, Afghanistan, Morocco, Lebanon, and Palestine-Israel might profitably be considered to form a more comprehensive view of Arab military effectiveness.

This work has a Rashomon-like feel that results from reading about military actions one state at a time, even though several belligerents participated in the same wars, sometimes even fighting each other. Pollack’s approach maintains a discrete analysis of national military efforts but creates a disjointed presentation of some events. Readers who are familiar with these conflicts from other sources will have an easier time keeping events in context. The book’s focus is on the effective use of instruments of war, particularly ground forces, and provides readers with little about the interplay of policy and strategy. Coalition dynamics also do not figure prominently in Pollack’s discussion, although there are hints that in Arab military collaboration the coalition whole was often worth less than the sum of the parts.

**Arabs at War and The Threatening Storm** are excellent works of history and analysis. *Arabs at War* is a valuable work of military history for military professionals and historians. *The Threatening Storm*, its main argument now dated, still serves as a useful history of U.S.-Iraq relations leading up to the war and remains a valuable guide to the challenges of postwar reconstruction.

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This is a book only a statistician could love. This reviewer is not a statistician. Chasdi, a visiting assistant professor of international relations at the College of Wooster, presents a quantitative analysis of the terrorist phenomena in four regions of the Middle East: Algeria, Egypt, Turkey, and Palestine and Israel. Purportedly Chasdi attempts to examine the antecedent events and conditions in the four subject nation-states with an eye toward understanding why terrorism occurs at the systems or operational level as well as at the state and subnational-actor levels. He hopes that in doing so he will give counterterrorism planners and policy makers data to help them better craft counterterrorism policy in the future. If this sounds complex, it is. Chasdi’s complicated quantitative analysis coupled with his turgid and at times unfathomable prose makes the effort even more difficult.

**Tapestry of Terror** is the second of a projected trilogy studying the root causes of
Middle Eastern terrorism. In his first volume, *Serenade of Suffering*, Chasdi examines terrorism in the context of the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian-Arab conflict. He throws a wider net in his second work by examining conditions in countries as diverse as Turkey and Algeria, as well as the more widely studied Israeli, Palestinian, and Egyptian varieties of terrorism. Because comparatively less has been written about terrorism in Algeria and Turkey, these two sections are uniquely interesting. In the section relating to Algeria, Chasdi devotes considerable time to the Islamic Salvation Front, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), and some relatively obscure splinter groups of the GIA. Unfortunately, Chasdi’s examination of them falls short. Much of his analysis does not really address the basic questions of who these groups are or what constitutes their ideologies, their political, social, and religious goals, and how they differ from each other. Rather, Chasdi devotes most of his effort to studying the current state of the scholarship on different Algerian terrorist movements. This approach, historiographical in practice, is unhelpful, because it presumes that the reader is familiar with the differing views of the various scholars he is discussing. Last time I looked, not too many policymakers were steeped in the nuances of Algerian terrorist historiography.

The section devoted to the study of Turkish terror covers such well known groups as the Kurdistan Worker’s Party and some not so familiar organizations, like the Greater Eastern Islamic Raiders and the Anatolian Federal Islamic State. While the information presented on these obscure organizations is interesting and frankly better presented than in the Algerian case, Chasdi once again falls victim to his fascination with the internecine disputes and discussions among scholars. Many times the more immediate questions of who and what these organizations represent are simply not presented in sufficient detail.

Another problem plaguing this book is Chasdi’s basic quantitative approach to the issue of identifying the root causes of terrorism and then using data to predict terrorist incidents. While using quantitative methods to study terrorism has been vetted and is useful in certain instances, Chasdi’s devotion to the methodology almost approaches the religious. With the text littered with such terms as “Pearson chi square values” and “Yates continuity corrections,” Chasdi is for not the casual reader but one who is well versed in statistical research analysis methods. This, of course, harkens back to the original purpose of the book, to assist policymakers in understanding the causality behind Middle Eastern terrorism. Unfortunately, Chasdi has crafted a work so complex and arcane that one must question the real utility of his work to those who shape policy. While the efforts of his scholarship are impressive, one cannot help wondering if the only real audience for Chasdi’s *Tapestry of Terror* is Chasdi himself.

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