The Fifty Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War; Cold War at Sea: High-Seas Confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union

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new wars has also changed the rules about who is a combatant. Even more recent is the case of Kosovo, where Serbian military commanders deliberately targeted civilians as a means of staving off NATO air strikes. It has been precisely the importance of noncombatants as victims in the post–Cold War era that has been the central feature of internal conflicts and has distinguished these recent intrastate wars. Yet no essay in this volume brings the historical cases up to the present.

This anthology is useful for historians looking backward for examples or precedents. However, the book will not work for everyday classroom teaching without supplementation, because the case studies omit some of the more current examples, as mentioned above. Finally, the editors should have added a final essay about the Geneva Conventions and other public humanitarian law. The rules of modern warfare and the centrality of protecting civilians cannot be divorced from the planning of any intervention. As the United States enters a new era of strategic doctrine and preemption, it is especially important that writing about war include not only the details of decision making but also the implications that such acts have on civilians who might be caught in the middle.

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Winkler, David F. Cold War at Sea: High-Seas Confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000. 263pp. $45

Although the Cold War ended more than a decade ago, its impact continues to haunt the international community to this day. These two excellent works from the Naval Institute Press will greatly enhance our understanding of this uncertain period.

Norman Friedman’s Fifty Year War is a broad look at the conflict between East and West. Friedman contends that the Cold War actually began in Spain in 1937, “when Stalin tried to hijack the ongoing civil war.” This divide between the Soviet Union and the West would not come to an end until 1991. Friedman poses several questions: “Should or did the West understand events in the Soviet Union? Did the West in fact defeat the Soviet Union, or did the Soviet Union defeat itself? Was the Cold War, then, about communism versus capitalism or was it about old-fashioned Russian imperialism, cloaked in a largely irrelevant ideology?”

Friedman contends that the Cold War was in fact a “real war” fought in slow motion. It was also a war lost by the Soviet Union for sociopolitical, economic, and ideological reasons. In the end, Friedman sees Mikhail Gorbachev as responsible for its collapse, because he “never understood that his state was built on terror, not on any kind of popular support.”

While making these arguments, Friedman also includes some very scary Cold War near misses, including a 1960 mistake by the new U.S. radar at Thule that interpreted the moon as a Soviet missile attack. Also intriguing is
Friedman’s critical analysis of President John Kennedy’s Cold War leadership. With *The Fifty Year War* Friedman presents a new, provocative survey of the Cold War from a joint force perspective while keeping both sides of the Iron Curtain in mind. He again demonstrates why he is considered a leading commentator on international security issues.

Unlike Friedman in his broad landscape of Cold War history, David Winkler paints a much smaller aspect of the Cold War canvas. This is a fine work that details the long road to mutual respect, safety, and communication on the high seas between the U.S. and Soviet navies. Utilizing previously classified official documents, other archival material, and personal interviews with senior participants from both sides, Winkler traces the history of confrontations between U.S. and Soviet naval forces—confrontations that often proved fatal. Eventually, these Cold War incidents demanded a solution lest the next such occurrence escalate into outright war. The solution was found in 1972, in the historic pact, known as the Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA).

INCSEA provided a direct navy-to-navy channel of communication that would help to limit and avoid future occurrences. How necessary was INCSEA? Winkler’s first chapter, “Playing with the Bear,” clearly reveals how “hot” the Cold War actually was, unbeknownst to many at the time. During the Truman and Eisenhower administrations alone, over one hundred Soviet and U.S. airmen were killed in air-to-air contacts. Throughout 1971–72, studies and negotiations took place that led to the signing of the INCSEA agreement by then Secretary of the Navy John Warner and Admiral Sergei Gorshkov of the Soviet navy. Winkler skillfully illustrates how the successful negotiations were rooted in mutual respect and professionalism. This mutual understanding and respect, along with the signing of INCSEA, would do much to end naval harassment between the Cold War superpowers.

As Winkler points out, INCSEA truly “is one of the positive legacies of the Cold War.” One should note that although *Cold War at Sea* represents first-class scholarship, the Cold War specialist is more likely to enjoy it than the armchair sailor. Nevertheless, with its superb chronology of Cold War naval incidents and excellent notes, this work will make a welcome addition to any serious Cold War library.

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Although ultimately worthwhile and entertaining, *Dark Waters* suffers from the strange paradox of inadequately describing underwater events that ought to be gripping while simultaneously portraying mundane and ordinary events in a marvelously compelling manner. Lee Vyborny was a new-construction plank-owner and member of the first commissioning crew of the U.S. Navy’s small nuclear-powered submarine *NR-1.* Don Davis has written or coauthored eleven books.

Overall, the book well rewards its readers, but unevenly. An example of its bumpiness comes early in the prologue