2002

On Seas of Glory: Heroic Men, Great Ships, and Epic Battles of the American Navy

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those that govern the procurement, education and training, advancement, and placement of their personnel—permit them to operate effectively with normal human beings, and to withstand the occasional individual who proves less than completely competent.”

Gratitude is due to Stanford University Press for publishing this valuable work, which even at its steep price is unlikely to return its costs. For a book that will probably be consulted a great deal, however, it is too bad that a sturdier binding was not used. My copy is already beginning to fall apart.

Chisholm has achieved what he set out to do in fine style. He has provided a comprehensive history of naval officer personnel management and at the same time has shed light on the creation, structure, and problem solving that resulted in the organization we see today. From now on it will be impossible to write usefully about the history of personnel management without reference to this book. It promises to be a standard authority.

JAMES BARBER
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John Lehman, former secretary of the Navy and author of Command of the Seas (1988), has with this book produced a masterful outline of “the grandeur of the American naval tradition.” The truest examples of this “grandeur” are “best found in its people, fighting sailors, technical innovators and inspiring leaders.” From John Paul Jones and the Revolutionary War to the six-hundred-ship fleet of the Cold War, John Lehman brings us a wonderful episodic view of the U.S. Navy’s people and ships, and their collective contribution to the strength and character of the nation they have served.

Using both primary and secondary sources in the United States and England, Lehman offers an exciting and message-laden portrait of the American naval tradition, a portrait that is “deliberately selective and subjective.” In short, this book is not a typical chronological narrative history of the U.S. Navy but a stimulating history of a highly adaptive institution.

One of the most intriguing sections is the story of Joshua Humphreys, the “premier ship-builder” and “the most innovative and revolutionary designer of the age of sail.” Humphreys would design several warships for the young republic, all of them larger, faster, and more heavily armed than similar vessels in England or France. Collectively known today as the “super frigates,” this group included such storied vessels as Constitution, United States, and President. Even Admiral Horatio Nelson, the preeminent naval leader of his day, is quoted by Lehman as foreseeing “trouble for Britain in those big frigates across the sea”; the trouble of which Nelson warned came during the War of 1812. Throughout, Lehman contends that, contrary to the views of many historians, privateering had a significant impact on the outcome of both the American Revolution and the War of 1812. He argues that “the battles of the American Revolution were fought on land, and independence was won at sea.” This work does much to reinforce such a view.

From the end of the Civil War to the beginning of the Spanish-American War, a great deal of technological and strategic
change was absorbed by the “new Navy” of American Manifest Destiny. Lehman reminds the reader that the “new Navy” was made possible by the nation’s ever-increasing industrialization. The epitome of these changes, according to Lehman, was the fast cruiser USS *Olympia*, “the product of the first American military-industrial complex.” The end result of this rapid naval evolution was a recognized role for the United States on the global high seas. Lehman believes that it was President Theodore Roosevelt who dragged the United States to its true destiny: “TR was the midwife who delivered from the old isolated America the new international United States. And his instrument was the Navy.” It is clear that Lehman holds that, today as well, the Navy is the instrument of the international United States.

Outlining the role of the Navy in the Second World War, Lehman begins with War Plan ORANGE. Rejecting Napoleon’s dictum that planned strategies cannot last beyond the opening salvos of battle, Lehman asserts that War Plan ORANGE was “the most successful strategic document in the history of warfare.” He then discusses key campaigns of the naval war, including Midway, Guadalcanal, Normandy, Leyte, and Okinawa.

Among the book’s many unique features are vignettes of naval personalities. From the chapter on the American revolution to that covering the Cold War at sea, Lehman has laced into his narrative many enlightening and analytical biographies of the people behind the wood and steel walls of the fleet—“daring warriors,” “more prudent—less dramatic leaders,” and the “reluctant warriors.” These figures include the likes of John Barry, John Paul Jones, Stephen Girard, Uriah Philips Levy, William B. Cushing, Raphael Semmes, Chester W. Nimitz, and Hyman G. Rickover, to name only a few.

John Lehman has given us a first-rate addition to the historiography of the U.S. Navy. With its brief bibliography, notes, and index, this work will benefit the naval enthusiast and the professional seafarer alike. However, this reviewer particularly commends *On Seas of Glory* to professional personnel of the sea services. It will remind them why they decided to commit their time, and possibly their lives, to such institutions.

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If you intend to own only a single volume on the crucial question of civil-military relations in the United States, choose this book. It is a comprehensive (indeed, exhaustive) review of the literature and commentary surrounding this timely debate. (A synthesis appears as the lead article in this issue.) It addresses what former secretary of defense William Cohen described as a “chasm” in American society. The editors have assembled a wide variety of commentators who examine two fundamental questions: Are the American armed forces and the civilian sector drifting apart as the result of a lack of shared values and near-total ignorance by the civilians of the military role? If so, what are the potential consequences for U.S. society?

The answer to the first question seems relatively easy. Clearly there is a growing divergence between civil and military sectors of society. This conclusion is based on