

2001

Book Reviews

The U.S. Naval War College

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

Recommended Citation

War College, The U.S. Naval (2001) "Book Reviews," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 54 : No. 1 , Article 13.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss1/13>

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Cambone, Stephen A. *A New Structure for National Security Policy Planning*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998. 262pp. \$23.95

Stephen Cambone is the director of research at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. A former senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Cambone is obviously well qualified to undertake work that focuses on a proposed reorganization of the National Security Council (NSC). Cambone approaches his work with vigor and an insider's knowledge of the workings of the U.S. government's highest national security entity. He also extensively uses the knowledge and expertise of two colleagues, Patrick J. Garrity of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Alistair J. K. Shepard of the University of Aberdeen, Scotland. They have included valuable appendices for students of national security affairs on the major interests and issues that surround national security policy development, as well as a historical synopsis of the various national security councils used by past presidents and how the institution has evolved. Cambone has included a compendium of important presidential directives.

Cambone's principal argument is that it is time—now that the end of the Cold

War is nearly a decade in the past—to re-evaluate the National Security Act of 1947 and the institutions created by that watershed law. Moreover, Cambone asks his readers to consider what, if any, institutional changes should be implemented to ensure that the United States is properly prepared for national security policy planning in the post-Cold War era. He is attempting, by his own admission, to conduct an organization-and-process approach to the question of revising the 1947 National Security Act; he is largely successful.

Cambone boils down the present-day debate over national security policy making to two essential features. He identifies one side as the *issues* faction and the other as the *interests* faction. "Issues" advocates emphasize such things as religion, ethnicity, and human rights. These national security analysts focus on the need for countries to conform to international laws and norms. They emphasize the protection of the rights of individuals against the power of the state. They rely heavily on international agreement to settle problems. The "interest" faction, on the other hand, is less concerned with

the legal authority of the international community and more interested in the construction of a system that manages risk to the United States as a sovereign state. However, Cambone argues that the real problem is that neither “issues” nor “interests” elements within national-security policy-making circles can agree on an overarching concept for, or definition of, the nation’s security. The author’s answer is to suggest a new model for national security decision making that eschews the Cold War mentality and methodology for policy making and takes into account the new paradigms of the post–Cold War era.

Cambone reviews how past national security policy was developed. He then proposes a reorganization of the NSC into five directorates: crisis management, regional affairs, home defense affairs, finance and trade, and science and technology. A “dual-hatted” cabinet secretary would head these directorates. In this way, the president’s control over national security policy development would be strengthened.

While his suggestions for improvement are well thought out and well intentioned, his proposals may prove nearly impossible to implement. First and foremost, such a proposed reorganization would need strong political support on Capitol Hill. A new National Security Act would likely entail a tremendous amount of debate, as senators and congressmen attempt to influence the legislation. One need only recall the highly rancorous and largely unhealthy debate over service roles and missions following the passage of the 1947 law to understand what might occur if a new national security law were passed along the lines that Cambone suggests. This is not to say that the United States should not consider a new law; Cambone

simply needs to be aware that national security policy has never been, and most likely never will be, entirely devoid of politics.

Nonetheless, Cambone’s model for a new NSC is a logical one. Efficient and elegant, if implemented it would maximize the president’s power to influence the creation and accomplishment of national security policy—something that the NSC and the national security advisor are supposed to facilitate. Further, it would make maximum use of the entire executive branch of government and take the pressure off an understaffed and ill-equipped White House to oversee national security policy, development, and implementation. Yet the suggestion of a dual-hatted cabinet secretary as head of a national security “directorate” could prove disastrous. Cambone ignores Washington’s deeply entrenched organizational bureaucracies and their tendency to “socialize” appointed cabinet officials into their own particular cultures. It has long been axiomatic in the nation’s capital that the president’s worst political and bureaucratic enemies can reside in his own cabinet; in 1867 such a situation nearly drove an unpopular president (Andrew Johnson) from office. To make matters worse, most cabinet officials have rather short tenures in office. Thus the Washington bureaucracy knows full well that these political appointees will be moving on sooner or later; it waits them out. Finally, presidential cabinet officials are usually chosen not for their expertise but for political expediency. Therefore, it is very likely that the person who would serve as a “directorate” chair might be thoroughly unqualified for such a position of responsibility. Although the way that national security policy is

developed today is certainly not optimal, would Cambone's system be better?

Despite his failure to consider the second and third-order effects of enacting the system he proposes, Cambone provides the basis for a great academic discussion over future national security policy and how it is developed. It is a topic that needs to be discussed, and as the author has emphatically pointed out, the time is now. This point is hard to refute. As the world's sole remaining superpower, and as the debate and divergence over how policy gets developed becomes stronger, the United States must reflect on how to improve its national security decision making structure.

In sum, Cambone and his colleagues have provided a good point of departure for a debate on how the United States should develop and implement future national security policy. There are many things to consider, and this book will get us started.

CHARLES NEIMEYER
Naval War College



O'Hanlon, Michael. *Technological Change and the Future of Warfare*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. 208pp. \$42.95

Over the past several years, the U.S. military has officially embraced the idea that rapidly evolving technologies soon will lead to a profound change in the conduct of warfare. The need to innovate in response to a prospective revolution in military affairs is the central theme of *Joint Vision 2010* and similar force-planning documents. Some studies, such as the congressionally mandated National Defense Panel, have concluded that only immediate and

radical transformation to new systems, new operational concepts, and new organizations will enable the U.S. military to retain its battlefield dominance.

Michael O'Hanlon, however, is not convinced. In his view, most calls for transformation lack any systematic or rigorous analysis of how emerging technologies might specifically change the character of combat in the coming decades. Thus the goal of this book is to provide realistic projections of technological possibilities that offer a better idea of how the U.S. military might best proceed in future research and acquisition.

O'Hanlon examines a wide range of militarily relevant technologies, in two broad categories: those primarily electronic (sensors, computers, and communications), and those primarily mechanical (vehicles, ships, aircraft, and weapons). From this survey he offers an evaluation of where evolving technologies are likely to provide new capabilities over the next two decades, and where significant force limitations are likely to remain.

In the realm of electronics, O'Hanlon expects continued advances in computers and communications but foresees no imminent breakthrough in sensors that will significantly improve one's ability to detect and track the adversary's activity. He specifically rejects the idea that the battlefield can be rendered "transparent." On the mechanical side, he sees no near-term developments that will allow maneuver and strike forces to become sufficiently light, fast, fuel efficient, or stealthy to allow profound improvements in speed of movement or lethality. Thus he concludes that proponents of transformation provide neither a compelling case for a near-term revolution in warfare nor any adequate idea of what the military should be transforming itself into.

O'Hanlon's general projections of future technologies appear reasonable. Yet the reader would be more assured of the author's conclusions if his technical evaluations did not rely so heavily upon articles in newspapers and popular periodicals. One can be justifiably skeptical that information drawn from *Army Times*, *Defense News*, or even *Aviation Week & Space Technology* fully reflects the broad range of scientific research and development throughout government, industry, and academia, both in the United States and abroad. Likewise, O'Hanlon's general dismissal of the future military challenges posed by China, Russia, and North Korea is somewhat cavalier. It would have been useful had O'Hanlon made clear his personal qualifications to provide an authoritative evaluation of such a wide range of technology projections and foreign military developments. He states that he presented his findings to "a number of weapons scientists and technology experts," but he does not identify them or indicate whether they agreed with his conclusions.

O'Hanlon uses his projections of future technology as the basis for a modernization strategy that is intended to promote "defense innovation" without increasing the defense budget. He proposes major reductions, up to two-thirds in such "expensive next generation platforms" as the F-22 and F/A-18E/F, in order to fund improvements to existing systems and a broad range of initiatives in research, development, and experimentation. However, most of his recommendations tend to be as vague as the assumptions he is challenging. For instance, O'Hanlon approves of the acquisition of "new fleets of unmanned aerial vehicles," because it "appear[s] generally sensible." He states that up to two billion dollars a year might be needed to outfit combat units with

"internet capabilities" but does not make clear whether he is referring to the commercial Internet, classified information networks, or some other type of equipment-interoperability initiative. Likewise, he makes a broad plea for the military to "avoid service parochialism and foster jointness" but does not elaborate on how best to balance the advantages of organizational unity (as distinguished from systems interoperability) against the important contribution of interservice competition to the process of military innovation.

O'Hanlon's basic thesis is certainly valid. As he points out, the fact that none of the military services has actually committed to major changes in its force structures, operational concepts, or organizations is evidence in itself that proponents of innovation have yet to articulate a compelling argument for a very different U.S. military. This book is far from the final word on military technology and transformation, but it may serve to stimulate the proponents of major change to engage in a more detailed debate.

JAMES R. FITZSIMONDS
Captain, U.S. Navy
Naval War College



Moskos, Charles C., John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, eds. *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000. 286pp. \$45

Ask a soldier or military analyst to describe the "postmodern military," and you are likely to get an answer that includes high technology, precision weapons, information operations, and possibly (especially if he or she is associated with the Navy) network-centric warfare. Much of the recent literature on military affairs

concentrates on these technology issues, and an observer might be forgiven for believing that such operational and technical differences are what separate twenty-first-century military forces from their predecessors.

This collection of essays describing the current state of military affairs in the United States and twelve other Western-oriented democracies takes a very different and welcome approach. The editors, well known authorities in the fields of military sociology and civil-military relations, examine the nature of post-Cold War militaries from the point of view of how military forces are organized and how they relate to civilian society.

Some of the issues raised will be familiar to anyone who has followed the debate in recent years over a possible crisis in civil-military relations in America. This book, however, goes well beyond that issue to posit a general model of how militaries in Western democracies are changing in the post-Cold War world.

As distinct from the “modern” military organization, which the authors trace from the French Revolution to the end of World War II, and the “Late Modern” military that prevailed from 1945 to the end of the Cold War, the “postmodern” military is described as one in which military forces undergo a loosening of ties with the nation-state. Postmodern military forces are characterized by an erosion of traditional martial values, a decrease in their sense of an identity separate from civil society, and a change of purpose from fighting wars to nontraditional missions, often involving, or authorized by, international and multinational entities. Kosovo is described as “the first Postmodern war,” while the Gulf War, involving a conventional military invasion and state against state

conflict, is seen as a “throwback” to the late-modern (Cold War) era.

On the basis primarily of the American experience, the editors describe trends in postmodern militaries, including several hot-button topics. What are the missions of militaries today? What is the relationship between the military and the media, and what is the public attitude toward the military? How fully are women and homosexuals to be incorporated?

The virtue of this book is that it is not just another rehash of the arguments concerning familiar issues. The essays, all by prominent sociologists, review how well militaries in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom reflect the postmodern model. The essays thus provide useful overviews of how those countries are adapting to many of the same forces that are shaping the American military. They may provide cautionary lessons for military officials and decision makers in the United States by underscoring, for instance, how terribly wrong things can go in “military operations other than war.”

In one extreme example of modern military disaster, the Dutch military still has not fully recovered from the failure of the Dutch 3d Air Mobile Battalion to defend the “safe area” of Srebrenica, Bosnia, in 1995. Bosnian Serb forces massacred thousands of Bosnian Muslims after the Dutch battalion allowed itself to be disarmed. At the other extreme, members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment deployed to Somalia in 1993 were later found to have tortured and murdered at least one Somali youth who had tried to infiltrate their camp to steal. Investigations revealed other abuses by the regiment, and eventually it was disbanded.

These examples underscore the challenges involved in postmodern military missions, and they may support the arguments of those who believe it is dangerous, if not impossible, to expect war-fighting troops to conduct “other than war” missions.

The limitation of this collection of essays is that it does not address the militaries of greatest interest to American military officers—those of potential adversaries to the United States. Because the editors are specifically proposing a theoretical model of how Western, democratic militaries are adjusting to a world with a dramatically reduced conventional threat, the reader must look elsewhere to discover whether or not such nations as China are experiencing the same trends.

Yet there is a great deal here to challenge those worried about the state of America’s military today, especially concerning social issues. One of the most interesting insights concerns the levels of integration of women and homosexuals in the American military, compared with the other countries surveyed. The case studies show that the United States is farther along than most in integrating women but lags behind the postmodern norm in allowing open homosexuals into its ranks.

The essay on Israel, for example, points out that the common perception of the “woman warrior” in the Israeli Defense Force is a myth. Although many women played active fighting roles in the Israeli war of independence, women today are less fully integrated into the IDF than in most other Western militaries.

On the subject of homosexuals, the success of Canada is cited as a possible guide for other nations. Homosexuals have been able to serve openly in the Canadian Forces since 1992, and the removal of previous restrictions is described as having had

“virtually no negative impact” on such matters as recruitment, retention, and morale. It is not clear if the Canadian experience is directly applicable to the United States, but the book suggests that perhaps it is. One of the editors writes that “if the full acceptance of openly homosexual service members is only a matter of time, given the increased tolerance for diversity of sexual orientation among the general population, it would be advisable for policy makers in countries where this is true to move beyond wishful thinking or abhorrence and consider how such a transition can be made with minimal negative impact on group cohesion and military effectiveness.”

Of course, case studies from other countries may do little to persuade those who have already made up their minds. The decision of Canadian Forces authorities in 1998 to approve financial support for a service member’s sex-change operation, for example, may provide ammunition for both sides in that particular debate. Whether or not the Canadian example is one to be feared or applauded, it does suggest how important it is to study closely the development of the postmodern military.

ERIK DAHL
Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College



Feiveson, Harold A., ed., *The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and Dealerting of Nuclear Weapons*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999. 460 pp. \$52.95

Ah, ecstasy! A benign world for the next two decades. Power politics disappear. America leads the drawdown, with Russia following to achieve parity with China, Britain, and France at about two hundred nuclear weapons. Worldwide nuclear

verification becomes practically perfect. Permanent members of the UN Security Council agreeably limit their vetoes. It is all here in this book, the product of the “Deep Cuts Study Group.”

The authors make no secret of their advocacy for drastic nuclear weapons reductions by the United States and Russia, the dealerting or deactivating of all weapons to preclude launch on warning, and announcements of no-first-use policies. The thesis depends on extraordinary verification beyond today’s technology, open sharing of weapons storage data, ironclad control of fissile material, and an effective worldwide security system. An actual nuclear war with Russia is considered unthinkable, despite significant nuclear capability in that country; although Russia now makes no bones about its dependence on nuclear weapons, the authors believe intentions can change. The authors reject nuclear supremacy and deterrence for the unknown of utopian equality.

On the other hand, this book espouses a number of valid premises. “Military and political objectives should be achieved without use of nuclear weapons, if at all possible.” The Russian early-warning system has deteriorated since the breakup of the Soviet Union (hence recent U.S. overtures to share data). Any national missile defense system must be tested extensively against a host of decoys before the United States can certify its technical effectiveness. As a result of conventional weaknesses, Russia has placed great reliance on nuclear weapons in its military strategy. The Russian government has been unable to negotiate effectively on the issue during the past few years; significant problems remain in the transparency of weapons systems between Russia

and the United States, and fissile material stockpiles are hard to verify.

However, if you are looking for a balanced blueprint for the sizing, alert status, and verification of nuclear forces during the next two decades, you will not find it here. There are several bothersome aspects. The authors cite Article VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and chide the nuclear powers for failure to pursue more rapid reductions despite enormous changes in the 1990s. Except for one footnote on page 34, the authors fail to address the full provisions of Article VI, which calls for not only “cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and . . . nuclear disarmament” but also “a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” With international initiatives not in fact leading to “general and complete disarmament,” and with potential aggressors armed as they are today, the nuclear nations have no incentive to seek the reductions envisioned.

The authors place great stress on the premise that Russian command and control has dangerously deteriorated. In fact, the system seems to have functioned the way it was designed in the incident of the 1995 rocket launch from northern Norway. Assertions by the Russian defense minister indicate this fear is groundless.

A “no first use” declaration concerning nuclear weapons by the United States is not in its national interest. The United States reacts to specific circumstances. It need not specify how it would respond to aggression, particularly involving weapons of mass destruction. Aggressors should realize that the United States considers nuclear weapons an absolute last resort, but aggressors should not be certain how the nation will respond, or be offered a

protective declaratory policy. Current U.S. security assurances, including the “no first use” negative-security assurance of 1978 concerning the Non-Proliferation Treaty, serve its interests well.

Low numbers of nuclear weapons would affect the international security environment and American presidential policies. First, a limit of two hundred nuclear weapons almost certainly would necessitate targeting population centers rather than military facilities. Such a strategy violates international law. Second, the United States must understand the impact such a reduction would have on allies to whom it extends nuclear protection. These countries can and likely would develop nuclear weapons on their own; proliferation as a result of destroyed confidence in American nuclear deterrence is not in the nation’s best interest. Third, other powers may conclude that they can and should make the investment in nuclear weapons to match the United States. Today, they have little chance of succeeding.

The authors harp on the “hair trigger” readiness (alert) status of U.S. nuclear weapons without explanation that launch on warning is only one presidential option. The United States has already removed strategic bombers and dual-capable aircraft from alert, detargeted ballistic missiles, removed nuclear capability from carriers and surface ships, and improved technical means to ensure against unauthorized firing or use of nuclear weapons. Russia has taken similar measures to dealert selected forces. However, none of these measures are unequivocally verifiable. There are no magic wands for foolproof verification. Moreover, in a dealert world, a crisis could trigger the most precipitous, dangerous arms race to realert that the world has ever

seen—highly destabilizing and potentially disastrous.

Finally, the real issue is not just numbers of nuclear weapons, “no first use,” alert status, or verification but the preservation of the peace between international entities that might resort to warfare if the calculus did not involve nuclear weapons. From 1600 to 1945, wartime casualties of civilian and military personnel generally varied between 1 to 2 percent of the world’s population (2.6 percent in World War II). After 1945 the casualty percentage dropped significantly, and since about 1953 has consistently remained near 0.1 percent. Nuclear weapons have been a key aspect of the preservation of peace between superpowers for the last five decades. The United States must fully understand the impact on American leadership of any new arrangement before it trashes what has proven to benefit world democracy and freedom.

HANK CHILES
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
U.S. Naval Academy



Gray, Colin S., *The Second Nuclear Age*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999. 193pp. \$45

Readers of Colin Gray’s earlier works will not be disappointed by this new book, nor will his critics be surprised by his conclusions.

Gray argues that the end of the Cold War does not mean that nuclear weapons can be eliminated or forgotten. This book is indeed valuable for noting, and taking to task, the wide variety of academic trends and fashions that have drawn such optimistic conclusions since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Gray ably points to the many ways in

which nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction will continue to cast a shadow over international relations, even if no single superpower confronts the United States as a possible enemy.

Gray certainly claims to be in step with rapidly changing events, while cautioning us against the missteps of others. Even while he asserts that the role of nuclear weapons will be substantially different in light of all that has happened in the years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Gray, by stressing a *second* nuclear age, emphasizes that such weapons will still be very important.

However, one suspects that most of the advice offered here, now that the Cold War is over, is not really so different from the advice the author was offering during the Cold War, advice that did not have much influence on policy. Gray states that anti-missile defense is necessary, not merely desirable. Yet was not his message earlier that such defenses were desirable, almost to the point of being necessary?

Gray says that deterrence is not always reliable—the same message he often advanced with regard to the Soviet Union. He notes that the American advantage in conventional weapons, in conjunction with the enthusiasm over a “revolution in military affairs,” may be transitory and illusory; however, during the Cold War he believed that the advantage in conventional warfare rested with Moscow.

Gray scoffs at the analyses that emphasize preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, suggesting instead that such proliferation may be inevitable—a condition rather than a problem. But in the old days of the Cold War, Gray was ready to argue that one should not make too much of the Soviet-American cooperation

in pushing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; such a joint interest was not nearly so important as the issues that divided Washington and Moscow—and they were dire.

In short, Colin Gray’s book may be right on many of the points it raises, but it is misleading to advertise it as heralding something so new as a “second” nuclear age.

As always, Gray displays a broad awareness of the contemporary literature, set against a deep familiarity with history. But notwithstanding Gray’s critical analysis of the foibles of those who prematurely think that any “nuclear age” has come to an end, his own prose at times comes across as wordy and convoluted, and his message has not changed.

In sum, the book might amount to what could have been said as well in one of the author’s journal articles.

GEORGE H. QUESTER
University of Maryland



Bracken, Paul. *Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age*. New York: HarperCollins, 1999. 186pp. \$25

The incorporation of Asia into the Western-dominated international system is critical for the United States. At present, the United States is reacting to events in Asia instead of shaping them. This is the fundamental message of *Fire in the East*, an important book by Paul Bracken of Yale University.

Asia, extending from Israel to North Korea, has become increasingly visible since the end of the (primarily Eurocentric) Cold War. Discussions of Asian strength, however, have been flawed. Japan has struggled economically for ten years, and

it still lacks political and military power. The intent of Chinese modernization and its impact on the world community remain subjects of controversy. The 1998 “Asian Flu” wracked the economies of the infamous “Little Tigers,” thereby diminishing their statures.

Because globalization and nationalism provide the means and desire to develop nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and the ballistic missiles to deliver them, rising Asian power is increasingly important. As Bracken contends, globalization is about economics, not politics, yet it increases national military potential by providing multiple, inexpensive sources of weapons and military technologies. Consequently, proliferation in a globalized economy is a long-term process linked to rising global scientific and technological prowess. Add to this existing national security motivations for the development of these capabilities, and it is evident how and why Asian military power will grow.

These trends are particularly important because they constitute a second nuclear age. Recent evidence abounds; for instance, in the wake of the Gulf War it was discovered just how close Iraq had been to completing a deliverable nuclear weapon. Iranian missile and nuclear ambitions are clear, punctuated by a medium-range ballistic missile test in 1998. The governments of Pakistan and India conducted flight tests of similar missiles in April 1998 and May 1999, respectively, and each country detonated nuclear weapons in May 1998. China is actively modernizing both its nuclear capabilities and ballistic missiles, manifested by an August 1999 flight test of a mobile intercontinental ballistic missile. Much has been written about the nuclear potential of North Korea, which continues to

develop and test ballistic missiles, most notably in August 1998.

Bracken maintains that these trends portend the decline of Western military dominance, in part because Asia and the West are moving in different directions. For example, nationalism, considered by the United States to be an anachronism, remains a powerful force in Asia. In another case of strategic divergence, Bracken highlights different approaches to warfare. The U.S. prefers long-range, stealthy, and precise conventional attacks that allow conflict that is quick and bloodless (with respect to Americans), with less collateral harm to noncombatants and civilian resources. In the East, indiscriminate weapons and ballistic missiles encourage more destructive and decisive options.

American policy may encourage the growth of Asian political-military power. By preferring an antiseptic form of future war and by not preparing for casualties, the United States leaves itself vulnerable to, and provides incentive for, a nation that has a greater will to visit destruction upon its adversaries. This has the further result of straining the foundations of deterrence. In the first nuclear age, the United States sought to deter one opponent, the Western-oriented and largely risk-averse Soviet Union. Now, the United States must deter multiple powers whose values, belief systems, and strategic-cultural orientations differ greatly from those of the United States.

This is not merely an academic point. Although deterrence during the Cold War was dangerous, the Cold War never turned hot. The perils of the second nuclear age, however, have already been evinced: the Iraqi obstinacy in 1990 that led to war; the crisis-filled nuclear negotiations with North Korea between 1992 and 1994; the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis

with China; and the 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. These events illustrate a dynamic that pits increased Asian assertiveness against U.S. desire for the status quo.

Bracken argues these points persuasively. Historically, these kinds of systemic transformations have been the most dangerous. In the fifth century B.C., Thucydides asserted that the Peloponnesian War had begun due to Spartan fear of rising Athenian power. Thus, a greater discussion of how to integrate such diverse, assertive, and armed Asian nations would have been interesting.

It could be objected that Bracken incorrectly treats many dissimilar nations, governments, and cultures as if they were the same. Simply stated, it makes a difference what kind of government is in power. In addition, other variables are not accounted for, such as the disintegration of the Iranian theocracy (less than twenty-five years ago Iran was our staunchest ally in the Middle East). In North Korea, whether a “soft landing” or a more violent collapse occurs could fundamentally influence regional transformation. Last, the effect of potentially severe ethnic problems in China is not addressed.

Despite these shortcomings, Bracken deals convincingly with important topics. Footnotes are not to be found, and his bibliography is limited given the breadth of the subject, but he has integrated information from a variety of fields. Defense and foreign policy students and practitioners alike should read *Fire in the East*.

PHILIP L. RITCHESON
Falls Church, Virginia



Lilley, James R., and David Shambaugh, eds. *China's Military Faces the Future*. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1999. 356pp. \$29.95

This collection of high-quality essays by some of the leading experts on the Chinese military is the product of the 1997 Seventh Annual Conference on the People's Liberation Army (PLA), sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute. The authors, although inspired by different security and threat perceptions, present sober, straightforward, and reasonable assessments of PLA efforts to modernize itself in the 1990s and of its prospects for the immediate future. Evidence drawn from the essays shows that the PLA is increasingly modern, confident, and assertive but that it has not yet developed sophisticated theories and technologies comparable to those of the United States or relevant to fighting an American-style, high-tech limited war, or any war beyond its borders. The provocative variations on this theme, shaped by starkly different—seemingly contradictory, yet ultimately reinforcing—dynamics of Chinese and East Asian politics, are instrumental in defining the evolution and nature of the PLA.

This perceptive, informative, and well written book is divided into four sections: on the “New High Command,” “Doctrine, Strategy, and Weapons,” the “Support Base,” and “China's Northeast Asian Security Environment.” Each section has its strengths. After a careful but critical examination of biographical materials on new military leaders, the first provides unusual insight into the PLA's inner circle of decision making by identifying two fundamental changes in civil-military relations in the post-Deng era. First, none of the top party leaders has any military background or connections, whereas none

of the senior military commanders and political commissars has any experience in party politics. Second, professionalism and corporatism prevail in the PLA. This distinct disconnection between the party and the PLA challenges the traditional mind-set of the “interlocking directorate of the party and the military,” namely, that the party is the army, while the army is the party.

The second section gives readers a serious but enjoyable discussion of doctrinal, strategic, and weaponry issues reflecting different schools of thought among scholars and analysts. One school holds that the PLA would no longer squander human life by sending waves of peasants against Western firepower as Mao Zedong once did. Advocates of this way of thinking argue that high-tech weapons have become the PLA’s new hallmark but that it has a long way to go before it achieves the level of operational capability and technological sophistication its leadership desires. The fatal weakness lies in its strategy, doctrine, and weapons, which remain thirty to forty years behind those of the United States. The other school of thought insists that the PLA is in fact not so far behind the United States. Data offered here (the excellent bibliography in Chinese and the appendix) is empirical proof that the PLA actively studies the revolution in military affairs and is applying its lessons, developing sophisticated weapons, and acquiring advanced combat systems for asymmetric warfare. The modernized PLA could likely threaten the vital interests of the United States and its East Asian allies in the near future. Whether or not these concerns are justified, there is little doubt that the PLA is catching up with its regional counterparts.

The third section offers a professionally knowledgeable overview and analysis of the PLA’s budget, logistics, and technology, detailing some “contradictions” inherent in the support system. For example, the PLA’s modest defence budget is, at least for now, qualitatively different from those of industrialized countries; its essence is different, and its implications are different. For whatever reasons, the PLA has remained integrated within a larger socioeconomic composite that is able to provide unlimited resources for soldiers and to focus procurement priorities on items suitable for conflict scenarios with Taiwan.

A more troublesome issue, and one central to PLA logistics, is a continued debate on centralization and decentralization. Lack of consensus and resources often forces the central command to encourage units to find their own ways to survive economically or to upgrade their weapons and equipment, even while it tries to create a unified, reliable, and effective support system.

The PLA’s most vulnerable aspect remains its technological obsolescence. Even though the PLA closely watches developments in military technologies, progress in its key technologies is very slow, and technical difficulties make its military modernisation programs less than ideal. The resulting inconsistent policies and uneven development may eventually neutralize the effectiveness of its future operations.

The final section examines regional security issues with respect to the Korean Peninsula and Japan, areas of deep concern in Washington at a time when America’s presence there is already stretched thin. The analysis shows that China’s approach to Korea is rational. The most visible factor is that Beijing

does not want Pyongyang to collapse, politically or economically; at the same time, Beijing is pessimistic about the reunification of North and South Korea. Similarly, emerging nationalism in China and in Japan, and military modernisation in both nations, strengthen their threat perceptions. A confrontation between these two regional powers is possible, but a military one would appear to be highly unlikely in the near future. In short, regional stability and security hang on the joint efforts of all regional powers.

The book has two major flaws concerning PLA capabilities. First, the authors of these essays rely exclusively on their distinct assessments of PLA material power and terms of reference, and these leave unrecognized the role of Chinese spiritual power—that is, political indoctrination and nationalism—and of the incalculable advantages to the Chinese of fighting a war, whether high-tech or low-tech, on their homeland. Second, naval readers will regret the lack of an in-depth study of the Chinese navy. Also, there is no mention of recent developments in divesting the PLA of commercial enterprises, implementing the regulations of joint operations, or in introducing a joint support system.

All in all, the book is not only highly recommended for students of PLA studies but will undoubtedly also interest readers who have a general concern for Chinese and East Asian security.

JIANXIANG BI
Kanata, Ontario, Canada



Kim, Duk-ki. *Naval Strategy in Northeast Asia: Geostategic Goals, Policies and Prospects*. Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 2000. 261pp. \$57.50

The growing economic, strategic, and cultural importance of Asia calls for a U.S. foreign policy attuned to the unique environment of this diverse area. As this economic dreadnought emerges from the fog of uneven treaties, wars, and cultural misunderstanding, U.S. politico-military thinkers must recognize the pressures of history and geography that will dislodge any policy not firmly anchored in Asian realities.

Northeast Asia in particular, with its increasing importance in world trade, its potential for undersea resource development, archipelagic territorial disputes, and the possibility of environmental catastrophe caused by its rapid industrialization and nuclear-waste dumping at sea, is vital to U.S. geostrategic interests. These factors, coupled with historical regional animosities, a diminishing Russian and U.S. military presence, a naval arms buildup, and the associated ability to project power from the sea, highlight that security in Northeast Asia has assumed a decidedly maritime flavor.

Competing interests and local concerns abound. China desires to be a world power and regional leader, if not a full-fledged Asian hegemon. Japan quietly remilitarizes as it accepts a larger regional security role. South Korea desires unification of the peninsula under democratic rule, eagerly awaiting the collapse of the intransigent and Stalinist regime. Finally, the United States and Russia have growing regional economic and political interests, accompanied by a waning military presence brought on by budget constraints and defense retrenchments. Thus Northeast Asia, a bubbling cauldron that may boil over at any moment, is a focus of world attention.

This book is largely based on research for the author's doctoral dissertation.

Commander Duk-ki Kim, Republic of Korea Navy, has developed a wonderful primer for anyone desiring to understand the underlying factors of Northeast Asian international relations and emerging maritime issues. Kim's purpose for writing this book was to design a cooperative maritime security structure to enhance security throughout Northeast Asia.

In this scrupulously footnoted and documented work, Kim calls for bilateral and multilateral cooperative security among historically adversarial Northeast Asian nations. This framework for security will not only strengthen understanding of mutual security needs but also broaden the definition of security beyond the traditional approach of unilateral defense. Kim defines cooperative security as a system of security practiced with, rather than against, adversaries. His suggested maritime measures for security forums include: naval arms control to provide limitations and constraint; maritime confidence building measures to provide reassurance, confidence, and transparency; and maritime cooperation to introduce habits of cooperation.

Kim argues that the opportunity exists now for the regional powers to turn to cooperative security measures in order to lend stability to this historically unstable area. This cooperation, he believes, will go far in allaying fears of China's growing power-projection capability and Japan's acceptance of its growing regional security role. Cooperative security measures will also help in resolving resource and fisheries claims that threaten to erupt into open hostilities. By providing a vehicle for dialogue, cooperative security may serve as an acceptable alternative in the absence of any other formal institutional structure to manage growing disputes.

Kim's first three chapters make an excellent summary of the overarching maritime political and strategic concerns that undergird naval strategy in the region. Kim follows with chapters that describe U.S., Russian, and Japanese maritime strategies and concerns, and he concludes by showing how trying to amalgamate these diverse interests can be greatly eased by U.S. and Northeast Asian cooperative approaches on bilateral, regional, and international levels to provide stability through a framework of dialogue on peace and security.

As a naval officer intimately familiar with the region, Kim assesses the limitations of his proposals, such as Northeast Asian nations that are not yet ready for full-scale negotiations on reductions in naval forces. As these navies continue to grow, he sees a need for agreements to mitigate the inevitable high-seas misunderstandings. He also calls for more transparency through increased ship visits and high-level official exchanges, as well as cooperative development of off-shore natural resources. As a further preventive measure, Kim suggests rules governing fishery violations, to help avoid dustups over fishing rights.

Although an excellent background read, this book contains two flaws that, while they do not detract from the central theme or lessen its value as a resource, may disconcert the reader. First, although much of Kim's work was completed before 1999, the copyright date is 2000. Thus in a number of places Kim refers to actions that should occur "by the next century," or "by the year 2000." Additionally, because of the dynamism of naval growth within Northeast Asia, much of the force structure he projects for the future already exists (e.g., the *Luhai*-class DDG alluded to on page 146

joined the Chinese South Sea Fleet in January 1999, and a *Sovremenny* DDG entered the Chinese order of battle in early 2000). Second, Kim does not treat the Republic of Korea Navy as a major regional actor, leaving it conspicuously absent from his chapters on strategy and concerns about cooperative maritime security. This is a significant omission. Korea is a growing naval power with extensive regional concerns, and it is possibly the nation most likely to find itself in armed conflict across its borders.

These gaps aside, this is a book worth having in a library on modern Asia. The extensive selected bibliography adds value to this work as a resource on Northeast Asian politico-military matters. It obviously should be required reading for those involved in Northeast Asian regional maritime issues, and it would also be of interest to anyone seeking to understand the unique problems of Northeast Asia and possible solutions to them.

ROBERT MARABITO
Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College



Weintraub, Stanley. *MacArthur's War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero*. New York: Free Press, 2000. 385pp. \$27.50

No figure of the Korean War looms quite so large as General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, simultaneously brilliant, arrogant, inscrutable, successful, and fallen—all the elements of a Greek tragedy. His military career, spanning the major portion of the twentieth century, also renders him appealing as a symbol of broader themes of that war and of American society. So we come to Stanley Weintraub's *MacArthur's War*, advertised on its dust

jacket as a “fascinating, well rendered history of the general who refuses to fade away,” a book based on “extensive research in primary and secondary sources and laced with colorful anecdotes.”

Unfortunately, the book is none of those things but rather a facile, cobbled-together mishmash of principally secondary sources, laced with myriad errors of chronology, fact, and interpretation—all poorly documented. When reading this book, one feels not unlike Vice Admiral James H. Doyle after reading a draft of a Korean War history sent to him in the late 1950s: “Your versions of the Inchon assault and Hungnam redeployment contain so many errors and distortions of fact and of emphasis that I am unable to assist you with my comment.” However, I would like to make note of a baker’s dozen of errors to provide specific evidence for my general assertions.

The author states on page 107 that the amphibious commander, Rear Admiral Doyle, “had been Richmond Kelly Turner’s operations officer in the final months of World War II.” In fact, Doyle served on Turner’s staff from August 1942 to March 1943; in the final months of the war, Doyle was commanding the cruiser *Pasadena*. These are not obscure facts but can readily be found both in George Dyer’s biography of Turner, *The Amphibians Came to Conquer*, and in Doyle’s official biography at the Naval Historical Center.

Weintraub writes that Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke explained to MacArthur the need to sail early for Inchon because of the typhoon season. “Although nearly a month remained before departure, the ship movement orders were issued immediately,” which would suggest that the conversation took place around 15 August. Burke was good, but probably

not that good. He did not arrive in Japan until 3 September 1950, twelve days before the operation. He *did* have such a conversation with MacArthur, but only several days before the scheduled sailing, and with respect specifically to Typhoon Kezia. This is all described in Burke's oral history, which is available at the U.S. Naval Institute, and which apparently Weintraub consulted.

We also learn that during World War II the 1st Marine Division "had stormed the beaches of Guadalcanal, New Guinea, New Britain, Peleliu, and Okinawa." The 1st Marine Division did not assault any beach or conduct any operation in New Guinea, although several other smaller Marine units did. That was an Army show.

Weintraub contends that Inchon was largely possible only because a World War II study conducted for the Joint Chiefs of Staff assessed Inchon as a possible landing site: "Without such detailed earlier data, MacArthur could not have carried out Chromite on such a short fuse." None of the principals involved have, to my knowledge, made reference to such a study. Poor institutional memory is not unusual. Little was known about Inchon in 1950, but someone recalled that Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, commander of the Seventh Fleet, had accepted the Japanese surrender there in 1945. The U.S. Army had run the port for a time. At Doyle's insistence, a "frantic search turned up an Army warrant officer, W. R. Miller, who had lived on Wolmi Do and operated Transportation Corps boats over Inchon Harbor. . . . [He] forthwith joined Admiral Doyle's staff." (The reader can refer to Robert Debs Heinl, Jr.'s *Victory at High Tide* [Lippincott, 1968].)

In chapter 8, the author quotes from James Alexander's *Inchon to Wonsan*:

"On the destroyer *Borland*, accompanying the escort carrier *Badoeng Strait* as the Inchon flotilla moved north[,] . . . Marine and FEAF [Far East Air Force] pilots could be picked up on ship's radio." There has never been a U.S. Navy destroyer *Borland*, which one can confirm in the *Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships*, volume 1. Better yet, simply read the publisher's description of Alexander's book: "Alexander has created a fictional destroyer, the USS *John J. Borland*, and he records through this single ship the actual experiences of a number of real destroyers through their logs and diaries."

At one point, Weintraub has Lewis B. Puller commanding the 1st Marines, which he did. Later in the book, however, the author has Puller commanding the 5th Marines; this would have undoubtedly surprised Ray Murray, who actually did command the 5th Marines. Also, Homer Litzenberg is given the 11th Marines—he commanded the 7th Marines—and Ray David, who won the Congressional Medal of Honor at Chosin, will be pleased to learn that, according to Weintraub, he became a Marine Corps commandant.

During the delay in landing X Corps because of land mines, Weintraub writes, MacArthur "insist[ed] that the amphibious operations proceed but with the 7th Division now to make an alternative assault at Iwon." That decision was mutually made by the X Corps Commanding General (CG), Major General Edward Almond, with Doyle and Struble, aboard the USS *Mount McKinley* on 24 October 1950. The reader can refer to the Naval Historical Center's Operational Archives.

Weintraub also tells us on page 169 that "for Wonsan, Admiral Struble hastily assembled a twenty-one minesweeper

flotilla, including nine ships from the impounded Imperial Japanese Navy.” This short sentence contains three errors of fact. Struble, as Commander, Joint Task Force, did not assemble the minesweeping force. Captain Richard Spofford, commander of Mine Squadron 3, in fact reported to Vice Admiral Turner Joy as Commander of Naval Forces Far East. Joy intentionally kept control of the “sweeps.” Burke requested the Japanese minesweepers on 2 October. These were not impounded Imperial Japanese Navy ships but Japanese Maritime Safety Agency (JMSA) vessels that had been actively sweeping the Inland Sea since the end of World War II. On 6 October, the JMSA quietly authorized twenty minesweepers, four patrol boats (to act as mother ships), and one other vessel, to deal with magnetic mines. Some went to Korea’s west coast, and ten or twelve went to Wonsan, as stated in Burke’s oral history.

It is in its discussion of Hungnam, however, that the book really shines. On page 287, Weintraub blithely writes that “stowage diagrams for troops and equipment were ignored daily as troops filled whatever ships were available.” This statement implies a willy-nilly process of outloading at Hungnam. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Burke began to hold shipping in Japan in mid-November; Doyle issued Operation Order 19-50 on 29 November, for planning purposes; his control and loading plan was issued on 11 December; and he issued Operation Order 20-50 on 13 December. Doyle’s action report describes an expeditious but well organized movement of shipping in and out of Hungnam Harbor. Loading officers quickly developed an ability to estimate loading capacities without diagrams. The author’s casual assertion not only is inaccurate but does a disservice to those who did the job. One need

only read Doyle’s article “December 1950 at Hungnam,” in the April 1979 U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, to understand this.

The author then puzzles over why Chinese forces did not put more pressure on the Hungnam perimeter. He concludes it was “as if a gentlemen’s agreement were in force.” Major General O. P. Smith, CG 1st Marine Division, had a different notion. In a 12 December letter to his wife Esther (which can be found in his personal papers at the Marine Corps University Research Archives, Quantico), the general observed that “six Chinese divisions will not bother anyone for a while”; the Marines, assisted by “old man winter,” had already taken a terrible toll on their attackers. Organic X Corps artillery was used for close support. Doyle had used two heavy cruisers, four to seven destroyers, and three LSMRs (medium landing ships equipped with rockets) throughout (augmented on “Dog Day” by the battleship *Missouri*) for naval gunfire support, area harassment fire, illumination, and deep support. Doyle also had the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing at Yongpo and Task Force 77 aircraft on call. From 9 to 24 December, 2,932 eight-inch high-capacity, 14,491 five-inch proximity-fuzed, and 3,741 five-inch illuminating rounds were fired at Hungnam.

Weintraub also errs in his summary of the outloading statistics for Hungnam, which are among the most widely published figures from the Korean War, asserting that “550,000 estimated tons of bulk cargo” were lifted. The actual figure was “350,000 measurement tons” (refer to the Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center).

The caption for a photograph of MacArthur and other officers on *Mount McKinley*’s flag bridge on the morning of the Inchon landing mislabels one of the

officers as Vice Admiral Struble; it was actually Rear Admiral Doyle. Struble was aboard his own flagship, the cruiser *Rochester*. According to protocol, MacArthur should have been aboard Struble's ship; however, he elected to go with Doyle instead. The irony is that Doyle and Struble enjoyed a strong mutual antipathy.

It would have been useful to be able to refer to Weintraub's sources to trace the origins of his errors, but unfortunately, he condescends that "endnote numbers are eschewed as intrusive, as are most footnotes." He believes that "extensive back matter notes" on each chapter's sources would suffice. (It is worth mentioning that the Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-0, *Leading Marines*—primarily intended for young enlisted Marines—shows there as FMFM 101.) It is impossible to ascertain from his back-matter notes where specific material originated, unless one compares the text line by line with each source mentioned. I tried to do that for the dialog the author offers for the famous 23 August 1950 "showdown" meeting regarding the Inchon landing. Parts comport with published accounts and participants' recollections, but some of it I have never seen before. Perhaps it came from sources unnamed, but without notes one cannot be certain.

Notes are not a luxury or, to use Weintraub's word, an "intrusion." The author must know that. Notes are at the heart of rigorous scholarly research. Research is a social process, and its linchpin is the ability of other scholars to check the validity of reported findings. Ultimately, *MacArthur's War* contributes little to our understanding of the Korean War. It is so fraught with errors that it cannot be taken seriously.

It is a regrettable book.

DONALD CHISHOLM
Naval War College



Cable, James. *The Political Influence of Naval Force in History*. New York: St. Martin's, 1998. 213pp. \$59.95

Sir James Cable is a noted writer on naval affairs. His *Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919–1991* is a well regarded classic on the role of naval force.

His latest work is a historical survey of the political purposes for which governments have made use of naval force. Cable defines "naval force" as that "exercised by fighting ships manned by disciplined sailors at the direction of a central command responsible to the political leadership." His definition is necessary to distinguish naval force as we understand it today from the force exercised by pirates, privateers, adventurers, and users of "landing craft" (such as those that brought Roman soldiers to Britain in 55 A.D.) or galleys, which served merely as conveyances to bring soldiers together for seaborne hand-to-hand combat.

Cable examines the extent to which naval force furthered the political purposes of the governments that used it—the scale and nature of the force employed are not otherwise considered relevant. He focuses on examples of the use of force "for political purposes in which the naval element is significant, the facts are reasonably well established, and the degree of success or failure and the durability of the result are clear enough for useful conclusions to be drawn."

This definition thus largely excludes consideration of fighting at sea before the 1500s, because standing navies were rare, thus precluding the presence of disciplined officers and sailors. Portugal in the sixteenth and the Netherlands in the

seventeenth century first used naval force for political purposes, with great success in founding large empires. The establishment of global empires and expanded seaborne trade fostered the emergence of significant national navies (as opposed to privateers and pirates).

Cable surveys various instances when the use of naval force had profound, long-lasting political effects. Obviously, victories in major sea battles like Trafalgar or Tsushima, the ultimate use of naval force, could have significant political fallout. Yet the uses of naval force did not have to be that dramatic to have such effect. Cumulative efforts—such as those of the British to attain command of the seas in the eighteenth century; of the British (and others) to stamp out the slave trade in the nineteenth century; of the Union navy to blockade the Confederacy during the Civil War; of the German submarine campaigns to interdict sea traffic to Great Britain; and of the Japanese campaign to conquer Southeast Asia—all had long-lasting political consequences, even if the eventual outcomes were not always intended.

Discrete exercises of noncombat naval forces have also had huge political consequences. For instance, the Dutch navy's successful landing of William of Orange in England enabled the Glorious Revolution and all that followed from it in Britain (and Ireland). French naval intervention off Yorktown in 1781 was critical in ending the American Revolution. ("Indeed, we can scarcely expect to encounter any result of the use of naval force for political purposes that is larger or more lasting than the independence of the United States.") The U.S. Navy's "opening of Japan" had profound effects on that nation's development and thus Japan's impact on subsequent world

history. More recently, the Royal Navy's attack on the French navy in July 1940 was intended in part to influence American political opinion concerning British resolve to resist Nazi Germany.

Political influence from naval force can be latent as well. German construction of its High Seas Fleet, as well as British contemplation of "Copenhagening" that fleet in the decade before World War I, negatively affected the political environment of that era. The rise of the Soviet Navy in the 1970s and 1980s significantly affected U.S. political debate about national security; arguably, "the growth [in the 1980s] of the U.S. Navy probably caused greater harm to the Soviet Union than all the confrontations at sea put together."

Cable does not really address "dogs that did not bark"—that is, the *absence* of naval force, or more properly, the failure to use it. A counterfactual argument is usually difficult to make convincingly. However, the Royal Navy's failure to stop Italy from using the Suez Canal in 1935 during the Ethiopian campaign, and the impact of that failure on the European political scene, would appear to be a good case in point. It has been thought that the absence of strong Royal Navy forces in Singapore in 1941 played into Japanese political calculations. This would seem a good area for inquiry as the United States enters the Quadrennial Defense Review season. The Navy, like the other services, generally makes affirmative arguments for what it provides the nation; the possible consequences of *not* having the capability to be engaged is less often argued, yet may be even more compelling.

Cable ends with some "lessons and speculations." These are, unfortunately, not sharply focused. As he admits, it is hard

to discern any real patterns from his historical survey, and even if any exist, the stockbroker's warning that "future results cannot be predicted from past performance" applies. At best, "if anything approaching a principle emerges from the confused record of the past it may be that the natural political environment for navies, their *raison d'être*, is the unforeseen. . . . Warships allow choice, naval force is a flexible instrument."

The book is a good short summary of the political uses of naval force, both intended and unintended, over the past fifty years. However, it is of limited value in helping today's defense analysts and policy makers think through the requirements for tomorrow's naval forces.

JAN VAN TOL
Commander, U.S. Navy
CNO Executive Panel Staff



Lambert, Nicholas. *Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution*. Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1999. 364pp. \$39.95

This is a very good book and a very important one. Nicholas Lambert has followed in the path of Jon Sumida's *In Defense of Naval Supremacy* to present a lucid, compelling, and comprehensive analysis of the policies of Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Royal Navy in the decade before 1914. This work is based upon Lambert's doctoral study of the development of the submarine, but it goes much farther than his original work in explaining the fundamental elements of Fisher's naval policies and their effects on the Royal Navy.

Lambert's command of the primary sources is remarkable. He supplements grand strategy, national financial policy, and politics with the details of

operational and tactical concepts with a skill that illuminates the linkages between the various levels and gives them all sufficient and appropriate weight. His treatment not only lays bare the superficial nature of much previous historical research in this era but also indicates the degree to which that superficiality has caused our understanding of the period to be profoundly flawed.

The book is not an easy read, but Lambert's solid prose and grasp of his narrative allow the reader to follow his way through the labyrinth that was British naval policy in the Fisher era. To detail all its facets would take up an entire issue of the *Naval War College Review*, but some explanation is worthwhile.

Lambert makes clear that Fisher was installed as First Sea Lord in 1904 primarily to cut spending at a time when the British government desperately needed to achieve economies in its budget. He shows that Fisher developed extraordinary schemes to utilize emergent technology to maintain Britain's naval dominance when that dominance was being increasingly challenged and the country's ability to pay becoming ever more dubious. He shows too that Fisher's ideas of dominance always focused on Britain's worldwide requirements, particularly in the protection of sea communications (the threat from Germany was not the primary motivation of British naval policy until much later).

Lambert shows the devious way in which Fisher operated, often concealing his true motivations from politicians and naval colleagues alike, but he also maps out the logic behind the admiral's approach. To Sumida's explanation of the origins of the battle cruiser as the worldwide instrument of commerce protection, Lambert adds the concept of the "flotilla," by which small craft—both surface and

submersible—with torpedoes would close the “narrow seas” around the British Isles and the Mediterranean to the operation of enemy battle fleets and protect Britain and its possessions from attack. “Flotilla defence” would effectively replace the capital ship as the primary element in Britain’s naval strength.

Lambert shows how Fisher always returned to these ideas as the best ways for Britain to utilize both its technological advantages and its strategic geography to achieve affordable naval supremacy. Even in retirement Fisher continued his efforts, and Lambert has discovered incontrovertible proof that in 1914, when the overseas building rates of battleships had become more than British finances could match, Fisher persuaded Winston Churchill, the young First Lord, to cancel the construction of at least two battleships and divert the funding to submarines and destroyers. In other words, the British in 1914 were on the point of stopping battleship construction altogether.

Lambert’s mastery of detail is apparent throughout this volume, but there are four aspects that are most important for the readership of the *Naval War College Review* and for the challenges ahead.

The first is Lambert’s exposition of the issues that the Royal Navy faced as an organisation, some of which will have a particular resonance for the contemporary audience. Finance was always a fundamental concern, but there were other factors as well. Cutting construction to save money jeopardised the existence of the industrial capacity on which Britain’s latent supremacy at sea rested. Much of Britain’s power derived from the fact that it could, in the final event, construct and arm more warships more quickly than any rival; it was essential that this ability be maintained. The “We Want Eight”

crisis of 1909 may thus have had Fisher’s desire to sustain that capability as its primary cause, rather than his fears of German expansion.

The British also faced a crisis of manpower. Not only was the Royal Navy hard pressed to recruit sufficient personnel to man the increasing numbers of battleships and armoured cruisers entering service in the first years of the century, but retention was poor, particularly amongst the more highly skilled ratings vital to their operation. Even if the government provided the funds, the Navy did not have the human capacity to expand indefinitely to match increases in foreign naval capability. The primary focus of the redeployment process, which saw the removal of ships from overseas stations and the apparent concentration of forces in British waters, was not the German threat but the need to employ manpower more efficiently; perhaps, also, by retaining ships in home waters rather than keeping them semipermanently overseas it would improve the quality of life of the ships’ companies. The peacetime deployment of the fleet therefore did not necessarily reflect the intentions for its operations in a conflict.

A corollary to this is the fact that the primary focus of the Admiralty’s effort was the defence of the empire as a whole; the force that it sought to create was always intended to have worldwide responsibilities. The fleet that fought the 1914–18 war in the North Sea, the “Grand Fleet of Battle,” was an attempt to use resources that had been created the previous decade to the greatest effect within a theatre that was much more confined than had been expected only a few years earlier. The enemies that Britain faced in 1914 did not include Italy or any other power with the

potential to interfere with British maritime communications to the degree Russia or France could have. As it was, the problems of organising the Grand Fleet to be an effective tactical entity were such that many in the Royal Navy did not regard it as a practical offensive force. The results of Jutland show they had a point.

Thus we see the importance of Lambert's careful inclusion of what was going on in the fleets at sea in terms of operational innovation and development. *Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution* makes it absolutely clear that whatever their failings in critical thinking, staff work, and analytical method, the senior officers of the Royal Navy were not operating in an intellectual vacuum, and that those in seagoing command were energetically attempting to exploit the emergent technology to the full. Because these officers were responsible for the fighting efficiency of the Royal Navy, however, they were required to work with what they had. As with the aircraft carrier in the 1920s and 1930s, this reality explains the contemporary logic of many decisions that seem misguided in retrospect. It also explains a good part (though not all) of the opposition to Fisher's ideas, even amongst his erstwhile supporters, and thus a good part (though not all) of Fisher's deviousness. At the same time, Lambert does not neglect the effects of personality and party in his description of the controversies that raged over Fisher and naval policy. There are human beings in this book.

Lambert's mastery of context is, above all, why this work should be read by all who are involved with naval policy. He analyses the elements of British decision making and its consequences in terms of contemporary conditions, not hindsight. Lambert clearly explains the ways in which solutions and makeshifts were

developed to answer, in the time available, the problems that the Royal Navy faced. He places clear and necessary emphasis on the British need to maintain warfighting capabilities year by year, in spite of all the stresses on the budget and the "stop-go" nature of so many of the new capabilities, such as the submarine and long-range gunnery fire control. In the uncertain strategic environment of the opening years of the twentieth century, the Royal Navy could not afford to surrender existing or immediately available battle power in favor of unproven systems. Nor could it permit the deterioration of the industrial capacity that allowed it to outbuild rivals in an emergency, or continue to seek "more of the same" at the expense of national finances. However ambitious Fisher's ideas, all of what he did was influenced by these imperatives, as he sought to position the navy to exploit new possibilities.

Lambert's story of the Royal Navy before 1914 presents a picture completely different from the accepted one, but it is a picture that is solidly founded in primary sources. Equally to the point, it is one that is wholly convincing in total and represents a more satisfying explanation of what happened, and why, than we have ever had before. It is a study that should sound a familiar note for those who have themselves had to struggle with the same sort of problems in other navies and defence forces in recent years.

As one who has written on the operational history of the Royal Navy in the opening months of the First World War, I now believe that such history, and indeed the entire history of the war at sea, needs to be approached anew. I also believe that Lambert's work proves that we should look again at more of the history

of twentieth-century navies with the same comprehensiveness.

JAMES GOLDRICK
Captain, Royal Australian Navy



Maffeo, Steven E. *Most Secret and Confidential: Intelligence in the Age of Nelson*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000. 355pp. \$32.95

In *Most Secret and Confidential*, Steven Maffeo has written an exceptional study of how intelligence was collected and used during the French Revolutionary Wars and the Napoleonic Wars of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. To limited degrees, the intelligence activities of the United States, Spain, Russia, Denmark, and several other European nations are described. More detail is provided concerning the excellent French intelligence efforts under Napoleon. The bulk of the text, however, deals with the use of intelligence by the British government, especially the Admiralty, during the years between 1793 and 1815.

Maffeo, who is a commander in a naval reserve intelligence unit, has combined his intelligence expertise with the skills of an accomplished historian to write this informative and most enjoyable history of British intelligence efforts during this period. His knowledge of the history of intelligence operations is excellent, and his grasp of the British navy of this era is unsurpassed. He uses not only primary sources (government papers and personal letters) to document his work but also the books of such novelists as C. S. Forester and Patrick O'Brian to make his points.

The opening chapter describes how the British government collected intelligence. It has been clear that Lloyd's of London, by means of its agents located

around the world, was able to provide a continuous flow of intelligence to the government, but it is fascinating to learn that by virtue of opening diplomatic and personal mail, the British Post Office became the largest intelligence-gathering branch of the government.

Subsequent chapters treat other aspects of the British intelligence effort. The Admiralty's collection and use of intelligence is discussed in depth, and so is the transmission of information. The difficulties are shown of sending any type of message, especially when the usual form of communication at sea was signal flags, which were useless at night or in limited visibility, such as in battle. The subject of several chapters is the commander as his own intelligence officer. Some commanders, such as Nelson, were expert intelligence officers; others were not. However, all commanders had to sort through whatever information was available to them and make the best decisions they could—they were literally on their own. Communications between detached fleets and the Admiralty often took weeks, if not months. Commanders, therefore, without knowledge of the current government policy, would ultimately decide on courses of action. The fact that they were fully supported by the Admiralty and the government demonstrates the high level of intelligence skills among the officers of the Royal Navy.

The concluding chapters are case studies that show what role intelligence, or the lack thereof, played in three naval engagements. They are remarkable summations of the Indian Ocean action of Pulo Aur in February 1804, the Copenhagen expedition of December 1800–April 1801, and the Nile campaign of March through August 1798. These three chapters form an excellent conclusion.

This is a must read for every intelligence officer, and for any member of the military who is interested in the history of intelligence. It should also be on the reading list of every military and naval historian, most history buffs, and fans of naval fiction of this period. It

substantiates that such fictional characters as Horatio Hornblower and Jack Aubrey are soundly based on historical fact, and that their activities, especially concerning intelligence, are authentic.

MICHAEL RIGGLE
Naval War College