2001

Naval Strategy in Northeast Asia: Geostrategic Goals, Policies and Prospects,

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does not want Pyongyang to collapse, politically or economically; at the same time, Beijing is pessimistic about the reunification of North and South Korea. Similarly, emerging nationalism in China and in Japan, and military modernisation in both nations, strengthen their threat perceptions. A confrontation between these two regional powers is possible, but a military one would appear to be highly unlikely in the near future. In short, regional stability and security hang on the joint efforts of all regional powers.

The book has two major flaws concerning PLA capabilities. First, the authors of these essays rely exclusively on their distinct assessments of PLA material power and terms of reference, and these leave unrecognized the role of Chinese spiritual power—that is, political indoctrination and nationalism—and of the incalculable advantages to the Chinese of fighting a war, whether high-tech or low-tech, on their homeland. Second, naval readers will regret the lack of an in-depth study of the Chinese navy. Also, there is no mention of recent developments in divesting the PLA of commercial enterprises, implementing the regulations of joint operations, or in introducing a joint support system.

All in all, the book is not only highly recommended for students of PLA studies but will undoubtedly also interest readers who have a general concern for Chinese and East Asian security.

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The growing economic, strategic, and cultural importance of Asia calls for a U.S. foreign policy attuned to the unique environment of this diverse area. As this economic dreadnought emerges from the fog of uneven treaties, wars, and cultural misunderstanding, U.S. politico-military thinkers must recognize the pressures of history and geography that will dislodge any policy not firmly anchored in Asian realities.

Northeast Asia in particular, with its increasing importance in world trade, its potential for undersea resource development, archipelagic territorial disputes, and the possibility of environmental catastrophe caused by its rapid industrialization and nuclear-waste dumping at sea, is vital to U.S. geostrategic interests. These factors, coupled with historical regional animosities, a diminishing Russian and U.S. military presence, a naval arms buildup, and the associated ability to project power from the sea, highlight that security in Northeast Asia has assumed a decidedly maritime flavor.

Competing interests and local concerns abound. China desires to be a world power and regional leader, if not a full-fledged Asian hegemon. Japan quietly remilitarizes as it accepts a larger regional security role. South Korea desires unification of the peninsula under democratic rule, eagerly awaiting the collapse of the intransigent and Stalinist regime. Finally, the United States and Russia have growing regional economic and political interests, accompanied by a waning military presence brought on by budget constraints and defense retrenchments. Thus Northeast Asia, a bubbling cauldron that may boil over at any moment, is a focus of world attention.

This book is largely based on research for the author’s doctoral dissertation.
Commander Duk-ki Kim, Republic of Korea Navy, has developed a wonderful primer for anyone desiring to understand the underlying factors of Northeast Asian international relations and emerging maritime issues. Kim’s purpose for writing this book was to design a cooperative maritime security structure to enhance security throughout Northeast Asia.

In this scrupulously footnoted and documented work, Kim calls for bilateral and multilateral cooperative security among historically adversarial Northeast Asian nations. This framework for security will not only strengthen understanding of mutual security needs but also broaden the definition of security beyond the traditional approach of unilateral defense. Kim defines cooperative security as a system of security practiced with, rather than against, adversaries. His suggested maritime measures for security forums include: naval arms control to provide limitations and constraint; maritime confidence building measures to provide reassurance, confidence, and transparency; and maritime cooperation to introduce habits of cooperation.

Kim argues that the opportunity exists now for the regional powers to turn to cooperative security measures in order to lend stability to this historically unstable area. This cooperation, he believes, will go far in allaying fears of China’s growing power-projection capability and Japan’s acceptance of its growing regional security role. Cooperative security measures will also help in resolving resource and fisheries claims that threaten to erupt into open hostilities. By providing a vehicle for dialogue, cooperative security may serve as an acceptable alternative in the absence of any other formal institutional structure to manage growing disputes.

Kim’s first three chapters make an excellent summary of the overarching maritime political and strategic concerns that undergird naval strategy in the region. Kim follows with chapters that describe U.S., Russian, and Japanese maritime strategies and concerns, and he concludes by showing how trying to amalgamate these diverse interests can be greatly eased by U.S. and Northeast Asian cooperative approaches on bilateral, regional, and international levels to provide stability through a framework of dialogue on peace and security.

As a naval officer intimately familiar with the region, Kim assesses the limitations of his proposals, such as Northeast Asian nations that are not yet ready for full-scale negotiations on reductions in naval forces. As these navies continue to grow, he sees a need for agreements to mitigate the inevitable high-seas misunderstandings. He also calls for more transparency through increased ship visits and high-level official exchanges, as well as cooperative development of offshore natural resources. As a further preventive measure, Kim suggests rules governing fishery violations, to help avoid dustups over fishing rights.

Although an excellent background read, this book contains two flaws that, while they do not detract from the central theme or lessen its value as a resource, may disconcert the reader. First, although much of Kim’s work was completed before 1999, the copyright date is 2000. Thus in a number of places Kim refers to actions that should occur “by the next century,” or “by the year 2000.” Additionally, because of the dynamism of naval growth within Northeast Asia, much of the force structure he projects for the future already exists (e.g., the Luhai-class DDG alluded to on page 146).
joined the Chinese South Sea Fleet in January 1999, and a Sovremenny DDG entered the Chinese order of battle in early 2000). Second, Kim does not treat the Republic of Korea Navy as a major regional actor, leaving it conspicuously absent from his chapters on strategy and concerns about cooperative maritime security. This is a significant omission. Korea is a growing naval power with extensive regional concerns, and it is possibly the nation most likely to find itself in armed conflict across its borders. These gaps aside, this is a book worth having in a library on modern Asia. The extensive selected bibliography adds value to this work as a resource on Northeast Asian politico-military matters. It obviously should be required reading for those involved in Northeast Asian regional maritime issues, and it would also be of interest to anyone seeking to understand the unique problems of Northeast Asia and possible solutions to them.

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No figure of the Korean War looms quite so large as General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, simultaneously brilliant, arrogant, inscrutable, successful, and fallen—all the elements of a Greek tragedy. His military career, spanning the major portion of the twentieth century, also renders him appealing as a symbol of broader themes of that war and of American society. So we come to Stanley Weintraub’s MacArthur’s War, advertised on its dust jacket as a “fascinating, well rendered history of the general who refuses to fade away,” a book based on “extensive research in primary and secondary sources and laced with colorful anecdotes.” Unfortunately, the book is none of those things but rather a facile, cobbled-together mishmash of principally secondary sources, laced with myriad errors of chronology, fact, and interpretation—all poorly documented. When reading this book, one feels not unlike Vice Admiral James H. Doyle after reading a draft of a Korean War history sent to him in the late 1950s: “Your versions of the Inchon assault and Hungnam redeployment contain so many errors and distortions of fact and of emphasis that I am unable to assist you with my comment.” However, I would like to make note of a baker’s dozen of errors to provide specific evidence for my general assertions.

The author states on page 107 that the amphibious commander, Rear Admiral Doyle, “had been Richmond Kelly Turner’s operations officer in the final months of World War II.” In fact, Doyle served on Turner’s staff from August 1942 to March 1943; in the final months of the war, Doyle was commanding the cruiser Pasadena. These are not obscure facts but can readily be found both in George Dyer’s biography of Turner, The Amphibians Came to Conquer, and in Doyle’s official biography at the Naval Historical Center.

Weintraub writes that Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke explained to MacArthur the need to sail early for Inchon because of the typhoon season. “Although nearly a month remained before departure, the ship movement orders were issued immediately,” which would suggest that the conversation took place around 15 August. Burke was good, but probably...