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## Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces

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persuasive evidence of the current law. The United States does not agree with every provision in the manual, nor does any other state. Still, it is a fundamental source document that must be considered in any discussion of the law of naval warfare. As such, it is inexcusable of Detter not to cite it. Failing to do so detracts greatly from the text. Using the manual would have provided balance, and familiarity with it should have helped to avoid the errors described.

In Leslie Green's review of Detter's first edition, he concluded that "regrettably, it can hardly be said that Dr. Detter De Lupis' *Law of War* provides the reader with any real practical account of 'the body of rules which regulates relationships in war.'" Levie, after devastatingly recounting the representative errors and inaccuracies in the first edition, left to the reader to judge "whether [these errors] are important or unimportant, could a political leader or a military commander accept and rely on advice based upon this volume as authority?" Unfortunately, the passage of more than ten years and the addition of new information do not warrant improving these two assessments of Detter's *The Law of War*. Like the first edition, the second is not a very useful book if one is looking for a basic understanding of the law of war, nor is it helpful in advancing the development of that law.

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Podvig, Pavel, ed. *Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001. 692pp. \$45

This comprehensive encyclopedia of all Russian (and Soviet) nuclear weapons systems deserves attention not only because all earlier versions were confiscated by the Russian Security Service (FSB) but because it is a complete and authoritative chronology of the weapons, warheads, and delivery systems that enabled the Soviet Union to achieve "superpower" status. Authored by Russian physicists and mathematicians using only unclassified data bases, the book tells the "official" story of how Soviet and Russian bureaucracies built the world's most fearsome nuclear arsenal from World War II until the mid-1990s.

Organized by function and military services, the story is easy to follow for a reader reasonably conversant with the systems and willing to plow through tables and specifications. The book's objective, clinical, and dispassionate treatment is both its strongest and weakest point. It presents all the facts. The data presented in the tables and notes probably could not have been fabricated at this level of detail. However, the book makes no judgments or any effort to place its contents in political context.

The chapter on the Soviet navy details how technology shaped strategy. The development of the R-29 sea-launched ballistic missile (Nato's SS-N-8) and the Project 667B (Nato's Delta I) submarine put the Soviet ballistic submarine force within range of its American targets while remaining in the "bastions" of the ice-covered regions of the Arctic, thus obviating the need for the "Yankee patrols" (by Yankee-type submarines carrying SS-N-6 missiles). With only one-third of the range of the SS-N-8, the SS-N-6 missile was a threat only when it was brought near the U.S. coast, where the submarine could be constantly

targeted by antisubmarine warfare forces. American naval strategists of this era can take satisfaction in having correctly postulated that the central purpose of the entire Soviet navy was to support the submerged missile forces, particularly the Deltas and their successors near the Soviet coasts.

The authors dispassionately and authoritatively document the eventual decay of the Soviet land-based and sea-based strategic nuclear edifice. Perhaps this is why the FSB has declared the book a work of espionage. In fact, one of its authors, Igor Sutyagin, was arrested and held on charges related to his research for the book. Yet it is cold comfort even for an American reader to note the degeneration of the Russian early-warning satellite system or the pollution hazard caused by the way in which the nuclear submarine fleet was deactivated.

The table on nuclear testing provides a keen insight into the mindset of the Soviet decision-making elite, as well as the efficacy of focused, centralized planning. The sheer size of the program and its reckless disregard for the environment persuasively show the political power of the Soviet nuclear-industrial complex. The hundred pages devoted to this program make clear its importance. Of particular note, the Soviets conducted 135 nuclear explosions for industrial or other “peaceful” purposes. In fact, the Lazurit explosion of 1974 moved enough earth to form a dam.

The authors offer no apologies for the huge building programs or for the Soviet Union’s unabashed desire to prevail in the Cold War arms race. While the book is not overtly political, one senses that the authors believe the governmental pronouncements justifying the building or destruction of each weapon. They

make numerous allusions to the Soviet desire to adhere to international agreements, and to American perfidy as forcing the Soviets to build all of this weaponry. There is sadness in the discussion of the demise of the Russian strategic program, brought about by the dire economic situation facing Russia and the loss of Soviet republics as newly independent states, and with them the Soviet test ranges.

Nonetheless, this book should not be read for its political message. It is a well referenced storehouse of knowledge on Soviet strategic systems, useful to researchers and historians alike. Against its own standards, it is a remarkable accomplishment.

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Lowenthal, Mark M. *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Quarterly, 1999. 264pp. \$28.95

Mark Lowenthal’s professed intent in writing this book was to fulfill the need for an introductory text for students of intelligence. He is well qualified to do so, having devoted more than twenty years in the executive and legislative branches of government as an intelligence official and as an adjunct professor in graduate programs at Columbia and George Washington Universities. (He is now the vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council for Evaluation.) The resulting work is much more than an introductory textbook; it is a trove of valuable information and insights ranging from the basic concepts and definitions of intelligence to a thorough examination of the intelligence process.