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## Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy

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targeted by antisubmarine warfare forces. American naval strategists of this era can take satisfaction in having correctly postulated that the central purpose of the entire Soviet navy was to support the submerged missile forces, particularly the Deltas and their successors near the Soviet coasts.

The authors dispassionately and authoritatively document the eventual decay of the Soviet land-based and sea-based strategic nuclear edifice. Perhaps this is why the FSB has declared the book a work of espionage. In fact, one of its authors, Igor Sutyagin, was arrested and held on charges related to his research for the book. Yet it is cold comfort even for an American reader to note the degeneration of the Russian early-warning satellite system or the pollution hazard caused by the way in which the nuclear submarine fleet was deactivated.

The table on nuclear testing provides a keen insight into the mindset of the Soviet decision-making elite, as well as the efficacy of focused, centralized planning. The sheer size of the program and its reckless disregard for the environment persuasively show the political power of the Soviet nuclear-industrial complex. The hundred pages devoted to this program make clear its importance. Of particular note, the Soviets conducted 135 nuclear explosions for industrial or other "peaceful" purposes. In fact, the Lazurit explosion of 1974 moved enough earth to form a dam.

The authors offer no apologies for the huge building programs or for the Soviet Union's unabashed desire to prevail in the Cold War arms race. While the book is not overtly political, one senses that the authors believe the governmental pronouncements justifying the building or destruction of each weapon. They

make numerous allusions to the Soviet desire to adhere to international agreements, and to American perfidy as forcing the Soviets to build all of this weaponry. There is sadness in the discussion of the demise of the Russian strategic program, brought about by the dire economic situation facing Russia and the loss of Soviet republics as newly independent states, and with them the Soviet test ranges.

Nonetheless, this book should not be read for its political message. It is a well referenced storehouse of knowledge on Soviet strategic systems, useful to researchers and historians alike. Against its own standards, it is a remarkable accomplishment.

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Lowenthal, Mark M. *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Quarterly, 1999. 264pp. \$28.95

Mark Lowenthal's professed intent in writing this book was to fulfill the need for an introductory text for students of intelligence. He is well qualified to do so, having devoted more than twenty years in the executive and legislative branches of government as an intelligence official and as an adjunct professor in graduate programs at Columbia and George Washington Universities. (He is now the vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council for Evaluation.) The resulting work is much more than an introductory textbook; it is a trove of valuable information and insights ranging from the basic concepts and definitions of intelligence to a thorough examination of the intelligence process.

Thus not only is this an excellent textbook on the basics of intelligence and ideal for a course in Intelligence 101, but it is also an interesting and informative examination of intelligence and national security disciplines, one that would be of interest and value to national security “old-timers.”

This book addresses the fundamental issue of what “intelligence” is and what it is not, and it offers a detailed examination of the processes involved in the practice of intelligence—collection disciplines, analysis, counterintelligence, covert action, the role of the policy maker, oversight and accountability, and the ethical and moral issues generated by intelligence practice. Lowenthal provides an abbreviated but enlightening history of the development of the U.S. intelligence community, as well as a summary of significant historical intelligence developments since the creation of the Coordinator of Information and the Office of Strategic Services during World War II. There is not only a helpful examination of the structure of the U.S. intelligence community (with the obligatory wiring diagrams) but also an interesting description of the relationships between and among the players in the community, including the important stakeholders in the budgetary process.

Throughout the book, Lowenthal has inserted sidebars containing brief descriptions and vignettes summarizing the more detailed material in the text; these add a certain panache to the work. He also discusses historical examples of intelligence successes and failures, to illustrate the various concepts and insights he has mentioned. At the end of each chapter Lowenthal lists “key terms” unique to the profession, as well as additional readings. He has also included the

key provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order 12333, and the Senate resolution that established the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; all these are helpful for ready reference.

Lowenthal provides an interesting and valuable examination of the “syndromes” that sometimes affect the analyst, resulting in a faulty analysis and product. Most interesting is the “mirror-imaging” syndrome, in which the analyst erroneously presumes that other states will act in the same way as the United States would—Pearl Harbor is a classic example. Throughout the book, Lowenthal emphasizes the importance of the role of the policy maker and the fact that the purpose of intelligence is to support the policy makers who run the government. He also notes the converse responsibility of policy makers to provide clear and unambiguous requirements to the intelligence community.

In his chapter on covert action, Lowenthal characterizes these activities as “something between the states of peace and war.” That may not be entirely accurate, since covert action may consist entirely of nonforcible measures. Nevertheless, his description of the covert-action process and his examination of the ethical issues that are raised in connection with it are right on the mark. However, one would have liked a bit more discussion on what *does not* constitute covert action. For example, section 503(e)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 exempts “traditional military activities” from the definition of covert action, while in the *Senate Report on the 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act*, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence went to some length to describe those activities, including “almost every use of uniformed military forces . . . whether or

not the U.S. sponsorship of such activities is apparent or later to be acknowledged publicly.” More along these lines would perhaps reveal that policy makers have quite a bit more flexibility in responding to overseas events and that covert action is not the only option between inaction and the overt use of force. But this is a mere quibble.

In sum, Lowenthal has written an outstanding primer on intelligence, the intelligence process, and the intelligence community.

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Lerner, Mitchell B., *The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy*. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 2002. 320pp. \$34.95

Finally, an author has done a hard-hitting analysis of the USS *Pueblo* incident of January 1968. Mitchell B. Lerner, an assistant professor of history at Ohio State University, does not exonerate the commanding officer of the *Pueblo*, Commander Lloyd M. Bucher, for giving up the ship and crew, and the intelligence it had gathered. However, of all those who may have been culpable, Commander Bucher emerges a hero and is no longer the scapegoat his superiors made him out to be. Exhaustive research, including access to new information released from the Lyndon Johnson White House files, leads Lerner to place blame evenly on the shoulders of the Navy chain of command, the intelligence community, and Johnson’s foreign policy advisors, due to their misunderstanding and underestimation of

the North Korean–Soviet Union relationship.

Lerner asserts that the intelligence collection effort, code-named Operation CLICKBEETLE, was the idea of the National Security Agency and that it had been patterned after the efforts of the Soviet Union’s intelligence-collection ships (AGIs) off the coast of the United States. Deciding that the Navy should be the operational commander for this strategic tasking, the National Security Agency turned the program over to it. Converting tired, old, and slow cargo ships into intelligence collection platforms with insufficient money, inadequate self-defense, little more than fresh coats of paint, minimal training, and inadequate safeguards for the sensitive intelligence equipment on board, the Navy mismanaged the effort from the outset. The maladies that befell the USS *Liberty* in 1967 off the coast of Israel were repeated in the preparation and tasking of *Pueblo* just seven months later off the Korean Peninsula.

The USS *Pueblo* had been tasked to collect signals intelligence in the Sea of Japan using the “cover” of conducting hydrographic research. The operation had been deemed to be of minimal risk, based on the analogy of the Soviet AGIs. Lerner contends that whenever an AGI violated territorial waters, the U.S. Navy would turn it around with an admonishment and no more. Would not the North Koreans do the same? Herein rested the Navy’s greatest miscalculation. The Koreans were not the puppets of the Soviet Union or its foreign policy executors. Lerner goes to great lengths to take the reader inside the mind of Kim Il Sung and his vision of communism and the greater glory of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.