What Deters? Strength, Not Weakness

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In the turbulent years following the great Allied victory in World War II, the policy agenda for U.S. leaders overflowed. Demobilizing millions of service-men and shifting the economy to a peacetime footing were among the vital orders of the day. Yet the Cold War was dawning, and the military services—including the newly constituted U.S. Air Force—were maneuvering for position. An entirely new strategy had to be crafted in the wake of victory and for what was to be called the “atomic age.” Scientists, military leaders, academics, civilian analysts, and politicians lined up to offer their theories about the proper place of atomic weapons in the new strategies being proposed. Everyone was sailing into uncharted waters, without benefit of stars or reliable compasses.

One could argue today that with respect to nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy American leaders got it right, or mostly right. After all, there was no nuclear war, and after a bitter struggle the nation’s major competitor, the Soviet Union, disappeared from the scene. No doubt some excesses resulted from the competition between the superpowers, but they can be understood, even excused, when one reflects on the deep hostility that existed between the two systems. Secrecy and suspicion about intentions inflamed the relationship and motivated the competitors to seek security in large arsenals of weapons, especially nuclear weapons.

Now, in the post–Cold War world, American leaders find themselves looking again for navigational aids to guide them to safe waters. In “The Dilemma of Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-first Century,” Admiral Stansfield Turner has offered a chart and some sailing directions. Briefly, “The Dilemma” argues that:
Nuclear weapons are extraordinarily powerful, qualitatively different from conventional explosives;

An arms race caused the Soviet Union and the United States to acquire unnecessarily large inventories of nuclear weapons;

In any conceivable contingency, however effective nuclear weapons would be militarily, their use would be too risky;

No attempt at a first strike could ever destroy enough enemy weapons to prevent retaliation, the results of which would be unacceptable, since the United States is deterred from a nuclear attack by the prospect of even a single nuclear detonation on its soil, and other states are undoubtedly deterred by the same considerations;

There are too many nuclear weapons in the world—reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals promised by START II to 3,500 warheads are not deep enough and are too slow in any case;

"Strategic escrow"—removing ICBM warheads and storing them not less than three hundred miles from their launchers—should be initiated unilaterally by the United States, an action that in this view the Russians would be obliged to reciprocate;

In four to five years Russia and the United States would have only about a thousand warheads in strategic escrow;

The other six nuclear powers would then be invited to join a condominium in which each would place in escrow all of its nuclear weapons, no more than two hundred per country, under an international inspection regime;

The result would be a very stable world, in which the probability of surprise nuclear attack would be zero, nuclear proliferation would be discouraged, and momentum toward arms control would be restored.

The pivotal concept in this scheme is “existential deterrence.” The approach and the term were coined almost twenty years ago by McGeorge Bundy, who argued that so long as one maintained the ability to deliver a nuclear retaliatory response to an attack, deterrence would succeed. The mere existence of a response, which would inevitably cause unacceptable damage to the aggressor’s homeland, would deter nuclear attack. The proposition was attractive: it implied that deterrence was stable and that it could be ensured by small nuclear forces.

The enormous power of nuclear weapons, setting them qualitatively apart from other weapons, made existential deterrence possible. The vast uncertainties of system reliabilities, accuracy, survivability, and strategies such as “launch
on warning” shored up convictions on all sides that at least one retaliatory weapon would detonate on the aggressor’s soil. No prospective attacking nation could believe that its nuclear-armed adversary could be totally disarmed as the result of a first strike; some small number of retaliatory weapons would reach their targets—and the prospect of horrendous consequences would suffice to deter.

In his review (entitled “I Exist, Therefore I Deter”) of Bundy’s argument, Lawrence Freedman called the argument “immensely seductive,” in that “forces are to be judged by essentially negative criteria: they should not be vulnerable, provocative, disruptive of arms control, or prone to accidental detonation. So long as these criteria are met it does not matter what is procured, where and in what numbers it is deployed, and against what it is targeted.” But are such criteria—and the argument that is founded on them—valid?

If, indeed, nuclear-armed adversaries believe that a single nuclear detonation on their territory would negate any possible strategic objectives they might have, the logic of existential deterrence is persuasive. Bundy’s “Existential Deterrence” and the central theme of “The Dilemma,” however, contain five severe, even debilitating flaws: if its key assumption is wrong, this brand of deterrence could fail catastrophically; the possibility of the United States extending deterrence to its friends, allies, and those at risk of nuclear coercion would be nullified; the prospects of the use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. and allied forces would increase; it not only weakens nuclear deterrence but encourages the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and if increased national security is the objective of the scheme, the proposal, by focusing on weapons—one of the means of warfare—addresses the wrong issue.

First, then, the question must be asked: What if the key assumption is incorrect? While the prospect of “five or ten” nuclear explosions on its territory might well suffice to deter the United States, what if adversaries have different perceptions and dissimilar thresholds of pain?

The central premise of “The Dilemma” is rooted in unabashed mirror-imaging: “I believe A; you are a rational person, so you must also believe A. The logic is so strong that I require no evidence on which to base my conclusion.” This is a curious approach from the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency. It claims that in order to infer the intentions of others, one need look no farther than one’s own. If that were true, why would the United States need the CIA, or
for that matter, any intelligence agency? If one can mirror-image in this, the most vital of circumstances, with national survival at stake, why not in all lesser cases?

The historical record indicates that belligerent states have often been able to absorb great amounts of punishment. The premise of existential deterrence is that attacks with nuclear weapons will be deterred confidently by the prospect of a small retaliatory response. But how does that square with the ability of Germany and Japan to fight on through devastating aerial bombardment in the Second World War? States have withstood levels of destruction approaching those claimed to underwrite mutual assured destruction, which “The Dilemma” cites as “something like 40 percent of the Soviet Union’s industrial capacity and 25 percent of its population.” Indeed, by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, the fledgling Soviet Union lost “34 per cent of her population, 32 per cent of her agricultural land, 54 per cent of her industry, and 89 per cent of her coal mines.” 3 In a more recent example, “UNICEF indicates that at least 300,000 Iraqi children have died from illness, hunger, and disease as a result of the sanctions imposed after the Gulf War. . . . [O]ther sources go as high as 1.5 million Iraqis.” 4 This carnage has resulted from Saddam Hussein’s intransigence in refusing to comply with UN Security Council resolutions; it is totally avoidable. Given these reports, can one have high confidence that the prospect of a small number of nuclear detonations on Iraqi soil would be sufficient to deter Saddam, or others like him, from a nuclear attack? Do the statements of Muammar Qadhafi—“If we had possessed . . . missiles that could reach New York—we would have hit at the same moment [of the 1986 U.S. raid on Libya]. Consequently, we should build this force so that they and others will no longer think about an attack”—indicate that he would be deterred? 5 Does North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles to deliver them argue that Kim Jong-il would be deterred from using them by the prospect of a nuclear detonation on North Korean soil?

We cannot possibly know the answer to these questions. We know that potential adversaries are pursuing nuclear weapons and long-range delivery means. We know also that nuclear deterrence has not failed—but that does not mean it cannot. It might be true that “I Exist, Therefore I Deter”; but it might not. The risks are of the greatest magnitude, however, and so are the possible consequences. Existential deterrence is a prime example of a very risky and dangerous approach to nuclear deterrence—for if it fails, it fails catastrophically.

One can agree that the detonation of a few nuclear weapons on American soil would be the greatest disaster this country has ever experienced without taking the leap of faith that one’s adversaries or potential adversaries would have the same attitude. With no confirming evidence, believers in existential deterrence project their beliefs and fears on others, reaching the conclusion that all must
reason similarly. One is free to wonder, though, why the large risks involved should be deliberately assumed.

During the 1960s and early 1970s, at the high point of the superpower nuclear arsenals, the United States measured “how much was enough” by the rubber ruler of “assured destruction.” The assured-destruction criterion was that nuclear forces had to be large and robust enough to hold a specified, significant fraction of Soviet population and industry at risk in a retaliatory strike—that is, after having absorbed a Soviet first strike. Yet the point continued to be reinforced that the enemy’s prospect of certain loss had to be high if deterrence was to be reliable.

Moreover, deterrence is strengthened by availability. Would a prospective robber be more likely deterred by a gun pointed at him or by one upstairs in a dresser drawer? As Sir Michael Quinlan counsels, “Weapons deter by the possibility of their use, and by no other route.”

Small numbers invite malefactors to find ways to nullify them. In the case of nuclear escrow, the small number of warheads would be in known locations, because they would have to be monitored. It does not take a great amount of imagination to think of ways to nullify small numbers of unusable warheads at known locations, and the payoff from doing so would be very high; the temptation to acquire the capability to negate the escrowed weapons (or their owners’ ability to unite them with their delivery vehicles) could be irresistible.

In the final analysis, “a hundred weapons are not far more acceptable politically, more virtuous morally, safer, more stable in security terms, or even necessarily many times less expensive than, say, a thousand.” The difference between the approach taken by “The Dilemma” and one arguing that deterrent weapons must be usable and numerous is that the former is based on an assumption that deterrence cannot fail, and the latter on an assumption that it can. The prudent course is clearly not the one suggested by “The Dilemma.”

The second key criticism of an embrace of existential deterrence is that it contains no provision for extending deterrence. Since the middle of the twentieth century the United States has provided a nuclear shield to its allies. Nato and the Pacific allies (South Korea, Australia, and Japan, for example) have been the clear beneficiaries of this policy. Further—and in direct contradiction of the claim of “The Dilemma” that extended deterrence was “never a military strategy but a budgetary one”—the United States provided the ultimate earnest of its commitment to its allies: U.S. service members stationed forward. Unless one is prepared cynically to insist that the U.S. fighting forces, hundreds of thousands strong, stationed in allied countries were merely sacrificial tokens rather than...
couplings to the American strategic nuclear capability, one must consider that extended deterrence was a genuine commitment on the part of the United States to the defense of its allies. In the arrangement espoused by “The Dilemma,” where nuclear arsenals would be held in escrow and could be used only in retaliation for a direct attack on one’s home territory, extended deterrence could not function.

The third criticism asserts that if all nuclear weapons are placed in escrow, adversaries will be strongly tempted to use not only nuclear weapons but chemical, biological, or perhaps radiological weapons against U.S. forces in case of conflict. Given that American conventional forces are superior to all others in the world and that the nation appears to intend to preserve that superiority in the future, those who would engage U.S. forces militarily will be obliged to seek leverage in asymmetric ways, to level the battlespace. One such asymmetric method would be to employ varieties of weapons of mass destruction. With nuclear weapons in escrow and unusable except in the most severe exigencies, and having already foresworn possession or use of chemical and biological weapons, the United States would have only conventional weapons with which to respond to such attacks. Because the single data point on the subject—the restraint of Saddam Hussein in not using chemical weapons in DESERT STORM—suggests the value of nuclear weapons in deterring attacks by weapons of mass destruction, to relinquish all weapons of mass destruction would be to declare “open season” for their use against the U.S. military.

In the fourth place, the argument of “The Dilemma” stands both the evidence and the logic of proliferation on its head. The claim is that “if the two nuclear superpowers continue to need tens of thousands of nuclear warheads, other nations of the world will say they need them as well.” There is, however, no evidence to support such an assertion. When the Israeli Air Force attacked Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981, it was not because Iraq was attempting to obtain nuclear weapons to match those of the superpowers. Nuclear proliferation to India, Pakistan, South Africa, and presumably to Israel cannot be attributed to that cause either.

What the evidence shows instead is that “other nations” argue vigorously not for large nuclear arsenals of their own but for the nuclear states to effect reductions in their stockpiles. Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty entreats all states to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to pursue nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” In compliance with this obligation, the United States reduced its inventory of nuclear weapons by more than half during the 1990s.
If a potential acquirer of nuclear weapons scans the strategic horizon and sees super-states, with arsenals of nuclear weapons numbering in the thousands, offering security assurances to those who refrain from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, the aspirant may well be discouraged from developing or obtaining its own weapons. If, on the other hand, the numbers involved are in the hundreds, the ante to join the nuclear club is low, and even parity is achievable. If, moreover, the means of retaliation are locked up in escrow rather than immediately available, an adversary might look very differently on the value of acquiring nuclear weapons. In such an instance an opportunity—and therefore the temptation—to change the strategic balance decisively would have been created where none existed before. Thus, logic would indicate that rather than dampen proliferation, the proposed reductions in nuclear arsenals to very low levels would stimulate proliferation. Indeed, low levels of warheads could trigger clandestine programs and cheating, because of both the ease in attaining competitive numbers and the anticipated leverage that would be attained. Unlike legitimate weapons held openly in escrow, illegitimate covert weapons would be usable.

Moreover, since escrow deliberately retards retaliation, an aggressor might reason that either the condominium would significantly delay, if not prevent, the removal of weapons from escrow, or indeed, that retaliation could be forestalled altogether. If Russia and China had all their weapons in escrow, for example, would they consent to allow the United States to remove some or all of its weapons for use? Could they be certain that the United States was not scheming to coerce them with the now usable weapons? Would they not insist on removing their own weapons also, thereby precipitating a most deadly crisis? Even if consent were forthcoming, an adversary might believe that the time it would take the United States to bring the weapons to usable condition might offer time for negotiation—that it could negotiate something less than a nuclear retaliatory response. Given these considerations and the absence of extended deterrence noted earlier, proliferation would look a lot more attractive than it does currently, or would even under any official approach toward the ultimate size and disposition of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

Fifth and finally, “The Dilemma,” like many arms control proposals, is focused sharply on nuclear weapons. It laments the facts that nuclear weapons are so powerful and that there are so many of them in the world. Acknowledging that impressive strides have been taken to reduce nuclear arsenals, “The Dilemma”...
nevertheless conveys impatience at the tempo of reductions and offers a scheme to render them more safe while reducing their numbers dramatically.

It emphasizes—and demonizes—the weapons. It renders nuclear yields, for example, in terms not of kilotons, which is the convention, but of pounds of TNT equivalent. The twelve-kiloton Hiroshima bomb is presented as having yielded twenty-five million pounds of TNT equivalent. A similar rhetorical device is used to make numbers of weapons appear shocking. The figure of 32,500 “nuclear warheads” in the year 1969 is juxtaposed against “less than two hundred cities with populations of more than a hundred thousand in the Soviet Union.” But clearly the majority of those warheads were not designed for use against Soviet cities, nor could they have been so employed—atomic mines, antisubmarine and antiair weapons, and artillery shells come to mind.

Ultimately, however, as Colin Gray reminds us, it is not weapons but who owns them that matters: “Clear military advantage on the side of order is a force for peace. . . . For an extreme example, an Iraqi ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] force would not be the same as the U.S. ICBM force, no matter how similar the two forces might be in their technical characteristics and standard practices of operation.”11 To which point George Will adds: “Arms control as its believers envision it—agreements making the world safer by limiting technology—rests on the notion that the threat to peace is technological, not political, that the threat is the nature of particular weapons, not of particular regimes.”12

Winston Churchill appreciated the point also; he “unhesitatingly endorsed the Western monopoly of the atomic bomb, emphasizing his opposition to entrusting U.S. and British knowledge of its secrets to the UN. ‘It would be criminal madness to cast it adrift in this still agitated and un-united world,’ he warned. No country had slept less well because the secrets of the bomb were held in American hands, but this would not have been the case had ‘some Communist or neo-Fascist state monopolised for the time being these dread agencies.’”13

The focus on nuclear weapons, the means, devalues the more important questions: the objectives for which conflict is waged—the ends; and how conflicts are conducted—the ways. Nuclear weapons are not the enemy. By making them the enemy, the United States weakens itself vis-à-vis its real and prospective adversaries.

Ultimately, then, “The Dilemma” counsels an approach based on weakness, not strength. Responsible U.S. leaders have been very consistent on the point. President John F. Kennedy warned in his 1961 inaugural address, “We dare not tempt them with weakness. For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed.”14 His caution was echoed forty years later in the remarks of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld at his initial news briefing: “A strong military does not guarantee peace and stability in the world, but we know that the opposite is true—that weakness is
provocative, that it does invite and entice people into doing things they would otherwise avoid, and our task is to see that we fashion deterrence to fit in this new national security environment." In sharp contrast, “The Dilemma” asks that the United States: forgo its strategy of deterrence based on the expectation of prompt, severe retaliation; abandon its policy of extended deterrence; and instead accept high risks, even in effect tempting the use of weapons of mass destruction against its military, or even its homeland.

Still, despite the weakness and risk that must be assumed in moving toward a nuclear posture advocated in “The Dilemma,” one can agree that the detonation of a single nuclear warhead on American soil would be a catastrophe of the greatest magnitude. For a variety of reasons, that is a possibility today, and its probability is increasing with the passage of time. Even with large, ready nuclear forces, deterrence can fail. It would be the height of irresponsibility to believe, and to act on the belief, that deterrence cannot fail.

The detonation of a single nuclear warhead on U.S. soil would constitute an event from which the United States might never recover. The loss of confidence by the citizenry in the ability of the U.S. Department of Defense to protect them would be incalculable. The bond of trust that, at the most elementary level, the people will be kept secure would be sundered. What subsequent action could redress such a betrayal? A retaliatory attack that murdered thousands of innocents in the country of the aggressor might be delivered, to deter additional attacks from the original perpetrator or others watching the drama unfold. Even that, however, would be both unsatisfying and of highly questionable morality.

If the detonation of a single weapon on American territory, then, is truly unacceptable, the appropriate strategic response is not to shrink the U.S. nuclear arsenal and place it in unusable escrow. A better risk-reducing solution is to construct defenses against nuclear attack.

Today, arms control is preventing the United States both from reducing its strategic nuclear arsenal to levels that it would prefer (the START process) and from obtaining effective defenses (the ABM Treaty). In each instance, arms control gives Russia a veto on decisions of greatest import to U.S. security. An approach preferable to that presented in “The Dilemma” might be to withdraw from the START II Treaty and the ABM Treaty—bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union, a country that no longer exists. This could be done without abrogating either treaty; withdrawal is provided for in both instruments, and to take advantage of those clauses is to abide by the treaties’ provisions. In any case, arms control exists to control adversarial competition in weaponry. Russia and the United States.
States today are not adversaries. President George W. Bush put it straightforwardly in 2000, as a candidate: “Russia itself is no longer our enemy. The cold war logic that led to the creation of massive stockpiles on both sides is now outdated. Our mutual security need no longer depend on a nuclear balance of terror.” Therefore, arms control between the two countries is unnecessary and irrelevant. Each should be free to pursue its own strategic agenda.

The United States does not owe Russia, China, or any other country an unopposed opportunity to kill its citizens. Arguments claiming that missile defenses “threaten” the deterrents of other states must be rebutted in plain language: such defenses threaten only the ability of others to kill U.S. citizens in large numbers by means of ballistic missile attack. An argument that missile defenses threaten the deterrent capabilities of other states must be accompanied by some sense of what actions by the United States those deterrents are seeking to forestall. In other words, why does China or Russia require the unchallenged ability to exterminate American citizens in their homes? Why should the United States specifically grant such a capability? As Henry Kissinger has argued, “Deliberate vulnerability, when technology is available to avoid it, cannot be a strategic objective, cannot be a political objective, and cannot be a moral objective of any American president.”

A perfect “Astrodome” defense—an impermeable “roof”—is unnecessary. It is at the same time the wrong policy objective and the straw-man target of critics. Instead, by significantly complicating the strategic calculus, defenses offer important benefits regardless of how well they might actually perform. This is true because any adversary contemplating attacking in the face of missile defenses is obliged to believe they will work, and work well. The credibility of American defenses would be underwritten by the military and technological power of the United States. What prospective attacker would consider a defensive system built by the United States and confidently tell itself, “The U.S. defense is junk, our warheads will penetrate it”?

The U.S. strategic approach should be to reduce its inventory of strategic offensive weapons to levels that would ensure a strong, secure strategic reserve against any prospective threat, and to construct a national missile defense on a priority basis. The missile defense would seek to limit damage in the event of the failure of deterrence and to protect the United States actively against nuclear blackmail, as well as against accidental or unauthorized attack. President Bush addressed both sides of the equation in a speech on 1 May 2001: “We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today’s world. . . . I am committed to achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest-possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs.”
In summary, rather than take the high-risk course that leads to extremely deep reductions and nuclear escrow, the United States would be far better off to maintain a secure, capable strategic reserve and construct missile defenses to protect its people. The nation needs a “shield of dreams,” as Senator Joseph Biden has derisively called it.19 With a defense in place against ballistic missile attack, no challenger would be tempted to attack. Shield of dreams? That’s right: “Build it and they won’t come.”

NOTES

8. Ibid., p. 54.
9. As Robert Jervis has written, “Many analysts believe . . . that allies cannot be sheltered under the nuclear umbrella and that ‘extended deterrence’ is a fiction. As I have argued elsewhere, however, both logic and the historical record indicate that this position is not true.” See his “The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?” International Security, Winter 1991–92, p. 48.
10. Regarding Iraqi restraint, “In a variety of ways, including a direct meeting with Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi foreign minister, the American secretary of state, James A. Baker, warned Saddam Hussein that the use of chemical or biological weapons against allied forces would be met by ‘the most severe consequences.’ The Iraqis did not use these weapons and later said they understood the American warning to mean a nuclear response,” Michael Oreskes, “Troubling the Waters of Nuclear Deterrence,” New York Times, 4 June 2000, p. IV-3. Keith B. Payne put it this way: “The evidence that nuclear deterrence was necessary to deter the Iraqi use of chemical weapons during the Gulf War is not trivial. . . . Tariq Aziz has stated that
Iraq was deterred from using its weapons of mass destruction during the war because Saddam Hussein interpreted Washington’s various threats of grievous retaliation as meaning nuclear retaliation.”


13. Quoted in Spencer Warren, “Churchill’s Realism: Reflections on the Fulton Speech,” National Interest, Winter 1995/96, p. 48. Cf.: “There is no real security in being just as strong as a potential enemy; there is security only in being a little stronger. There is no possibility of action if one’s strength is fully checked; there is a chance for a positive foreign policy only if there is a margin of force which can be freely used.” Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (1942; repr. Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1970), p. 21.


19. Quoted in Robin Wright, “Powell Puts U.S. on Pedestal, Observers Say,” Los Angeles Times, 28 January 2001, p. 4. The allusion is to the 1989 Universal movie Field of Dreams, in which the main character is mysteriously urged by a disembodied voice to construct a baseball field on his property: “If you build it, they will come.”