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Jolly Roger with an Uzi: The Rise and Threat of Modern Piracy

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Recommended Citation
Jolly Roger with an Uzi is an easy, quick, and interesting read. Despite its relatively short length, it is a comprehensive examination of modern piracy. The authors’ arguments and logic are strongly supported with facts and analysis, making their book a work of substance. Jack Gottschalk and Brian Flanagan, with Lawrence Kahn and David LaRochelle, do an excellent job of putting modern-day piracy into historical, legal, and economic perspectives.

They begin by looking at the evolution of piracy through the ages and the socio-economic and political factors that have contributed and continue to contribute to its existence. In chapter 2 the authors lay out the legal considerations and framework for the differing thoughts on what constitutes piracy. Using the United Nations 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, the authors examine the international legal definition of piracy, as well as such criminal acts as larceny and robbery. The authors point out that piracy, by definition and by its very nature, has always been a crime for economic gain and, like other serious crime, often results in acts of violence.

One of the main points of this book is that regardless of legal definition, modern-day piracy has broadened its associated threats to include organized criminal activities, drug smuggling, potential environmental disaster, and common theft, as well as fraud. The heart of the authors’ analysis is contained in a regional look at piracy over the last three decades. Focusing on Europe, the Americas, Africa, and South-east Asia, Gottschalk and Flanagan bring the reader up to date on modern piracy. The authors establish a clear picture of the extent and nature of contemporary piracy by summarizing reports by region and country. Building on these data, the authors discuss the economic factors that influence the actions of governments and the maritime industry to counter piracy. This analysis is based on an easy-to-follow logic that looks at piracy’s impact on legitimate maritime trade from three points of view: those of merchants who use ocean transport, the shipping companies, and the insurance companies. The authors build a strong and credible case that, despite the significant increase in both frequency and violence, current economic losses due to piracy fail to outweigh the apparent costs of significantly lessening or stopping piracy, and so it continues. The authors conclude the issues and analysis portion of their book by discussing the potential for environmental disasters stemming from acts of piracy, and the differences between piracy and terrorism. In their “Solutions” chapter, the authors conduct a probing exploration of the challenges faced in putting an end to a criminal activity that has been around since the beginning of maritime trade. Their ultimate conclusion is that maritime trade, the target of piracy, is truly global and that therefore deterring or stopping piracy will require the cooperation of the international community of nations and the world’s maritime industry.

The authors are to be commended. Collectively they have a wealth of professional expertise and experience in the maritime arena. Their treatment of “the rise and threat of modern piracy” provides an updated foundation from which to seek solutions to this growing problem of maritime security.
international in nature, piracy, if left unchecked, will eventually provide the catalyst for future international crises and conflicts. This is a worthwhile read for anyone who is interested in or responsible for maritime security.

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Indian officers have written remarkably little about nuclear strategy in the more than quarter-century since India first demonstrated its ability to produce nuclear weapons. The cloak of secrecy that has traditionally surrounded India’s nuclear program, New Delhi’s declared policy of maintaining a nonweaponized nuclear stockpile, and a lack of interest in nuclear issues on the part of the Indian officer corps stifled discussion of nuclear issues. It is notable that the two most comprehensive accounts of India’s nuclear and missile programs written to date—George Perkovich’s *India’s Nuclear Bomb* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1999) and Raj Chengappa’s *Weapons of Peace* (New Delhi: HarperCollins India, 2000)—were written by an American scholar and an Indian journalist, respectively. India and Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear weapon tests changed all that, bringing New Delhi’s nuclear program into the open and triggering a new wave of thinking and writing about nuclear strategy. Raja Menon’s *A Nuclear Strategy for India* represents one of the first serious attempts by an Indian officer to address the doctrinal and force posture issues arising from India’s decision to go nuclear. The author, a naval officer who retired in 1994 as Assistant Chief of the Indian Naval Staff for Operations, is well qualified to write on this subject.

Menon begins by reviewing the history of New Delhi’s nuclear program and the development, such as it is, of Indian nuclear strategy. He is sharply critical of the Indian government and armed forces’ traditional approach toward nuclear weapons. He argues that decisions on nuclear weapons have been fueled by a mixture of political rhetoric and organizational politics but have occurred in a strategic vacuum. The secrecy that has always surrounded the Indian nuclear weapon program has prevented a dialogue between the political leadership, the military, and defense scientists on strategy and force posture issues. He argues that rational analysis, not emotion, should guide Indian nuclear policy.

The remainder of the book offers just such an analysis. Menon begins by giving the reader a primer on nuclear strategy, one that borrows heavily from U.S. literature on nuclear deterrence of the 1970s and 1980s. One wonders just how applicable this literature was to the problems the United States faced during the Cold War, let alone those India may face in the twenty-first century. Clearly, Indian thinking about nuclear weapons is still in its infancy.

Menon’s prescriptions for India make up the most interesting part of the book. While commentators in the United States have tended to focus on the Indo-Pakistani nuclear rivalry, the author makes it clear that it is China’s nuclear and missile programs that drive New Delhi’s force posture. He is particularly concerned that a modernized Chinese nuclear arsenal carried atop highly accurate missiles will render fixed targets in