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America's Overseas Garrisons: The Leasehold Empire

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of Defence, dealing with issues at the strategic level, exposed him to the ill-defined world of negotiation and compromise and to the requirement to balance the myriad of interests between politics, the defence industry, the research lobby, academia, and the military itself. Here, Hill's greater depth and increased granularity of analysis provide a far better insight to the man, who wrestled with the introduction of Trident as Britain's strategic deterrent, and with the reorganization of the highest levels of defence to establish the primacy of the Chief of the Defence Staff over the service chiefs. Lewin's open mind, calm and modern style of leadership, and determination to deliver a viable and flexible defence for the United Kingdom of 2020 made him unique amongst his peers and still marks him out as an inspiration for all today. His vision of the establishment of a genuinely joint-service culture and of a balanced fleet that is fully interoperable with the Army and Royal Air Force and has a global reach, with a resulting capability to act as a force for good on the international stage, still exists today and continues to be refined in an uncertain world. With the Quadrennial Defense Review in progress, the latter half of the biography will especially appeal to most of this journal's readership. It will be of real value to Naval War College students only a few years removed from their first assignment to the Department of Defense in Washington. Having gone myself straight from frigate command and the U.S. Naval War College to the Ministry of Defence for the first time—to face the Strategic Defence Review (our QDR)—I would have found Hill's insight into Lewin's match-winning formula an extremely useful preparation. Notwithstanding the time lapse and slight cultural

differences, the frenetic activity and the importance of networking skills and integrity are the same in the Ministry of Defence and the Department of Defense, and the wheels of progress still move quite slowly in both London and Washington.

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Sandars, C. T. *America's Overseas Garrisons: The Leasehold Empire*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000. 345pp. \$65

Christopher Sandars, a career civil servant at the British Ministry of Defence, has written a concise and judicious account, based on published sources, of the unique global security system developed by the United States in the years after World War II. Convinced that this American system was neither a traditional empire nor an attempt to gain worldwide hegemony, he describes it as a "leasehold empire," a novel security system necessitated by America's anticolonial tradition and by the surge of postwar nationalism, in which the United States negotiated a series of base agreements with largely sovereign states. His study traces the development of this system and the enormous variety within it, ranging from colonial relationships with Guam, Hawaii, Panama, and the Philippines to basing rights by virtue of conquest in Germany, Italy, Japan, and South Korea, to the revival of wartime arrangements in Great Britain, and to the acquisition of heavily circumscribed rights in some Middle Eastern nations.

In dealing with these categories, Sandars provides a brief history of America's

political relationship with each nation, a detailed account of the bases acquired, a shrewd analysis of the various quarrels that emerged, and a careful description of the changes that occurred over the fifty years covered by this book. With some nations, such as Japan, the security relationship displayed a remarkable continuity, while in others, such as Panama and the Philippines, growing nationalist tensions forced the United States eventually to close its bases. America's relationships with Greece, Spain, and Turkey, new allies in the Mediterranean, were always filled with difficulties, while the United States was never able to obtain access to permanent bases in the Middle East. In this area of the world it had to rely on mobile forces and the repositioning of military equipment.

By the mid-1980s America's leasehold empire was under serious strain, beset by nationalist pressures and by what some scholars described as imperial overreach. Sandars believes that critics like Paul Kennedy overemphasized the gap between American resources and obligations, and failed to anticipate the end of the Cold War, the revival of the American economy in the 1990s, and the agility with which the United States adjusted to the new international environment and redefined its informal empire. Between 1989 and 1995 the number of U.S. troops permanently based overseas fell over 50 percent, from 510,000 to 238,000.

Sandars speculates that America's leasehold empire will last, on a reduced scale, far into the new century. "After a long period of mismatch," he writes, "the demands of the U.S. global security system and the resources to sustain it are now back in equilibrium." He is convinced that the benefits of this worldwide system of military bases far outweigh the costs,

and he praises the accomplishments of American foreign policy in the second half of the twentieth century. The United States, he concludes, "has emerged with credit and honor from this unique experiment of policing the world, not by imposing garrisons on occupied territory, but by agreement with her friends and allies."

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Sarantakes, Nicholas Evan. *Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations*. College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2000. 264pp. \$34.95

In the after-action report on the U.S. occupation of the Rhineland following World War I, Colonel I. L. Hunt wrote, "The history of the United States offers an uninterrupted series of wars, which demanded as their aftermath, the exercise by its officers of civil government functions." "Despite the[se] precedents," he lamented, "the lesson seemingly has not been learned." The military returned to this tradition of forgetting after World War II. Subsequent to that second global conflict, U.S. forces assumed responsibility for over two hundred million people in occupation zones in Asia and Europe at a cost of over a billion dollars a year, yet official military histories barely touch the topic. Texas A&M University professor Nicholas Evan Sarantakes steps in to fill part of the void with a thought-provoking case study of the American occupation of Okinawa from 1945 to the island's formal return to Japanese sovereignty in 1972. Sarantakes's thesis is that bureaucratic infighting shaped the course of the occupation as much as did national