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## Book Reviews

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# BOOK REVIEWS

## Master Theory of the Causes of War

Van Evera, Stephen. *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1999. 270pp. \$35

**S**TEPHEN VAN EVERA, AN ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, claims to offer a “master theory” explaining the causes of war. He also seeks to provide policy prescriptions to show soldiers and statesmen how to make conflict less likely. It is a lofty aim, but the book falls far short of its mark.

*Causes of War* is a revision of part of a fifteen-year-old dissertation that must rank among the most widely cited unpublished works in history. It is a work of social science in which Van Evera takes great care to observe all the methodological conventions of the field. The resulting volume is thus of greater interest to students and professors than to soldiers and statesmen. It is, at its core, a book about formulating and testing hypotheses. It is organized around five hypotheses: (1) “war is more likely when states fall prey to false optimism about its outcome,” (2) “war is more likely when the advantage lies with the first side to mobilize or attack,” (3) “war is more likely when the relative power of states fluctuates sharply,” (4) “war is more likely when the control of resources enables the protection or acquisition of other resources,” and (5) “war is more likely when conquest is easy.”

Van Evera devotes the first four chapters to his first four hypotheses. These chapters collectively offer a useful survey of how power, and perceptions of it, can create incentives for war. At times, however, the book’s search for a “master theory” clashes with the demands of careful scholarship. In some cases, Van Evera cites evidence that

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supports his hypotheses while omitting equally persuasive facts contradicting them. Elsewhere, he draws upon ambiguous or contradictory cases, and he frequently makes assertions without corroboration. He claims, for example, that while striking first rarely confers a battlefield advantage, leaders often operate under the illusion that it does. He offers no basis for this conclusion but merely lists cases that he believes support it. Moreover, the cases he examines in depth—World War I, China's entry into the Korean War, and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War—are at best ambiguous with respect to this issue.

The heart of the book examines the hypothesis that war is more likely when conquest is easy—in other words, when the offense is at a marked advantage. Van Evera argues that his formulation of offense-defense theory offers the master key that unlocks the causes of war. It is, however, little more than a reread of models that grew during the Cold War out of nuclear deterrence theory and the study of the origins of World War I. There is scant evidence that statesmen actually decide to start wars because of a perceived offensive advantage. There is one possible exception, World War I, and Van Evera milks it for all it is worth. There is, however, something methodologically suspect about using a case to prove a theory that grew out of a study of that very case.

Thucydides believed that states go to war for reasons of fear, honor, and self-interest. Van Evera apparently dismisses the third explanation; it appears nowhere in his hypotheses. Implicit in the overall argument is the assumption that states can never use war as a rational instrument to achieve political objectives. In fact, however, throughout history statesmen have found war preferable to other outcomes, and not merely due to misperception.

The book's final chapter, which discusses nuclear strategy, is the weakest—indeed, it seems out of place. It is a polemic against ballistic missile defense, and one distinguished by assertion rather than argumentation. Whatever one's view of national missile defense, there are thoughtful cases to be made on both sides of the issue. These are entirely absent from this book. What appears instead is a regurgitation of Cold War views about nuclear deterrence, arguments that are by now worn and frayed.

Thomas G. Mahnken  
Naval War College

Sharp, W. Gary, Jr. *Jus Paciarrii: Emergent Legal Paradigms for U.N. Peace Operations in the 21st Century*. Stafford, Va.: Paciarrii International, 1999. 392pp. (no price given)

The recent conflict in former Yugoslavia provides an important vehicle for Gary Sharp as he explores the emergence of three international-law paradigms that will be critical to successful future humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Sharp is an international law scholar and retired Marine Corps judge advocate whose previous books include the highly regarded *UN Peace Operations* (1995) and *CyberSpace and the Use of Force* (1999). He carefully presents legal arguments and rational supporting paradigms that afford peacekeepers greater legal protection, impose an obligation on all states to search for and arrest war criminals, and grant the United Nations, states, and peacekeepers a greater range of legal authority to use armed force for humanitarian intervention.

To prove these paradigms, Sharp reviews in parts I and II existing international-law protections for all military forces, details the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations, and examines the state practice that has most changed the international community's attitude toward its peacekeepers. This section concludes that military forces serving under the UN Charter, Chapter VII

mandate—authorizing the use of “all necessary means”—should enjoy absolute immunity from any state against which the Security Council has directed coercive action. A draft protocol advocated by Sharp would, if accepted by the community of nations, protect all personnel who serve under the authority of the United Nations and make them unlawful targets under any circumstances.

In part III, Sharp examines the history of a state's obligation to search for and arrest suspected war criminals. Detailing the responsibility of states with respect to persons suspected of war crimes in Bosnia and Kosovo, he concludes that customary international law obliges all states to search for and arrest persons suspected of “grave breaches” in all territories in which they have been granted jurisdiction by international law.

Part IV is by far the most important, in the opinion of this reviewer. For the first time, a scholarly examination has been undertaken of the right of nations to intervene for humanitarian reasons when their own nationals are not at risk and no UN resolution authorizes military action. The determination by the United States to support a military response by Nato in Kosovo, despite the absence of the Security Council's approval, has been severely criticized in international legal circles as *ultra vires* (without

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authority). Carefully reviewing the key issue of whether Nato can exercise its regional prerogative under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (addressing the authority of regional organizations) and use all necessary means under Chapter VII without Security Council authorization, the author makes the case that state practice and customary international law have developed sufficiently to condone humanitarian intervention to prevent genocide and other widespread and arbitrary deprivation of human life in violation of international law. In Kosovo, moreover, the fear of the conflict's spreading into neighboring Nato states such as Hungary gave the alliance legal justification to use reasonable and proportional force in collective self-defense to contain the civil war within Serbia-Montenegro's borders. We may rightly conclude, with Sharp, that existing law and state practice permit a nation or a collective of states in a regional organization like Nato to use armed force to prevent genocide and other widespread abuses of human life within its regional boundaries, with or without Security Council authorization.

In this comprehensive volume, Sharp demonstrates through state practice that the international community desires to adhere to the principles embraced by the charter of the United Nations. He concludes that the international

community must now embrace legal paradigms that embody and enable these principles.

However, this volume leaves for another day the resolution of the conflict between a nation's exercise of its *inherent* right of self-defense (beyond that provided by the UN Charter) *as judged by that nation* and the concomitant right of peace-enforcement units, operating under the aegis of the United Nations Security Council, to exercise their mandate free from obstruction in that nation's territory. Where these rights collide, there has historically been agreement that the forces involved in national self-defense would not be held liable and could not be prosecuted criminally, whatever the moral stature of their nation's cause. Under the peacekeeper-protection regime advocated by the author, however, all this could change; peacekeepers and peace enforcers would enjoy complete immunity from any attacks, whether in self-defense or otherwise made, when operating under UN authority.

This book's principled discussion of humanitarian intervention and the authority of regional organizations to exercise their power separate from Security Council approval makes it one of the most important legal treatises published in years. This volume is a welcome addition to the literature, and it will be considered a valuable

resource for every serious international practitioner.

JAMES P. TERRY

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired

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Yost, David S., *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998. 450pp. \$19.95

For the student or policy analyst of European security, David Yost, professor of international relations at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, has written an exceptional book. An expert on European security issues, he has an impressive academic background and has spent time in the world of policy making at the Pentagon (net assessments). With this work Yost does not simply provide a history of a post-Cold War Nato grappling to adapt to a world where the principal impetus for its existence—the Soviet threat—has passed. He offers a comprehensive account of the two new roles that Nato has assumed: cooperation with former adversaries and other non-Nato states in the Euro-Atlantic region, and crisis management and peace operations. As part of his investigation into cooperation with former adversaries, he presents a full analysis of Nato enlargement, an issue that drew much

attention in 1998 and 1999 and is still pertinent today. In addition, Yost provides a full analysis of the implications of these new roles, especially regarding their relationship to Nato's first and continuing role: the collective defense of the territorial integrity of its member states. Thus this book is not only a recent, political-military, Euro-Atlantic history but also an analysis of current and future issues for policy makers within Nato states and, indeed, states aspiring to membership. Additionally, Yost, relying mainly on the scholarship of Inis Claude and Martin Wight, offers the reader the international political theory (collective security, collective defense, and balance-of-power politics) necessary to provide a conceptual and historical foundation for his analysis of current issues.

Yost's analysis is systematic, wide ranging, and compelling. He is fastidious in clarifying the issues and then presenting, in scholarly depth, their many sides before offering his own sense. In the opening pages he provides his thesis: Nato has two new principal roles, but its original function of collective defense remains paramount. The alliance has increasingly taken on collective-security activities on a selective basis. This raises three issues, the most important of which is how to reconcile the new roles (thus "devising positive synergy")

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with Nato's original purpose. Yost argues that the allies "have little choice but to follow a two-track policy—pursuing collective security aspirations . . . while maintaining their collective defense posture and orientation." Collective defense persists as the only firm foundation for alliance cohesion and strength.

The abridgement of his thesis in the opening chapter is fully remedied in his last chapter, "Prospects and Challenges," in which he gives fuller expression to the logical end points of the analysis presented in the body of his work. For the researcher, the lack of a bibliography is a drawback, although full citations are offered in the endnotes. Yost might have enriched even more the depth and balance of his analysis by including more references to the many challenges Nato has faced and surmounted in its fifty-year history.

As a reference, this book offers a number of helpful features. Its four appendices contain the Nato Treaty, the Partnership for Peace framework, the founding act between Nato and the Russian Federation, and the charter of partnership between Nato and Ukraine. Two useful glossaries and a schematic help in clarifying and making understandable the many organizations and terms currently constituting the European security architecture. Two maps, contrasting the Euro-

Atlantic region in 1988 and in 1998, are also supplied.

Yost began his research for this book in 1996–97 as a fellow at the United States Institute of Peace; his work continued until the spring of 1998. Yost's analysis of the issues is given weight not only by his scholarship but also by the quantity and quality of his primary and secondary sources, and by the many interviews he conducted on both sides of the Atlantic.

FREDERICK ZILIAN  
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Eberstadt, Nicholas. *The End of North Korea*. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1999. 191pp. \$14.95

*The End of North Korea* provides a nuanced and accessible, if wordy, analysis of North Korea's economic situation and political behavior. Nicholas Eberstadt, a visiting scholar at the conservative think tank American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and a visiting fellow at the Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies, has been watching North Korea for many years. He has written a timely book that will be of particular interest to the policy community.

One of his major themes is that politics decisively dominated economics in North Korea in the past

and continues to do so today. Historically, this is visible in North Korea's ambition to unify the Korean Peninsula under its domination, and in the development of a unique form of socialism and a self-reliant economy (*juche*). Eberstadt argues that until the late 1970s North Korea could reasonably think that an opportunity to unify the peninsula would come its way. South Korean economic growth did not take off until the mid-1960s, its politics were not stable until after 1979, and the U.S. commitment to its defense varied significantly. By the 1970s Kim Il Sung believed that after the unexpected failure of 1950, he had missed a chance to unify the peninsula in 1960; vowing to be ready next time, he tripled the size of the army and devoted much of the nation's resources to the military. The North Korean economy could not sustain this program of war mobilization without external support; the withdrawal of Soviet and Chinese aid in the early 1990s created a trade shock to which North Korea has not adjusted.

The economic collapse has precedents. Eberstadt examines North Korea's current economic situation by comparing it with the shorter but more intense mobilizations of the combatants in World War II; the trade shocks experienced by the American Confederacy, South Africa, Vietnam, Cuba, and Iraq;

and the famines early in the communist regimes of the Soviet Union, China, North Vietnam, and Cambodia. In most cases, economic problems either were shorter in duration (war mobilization) or could be addressed by policy changes (trade shocks and famine).

What is different about North Korea is that its leadership has chosen not to make the policy adjustments that would generate economic growth and feed its people, for fear that economic changes would be politically fatal. Abandonment of the goals of unification and of North Korea's unique form of socialism, as well as exposure to the material incentives and contacts with the outside world that would attend economically rational development, would likely erode the political position of the North Korean leadership. Kim Jong Il has seen what happened to the Soviet Union when Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to liberalize the Soviet economy and political system, and the stresses that have accompanied China's economic reforms. So the regime, in Eberstadt's words, "avoids two-sided trade relationships and encourages one-sided tribute relationships by exporting insecurity." The future may be worse: one of Eberstadt's most interesting arguments is that the economic stasis of the North and the dynamism of the South mean that the two economies will grow



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farther apart, thus increasing the difficulty and cost of their eventual integration. Eberstadt believes that Korea's situation will ultimately be better after unification, after which, he speculates in the last chapter, it will be peaceable, politically free, and market oriented. However, the author provides no warrant for this rosy prediction, and he does not consider alternative scenarios.

Can North Korean politics survive economic disintegration? This is a major question, because U.S. and South Korean policies seem to assume that the problem needs to be managed only until North Korea's imminent political collapse. Unfortunately, on this subject Eberstadt waffles, implying in the first five chapters that economic collapse does not necessarily cause political collapse but suggesting in the last chapter that it does. True, Eberstadt cannot consider reunification without presupposing collapse; however, without explicitly grappling with this question, he cannot address the title of his book. If states can endure economic collapse, Eberstadt has not made the case that the end of North Korea is in sight. Rather, we might expect that so long as the praetorians remain loyal, the economy will continue to muddle through, people will die of starvation, and the regime will remain in power. Failing a Gorbachev-like

miscalculation about political and economic reform by Kim Jong Il or his successors, North Korea may be exporting insecurity and importing tribute for years to come. Contrary to the title, the end of North Korea may not yet be at hand.

CARMEL DAVIS

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Varner, Joe. *Canada's Asia-Pacific Security Dilemma*. Halifax, Nova Scotia: Maritime Affairs. NIOBE Papers, vol. 10, 1999. 80pp. (no price given)

Haydon, Peter T. *Navies in the Post-Cold War Era*. Halifax, Nova Scotia: Dalhousie Univ. Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1998. 97pp. \$10.50

Varner's *Canada's Asia-Pacific Security Dilemma* is a series of essays that discuss Canada's position in the rapidly developing post-Cold War order. It is also a call to the Canadian government to commit itself, through defense spending and diplomacy, to providing security for its interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Varner begins by presenting a snapshot of world powers as a new order evolves, marked by dwindling Russian influence and shifting U.S. interests. Painting a bleak picture of escalating instability and growing military spending among smaller

powers throughout the Asia-Pacific region, Varner offers a new concept of international struggle. He presents a convincing argument that as global oil, waste, and toxin spills threaten vital supplies of fresh water and fisheries, disputes over possession and rights may lead to armed conflict. Additionally, he contends that ethnic divergence, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and the illicit drug trade will also significantly contribute to global instability, resulting in a fundamental shift from hegemonic expansionism to homeland defense. Based on these concepts, Varner reasons that the Canadian government must reaffirm its commitment to the 1994 Defence White Paper, which outlined military spending and its growth plans to provide combat-capable land, sea, and air forces in the twenty-first century. Recognizing current trends, insufficiencies due to aging weapons systems, incompatibility with the rapidly improving neighboring Nato systems, and airlift deficiencies, Varner fears that Canada will prove more of a liability than an asset in future combined peacekeeping task forces.

Varner's work is brief and to the point, yet very well supported. As a senior advisor for the Senate in Ottawa specializing in Canadian international security issues, Varner writes with credibility. He has military experience, and he is well

educated in international affairs, with a master's degree in political science as well as a fellowship in the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. At the time he wrote this book, he was an intern at the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada/Department of National Defence, sponsored by the Maritime Affairs Division of the Naval Officers' Association of Canada.

This book will be important for two reasons to government officials, military leaders, and professionals concerned about international security interests and trade. First, it succinctly outlines the history behind the political outlooks of the most influential and prevailing small and middle powers of the Asia-Pacific region. These are powers that could mature into formidable threats to global resources and regional interests. Second, it serves as a warning to prepare for a new nature of war. In a region of instability, which Varner compares to the Balkan unrest at the opening stage of World War I, with pressure from the guardian superpowers thinning and arms easy to procure, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction are becoming the venom of an unrestrained adolescent rattlesnake.

Haydon's *Navies in the Post-Cold War Era* is a collection of essays on the emerging role of maritime forces in the changing global environment. The collection is tailored

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to address specific concerns within the Canadian government over the size, structure, and responsibilities of Canada's maritime forces in the twenty-first century. Haydon contends that the fundamental role of "acting as an extension of state policy over the seas" still applies to naval operations but that changes will manifest themselves in the way navies perform that function. Beginning with a general synopsis of customary naval tasking—to include support to the United Nations, gunboat diplomacy, implementation of diplomatic initiatives, and humanitarian relief—Haydon recommends a redefinition of the navy's mandate rather than force reduction. Rapid action and crisis management, he judges, will be characteristic of future operations; he points out the maritime strategic application of the UN secretary-general's *Agenda for Peace* of 1992.

Navies are ideal in this capacity because of their seaborne logistical support, flexibility, and symbolic value. Naval operations—having three broad dimensions, the diplomatic, military, and constabulary—will expand into multinational naval forces. These forces will need to train together so that they may prepare for global peacekeeping missions and beyond. But who will lead such a force? What nations have navies that are organized and trained well enough to participate? How would administrative and

logistical support be handled? Is the UN willing to make the investment of time, effort, money, and other resources to support an endeavor of this magnitude? These are all questions that Haydon develops for the politicians to answer.

Haydon writes in a candid, straightforward manner that is easy to read and understand. His credentials are impressive, including thirty years of service in the Canadian navy and as a research fellow with the Center for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University. He has published several books on Canadian naval history and policy.

Although Haydon states in his introduction that the essays within have been made homogeneous, several concepts are restated verbatim, which can be a bit distracting. Nevertheless, his work strikes at the very heart of what is potentially the most complex future battlefield, that from the sea. His basic aim of crisis management in a maritime strategic application should be a primary concern of every littoral nation. Responsibility for maintaining global peace and reacting to aggression will become the primary concern for the international community as a new equilibrium is reached in the wake of the Cold War.

DAVID A. WILBUR

Major, U.S. Marine Corps

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Richelson, Jeffrey. *America's Space Sentinels: DSP Satellites and National Security*. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1999. 329pp. \$35

Jeffrey Richelson has written a thoroughly researched and comprehensive history of the development, fielding, operation, and evolution of the Defense Surveillance Program (DSP). DSP is the premier U.S. military space system for infrared surveillance, and it has been cloaked in secrecy for most of its forty-plus-year life.

This is a story with a lot of history. It takes us from the early days of the Cold War and the beginning of the space race to the present. It is a story about a high-stakes innovative concept, one with technological risk, developed to cope with a daunting nuclear threat. The program faced adversity at every step, but surprisingly it was an early success, its performance exceeding expectations. Richelson captures the flavor of the Cold War arms race, the advances in nuclear warfare theory and capability, the gradual thawing of the Cold War, and the emergence of the short-range or medium-range ballistic (now called theater ballistic) missile threat. The evolution of DSP is a moving story of the growing power and importance of space technology development. In the end, it is an interesting story of success, with a caution.

Richelson reminds us that DSP's beginning was tied to World War II and the advanced German rocket technology of that era. Captured by the United States and the Soviet Union late in the war, rocket technology was vital to the development of the intercontinental ballistic missile and the space age. With the advent of nuclear-weapon payloads, the United States entered the Cold War and the chilling nuclear impasse with the Soviet Union. Space-borne warning of rocket launches by detection of infrared signatures was a new technological concept, fraught with concerns about sensor systems, cost, performance, and feasibility. That DSP nevertheless was fielded was a remarkable achievement.

DSP was designed initially to provide early warning of long-range ballistic missile attack, but rocket and payload combinations improved, just as the evolving missile threat demanded more timely and precise performance. The theme of "mission creep" enters the story at this point. Once a purely strategic sensor, it came to be used for tactical warning of launches of short and medium-range ballistic missiles, such as Scud. The result has been a heavy demand for precise DSP performance. The numerous ballistic-missile events conducted by North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and the USSR (now Russia), not to mention several Western allies

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(not all for peaceful purposes), have made DSP data a high-demand commodity. Richelson points out that DSP has observed ballistic missile attacks on Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Saudi Arabia in the 1990s alone.

This is, however, a cautionary tale. Richelson's arguments are convincing that the threat of missile attack continues to grow and along with it the demand for quicker and more certain warning. He notes the irony that DSP has itself become a significant programmatic "rice bowl" and that consequently the development of a successor has been muddled by numerous false starts. Richardson makes a clear case that the community of DSP users and stakeholders has grown to almost unmanageable size and that therefore consensus on performance and cost is elusive. He points out the lingering support for an upgraded DSP, but he argues that DSP is past being optimized and that a more capable system is needed, and soon. He lists the sordid histories of numerous failed contenders; the current one, the Space-Based Infra-red System (SBIRS), appears to be on a path to success.

There is no shortage of detail in this work, which can be problematic. It interferes with the flow of the story. Flight-by-flight chronologies of every satellite, and each position of every satellite, are provided; such detail would have been

better relegated to the appendices. On the plus side, there are extensive appendices on system design and operation.

In sum, Richelson has written a winning book that is strongly recommended to the student of the military space age. It also provides lasting lessons to the military force planner.

DOUGLAS THOMPSON  
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Hunter, Robert W., with Lynn Dean Hunter, eds. *Spy Hunter: Inside the FBI Investigation of the Walker Espionage Case*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1999. 250pp. \$27.95

Herrington, Stuart A. *Traitors among Us: Inside the Spy Catcher's World*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1999. 409pp. \$27.95

The enormity of the actual and potential losses to the United States due to the undiscovered treason by John A. Walker, Jr., Clyde Conrad, James Hall, and their colleagues is deftly told in these two exciting and disturbing books. Detecting treason in the United States is a daunting and unending task. The urgent message of both books is that of the need for constant vigilance by all with access to U.S. secrets. Nowhere is that message more critical than in our military,

where, the authors state, it had been tragically ignored for too long.

Robert Hunter, a now-retired FBI foreign counterintelligence agent who at the time was assigned to the Norfolk, Virginia, field office, was the lead investigator for the Walker spy case. He is a talented storyteller. He begins his fascinating narrative in late 1984, when John Walker's former wife telephoned the Boston office to reveal that her divorced husband had been selling secrets to the Soviets for nearly nineteen years. The FBI followed up on that call with an investigation into Walker's naval career, from his days as a radioman in 1955 through his promotion to chief warrant officer and his subsequent retirement from the Navy in 1976. Hunter takes the reader on the arduous and urgent hunt, which led across the nation and overseas. The result was the identification of an espionage ring that probably included John A. Walker, Jr.; his son, Seaman Michael Walker; his brother, retired lieutenant commander Arthur James Walker; and his "best friend," Jerry Whitworth, a retired senior chief petty officer.

Early in the investigation, a preliminary assessment of the damage done by Walker was made by the National Security Agency. It concluded that "if these people gave the Soviets the information they had access to, the damage will be not only grave, it will be catastrophic."

The FBI's exhaustive telephone and "eyeball" surveillance of John Walker resulted in its discovery of highly classified documents taken by Walker's son Michael from his ship for delivery to his father's Soviet contact at an isolated drop site in the Maryland countryside. Once the FBI had evidence of his treachery, Walker's career as a spy was finally about to come to an end. Walker's arrest was the result of an exhaustive search of his home, where a "mother lode" of espionage paraphernalia, given to him by his handlers over many years, was found, as well as copies of classified Navy documents that had already been delivered to his contacts. Examination of the seized documents finally led to the arrests also of Whitworth, Arthur and Michael Walker—all the members of the Walker ring. During the lengthy preparations for their trials, John Walker and his son entered guilty pleas. John and his brother were each sentenced to life imprisonment, Jerry Whitworth was sentenced to a total of 365 years, and Michael Walker was given a sentence of twenty-five years.

The enormous damage to the security of the United States by these four men was highlighted in John Walker's sentencing affidavit, composed by Rear Admiral William Studeman, then Director of Naval Intelligence, who bluntly stated: "The KGB considered the Walker-Whitworth operation to be the

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most important operation in the KGB's history. This certainly ranks this Soviet intelligence operation as one of the greatest espionage successes in intelligence history. We have little confidence that we understand the full extent and scope of the Walker conspiracy and the damage they have done."

Stuart Herrington, for thirty years an Army intelligence officer, treats the reader to a truly remarkable look at the "silent war" waged by Army counterintelligence against the Soviets and their surrogates and allies in Western Europe. He describes the divided city of Berlin as it was in 1985, "the world's undisputed capital of espionage," filled with military and civilian intelligence-collection personnel from both sides of the Iron Curtain. Herrington's unit's mission was to "detect and foil the attempts of our communist adversaries to turn American soldiers into traitors." The scope of that challenge and the difficulties fulfilling his mission are richly told.

The book rivals the best Cold War espionage fiction. It is a fast-paced story of "teamwork and cooperation between counterintelligence agents of the United States Army, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation," who "collaborated closely with German, Swedish, Austrian, and Italian security officials to unmask traitors among us who were selling top secret plans for the

defense of Europe." Herrington asserts that the enormous scope of the treasonable thefts and disclosures of highly classified documents "was so voluminous, so sensitive, and so strategically advantageous to Moscow that, had war broken out in Central Europe, America and her NATO allies would have been forced to choose between capitulation or the desperate use of nuclear weapons on German soil."

The reader is first introduced to Soviet penetration efforts directed against an American signals intelligence site in West Berlin that was then the KGB's top-priority Berlin target. Herrington describes how a Soviet effort to recruit an American sergeant was foiled. The sergeant, who was having financial problems, had been approached by Soviets offering an "attractive business proposition," which he immediately reported to his superiors. Herrington's group then baited the Soviets for six months until they were finally trapped in a meeting with the courageous sergeant. Although the KGB officers were quickly released to their superiors, their apprehension was a significant victory in the "silent war" in Berlin.

In August 1987, Herrington assumed command of the Army's elite Foreign Counterintelligence Activity (FCA), based at Fort Meade, Maryland. Its task was to control extremely sensitive counterintelligence operations worldwide. Those

daunting investigations are the major focus of his book.

In the late 1970s, Moscow sources informed the CIA that an American with access to U.S. war plans was regularly delivering information to the Hungarian military intelligence service, which in turn was sharing the documents with the Soviets. The sources further advised that "the Hungarian penetration was regarded as the most lucrative espionage success in Europe since the end of World War II." The identity of the spy, whose operation reportedly had lasted for many years, was unknown to the informants, but if they were correct, "NATO's ability to defend Western Europe against the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies was in jeopardy." The disclosures "led to what would ultimately become the longest running, most sensitive, most tightly compartmented, and costliest counterintelligence investigation in history."

The quest to uncover the identity of the American spy was stymied for several years by a paucity of investigating agents and by the need to protect the investigation and the identities of sources. The investigation was revived in March 1985 with the appointment by CIA director William Casey of a new head for the agency's counterintelligence staff, Gus Hathaway, former chief of station in both Bonn and Moscow. He and the Army's

senior intelligence officer, Lieutenant General William E. Odom, breathed new life and urgency into the critical investigation. The CIA and the FCA refocused their efforts. Herrington details the painstaking process by which both organizations constructed a "profile" of potential suspects and winnowed countless Army assignment lists for those with access to the war plans. They were finally led to Germany and a retired sergeant first class, Clyde Lee Conrad.

Herrington traces the challenges Hathaway faced in bringing Conrad to trial before a German court, where Conrad was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. In passing sentence, the German judge stated in part that "the espionage of the accused must be assessed as the most significant, and for the West the most crippling, since the Second World War. The accused stands at the top of the worldwide list of all known spies."

Herrington also skillfully details the equally disturbing six-year-long espionage career of a U.S. Army warrant officer, James W. Hall. Both authors question how the United States could have allowed treachery of such magnitude to go undetected for so many years.

While the sharp conflicts of the Cold War may have passed into the history books, espionage directed at the United States continues unabated. Both books ably discuss



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painful lessons. Whether those lessons will be heeded remains to be seen.

ROBERT G. SULLIVAN

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Christman, Al. *Target Hiroshima: Deak Parsons and the Creation of the Atomic Bomb*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1998. 305pp. \$32

The roles of J. Robert Oppenheimer, Leo Szilard, Leslie Groves, Paul Tibbets, and other participants in the creation and use of the atomic bomb have been well documented in a host of articles and books concerning the Manhattan Project. Even relatively minor players (such as Louis Slotin, who died of a radiation overdose in a criticality accident) are known to us through fictionalized versions of the popular movie *Fat Man and Little Boy*. In these and other accounts, a uniformed naval officer appears briefly, and we have wondered, who was that man? Al Christman, who was the historian for the Naval Weapons Center, China Lake and for the Navy Laboratories of the Naval Material Command, presents an in-depth biography of that man—Captain William “Deak” Parsons. Deak Parsons, ordnance expert and associate director of Los Alamos, provided the practicality that turned the physicists’ creation into a deliverable weapon.

Christman portrays Parsons as the complete naval officer, subordinating his personal aspirations for more glamorous operational assignments in order to do what his country required. Deak Parsons was rare: a scientist, engineer, and military man who combined detailed technical expertise with the leadership abilities of a seafaring line officer. He exemplified the close professional partnership that existed during World War II between the nation’s scientists and its military.

Al Christman believes that Parsons was uniquely qualified to bridge these two cultures. He had been involved in the development of radar and the proximity fuse, and he had been crucial in making them operationally useful. He was the “atomic admiral” who provided technical direction to Operation CROSSROADS, the postwar series of nuclear weapons tests that changed the atomic bomb from a test bed into a weapon.

Parsons’s last shipboard assignment prior to America’s entry into the war was in 1939, as gunnery officer on board the USS *Detroit*, flagship of the commander of destroyers of the Pacific battle force. Shore duty came next, at the Naval Proving Grounds, Dahlgren, Virginia, and at the Applied Physics Laboratory in Silver Spring, Maryland, where he made possible the introduction of the proximity fuse

for combat use. By 1942 he thought he had paid his dues and would be sent to sea, duty for which he was long overdue. If he had had his choice, Parsons's next assignment would have been as executive officer of the light cruiser *Helena*. Instead, the president's science advisor, Vannevar Bush, drafted him into the atomic bomb project. On 5 May 1943, Parsons received a call to report to Admiral Ernest King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. King dashed Parsons's hopes for wartime sea command. King told him that the services of an ordnance officer were needed to supervise the production of an atomic bomb. Like the military leader of the Manhattan Project, General Leslie Groves, Deak Parsons put aside his personal desire for combat duty to make greater contributions to the total war effort—helping to create “a perfectly functioning atomic bomb that could end the war.”

In today's climate, where lip service to “technology” is often given by many who themselves lack the detailed knowledge needed to participate in its development, the example of Parsons, with his expertise, should stand as a model for officers. Parsons did his duty, sacrificing “careerist concerns.”

Al Christman has done his homework, synthesizing the results of research from recently released Manhattan Project records with

personal interviews, conducted over thirty-plus years, of prominent World War II scientists and officers. *Target Hiroshima* is a “must read” for those who wish to understand the role of a military officer in technological innovation.

XAVIER MARUYAMA  
Monterey, California

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Kimball, Warren F. *Forged in War: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Second World War*. New York: William Morrow, 1997. 422pp. \$16

Some casual readers of World War II history have the simplistic notion that the Anglo-American alliance was a natural, inevitable coalition against the evils of Hitlerism and that following America's belated entry into the war, the Anglo-Saxon powers, with a bit of help from the Soviet Union, were foreordained to defeat Nazi Germany. In this view, these nations formed a noble, almost selfless alliance dedicated to the unconditional defeat of a monstrous regime that could not be allowed to survive.

The reality was, of course, much more complex. Far from sharing a unified view of the war, each of the three allied nations had its own divergent national interests and imperatives throughout the war. Most readers are aware of the divergence between the Soviet Union on the

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one hand and the Western allies on the other. Fewer are aware of the deep differences that divided Great Britain and America.

The relationship between the Anglo-Saxon powers had, broadly, three phases. The first phase ran from the summer of 1940 until Pearl Harbor (7 December 1941), months in which an anxious America provided increasing logistical and diplomatic support to Britain. It was by no means clear that Britain would remain in the war after Dunkirk. The United States faced the difficult choice between providing scarce resources to a losing cause and ultimately facing a hostile Europe alone. Less than full U.S. support during that desperate time, on the other hand, did not sit well with Britain. Prime Minister Winston Churchill stated privately that the Americans were "very good in applauding the valiant deeds done by others." When Americans slowly realized that Churchill would survive politically and that the British would be in it for the long haul (the ruthless British attacks on the French fleet in July 1940 and survival in the Battle of Britain were key), the United States increased its support accordingly.

In the second phase, from 1942 through early 1943, victory remained in doubt (or so thought the protagonists). There were deep disagreements on strategy between the U.S. and Britain. The United States argued forcefully for an early

cross-Channel invasion in 1942, which the British rightly viewed as unrealistic (as the initial combat engagements with the Wehrmacht had surely demonstrated). British reluctance fueled American threats to shift significant resources to the Pacific theater if they were not going to be used aggressively against Germany. Underpinning all U.S.-British debates was the constant worry that Germany would either defeat the Soviets before American industrial and military potential could be brought to bear or that Stalin, who was deeply mistrustful of the Western allies, would negotiate an end to the war on the Eastern Front. Severe shipping losses in the Atlantic (which at one point caused the suspension of Lend-Lease shipments to Russia) through early 1943, the dismal British military performance in North Africa and the Far East, and Soviet awareness of deep anticommunist views on the part of senior American and British political leaders (Senator Harry S. Truman suggested hopefully that Germany and Russia would bleed each other to death) all influenced the dynamic calculations each ally made concerning the amount and nature of the cooperation necessary for eventual victory over Germany. Issues in the Far East were left for less desperate times.

After early 1943, in the third and final phase of the war, it was clear that Germany and Japan would

lose. Britain and America now could afford to pay closer attention to how the postwar world should look. Since intensity of cooperation within an alliance varies with the level of mutual need, Anglo-American frictions increased, and divergences in their outlooks and interests became more apparent. The United States opposed the restoration of the prewar European colonial systems, while British policy was "Hands Off the British Empire." Britain was already actively concerned with postwar European balance-of-power issues, especially about how to deal with the Soviet Union. America, however, under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, intended to rely on great-power cooperation through international treaties and organizations (like the future United Nations) as the basis for maintaining peace. America and Britain strongly disagreed over how to resist Soviet influence in eastern and southeastern Europe, even while each was engaged in separate discussions with Stalin. The postwar bitterness over the 1945 Yalta agreements and their aftermath suggests how great the divergence between American and British views became late in the war.

Throughout this book, Kimball shows the extent to which the relationship between America and Britain was a close reflection of the personal relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt. Early mutual underappreciation and

private Churchillian bitterness and frustration over Roosevelt's apparent reluctance to commit America against Hitler gave way to an intimate partnership once the United States entered the war. Yet as national interests diverged toward war's end, their close personal bond that had developed during the war's most desperate years so deteriorated that Churchill chose not to attend Roosevelt's funeral. Still, as Kimball concludes, "But almost always, when faced with crucial choices about victory versus postwar political advantage, Roosevelt, Churchill, or both made the decision to keep the Grand Alliance together and to defeat the Axis."

The Second World War is thoroughly plowed ground. However, *Forged in War* is an outstanding, highly readable, single-volume account of the complex political and strategic issues with which Roosevelt and Churchill dealt. Readers at all levels will find it worthwhile.

Warren F. Kimball, a professor of history at Rutgers University, has spent his career studying both Churchill and Roosevelt. His three-volume *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence* (Princeton University Press, 1984) is a basic source for period scholars.

JAN VAN TOL  
Captain, U.S. Navy

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Norman, Elizabeth. *We Band of Angels: The Untold Story of American Nurses Trapped on Bataan by the Japanese*. New York: Random House, 1999. 272pp. \$26.95

The nation was done a tremendous service when Elizabeth Norman crafted this sensitive and insightful narrative of quiet and enduring heroism. *We Band of Angels* brings to our attention the experiences of nearly a hundred female soldiers and sailors who up to now have, for the most part, been neglected.

We could view their experience as unique, groundbreaking, extraordinary, even tragic. However, any of these perspectives would be unfair to the people we meet in this, Norman's second book. (Her first was *Women at War: The Story of Fifty Nurses Who Served in Vietnam*, 1990.) The "angels" in her title are the nurses who served in World War II; however, they still view themselves as simply having done their parts in the struggle. They are not interested in special attention or in their unintentional roles as prisoners. Their heroic contributions are enhanced by their belief that they were part of a larger, more important effort. Their courage is all the more remarkable in light of their collective self-assessments of the Japanese misdeeds against them in China, especially Nanking (see Iris Chang's superb research on this topic).

The story of each woman comes alive from beginning to end: the onset of the war, each nurse's

decision to join the military, and the successful Japanese campaign on Luzon. The poignant losses of comrades during the conflict heighten the drama.

General Jonathan Wainwright, in command in the Philippines after the departure of General Douglas MacArthur, carefully considered his options for the Army nurses on Bataan. They were taken to Corregidor, and some were evacuated. However, regrettably, eleven nurses were left behind. They were the first to be taken prisoners of war.

The nurses' nickname for MacArthur was "Dugout Doug." The betrayal felt by these women when he left was remarkable. Those who managed to escape to Australia were very public in their criticism of him. The rest were captured, taken from the hospital into the jungles of Bataan Peninsula, on to Corregidor, and finally to internment camps. Malnutrition and malaria, always a threat, became almost inescapable during captivity. Anecdotal references to the Bataan Death March and the Los Baños raid provide depth and texture to the narrative.

Perhaps the most frustrating issue for the women after the war was caused by those who admired them most. Focusing on the nurses' womanhood rather than on their roles in the military, these people trivialized their war efforts. They could not possibly understand what the war had meant to the nurses,

or the situations they had been forced to confront. It is a problem not unlike what women in the armed forces struggle with today.

There is one notable slip in this otherwise exceptional book—stereotyping. While praising the remarkable women of World War II, Norman tells us that “a man’s notion of honor was driven by ego, a woman’s by an inviolable sense of self built on the sentiment of sacrifice.” I must say that when I was commanding officer of a naval station, I found no discernable difference in the character of my sailors based upon any demographic variable, let alone gender. In fact, both types of honor were demonstrated by both genders. Perhaps the author allowed a bit of understandable romanticism to creep in.

This is a powerful story of raw courage. It speaks to who we were as a nation in the early 1940s and to who we became when our collective character was measured. The book also makes clear that during the war Americans usually rose to meet challenges wherever they found them. Meeting our challenges today is the best way to honor the sacrifices and achievements of the men and women who wore the uniform before we were born.

JOHN N. PETRIE  
Captain, U.S. Navy

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Miles, Wilma Jerman. Edited by Charles H. Miles. *Billy, Navy Wife*. Chevy Chase, Md.: privately published by Charles H. Miles and Murray Miles, 1999. 587pp. \$25

*Billy, Navy Wife* is the autobiography of Wilma J. Miles, wife of Vice Admiral Milton E. Miles, for whom the Naval War College’s Milton E. Miles Chair of International Relations is named. This book begins in 1904, the year of Wilma Miles’s birth, and it ends in 1961, the date of her husband’s death. An epilogue written by her sons, Charles and Murray, contains an account of their mother’s activities and travels until her death in July 1996. Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III provided the foreword. In the introduction, Wilma Miles tells why she wrote her story: to inspire and encourage young Navy wives who must cope with their husbands’ long absences and with economic privations, to recount her own life experiences in a smaller and less technologically complex Navy, and to laud the unsung fraternity of Navy wives who play a part (albeit indirect) in all that the Navy does.

By all indications, Wilma Miles’s life was an extraordinary one, marked by adventure; travel to exotic places; social contacts with royalty, heads of state, and diplomats; strong family ties; and loyalty to her husband and to the U.S. Navy. She saw herself first and foremost as a Navy wife, as a

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helpmate and partner to her husband in his career—but she was much more. Wilma wrote, “[A] Navy wife couldn’t really advance her husband in his career, but . . . as sure as Christmas, she could hold him back.”

Wilma met her husband when she was fifteen years old and married him in Hong Kong in 1925 at the age of twenty-one (not having seen him for three years), to be left alone for the greater part of the next two years while he cruised the West and Pearl Rivers in the gunboat *Pampanga*, chasing pirates and protecting missionaries. Always eager to travel and learn about other cultures and people, Wilma and Milton, during his leaves, visited Canton, Peking, and Macao, attempted to learn Chinese, and became fascinated by the Far East. When they returned to Chefoo in 1936 for a three-year tour of duty, she continued her travels, while Milton served in the destroyer tender *Black Hawk*, and then as commanding officer of the destroyer *John D. Edwards*. In 1938, she traveled alone throughout the Dutch East Indies and Southeast Asia, photographing the harbors. Her photographs, the only ones available at the time, proved to be invaluable to the U.S. Navy at the beginning of World War II—unwittingly, she had aided the war effort. The Mileses were the first Americans to exit China over the Burma Road in 1939. The journey took a

week, and Wilma recorded it in detail, as well as her travels through India, Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq—including the couple’s arrest in Mashad for photographing the city. This was the first of their six arrests in foreign countries.

During World War II, Milton Miles was stationed in China for three years as head of the Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO), which was involved in intelligence work and weather forecasting in preparation for an American invasion of the mainland. Wilma, who had received a master’s degree in home economics from Columbia University in 1929, spent the war years in Washington, D.C., where she served as head of the nutrition services for the Red Cross and taught classes. When the war ended, she continued to teach nutrition, edited a monthly newsletter, lobbied for school lunches, helped popularize skim milk as healthful, and appeared on one of the first cooking shows on television. She maintained a lifelong interest in nutrition education.

In 1954 Milton Miles went to Panama as commanding officer of the Fifteenth Naval District for a two-year tour of duty. He and Wilma traveled throughout South America, where they made three harrowing and dangerous transcontinental treks through jungles in search of an alternative canal route. Whether having tea with

Anastasio Somoza or traveling by bus through Bolivia, Wilma was always interested in experiencing to the fullest the culture, language, historic sites, and people of each country. Her descriptions of the places she visited read like travelogues, with full historical background provided.

Wilma Miles was a Navy widow for thirty-four years, during which time she was instrumental in the publication of *A Different Kind of War*, the story of SACO, which she had researched and compiled with her husband after his retirement. She traveled, worked, attended SACO reunions, and deposited her personal papers and extensive photograph collection in the U.S. Naval War College archives.

This book is illustrated with Miles's trademark—the "What the Hell?" pennant—as well as signature whales and pencil sketches. Readers interested in the life of an independent, courageous, and intrepid Navy wife of the "old Navy" will find this personal story enjoyable.

EVELYN M. CHERPAK  
Naval War College

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Hone, Thomas C., Norman Friedman, and Mark D. Mandeles. *American & British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919–1941*. Annapolis,

Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1999. 248pp. \$39.95

Working from the premise that a truly revolutionary military innovation is one that changes an armed service as an institution, *American & British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919–1941* studies how two such institutions, the American and British navies, incorporated naval aviation, and also why airpower developed very differently in those fleets. It is a social analysis, not a design or tactical history. Although published more than six decades after the events, this book provides notable new insights and highlights. The authors, all naval experts, collaborated in finding whether the development of the aircraft carrier before World War II offers parallels for how military services might capitalize today on high-speed networks and miniature sensors.

The book is particularly interesting in its revelation that issues more fundamental than uncooperativeness on the part of the Royal Air Force (RAF) weakened tactical aviation in the Royal Navy. After the transfer in 1918 of most naval aviation personnel and all aircraft to the RAF, neither service's personnel saw sea-based aviation as a good career path. No internal organization turned innovative aviation tactics into correspondingly sound technical decisions about ships, aircraft, or air defense weapons. Anticipating frequent bombing attacks



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from land bases (and accustomed to operating in heavy northern seas, a factor not discussed in this book), the British stored all aircraft under short and usually armored flight decks. Holding flight decks empty resulted in slow flight-deck cycles that kept only a few aircraft actually aloft. Designed (though rarely procured) for catapult launch from dispersed cruisers and battleships, British naval strike aircraft sacrificed airborne performance for low take-off speed. These restrictions and the lack of institutional career incentives left the prewar Royal Navy with weak aircraft, small air wings, and few replacement personnel.

The authors observe that both organizations and individuals were influential within the U.S. Navy. Cooperation among the Naval War College, the Bureau of Aeronautics, and innovators in the fleet was the most important factor in the maturation of U.S. Navy carrier airpower. The 1920s Naval War College gaming models showed the potentially high payoff of a large airborne "pulse" attack to cripple enemy carriers and thus achieve decisive air superiority. Naval aviation proponents convinced Congress that the Hugh Trenchard—"Billy" Mitchell vision of an aviation corps was an error. Assigning long-range patrol to seaplanes, the U.S. Navy, through its Bureau of Aeronautics, also devised specialized carrier-based combat aircraft, including

high-powered fighters, to defeat land-based aircraft. U.S. naval aviation could capitalize on the wartime development of radar and long-range at-sea logistics to operate as a mobile, strategic attack force.

Under financial and treaty restrictions, neither of these prewar navies had enough aircraft carriers to develop massed-carrier doctrines, either offensive or defensive. Neither navy developed coordinated air and surface tactics. It is possible that the Royal Navy could not have afforded anything much better than what it actually had; the authors observe, however, touching on Japanese naval aviation, that heavy investment by itself was insufficient. Once reconstituted, the Fleet Air Arm after World War II developed angled decks and steam catapults. Those successes support the authors' contentions about the importance of functioning organizations and the development of evidence, since previously the Royal Navy had followed prominent individuals' initiatives on faith.

The authors conclude that new technology did not dictate a single or obvious path to success: top-down "vision" about military aviation failed. Learning by doing worked: "We believe that the capacity to learn operational and organizational lessons in the course of daily operations was and is a major means of reducing risk." Existence of a threat or rival against

which to measure performance was an important impetus; an “organization or process to connect the technical branches with their operational counterparts” was essential. It will be interesting to see how well these useful lessons are put into practice in today’s military.

MICHAEL C. POTTER  
Captain, SC, U.S. Naval Reserve

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Meilinger, Phillip S., ed. *The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory*. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1997. 650pp. (no price given)

From dirigibles to stealth bombers, the theory and practice of airpower are distilled in this anthology’s fifteen thought-provoking essays by thirteen practitioners and students of military aviation. *The Paths of Heaven* traces the development of airpower doctrine and strategy from before World War I through DESERT STORM and beyond. Of necessity, many of the subjects are familiar to aviation history buffs, but the depth of scholarship evident in each essay will not only educate but entertain most readers.

The editor and author of three articles is Colonel Phillip Meilinger, Ph.D., a former C-130 pilot and previously the dean of the School

of Advanced Airpower Studies. His operational background and academic credentials are matched by those of several other contributors. As a result, the book reflects hands-on knowledge of airpower, in addition to historical and doctrinal perspectives.

The book’s organization is largely chronological. Meilinger looks at Giulio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard, and Alexander de Seversky, while Lieutenant Colonel Mark Clodfelter assesses William “Billy” Mitchell—thus the most influential airpower exponents and advocates are assembled in this one volume. Latter-day air strategists John Boyd and John Warden are addressed by Lieutenant Colonel David Fadok.

Beyond the key personalities of airpower doctrine, topical contributions include those of David Mets, with coverage of aviation influence in the U.S. Navy, and Lieutenant Colonel Peter Faber, in a review of the interwar Air Corps Tactical School. Contemporary European views are provided by James Corum. Cold War perspectives are examined by Karl Mueller (airpower and nuclear strategy); Dennis Drew (low-intensity conflict); Harold Winton (joint U.S. Army and Air Force operations following Vietnam); Colonel Buster McCrabb (Nato air doctrine); Lieutenant Colonel Edward Felker (Soviet aviation theory); Major Bruce DeBlois (airpower and space power); and I.

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B. Holley (the continuing search for an airpower theory).

Among the most revealing upshots of these essays is the interdependence of the early theorists. Douhet, who began thinking about airpower in 1908, was not well known outside Europe until the 1920s. (He spent a full year of the Great War in prison for his non-conformist views, but he was fully vindicated afterward and promoted to general, though he declined to return to active duty.) His influence on Mitchell and de Seversky was profound. Meilinger makes a strong case that the two Americans were more effective proselytizers than prophets (though both made uncannily accurate predictions) and that both fell wide of the mark in some ways. A spectacular film by de Seversky, animated by Disney and based on his best-selling *Victory through Airpower*, envisioned a huge bomber force destroying Japan from Alaska. Anyone who has flown in the Aleutians—arguably the worst aviation weather on earth—will marvel at the major's reasoning.

Apart from Mets's chapter on naval aviation, the book's perspective is understandably Air Force oriented. That fact undoubtedly accounts for statements that are accurate only within a land-based framework. For example, Meilinger states that the Battle of Britain remains the only clear-cut defensive air victory; in fact, the fast carrier

task forces' defeat of the kamikazes in 1944–45 was a campaign lasting twice as long as the 1940 battle, covering vastly more territory and fought from bases infinitely more vulnerable than even Fighter Command's grassy fields. Additionally, F-86 counterair operations in Korea scored a defensive success, in that they ended almost entirely Communist air attacks south of the Yalu.

Naval readers will be interested in some of the "prophets" waver- ing attitudes toward aircraft carriers. Mitchell, for instance, supported the Navy's experiments with USS *Langley* (CV 1), but he reversed helm when more effective ships and aircraft emerged. So did de Seversky, who was at least as antagonistic to the Navy as Mitchell—a supreme irony, considering that de Seversky's own czarist navy (de Seversky, a native Russian, had served in the Russian naval air service until 1918) had matched the world in use of seaplane carriers.

*The Paths of Heaven* offers much more than can be described here. Suffice it to say, this volume will provide hours of compelling reading for any sailor or airman concerned with the use of the sky.

BARRETT TILLMAN  
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Vego, Milan N. *Austro-Hungarian Naval Policy, 1904–14*. Portland, Ore.:

Frank Cass, 1996. 202pp. \$47.50

Although Austria-Hungary and Italy had both been members of the Triple Alliance before the outbreak of World War I, the two powers became rivals for supremacy in the Adriatic Sea. According to Milan Vego, the Dual Monarchy increased its naval construction to match Italy's, thus prompting Rome to enlarge its navy to preserve superiority over its ally. Therefore, the Italian fleet became "the yardstick by which the strength of the Austro-Hungarian navy was measured." Nonetheless, the two powers coordinated naval efforts in the Mediterranean Sea to benefit Germany, the remaining member of the alliance. Germany hoped that the combined Austro-Italian fleet would force Britain to divert part of its fleet from the North Sea, where it posed the larger threat, whereas Italy required Austria-Hungary's aid to counter French strength in the western Mediterranean. Although the Habsburg monarchy had no vital interests in the Mediterranean, it expanded its fleet there in the interest of its allies, by building dreadnoughts. Control of the Adriatic, however, was important to the Dual Monarchy, to prevent it from becoming a landlocked power.

Other external and internal factors affected the Habsburg naval policy. Austria-Hungary's annexation

of Bosnia in 1908 damaged its relations with Serbia but enhanced its position in the Balkans, thus necessitating an expansion of its navy. Austria-Hungary opposed Serbia's gaining a port on the Adriatic Sea that the Russian fleet could use to strengthen its own position. Italy acquired Libya and occupied the Dodecanese Islands during the Turco-Italian War, improving its status on both shores in the central Mediterranean. Italy determined that naval cooperation with its allies presented the only opportunity to stop French expansion in the region. The subsequent renewal of the Triple Alliance Treaty in 1912 accepted Italy's territorial acquisitions and Austria-Hungary's stand in the Balkans. Nevertheless, their competing interests in Albania remained and contributed to the adoption of Austria-Hungary's latest ship-construction program. Internally, the Dual Monarchy's constitutional arrangement required the approval of the Hungarian delegation for naval expansion. Hungary, therefore, could demand additional petty officers, larger participation by its industries in construction, and increased use of the Hungarian language. Austria's weak finances further constrained its naval budget, and lack of popular support hampered the government's efforts. Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the heir to the throne, however, praised naval expansion as necessary if the

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empire was to take its place as a maritime power, while he harbored distrust of Italian commitment to the alliance.

Twelve years of active service in the former Yugoslav navy sparked Vego's interest in the naval history of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Vego, professor of operations at the U.S. Naval War College, conducted his research in Austria and Washington, D.C., but relied primarily on published works for documents from other European powers. My only serious criticism of this work is the omission of maps; two are not sufficient. Even a reader familiar with Austro-Hungarian history needs visual aids showing the specific locations of port cities and areas in dispute in the Turco-Italian War and the Balkan crises.

The title *Austro-Hungarian Naval Policy, 1904–14* is misleading, for this work offers much more. It provides an excellent overview of not only Triple Alliance naval policy but also its effect on the Triple Entente's strategy. Vego addresses as well the politics within the alliance and Germany's dominant role. London understood Vienna's dreadnought construction as a response to Berlin's demands and thus viewed the Dual Monarchy as a German tool, just as it would during World War I. This monograph presents a background of events that contributed to the outbreak of war in 1914, by describing the crises in the Balkans

and the Turco-Italian War. Any reader interested in early twentieth-century European history generally and naval policy specifically should read this work.

CAROL JACKSON ADAMS  
Salt Lake Community College

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Gleick, James. *Faster: The Acceleration of Just About Everything*. New York: Pantheon, 1999. 324pp. \$24

James Gleick's book points to the fact that the human condition is moving at a speed that sometimes makes us feel as if we are living a blur. Not only do we feel that we are moving at a fast-forward pace, but we find ourselves frustrated by the absence of leisure time despite all the conveniences the modern world offers us. Gleick makes the point that people deal more with the perception of time than with the reality of it. "Time is defined, analyzed, measured, and even constructed by humans. . . . [T]ime is not a thing you have lost. It is not a thing you have ever had. It is what you live in. You can drift in its currents, or you can swim." For the software industry, where development cycles are shrinking every quarter and distribution has moved from the retail store to instant downloading from the Internet, life is also accelerating. Gleick's primary focus, however, is on how people

try to bring perception in line with reality. Time needs to be managed to reflect the kind of life you want to live.

In *Faster*, Gleick makes the argument that people are trying to accomplish more and more in the same amount of time through a variety of means. He makes his case by devoting entire chapters to seemingly endless examples of multitasking, rapid task-switching, and parallel processing—methods of accelerating our lives—and he discusses some of the consequences of those actions. For example, multitasking assumes a level of efficiency. How many of us can engage in a telephone conversation and respond to an electronic-mail message simultaneously? Closely aligned with multitasking is information flow. Gleick notes that as an information flow accelerates, it becomes more difficult to track. For instance, how do we distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information? Perhaps intuition and experience take over. Gleick also discusses speed, reminding us of the slogan, “Speed is God, and time is the devil.”

Gleick observes that as we move through life, we are constrained by time. How long will it take you to read this review and move on to another? Too long? Perhaps a speed-reading course is in order! One of the main shortfalls of the book is that the author fails to recommend the best way to manage

our time. How do we find equilibrium between our personal lifetime goals and the curves thrown at us by an uncertain world?

Gleick’s observations are relevant to current directions in naval planning. For the U.S. Navy, speed is a critical advantage when responding to crises. The Navy also holds that the faster you are able to make decisions or deploy your forces, the better tactical decisions you are likely to make. But what are the trade-offs? Recently, the U.S. Navy embarked on the development of a new concept that promises a better way to integrate its various platforms.

Known as network-centric warfare, it is meant to provide a comprehensive approach to warfighting in the twenty-first century. Concepts like the speed of command and an integrated situational picture theoretically will allow senior commanders to reach better conclusions based on complete and timely data regarding battlefield conditions. Intervals of time will not change, but senior commanders will feel as if they are being squeezed even more than usual under time-sensitive or stressful conditions. Can the human mind take advantage of a networked community of information in real time? Will the pace of battle or the challenges of a military campaign be less stressful in an integrated environment? Can military commanders

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manage their time “better” under stressful conditions given this complex architecture? How can military commanders manage their time as the pace of events or the quality of their situational awareness increases?

Unfortunately, Gleick only hints at the directions that must be taken to answer these questions. Time feels increasingly precious as more demands are placed upon us, even when more relevant information is provided. Experience teaches us how

to sort the most important data, but will experience continue to serve us as we are forced to sort through exponentially larger amounts of information? Or is there some limit to our ability to accomplish goals within a finite period? Gleick does not tell us; perhaps time will.

THEODORE GEMELAS  
Associate Director of Studies,  
Council on Foreign Relations

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